Sam Harris: a neo-Buddhist after my own heart

Comments

• Vincenzi Veteran

  July 2011

  buddhist meditation will probably branch in the "classical" one and a new one that takes from neuroscience and psychology. if we are lucky, it will totally dismiss psychiatry.

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• SherabDorje

  July 2011

  buddhist meditation will probably branch in the "classical" one and a new one that takes from neuroscience and psychology. if we are lucky, it will totally dismiss psychiatry.

  I can understand your skepticism about psychiatry, but it will take a lot of scientific advancement before that happens.
  
  Some people are actually helped by psychiatry. I myself would like to see more neuro-bio-feedback things taking place, like experimenting with light and sound to see what effects it may have on mood. Like for me, it would probably be music in the key of D flat together with a royal blue kind of light- hook me up to a functional magnetic resonance imaging device and see what happens... that would beat the hell out of taking antidepressants, but for now it's all some people have.
  
  

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• kaci

  July 2011

  
  with all possible respect and good intention:
  
  the question "is there a god" is a particularly problematic one and like the question "is there a self" one that gotama identified as a hindrance - giving attention to this sort of thing generally results in endless unresolvable argument, doubt and uncertainty .. in short, dukkha (which i translate as having a central meaning of conflict with many other dimensions .. ). the reasons for this are obvious when one considers it. there is no agreed upon definition of "god" or precisely what it means to "believe" in god. arguing about the existance or nonexistance of something undefined to begin with is an endless rhetorical conflict, it will only cause disturbance, ill will, remorse and so on .. in fact several old philosophical debates fall under the same observation - they are not useful. generally dissent and division will result, heated emotions .. in my understanding the third noble knowledge (dukkhanirodha) is well translated with a central meaning of "peacemaking" (dukkha = conflict, nirodha = control or mediation leading to cessation [i refer to sanskrit connotations for the "control"], ie. conflict mediation).
  
  another consideration is this: atheism is basically a confrontational response to christianity in particular and any ideas not strictly _materialistic_ in general. the unspoken assumption is "there is the physical world and nothing else; consciousness is a by product of purely physical processes and when the body dies that is the end.". this is actually a wrong view (michaditthi) that was also identified; it is essentially nihilism that was present also in ancient india - it denies both kamma and rebirth as well. on a buddhist forum i think it would be an error to continue with this sort of discussion, it will not bring benefit and probably create only an opportunity for conflict.
  
  btw, to be clear, i would not call myself religious .. or for that matter a buddhist. if pressed i might describe me as a samana and clarify that i follow buddhadhamma .. i try to focus on observing "when this is that is, with the arising of this comes the arising of that .. "
  
  my 0.2 cents .. peace.
  

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• person Don't believe everything you think The liminal space Veteran

  July 2011

  I appreciate the fact that he embraces the 'mystical' experience as part of our human condition. Most athiests, while acknowledging that it occurs, dismiss it because its generally couched in religious terms.
  
  I notice that he acknowledges Richard Davidson's work with Buddhist meditators in his writing, its nice to think that the meetings the Mind and Life institute have been having with HHDL is bearing some fruit in persuading people to live a more mindful life.

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• kaci

  July 2011

  yes - there does seem a bit of room for the "mystical" yet .. . and i would add that the recent MRI studies and so on may help to clear up a lot of poetic confusion between the various traditions - i have been looking at this sort of thing quite a bit myself. and it is possible that the experimental data will not become twisted into "proof" of materialism the way that it so frequently does in the public mind ... but i have witnessed enough of this sort of thing to be quite cautious. eh, old farts like me are just like that sometimes .. ah well.

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• Jason God Emperor Arrakis Moderator

  July 2011 edited July 2011

  with all possible respect and good intention:
  
  the question "is there a god" is a particularly problematic one and like the question "is there a self" one that gotama identified as a hindrance - giving attention to this sort of thing generally results in endless unresolvable argument, doubt and uncertainty .. in short, dukkha (which i translate as having a central meaning of conflict with many other dimensions .. ). the reasons for this are obvious when one considers it. there is no agreed upon definition of "god" or precisely what it means to "believe" in god. arguing about the existance or nonexistance of something undefined to begin with is an endless rhetorical conflict, it will only cause disturbance, ill will, remorse and so on .. in fact several old philosophical debates fall under the same observation - they are not useful. generally dissent and division will result, heated emotions .. in my understanding the third noble knowledge (dukkhanirodha) is well translated with a central meaning of "peacemaking" (dukkha = conflict, nirodha = control or mediation leading to cessation [i refer to sanskrit connotations for the "control"], ie. conflict mediation).

