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Hi All,
I have been going through Chandrakirti's syllogism - I can follow along fairly well enough, except for the 6th statement - "X" is not merely a collection of its parts. If I were to substitute "self" in for "X", OK - I think I can understand that, in developing the cognition of inherent existence, when someone is asked "What are you?" They give various labels, e.g., job, parent, student, athlete, etc ... Obviously, none of these seem to come from or are the collection of the parts of mind/body.
However, when something else is substituted for "X" I get a bit confused - Why is it that a cup is not the mere collection of its parts?
In some of the commentaries I have read, they were saying that there is a redundancy here - I understand them to mean, that if we have some valid cognition of the inherently existing cup then it does not make sense to say "cup" as separate from the parts. To me this seems somewhat circular. If someone asks "What is a cup?" we could say that it is some vessel for holding liquids to drink or something along those lines ... so, I am having a bit of difficulty with what the (6) part, any help?
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I think I can get away from the circular reasoning problem, in that there are cups in a multitude of forms - all that have differing parts, e.g., cups with handles and cups without handles. Yet, I still observe a cup, whether there is a handle or not - as such, a cup can not be just the mere collection of its parts.