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What reincarnates?
Obviously emptiness is a fundamental teaching in Buddhism. I understand that if you start dissecting yourself and your mind, you discovery that there is no 'I', inherently existing in and of itself. Which led me to wonder, if there is no inherent 'I', what reincarnates, and what is inherently compassionate?
I thought I might make my first question on this forum, a nice easy, light one lol:)
I thought I might make my first question on this forum, a nice easy, light one lol:)
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Comments
And might I suggest, as this topic has been done to death (if you will forgive the pun) that you look through some already existent threads?
It's becoming a seriously over-done topic....
I don't mean to sound bitchy, as you're new and all...
(I keep editing this post...I'll stop in a minute) but seriously, Rebirth/reincarnation is huge, and really, it would be best for you to do some preliminary research....
The word reincarnate means return to flesh, which implies a singular/permanent/unchanging identity that re-inhabits a material form in a singular succession of lives.
Buddhist rebirth is not about the re-enfleshment of an unchanging entity or consciousness.
Whatever, if anything that "returns to birth" is impermanent, identityless, birthless, and completely empty of inherent existence.
Continuity does NOT imply permanence.
In my opinion nothing is inherently compassionate, but when an individual comes to know the nature of reality, pure altruism is an unavoidable latent function of that realization.
Karma is action, causes and conditions, its not a single thing that is carried by another thing.
There is no single pack-mule consciousness that carries a load of karma from one life to the next.
The idea is much more subtle, and to be honest, there is no definitive answer.
A lot of different opinions and theories get tossed around.
Its probably better for us all to talk to your teachers and just practice.
The rebirth part is not even the relevant part of your question. You might as well have asked if there is no self, then what gets enlightened? Either way the premise, that there is no self at all, is false. The reason is very simple: the Buddha never stated that there is no self.
The texts that state that there is no self also state that there is no suffering, cessation of suffering and so on (i.e. there are no 4 noble truths). Clearly they aren't meant to be taken literally.
Why do we need a forum then?
http://newbuddhist.com/forum/showthread.php?t=5573
the causes
touché
Good point.
To practice letting go of opinions.
Why do you need a forum for that? To get opinions on how to let go of opinions?
You might care to investigate the idea that nothing reincarnates/reborn and that this is what the Buddha taught...
There is no evidence whatsoever (no matter how hard people try to fabricate it) that the Buddha didnt teach literal rebirth.
Your post is historically inaccurate and will only lead to further confusion for the op.
Did he teach what is reborn by any chance?
What is recorded doesnt clearly represent any specific and clear "what" that is reborn as far as I know. But the assertion that he didnt teach it at all is just ignorant to be honest. Even the prominent teachers and academics who think rebirth is nonsense accept that it was taught.
Sure, hence my short suggestion to a new and curious Buddhist mind, rather than any bold statement claiming this or that.
When looking at any issue of rebirth all avenues should be investigated, none should be claimed to be certain.
He over-simplifies (which is his M.O., and I think he does it on purpose in order to present a very simple interpretation to new students) the nature of persons and phenomena and then makes an irrelevant assertion about rebirth. His argument could be read as nihilism.
I also dont see anywhere in that quote where he addresses the issue of what is "reborn".
Here:
I think what he tries to elaborate is that there is no self to be reborn or any entity which transmigrates which can be called a self. However, he has not explicitly denied the possibility of some continuity after death. How can these things be explained?
My understanding is that, as a doctrinal term, emptiness (adj. sunna, noun sunnata) in and of itself is used in a couple of different but related ways in Theravada. In one context, emptiness is used as a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience that's utilized in meditation (e.g., MN 121, MN 122). In another context, emptiness refers to the insubstantiality of the five clinging-aggregates (khandhas) and the six sense media (ayatanas) (e.g., SN 22.95, SN 35.85). In this sense, it's synonymous with not-self (anatta).
In my opinion, not-self is one of the most controversial and misunderstood subjects in Buddhism. I think part of the reason this doctrine is so misunderstood is due to the fact that it's often taken out of context. Personally, I think it's important to at least understand the purpose of specific teachings — especially those on not-self — so that they're used skillfully, which is essentially the point of the water-snake simile in MN 22. And when it comes to the teachings on not-self, I agree with Thanissaro Bhikkhu that "the anatta teaching is not a doctrine of no-self, but a not-self strategy for shedding suffering by letting go of its cause, leading to the highest, undying happiness."
The view that there is no self and the view that there is a self are both forms of self-view. Unfortunately (or fortunately depending on you how you look at it), the Buddha refused to directly answer whether or not there is a self, stating that he didn't see "any such supporting (argument) for views [of self] from the reliance on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair" (MN 22). Instead, he focuses on events in and of themselves, as they are experienced, bypassing the question of self altogether. The Buddha said, "Who suffers," isn't a valid question, and suggests the alternative, "From what as a requisite condition comes suffering" (SN 12.35) in an effort to re-frame these questions in a way that's conducive to liberation, i.e., in terms of dependent co-arising. Hence, my understanding is that the teachings on not-self are ultimately pragmatic, soteriological methods rather than strictly ontological statements.