  I think you make some good point. Unfortunately, I'm one of those people who think that the Buddha was a lot more critical of the idea of an eternal self and an eternal god than many people realize, e.g., DN 1 is fairly critical of both views. However, that's not really the point of this thread.

  another consideration is this: atheism is basically a confrontational response to christianity in particular and any ideas not strictly _materialistic_ in general. the unspoken assumption is "there is the physical world and nothing else; consciousness is a by product of purely physical processes and when the body dies that is the end.". this is actually a wrong view (michaditthi) that was also identified; it is essentially nihilism that was present also in ancient india - it denies both kamma and rebirth as well.

  It's not so much an assumption as the direction all the empirical evidence is pointing towards. Nevertheless, the point of this thread isn't that materialism is the correct view, but that I like Sam Harris and his scientific approach to contemplative issues.
  
  That said, I don't see how materialism in and of itself denies the efficacy of actions since it doesn't reject causality, and kamma is essentially a casual mechanism. Simply saying that our intentions are ultimately the result of electrochemical processes in the brain doesn't negate them or their correlates.

  on a buddhist forum i think it would be an error to continue with this sort of discussion, it will not bring benefit and probably create only an opportunity for conflict.
  

  You may be right, but I like to think we're capable of having a rational discussion about Sam Harris in the Modern Buddhism forum without it devolving into a heated verbal conflict.
  
  

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• Jason God Emperor Arrakis Moderator

  July 2011 edited July 2011

  I appreciate the fact that he embraces the 'mystical' experience as part of our human condition. Most athiests, while acknowledging that it occurs, dismiss it because its generally couched in religious terms.

  I agree. I think he finds a good balance between atheism/materialism and the fact that people have and can benefit from these kinds of 'spiritual' experiences that's definitely missing from other atheist writers such as Richard Dawkins.

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• kaci

  July 2011

  with all possible respect and good intention:
  
  the question "is there a god" is a particularly problematic one and like the question "is there a self" one that gotama identified as a hindrance [snip]

  I think you make some good point. Unfortunately, I'm one of those people who think that the Buddha was a lot more critical of the idea of an eternal self and an eternal god than many people realize, e.g., DN 1 is fairly critical of both views. However, that's not really the point of this thread.
  
  

  nothing unfortunate about that; i agree with you - in fact virtually every possible permutation of metaphysical theory regarding self and god is rejected in some detail - including the theory that there is no self or that the self is the same as the body .. and so on.

  another consideration is this: atheism is basically a confrontational response to christianity in particular and any ideas not strictly _materialistic_ in general. the unspoken assumption is "there is the physical world and nothing else; consciousness is a by product of purely physical processes and when the body dies that is the end.". this is actually a wrong view (michaditthi) that was also identified; it is essentially nihilism that was present also in ancient india - it denies both kamma and rebirth as well.

  It's not so much an assumption as the direction all the empirical evidence is pointing towards. Nevertheless, the point of this thread isn't that materialism is the correct view, but that I like Sam Harris and his scientific approach to contemplative issues.
  
  

  i would point to the evidence from over 100 years of parapsychological research - in fact, there is substantial empirical evidence to support a much broader view of kamma than the notion that it is a complex but purely physical phenomena. what i would say is unfortunate is that the main stream of science ignores parapsychological research entirely.

  
  
  That said, I don't see how materialism in and of itself denies the efficacy of actions since it doesn't reject causality, and kamma is essentially a casual mechanism. Simply saying that our intentions are ultimately the result of electrochemical processes in the brain doesn't negate them or their correlates.
  
  

  well, the implication of this is that volition is an illusion .. a common view of dhamma with which i am at odds. to me this makes very little sense and negates the concept of kamma; if our intentions are merely the result of physical processes (which processes, btw, have yet to be defined ..) then the central factor of kamma according to the dhammic view is beyond our control - rendering the whole idea of practice absurd or a cruel joke. i would say that this leads inevitably to determinism - a view of the world in which there is really nothing one can do about anything; the old question of free will. i agree with william james; the mere fact that i am able to bring the question of free will to the forefront of my consciousness is in and of itself an example of free will ... i might just as easily say, "ah - who cares" and go to bed.
  
  moreover, recent recognition of the degree to which the brain is plastic and subject to deliberate, volitional alteration (neuroplasticity) throws the whole question into a different light - basic assumptions of neuroscience are now up for serious scrutiny based on empirical evidence.
  
  this is not (nor would i encourage) a dismissal of scientific inquiry - i believe it can help. but, to quote gregory bateson "science doesn't prove anything", that's not what its for, its merely for making relatively reliable predictions.

