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Do your teachers teach "the Mind of the sentient being"?
Blondel
Veteran
From the Awakening of Faith Treatise:
The principle is "the Mind of the sentient being." This Mind includes in itself all states of being of the phenomenal world and the transcendental world. On the basis of this Mind, the meaning of Mahâyâna may be unfolded.
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Comments
A transcendent world implies a higher reality that serves as the ultimate ground of existence to the phenomenal world of sensory experience.
This is a very important point. I know it is hard to switch to this view, but I am positive that the skhandas are non-self and not a refuge. For example if the truth were a body we would suffer. But the body is not the self and thus is not a refuge. I'll leave it up to you to see if there is anything other than the aggregates. But there is no refuge in the aggregates, thus if there is nothing else then there is NO refuge at all. That's certainly not what Buddha taught.
The aggregates are dependently originated and they belong to Mara, in addition the Buddha says they are murderous (SN III, 114). There are 40 negative characteristics of the five aggregates listed in the Patisambhidamagga. Only by nirvana, which has the self-nature (sabhâva) of unconditionality, is one freed from the world of conditionality which includes the aggregates. Nirvana is outside of the khandhas/aggregates.
Anyway, the five aggregates of grasping as an object of higher knowledge is found directly in the Agantuka Sutta (SN 45.159): buddha-vacana.org/sutta/samyutta/maha/sn45-159.html, and referred to, though not as direct, in the Kimsuka Sutta (SN 35.204) : accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.204.than.html
This shows that the object of higher knowledge is the phenomenal world and not a higher metaphysical reality serving as the ultimate ground of existence be it called a world soul, first cause, transcendent nature, etc...
Also, it is not the five aggregates that are the source of suffering, but the five aggregates of grasping.
As far as Mara goes, it is not possible for me to believe that there is a personality by that name. It would be problematic and a hindrance for me to believe that.
I heard a teaching that the aggregates are transformed:
form -> morality
feeling -> concentration
perception -> wisdom
formation -> liberation of the heart
consciousness -> knowledge of liberation
Direct knowledge or abhiññā refers to psychic powers (A.iii.281). 1) Iddhi (levitation); 2) divine ear; 3) knowing the thoughts of others; 4) recollection one's previous lives; 5) knowing of other's rebirths; 6) certainity of emancipation.
Nibbana simply is the negation of the process of grasping and therefore the negation of samaric dimension. The aggregates, including feelings, are no longer identified as self, so it is not that aggregates themselves that are the source of suffering but grasping and identifying them as self. anatta The aggregates, but no longer grasped at or identified as self anatta
With regards to nibbana the own-nature or sabhâva of which is unconditioned, the Tathagata, the one who attains nibbana, does not concieve things about nibbana, as shown in the Majjhiminkaya: vipassana.com/canon/majjhima/mn1.php
Additionally, Professor Y. Karunadas addresses the own-nature notion in this excerpt from his publication The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the ABHIDHAMMA: abhidhamma.org/dhamma_theory_philosophical_corn.htm
“Another doctrinal controversy that has left its mark on the Theravada version of the dhamma theory is the one concerning the theory of tri-temporal existence (sarvamastivada). What is revolutionary about this theory, advanced by the Sarvastivadins, is that it introduced a metaphysical dimension to the doctrine of dhammas and thus paved the way for the erosion of its empirical foundation. For this theory makes an empirically unverifiable distinction between the actual being of the dhammas as phenomena and their ideal being as noumena. It assumes that the substances of all dhammas persist in all the three divisions of time -- past, present, and future -- while their manifestations as phenomena are impermanent and subject to change. Accordingly, a dhamma actualizes itself only in the present moment of time, but "in essence" it continues to subsist in all the three temporal periods. As is well known, this resulted in the transformation of the dhamma theory into a svabhavavada, "the doctrine of own-nature." It also paved the way for a veiled recognition, if not for a categorical assumption, of the distinction between substance and quality. What interests us here is the fact that although the Theravadins rejected this metaphysical theory of tri-temporal existence, including its qualified version as accepted by the Kasyapiyas, it was not without its influence on the Theravada version of the dhamma theory.
This influence is to be seen in the post-canonical exegetical literature of Sri Lanka where, for the first time, the term sabhava (Skt svabhava) came to be used as a synonym for dhamma. Hence the recurrent definition: "Dhammas are so called because they bear their own nature" (attano sabhavat dharenti ti dhamma). Now the question that arises here is whether the Theravadins used the term sabhava in the same sense as the Sarvastivadins did. Did the Theravadins assume the metaphysical view that the substance of a dhamma persists throughout the three phases of time? In other words, does this amount to the admission that there is a duality between the dhamma and its sabhava, between the bearer and the borne, a dichotomy which goes against the grain of the Buddhist doctrine of anatta?
This situation has to be considered in the context of the logical apparatus used by the Abhidhammikas in defining the dhammas. This involves three main kinds of definition. The first is called agency definition (kattu-sadhana) because it attributes agency to the thing to be defined. Such, for example, is the definition of citta (consciousness) as "that which thinks" (cinteti ti cittat). The second is called instrumental definition (karana-sadhana) because it attributes instrumentality to the thing to be defined. Such, for example, is the definition of citta as "that through which one thinks" (cinteti ti etena cittat). The third is called definition by nature (bhava-sadhana) whereby the abstract nature of the thing to be defined is brought into focus. Such, for example, is the definition," The mere act of thinking itself is citta (cintanamattam eva cittat)."