Self (atta), in the philosophical sense as opposed to it's conventional usage, is defined as that which is "permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change" (SN 24.3). Our sense of self, the ephemeral 'I,' on the other hand, is merely a mental imputation, the product of what the Buddha called a process of 'I-making' and 'my-making.'
In the simplest of terms, the Buddha taught that whatever is inconstant is stressful, and whatever is stressful is not-self—with the goal being to essentially take this [analytical] knowledge, along with a specific set of practices such as meditation, as a stepping stone to what I can only describe as a profound psychological event that radically changes the way the mind relates to experience. That doesn't mean, however, that the teachings on not-self are understood to deny individuality (MN 22) or imply that the conventional person doesn't exist (SN 22.22). The way I understand it, they merely break down the conceptual idea of a self — i.e., that which is satisfactory, permanent and completely subject to our control — in relation to the various aspects of our experience that we falsely cling to as 'me' or 'mine' (SN 22.59).
So in essence, the Buddhist teachings on not-self aren't merely assertions that we have no self; they are a method for deconstructing our false perceptions about reality, as well as an important tool in removing the vast net of clinging that gives rise to suffering.
As for the question of rebirth, I'm agnostic when it comes to the postmortem rebirth. I am, however, a firm believer in moment to moment rebirth, which is readily observable in the here and now. The Buddha himself spoke about punabhava, literally 'again becoming.' The way I understand it, becoming (bhava) is a mental process, which arises due to the presence of clinging (upadana) in the mind with regard to the five-clinging aggregates, and acts as a condition for the birth (jati) of the conceit 'I am,' the self-identification that designates a being (satta).
There's rarely a moment when the mind isn't clinging to this or that in one or more of the four ways (MN 11). Our identity jumps from one thing to another, wherever the clinging is strongest. Our sense of self is something which is always in flux, ever-changing from moment to moment in response to various internal and external stimuli, and yet at the same time, we tend to see it as a static thing. It's as if our sense of self desires permanence, but its very nature causes it to change every second. As the Buddha warns in SN 12.61:
Change is, of course, a fact of nature. All things are in a perpetual state of change, but the problem is that our sense of self ignores this reality on a certain level. From birth to death, we have the tendency to think that this 'I' remains the same. Now, we might know that some things have changed (e.g., our likes and dislikes, our age, the amount of wrinkles we have, etc.), but we still feel as if we're still 'us.' We have the illusion (for lack of a better word) that our identity is who we are, a static entity named [fill in the blank], and we tend to perceive this as being the same throughout our lives.
That said, the conventional use of personality is a function of survival, as well as convenience. However, clinging to our personalities as 'me' or 'mine' is seen as giving continued fuel for becoming, i.e., a mental process of taking on a particular kind of identity that arises out of clinging. Our sense of self, the ephemeral 'I,' is merely a mental imputation — the product of what the Buddha called a process of 'I-making' and 'my-making' (AN 7.46, MN 72, MN 109) — and when we cling to our sense of self as being 'me' or 'mine' in some way, we're clinging to an impermanent representation of something that we've deluded ourselves into thinking is fixed and stable. It becomes a sort of false refuge that's none of these things.
So regardless if postmortem rebirth is true, this process of 'I-making' and 'my-making' can be seen here and now, and it's the stilling of this mental process that leads to freedom, liberation, awakening (AN 6.104).
Nevertheless, the process of dependent co-arising, while predominately mental, is a process of conditionality that's traditionally understood to occur moment to moment and over multiple lifetimes, and there's nothing to preclude it from doing both. It's not logically impossible that a new psycho-physical organism can be also born via the same process at the time of death of the physical body whereby the last consciousness of a being at the time of death immediately conditions the arising of a new consciousness, hence statements like, "... when a being sets this body aside and is not yet reborn in another body, I designate it as craving-sustained, for craving is its sustenance at that time" (SN 44.9).
But in either interpretation, rebirth is the continuation of a process — nothing 'remains,' nothing 'transmigrates,' etc. — there are merely phenomena that condition other phenomena in the interdependent process we call life. The only difference I see is that one side believes this process ceases at death, regardless of whether there's still craving present in the mind, and the other doesn't. If you're interested, you can find more of my thoughts on the subject of rebirth here.
I had some for lunch, and I'm still tasting it this evening.
But after you are awake, you won't care anymore.
On this board, threads on reincarnation.
The nature of rebirth is like the flame on a candle - take two candles, one lit. Light the second candle with the first, then blow out the flame of the first. Now, only the second candle is lit.
Is the flame of the second candle different to the first? Are they, in fact, the same flame?