  
  

  on a buddhist forum i think it would be an error to continue with this sort of discussion, it will not bring benefit and probably create only an opportunity for conflict.
  

  You may be right, but I like to think we're capable of having a rational discussion about Sam Harris in the Modern Buddhism forum without it devolving into a heated verbal conflict.
  
  

  well - you provide a wonderful example of balanced and reasonable discussion .. i retract my objection. and, in good scientific spirit we can observe the results of the experiment.
  
  
  

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• Jason God Emperor Arrakis Moderator

  July 2011 edited July 2011

  i would point to the evidence from over 100 years of parapsychological research - in fact, there is substantial empirical evidence to support a much broader view of kamma than the notion that it is a complex but purely physical phenomena. what i would say is unfortunate is that the main stream of science ignores parapsychological research entirely.
  

  Perhaps. Personally, I don't think it's so much that it's been ignored as that it hasn't withstood the rigours of scientific questioning. That, or what evidence there is remains inconclusive, meaning they believe x happens but have no testable theory to explain how and/or x can be reproduced in the lab via non-parapsychological means.
  
  Of course, I do agree that there seems to be an inherent bias in the mainstream scientific community against parapsychology in general, which I think is a big problem, especially since I'm a fan of this kind of research ("I want to believe"). Who knows, maybe we're not hearing about some of these rigourous studies and their findings because they're being suppressed.

  
  well, the implication of this is that volition is an illusion .. a common view of dhamma with which i am at odds. to me this makes very little sense and negates the concept of kamma; if our intentions are merely the result of physical processes (which processes, btw, have yet to be defined ..) then the central factor of kamma according to the dhammic view is beyond our control - rendering the whole idea of practice absurd or a cruel joke. i would say that this leads inevitably to determinism - a view of the world in which there is really nothing one can do about anything; the old question of free will. i agree with william james; the mere fact that i am able to bring the question of free will to the forefront of my consciousness is in and of itself an example of free will ... i might just as easily say, "ah - who cares" and go to bed.

  I wouldn't necessarily say that volition is an illusion as much as it's not the result of an independent agent or self, and that it, like everything else in the world, is ultimately the result causally determined processes. True free will requires an independent agent, and both Buddhism and science effectively deny such an agency. And while I tend to take a more moderate position myself, Buddhism is entirely compatible with causal determinism. For example, Dhammanando Bhikkhu once gave me the example of a mosquito biting you on the nose: first you feel annoyed and want to squash it, but then you recall that you're a precept-observing Buddhist and so restrain yourself.
  
  He explained that when this event is described in conventional terms, or according to the Sutta method, it might be said that you had a choice to kill the mosquito or to refrain, and that you chose the latter. But when it's described according to the Abhidhamma method, your abstention from killing wasn't due to choice but to the arising of kusala cetasikas (wholesome mental factors) such as moral shame and fear of wrong-doing (hiri & ottappa), and abstinence (virati), i.e., it was causally determined.
  
  And then there are passages like this from the Dhammasangani (pp. 7-8):

  What on that occasion is volition (cetana)? The volition, purpose, purposefulness, which is born of contact with the appropriate element of representative intellection - that is the volition that there then is.

  And the Atthasalini, pp.147-148:

  Volition is that which co-ordinates, that is, it binds closely (abhisandahati) to itself associated states as objects. This is its characteristic; its function is conation. There is no such thing as volition in the four planes of existence without the characteristic of co-ordinating; all volition has it. But the function of conation is only in moral and immoral states; as regards activity in moral and immoral acts, the remaining associated states play only a restricted part. But volition is exceedingly energetic. It makes double effort, double exertion. Hence the Ancients said: 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who, taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength, he doubled his effort, and said, "Take your sickles," and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' Volition is like the cultivator; the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, double effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts. Thus should conation as its function be understood.
  
