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bob, isn't I make it clear it is from Mahayana treastise, Yogachara school & the name & author of the Buddhist treastise?
I do understand in the west , practitioners are lesser familiar to Mahayana treastise , as they are more familiar from the background of Theravadin and Zen , Hence I took the purpose to introduce them here
Dear ansanna,
Doesn't writing that something is the 'Buddhist perspective' indicate that what is written is accepted by all Buddhists?
That's what I'm pointing out. What you offer as an argument clearly indicates that you did mention the schools and author. It's just that the statement that this is the 'Buddhist perspective' is problematic.
Well, Bob, there are only two main branch of Buddhist , the Theravadin and the Mahayanist
the former is about 30% , while the Mahayanist is about 70% - technically it is not wrong do generalise as Buddhist view ( or majority view )
but yes I agreed with you I put it more clearly next time
Whew, Thank you ansanna. I felt a little tension there for a moment. I appreciate what you're sharing and happy to read another Mahayana voice.
By the way I've studied and trained (and continue to study and train) in both Cittamatra (Chan/Zen) and Madhyamika (prasangika-madhyamika) schools and find them compatible.
For anybody who might be interested, here's my understanding of the debate within Theravada.
In terms of the aggregate of consciousness (vinnana-khandha), it's clear that consciousness is a dependently existing phenomena. Sensory consciousness can only arise with the presence of the appropriate sense organ and its corresponding object of reference. The process of seeing, for example, is described as a conditional process where "dependent on eye and visible forms, eye-consciousness arises" (SN 12.43). Without the presence of the appropriate sense organ (e.g., the eye) or the corresponding object of reference (e.g., rock), sensory-consciousness (e.g., eye-consciousness) can't arise. So none of the six forms of sensory consciousness can stand on its own without the corresponding stimulus to make it manifest or arise.
Nevertheless, there are a couple of sutta passages which could seem to suggest that there's a form of consciousness that doesn't come under the aggregate of consciousness. For example, Thanissaro Bhikkhu states in a note to his translation of MN 109:
One form of consciousness apparently does not come under the aggregate of consciousness. This type of consciousness is termed vinnanam anidassanam — consciousness without a surface, or consciousness without feature. MN 49 says specifically that this consciousness does not partake of the "allness of the all," the "all" being conterminous with the five aggregates. The standard definition of the aggregate of consciousness states that this aggregate includes all consciousness, "past, present, or future... near or far." However, because vinnanam anidassanam stands outside of space and time it would not be covered by these terms. Similarly, where SN 22.97 says that no consciousness is eternal, "eternal" is a concept that applies only within the dimension of time, and thus would not apply to this form of consciousness.
There are those in academia who also acknowledge this possibility. Peter Harvey, professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Sunderland, writes in his Introduction to Buddhism:
Nevertheless, certain passages in the Suttas hint that Nibbana may be a radically transformed state of consciousness (vinnana):
The consciousness in which nothing can be made manifest (like space), endless, accessible from all sides (or: wholly radiant): Here it is that solidity, cohesion, heat and motion have no footing,
Here long and short, coarse and fine, foul and lovely (have no footing),
Here it is that mind (nama) and body (rupa) stop without remainder:
By the stopping of consciousness, (all) this stops here. (D.I.223)
Like Ud.80, above, this describes a state beyond the four physical elements, where mind-and-body are transcended. As the heart of Conditioned Arising is the mutual conditioning of consciousness and mind-and-body, this state is where this interaction ceases: from the stopping of consciousness, mind-and-body stops. Consciousness is not non-existent when it stops, however; for it is said to be non-manifestive and endless. One passage on the stopping (nirodha) of the nidana of consciousness (S.III.54-5) says that there is no longer any object (arammana) or support (patittha) for consciousness; consciousness is thus 'unsupported' (apatitthita) and free of constructing activities, so that it is released, steadfast, content, undisturbed, and attains Nibbana. This description, of a 'stopped' consciousness which is unsupported by any mental object, where mind-and-body are transcended, seems to accord well with the Ud.80 description of Nibbana itself.