The first two kinds of definition, it is maintained, are provisional and as such are not valid from an ultimate point of view. This is because the attribution of agency and instrumentality invests a dhamma with a duality when it is actually a unitary and unique phenomenon. Such attribution also leads to the wrong assumption that a given dhamma is a substance with inherent qualities or an agent which performs some kind of action. Such definitions are said to be based on tentative attribution (samaropana)and thus are not ultimately valid. It is as a matter of convention (vohara), and for the sole purpose of facilitating the grasp of the idea to be conveyed, that a duality is assumed by the mind in defining the dhamma, which is actually devoid of such duality. Thus both agency and instrumental definitions are resorted to for the convenience of description, and as such they are not to be understood in their direct literal sense. On the other hand, what is called definition by nature (bhavasadhana) is the one that is admissible in an ultimate sense. This is because this type of definition brings into focus the real nature of a given dhamma without attributing agency or instrumentality to it, an attribution which creates the false notion that there is a duality within a unitary dhamma.
It is in the context of these implications that the definition of dhamma as that which bears its own nature has to be understood. Clearly, this is a definition according to agency (kattu-sadhana), and hence its validity is provisional. From this definition, therefore, one cannot conclude that a given dhamma is a substantial bearer of its qualities or "own-nature." The duality between dhamma and sabhava is only an attribution made for the convenience of definition. For in actual fact both terms denote the same actuality. Hence it is categorically stated that apart from sabhava there is no distinct entity called a dhamma, and that the term sabhava signifies the mere fact of being a dhamma.
If the dhamma has no function distinct from its sabhava, and if dhamma and sabhava denote the same thing, why is the dhamma invested with the function of bearing its own-nature? For this implies the recognition of an agency distinct from the dhamma. This, it is observed, is done not only to conform with the inclinations of those who are to be instructed, but also to impress upon us the fact that there is no agent behind the dhamma. The point being emphasized is that the dynamic world of sensory experience is not due to causes other than the self-same dhammas into which it is finally reduced. It is the inter-connection of the dhammas through causal relations that explains the variety and diversity of contingent existence and not some kind of transempirical reality which serves as their metaphysical ground. Nor is it due to the fiat of a Creator God because there is no Divine Creator over and above the flow of mental and material phenomena.
Stated otherwise, the definition of dhamma as that which bears its own-nature means that any dhamma represents a distinct fact of empirical existence which is not shared by other dhammas. Hence sabhava is also defined as that which is not held in common by others (anannasadharana), as the nature peculiar to each dhamma (avenika-sabhava), and as the own-nature is not predicable of other dhammas (asadharana-sabhava). It is also observed that if the dhammas are said to have own-nature (saka-bhava = sabhava), this is only a tentative device to drive home the point that there is no other-nature (para-bhava) from which they emerge and to which they finally lapse.
Now this commentarial definition of dhamma as sabhava poses an important problem, for it seems to go against an earlier Theravada tradition recorded in the Patisambhidamagga. This canonical text specifically states that the five aggregates are devoid of own-nature (sabhavena-sunnat). Since the dhammas are the elementary constituents of the five aggregates, this should mean that the dhammas, too, are devoid of own-nature. What is more, does not the very use of the term sabhava, despite all the qualifications under which it is used, give the impression that a given dhamma exists in its own right? And does this not amount to the admission that a dhamma is some kind of substance?” No disagreement No disagreement
How is it then that an unconditioned own-nature produce that which is conditioned?
By the way, have you come across anything in the commentarial literature which says samsara has the sabhâva of being conditioned? It would be an interesting find. I have only managed to find "nibbâna, whose own nature is that of being unconditioned" (Masefield's trans.).
If realization of emptiness does not result in all of the limitless Buddha qualities, such as knowing and love, then it is not really freedom from prapancha/sankhara. Tantra, I believe, is the developement of the Buddha qualities in the most expedient way. Tantra and Prajnaparamita (the wisdom of emptiness) are seamless with each other.
From the Awakening of Faith.
[Suchness is empty] because from the beginning it has never been related to any defiled states of existence, it is free from all marks of individual distinction of things, and it has nothing to do with thoughts conceived by a deluded mind" (AwF, p. 41).
accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html
what-buddha-taught.net/Books3/Ajahn_Brahm_Paticca_samuppada_Dependent_Origination.htm
http://accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/wheel277.html
I'm not rejecting nibbana, but only that it is the ground of all existence, so I will put the question another way that hopefully will clarify was I was asking. If the ground state is originally nibbana how does ignorance arise?
This commentary might explain better why I take the position:
accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_27.html
We may never agree regarding the difference, but at least we can agree to disagree.
So why did the dancer get caught in the dance? Your guess is as good as mine.
Pande also mentions something about the "mystical aspect of paticcasamuppada" (p. 415) and that it is the "negation of finite self-subsistence" (p. 416).