  It has directing as manifestation. It arises directing associated states, like the chief disciple, the chief carpenter, etc., who fulfil their own and others' duties... even so, when volition starts work on its object, it sets associated states to do each its own work. For when it puts forth energy, they also put forth energy... It is also evident that it arises by causing associated states to be energetic in such things as recollecting an urgent work and so forth.

  Moreover, I think this Abhidhammic position accords well with what Sam Harris writes about the illusion of free will here, here and here.

  moreover, recent recognition of the degree to which the brain is plastic and subject to deliberate, volitional alteration (neuroplasticity) throws the whole question into a different light - basic assumptions of neuroscience are now up for serious scrutiny based on empirical evidence.

  Not necessarily. Most materialists don't deny that there's what we'd call 'mental phenomena'; they simply view them as being limited to emergent properties of the brain that are causally determined and reject the idea that these phenomena can exist independently of the brain.
  
  Moreover, they recognize that these phenomena, which are expressed via chemical reactions and electrical impulses in the brain, can alter the brain and our experience of consciousness or vice versa, e.g., things like meditation have been shown to produce noticeable changes in the brain, increasing and decreasing certain chemicals.
  
  None of that goes to show, however, that our 'volitional choices' are the result of free will, and I find myself being swayed even further from my previous belief in free will by many of the arguments made by Harris and others.

  well - you provide a wonderful example of balanced and reasonable discussion .. i retract my objection. and, in good scientific spirit we can observe the results of the experiment.

  

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• kaci

  July 2011

  hmmm.
  
  with the intention of assisting you to arrive at a clearer and more beneficial position and for the sake of those perhaps less experienced and knowledgeable that might be led astray by this sort of argument i see i must indulge in one more response.
  
  you are a capable and eloquent writer - it does not become one of such intelligence and ability to speak out of ignorance so i will attempt to remedy this factor.

  i would point to the evidence from over 100 years of parapsychological research - in fact, there is substantial empirical evidence to support a much broader view of kamma than the notion that it is a complex but purely physical phenomena. what i would say is unfortunate is that the main stream of science ignores parapsychological research entirely.
  

  Perhaps. Personally, I don't think it's so much that it's been ignored as that it hasn't withstood the rigours of scientific questioning. That, or what evidence there is remains inconclusive, meaning they believe x happens but have no testable theory to explain how and/or x can be reproduced in the lab via non-parapsychological means.
  
  

  there are three fallacies here:
  1. the data has been collected, experimental protocols devised by rigorous scientific method - just one example is the program at princeton university run for years by the chair of the physics department. see Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research (PEAR) website for the actual data and protocols.
  
  2. the evidence is not inconclusive - a variety of paranormal phenomena have been identified, observed and reproduced in laboratory settings (notably remote viewing, remote influence and telekinesis) . there is also peer review although the stigma of parapsychology leads to a fairly small community of peers.
  
  3. you are correct - there is to date no agreed upon theoretical framework. however, this in no way impinges on the validity of the data or the applicability of the experimental protocols. that would be purely sloppy reasoning ..

  
  
  Of course, I do agree that there seems to be an inherent bias in the mainstream scientific community against parapsychology in general, which I think is a big problem, especially since I'm a fan of this kind of research ("I want to believe"). Who knows, maybe we're not hearing about some of these rigourous studies and their findings because they're being suppressed.
  

  there are numerous groups, studies, experimental data, papers and so on available - i recommend that you look into PEAR, the work done at Stanford and Duke University to start with. the findings are not suppressed, they have been published in several books.

  
  well, the implication of this is that volition is an illusion ..
  

  [snipped for space ..]
  
  None of that goes to show, however, that our 'volitional choices' are the result of free will, and I find myself being swayed even further from my previous belief in free will by many of the arguments made by Harris and others.
  
  
  with all due respect, the remainder of this is what i would call eel-wriggling. cherry picking pieces of abhidhammic theory and commentaries to fit a particular view does not really help any one and hiding the real statement that scientific materialism and causal determinism makes in complex logical rhetoric is misleading and causes confusion; it may provide some temporary intellectual satisfaction but it conceals a subtle dishonesty. in stark terms the statement is this: there is no other-world, there is no volition (cetana) - these are either the projection of wishful thinking or the imagination and epiphenomenal product of purely physical processes. moreover, there is no continuation of consciousness beyond "the break up of the physical body and death" (as it is frequently described in the pali canon).
  