To say that Nibbana is unconditioned, objectless consciousness indicates something of its nature, but it does not penetrate far into its mystery. For it seems impossible to imagine what awareness devoid of any object would be like. As regards the 'stopping' of mind-and-body, as a state occurring during life, this is perhaps to be understood as one where all mental processes (including ordinary consciousness) temporarily cease, and the matter of the body is seen as so ephemeral as not to signify a 'body'. A passage at M. I.329-30 which parallels D.I.223 says that the non-manifestive consciousness 'is not reached by the solidness of solidity, by the cohesiveness of cohesion...'. The analysis of Nibbana as objectless consciousness, though, is the author's own interpretation. Theravadin tradition sees Nibbana as 'objectless' (Dhs.I408), but regards 'consciousness' as always having an object. D.I.223 is thus interpreted as concerning NIbbana as to-be-known-by-consciousness: Nibbana is itself the object of the Arahat's consciousness (Pati.II.I43-5).
While the view that there's a type of consciousness that lies outside of space and time, and therefore, outside the consciousness-aggregate altogether, isn't a view that's supported by the "classical" Theravada Tradition in which the entire Tipitaka and its commentaries are considered authoritative, the imagery of consciousness that "does not land or increase" mentioned in SN 12.64 does seem to support such a possibility, even if some might say that comparing this imagery of consciousness that "does not land or grow" to the consciousness of nibbana is taking it out of context. At least I think so.
The commentaries, on the other hand, gloss the term "vinnanam anidassanam" in a way that denies such a possibility. Using the Kevatta Sutta (DN 11), for example, Suan Lu Zaw, a Burmese lay-teacher of Pali and Abhidhamma, explains that according the the Kevatta Sutta Atthakatha [DN 11 commentary], vinnanam does not refer to the usual meaning of "consciousness" here, but instead defines it as, "There, to be known specifically, so (it is) "vinnanam." This is the name of Nibbana." He also explains that the following line of DN 11, "Here (in Nibbana), nama as well as rupa cease without remainder. By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here" illustrates this point. He states that, "Nibbana does not become a sort of consciousness just because one of the Pali names happens to be vinnanam."
He concludes by using a quote from a section of the Dhammapada Attakatha [Dhammapada commentary], which apparently states that there is no consciousness component in parinibbana after the death of an arahant. This, of course, is in direct contrast to Thanissaro Bhikkhu's note to this particular sutta, which suggests that this term refers to a consciousness that lies outside of space and time, and therefore, outside the consciousness-aggregate altogether.
Basically, what this controversy seems to boil down to is the experience of nibbana and the nature of that experience, especially after death. The general tendency is to either describe nibbana as the ending of all consciousness, all awareness, or in other words, to stress the cessation aspect of nibbana, or to describe nibbana as a state of purified awareness, "consciousness without feature," or in other words, to stress the transcendent aspect of nibbana. The "classical" Theravada Tradition favors the former view of nibbana while others, especially some within the Thai Forest Tradition, favor the latter.
As for which view is right, however, I can't say. Perhaps consciousness is purely a conditional phenomenon with nothing else underlying it. Perhaps consciousness is something that is fundamental to the basic structure of the universe. Perhaps there is a separate type of consciousness that doesn't partake of any of the six senses or their objects. Who knows, perhaps none of them are right. For me, the jury is still out on this one, especially since I can see how both views — i.e., the cessation of consciousness vs. an awareness untouched by death — seem to fall into the extremes of annihilationism and eternalism. Nevertheless, both have support in the suttas, as well as sophisticated arguments as to why their view don't fall into either extreme.
As I said before, I used to lean towards the classical position that all consciousness ceases at death, but now I tend to lean more towards the view that there is a type of consciousness that lies outside of space and time. I think the imagery of consciousness that "does not land or increase" mentioned in SN 12.64 does support such a possibility, as does various other passages throughout the Canon. My position on this may change again, but for now I simply find the latter to be more interesting, as well as motivating as far as my practice is concerned.