  it is fine if one wishes to subscribe to this theory - its your right to choose this and many do. but to claim that it is compatible with gotama's dhamma is only possible if you dismiss the many places in the record of the teaching that we have that explicitly and clearly reject this. disregarding these is butchering the dhamma to fit a preferred world view - this is senseless and harmful as it confuses people. i will quote only one of the many cases that specifically refute this interpretation of the dhamma from the Apannaka Sutta (MN 60) :
  
  "Because there actually is the next world, the view of one who thinks, 'There is no next world' is his wrong view. Because there actually is the next world, when he is resolved that 'There is no next world,' that is his wrong resolve. Because there actually is the next world, when he speaks the statement, 'There is no next world,' that is his wrong speech.6 Because there actually is the next world, when he is says that 'There is no next world,' he makes himself an opponent to those arahants who know the next world. Because there actually is the next world, when he persuades another that 'There is no next world,' that is persuasion in what is not true Dhamma. And in that persuasion in what is not true Dhamma, he exalts himself and disparages others. Whatever good habituation he previously had is abandoned, while bad habituation is manifested. And this wrong view, wrong resolve, wrong speech, opposition to the arahants, persuasion in what is not true Dhamma, exaltation of self, & disparagement of others: These many evil, unskillful activities come into play, in dependence on wrong view."
  

  
  

  well - you provide a wonderful example of balanced and reasonable discussion .. i retract my objection. and, in good scientific spirit we can observe the results of the experiment.

  

  with that i must withdraw - may it be of benefit to you and other living beings.
  i wish you well.
  
  
  

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• Jason God Emperor Arrakis Moderator

  July 2011 edited July 2011

  I don't really have time to address everything right now, and since you're right that I'm not very knowledgeable about the field of parapsychological research, I'm going to skip responding to the first part for the time being; although I appreciate the clarifications and references. As for the rest:

  with all due respect, the remainder of this is what i would call eel-wriggling. cherry picking pieces of abhidhammic theory and commentaries to fit a particular view does not really help any one and hiding the real statement that scientific materialism and causal determinism makes in complex logical rhetoric is misleading and causes confusion; it may provide some temporary intellectual satisfaction but it conceals a subtle dishonesty. in stark terms the statement is this: there is no other-world, there is no volition (cetana) - these are either the projection of wishful thinking or the imagination and epiphenomenal product of purely physical processes. moreover, there is no continuation of consciousness beyond "the break up of the physical body and death" (as it is frequently described in the pali canon).
  
  it is fine if one wishes to subscribe to this theory - its your right to choose this and many do. but to claim that it is compatible with gotama's dhamma is only possible if you dismiss the many places in the record of the teaching that we have that explicitly and clearly reject this. disregarding these is butchering the dhamma to fit a preferred world view - this is senseless and harmful as it confuses people. i will quote only one of the many cases that specifically refute this interpretation of the dhamma from the Apannaka Sutta (MN 60) :
  
  "Because there actually is the next world, the view of one who thinks, 'There is no next world' is his wrong view. Because there actually is the next world, when he is resolved that 'There is no next world,' that is his wrong resolve. Because there actually is the next world, when he speaks the statement, 'There is no next world,' that is his wrong speech.6 Because there actually is the next world, when he is says that 'There is no next world,' he makes himself an opponent to those arahants who know the next world. Because there actually is the next world, when he persuades another that 'There is no next world,' that is persuasion in what is not true Dhamma. And in that persuasion in what is not true Dhamma, he exalts himself and disparages others. Whatever good habituation he previously had is abandoned, while bad habituation is manifested. And this wrong view, wrong resolve, wrong speech, opposition to the arahants, persuasion in what is not true Dhamma, exaltation of self, & disparagement of others: These many evil, unskillful activities come into play, in dependence on wrong view."

  I fail to see any dishonesty in what I wrote, subtle or otherwise. I may be guilty of misinterpreting certain teachings, or of thinking that I know more about a particular subject that I really do, but I think it's a little much to imply that I'm being dishonest or eel-wriggling. I also think you may have misunderstood what I said. For example, I never said that materialism was entirely compatible with everything in Buddhism, but that causal determinism is compatible with Buddhism (materialism ≠ causal determinism), especially from an Abhidhammic point of view since Buddhism admits the possibility of immaterial causes and not just material ones (e.g., I find AN 11.2 interesting in that it seems to show how certain wholesome mental factors (kusala cetasikas) condition certain wholesome qualities and experiences).
  
  And just for reference, none of those examples were originally mine, but were provided by Dhammanando Bhikkhu and other 'classical' Theravadins (i.e., those who accept the validity and authority of the the entire Tipitaka and its commentaries) in a conversation about the illusion of choice in the present moment. Dhammanando is well-versed in the Pali Canon, and I can assure you that he wasn't simply "cherry picking pieces of Abhidhammic theory and commentaries to fit a particular view" when he provided that example, nor whomever provided the passages from the Abhidhamma (probably robertk) to support it.
  
  As for the rest, it's a non-sequitur since it doesn't necessarily follow from saying that intention is conditioned/causally determined that there's no intention; unless, of course, intention is defined as an independent and unconditioned agency, and as far as I'm aware, the Buddha does no such thing. Furthermore, MN 60 is essentially a Buddhist version of Pascal's Wager (the name of the sutta itself, Apannaka, roughly translates as 'safe bet'), and I suggest reading the translator's note, especially this part:

  The safe-bet arguments in the first part of the sutta follow two patterns. The first pattern covers controversies over whether there is a life after death, whether actions bear results, and whether there is a causal connection between one's actions and one's experience of pleasure and pain. The pattern here is as follows:

  A: a statement of the anti-Dhamma position;
  B: a rejection of the anti-Dhamma position;
  A1: a pragmatic argument against holding to A — a person who does so is likely to act, speak, and think in unskillful ways;
  A2: further unfortunate consequences that follow from holding to A, given that A is wrong;
  A3: further unfortunate consequences that come from holding to A whether or not it is right;
  B1: a pragmatic argument for holding to B — a person who does so is likely to act, speak, and think in skillful ways;
  B2: further fortunate consequences that follow from holding to B, given that B is right;
  B3: further fortunate consequences that come from holding to B whether or not it is right.

  It is noteworthy that the arguments in A2 [which you quoted above] and B2 are not safe-bet arguments, for they assume that A is wrong and B is right. Whether these arguments date from the Buddha or were added at a later date, no one knows.

  As Thanissaro Bhikkhu, who himself accepts the literal interpretation of rebirth, points out, these particular passages fall outside of the sutta's logical framework, and it's quite possible that they were later additions. And even if they're not, I never suggested that Buddhism is strictly materialistic, or that the Buddha never taught about rebirth, so it's a bit of a moot point.
  
  That said, it's interesting to note that the Buddha generally only mentions things like rebirth, heavens, hells, devas, etc. in teachings concerning morality to those who already have a belief in such things (often brahmins and lay-followers), which correspond to what he calls "right view with effluents, siding with merit, resulting in the acquisitions [of becoming]," and they almost never appear in his 'supramundane' teachings, which correspond to what he calls "noble right view, without effluents, transcendent, a factor of the path" (MN 117). That doesn't mean, however, that I don't entertain the idea of postmortem rebirth or express it in a way that's faithful to tradition even though I'm skeptical.

  with that i must withdraw - may it be of benefit to you and other living beings.
  i wish you well.

  Personally, I think every discussion is beneficial. How else can we learn if we're not open to debate and the exchanging of ideas? Thanks for indulging me as much as you have.

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• kaci

  July 2011

  well said and well taken. and i admit and apologize for what seemed to be a personal accusation of dishonesty; i was referring more to the integrity of the general abstract position but i definitely could have done better expressing it. sometimes the old habit of debate rhetoric arises to reassert its continued presence..
  
  also, i agree that the will is "conditioned" - in fact i think _absolute_ free will would be an almost meaningless concept, one chooses between possible courses which implies the formal existence and constraints of those courses. it makes sense to me to think that there are preexisting factors and the momentum of previous kamma which constrain the range of choices available, not to mention ignorance and habitual cravings (avijja, tanha) which inform the awareness (or lack thereof) of those courses. however, in my understanding this does not diminish the existence or importance of the faculty itself. the issue of an agent (self) is probably more than we should take on at the moment ..
  
  as for the translators notes - i actually chose thanissaro's translation as he presents cogent arguments in support of (limited) free will pointing out as i was above that it is central to the whole notion of kamma and the practice of the path. i encourage you to examine them and would also encourage you to look into "The Moral Imagination" by Mark Johnson (cognitive scientist).
  
  as for debate .. mmm, there are many ways to learn. well, that's a topic for another time .
  
  perhaps with this we reach the middle ground.
  
  peace.
  
  

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