Another thing on citta as consciousness. I think there are like 4 classes of cittas. Sensory cittas; fine material cittas, immaterial cittas, and supramundane cittas. The abhidharma on this get really complicated; I am not familiar with all the terms yet. Of these, it appears that only the sensory cittas have contact with objects of the senses. It would make sense if this is mind operating through the sense doors, but I do not know enough to say that. Fine material consciousness would be intangible form, like mental imagery; or the countersign of appana samadhi. Immaterial consciousness might be purely abstract concepts; which do not have any specific form.
iirc, the supramundane consciousness sort of transcends the kandhas. This could be the same as nirodha-samaapatti? I also think this can be developed through the moment-to-moment concentration of vipassana practice. This supramundane consciousness might be the purified luminous citta that is free from defilements.
The four would also correspond with the three realms; plus a fourth:
Kama-dhatu: The realm of sensory contact.
Rupa-dhatu: The Fine Materal Realm
Arpua-dhatu: The Immaterial Realm.
Amata-dhatu: The DeathlessRealm.
Comments
Dear ansanna,
Doesn't writing that something is the 'Buddhist perspective' indicate that what is written is accepted by all Buddhists?
That's what I'm pointing out. What you offer as an argument clearly indicates that you did mention the schools and author. It's just that the statement that this is the 'Buddhist perspective' is problematic.
the former is about 30% , while the Mahayanist is about 70% - technically it is not wrong do generalise as Buddhist view ( or majority view )
but yes I agreed with you I put it more clearly next time
By the way I've studied and trained (and continue to study and train) in both Cittamatra (Chan/Zen) and Madhyamika (prasangika-madhyamika) schools and find them compatible.
In terms of the aggregate of consciousness (vinnana-khandha), it's clear that consciousness is a dependently existing phenomena. Sensory consciousness can only arise with the presence of the appropriate sense organ and its corresponding object of reference. The process of seeing, for example, is described as a conditional process where "dependent on eye and visible forms, eye-consciousness arises" (SN 12.43). Without the presence of the appropriate sense organ (e.g., the eye) or the corresponding object of reference (e.g., rock), sensory-consciousness (e.g., eye-consciousness) can't arise. So none of the six forms of sensory consciousness can stand on its own without the corresponding stimulus to make it manifest or arise.
Nevertheless, there are a couple of sutta passages which could seem to suggest that there's a form of consciousness that doesn't come under the aggregate of consciousness. For example, Thanissaro Bhikkhu states in a note to his translation of MN 109:
There are those in academia who also acknowledge this possibility. Peter Harvey, professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Sunderland, writes in his Introduction to Buddhism:
Here it is that solidity, cohesion, heat and motion have no footing,
Here long and short, coarse and fine, foul and lovely (have no footing),
Here it is that mind (nama) and body (rupa) stop without remainder:
By the stopping of consciousness, (all) this stops here. (D.I.223)
Like Ud.80, above, this describes a state beyond the four physical elements, where mind-and-body are transcended. As the heart of Conditioned Arising is the mutual conditioning of consciousness and mind-and-body, this state is where this interaction ceases: from the stopping of consciousness, mind-and-body stops. Consciousness is not non-existent when it stops, however; for it is said to be non-manifestive and endless. One passage on the stopping (nirodha) of the nidana of consciousness (S.III.54-5) says that there is no longer any object (arammana) or support (patittha) for consciousness; consciousness is thus 'unsupported' (apatitthita) and free of constructing activities, so that it is released, steadfast, content, undisturbed, and attains Nibbana. This description, of a 'stopped' consciousness which is unsupported by any mental object, where mind-and-body are transcended, seems to accord well with the Ud.80 description of Nibbana itself.
To say that Nibbana is unconditioned, objectless consciousness indicates something of its nature, but it does not penetrate far into its mystery. For it seems impossible to imagine what awareness devoid of any object would be like. As regards the 'stopping' of mind-and-body, as a state occurring during life, this is perhaps to be understood as one where all mental processes (including ordinary consciousness) temporarily cease, and the matter of the body is seen as so ephemeral as not to signify a 'body'. A passage at M. I.329-30 which parallels D.I.223 says that the non-manifestive consciousness 'is not reached by the solidness of solidity, by the cohesiveness of cohesion...'. The analysis of Nibbana as objectless consciousness, though, is the author's own interpretation. Theravadin tradition sees Nibbana as 'objectless' (Dhs.I408), but regards 'consciousness' as always having an object. D.I.223 is thus interpreted as concerning NIbbana as to-be-known-by-consciousness: Nibbana is itself the object of the Arahat's consciousness (Pati.II.I43-5).
While the view that there's a type of consciousness that lies outside of space and time, and therefore, outside the consciousness-aggregate altogether, isn't a view that's supported by the "classical" Theravada Tradition in which the entire Tipitaka and its commentaries are considered authoritative, the imagery of consciousness that "does not land or increase" mentioned in SN 12.64 does seem to support such a possibility, even if some might say that comparing this imagery of consciousness that "does not land or grow" to the consciousness of nibbana is taking it out of context. At least I think so.
The commentaries, on the other hand, gloss the term "vinnanam anidassanam" in a way that denies such a possibility. Using the Kevatta Sutta (DN 11), for example, Suan Lu Zaw, a Burmese lay-teacher of Pali and Abhidhamma, explains that according the the Kevatta Sutta Atthakatha [DN 11 commentary], vinnanam does not refer to the usual meaning of "consciousness" here, but instead defines it as, "There, to be known specifically, so (it is) "vinnanam." This is the name of Nibbana." He also explains that the following line of DN 11, "Here (in Nibbana), nama as well as rupa cease without remainder. By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here" illustrates this point. He states that, "Nibbana does not become a sort of consciousness just because one of the Pali names happens to be vinnanam."
He concludes by using a quote from a section of the Dhammapada Attakatha [Dhammapada commentary], which apparently states that there is no consciousness component in parinibbana after the death of an arahant. This, of course, is in direct contrast to Thanissaro Bhikkhu's note to this particular sutta, which suggests that this term refers to a consciousness that lies outside of space and time, and therefore, outside the consciousness-aggregate altogether.
Basically, what this controversy seems to boil down to is the experience of nibbana and the nature of that experience, especially after death. The general tendency is to either describe nibbana as the ending of all consciousness, all awareness, or in other words, to stress the cessation aspect of nibbana, or to describe nibbana as a state of purified awareness, "consciousness without feature," or in other words, to stress the transcendent aspect of nibbana. The "classical" Theravada Tradition favors the former view of nibbana while others, especially some within the Thai Forest Tradition, favor the latter.
As for which view is right, however, I can't say. Perhaps consciousness is purely a conditional phenomenon with nothing else underlying it. Perhaps consciousness is something that is fundamental to the basic structure of the universe. Perhaps there is a separate type of consciousness that doesn't partake of any of the six senses or their objects. Who knows, perhaps none of them are right. For me, the jury is still out on this one, especially since I can see how both views — i.e., the cessation of consciousness vs. an awareness untouched by death — seem to fall into the extremes of annihilationism and eternalism. Nevertheless, both have support in the suttas, as well as sophisticated arguments as to why their view don't fall into either extreme.
As I said before, I used to lean towards the classical position that all consciousness ceases at death, but now I tend to lean more towards the view that there is a type of consciousness that lies outside of space and time. I think the imagery of consciousness that "does not land or increase" mentioned in SN 12.64 does support such a possibility, as does various other passages throughout the Canon. My position on this may change again, but for now I simply find the latter to be more interesting, as well as motivating as far as my practice is concerned.
iirc, the supramundane consciousness sort of transcends the kandhas. This could be the same as nirodha-samaapatti? I also think this can be developed through the moment-to-moment concentration of vipassana practice. This supramundane consciousness might be the purified luminous citta that is free from defilements.
The four would also correspond with the three realms; plus a fourth:
Kama-dhatu: The realm of sensory contact.
Rupa-dhatu: The Fine Materal Realm
Arpua-dhatu: The Immaterial Realm.
Amata-dhatu: The DeathlessRealm.