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The distinction of language in Buddhism—the conventional versus the ultimate.
Elohim wrote:Vaccha,
Also, just to make myself absolutely clear, I am not denying individual effort (attakara), nor have I ever done so that I am aware of; nevertheless, I am denying that individual effort arises of its own volition. In the context of this thread, I would say that individual effort has its own requisite conditions just as right effort (sammakara) has its requisite conditions as well i.e. right view (sammaditthi).
Jason
jason, how can there be such a thing as individual (indivisble) effort, when the only "individuals" remain are dhammas?Would individual effort not become also a meaningless term, as well as controll seems to become?
Regards
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Comments
As I have said, there are many different ways in which we can look at this subject depending on the context. When we are speaking about an individual, what exactly is it that we are speaking about? On the whole, a being (satta) or person (puggala) can be considered an individual, however what about when we consider the six sense media (salayatana) or the five aggregates (pancakhandha)?
Does the eye, for example, put forth effort to see, or is it that the eye-faculty comes into contact with a visible object, and with the arising of eye-consciousness there is sight? On one level we can certainly talk about individuals and individual effort (attakara), I do not deny that, but on another level we cannot talk about individuals and effort in the same way as these concepts no longer apply.
Jason
the point i want to make is this: If we all desribe in dhammas, seeing it as ultimate, then surely satta and pudgala are mere convention. An effort of a satta or pudgala is as meanigful or -less then the control a satta or pudgala has.
There is no such thing then as individual or individble thing at all except the dhammas. Subject and object no longer exist. All explanations in terms of subjects and objects, the very structure of at least our indo-european languages, fail to express what we want to say. Every attempt would be self defeating. When i was in school, one of the first lessons in english i learned was that the sentences there follow the SPO-rule. Subject Predicate Object . fofoo writes this post. jason reads the post. it might sound silly, but how we can express agentless activities, at least in our language, at all?
Maybe i got it totally wrong, but that`s the way I see it at the moment.
Regards
edit: that being said, even if i was to believe or even realize there were no agent, I would probably fail to express the damma in my mother tongue or in english.
Language itself is a convention. Externally, language is useful for the fact that individuals can relate various concepts between themselves in order to comprehend them such as topics of Dhamma for example. In the context of our practice, language is can be very useful, such as in the case of verbal fabrications or direct thought and evaluation, which are used to achieve the first jhana in meditation (AN 5.28). Nevertheless, these things are themselves conditioned, and therefore must be relinquished when the conditions are ripe for their relinquishment in order to touch the Deathless (amata). Essentially, what this means is that we cannot simply think our way to Nibbana, even though thought can help us to get to that the point of release.
When you are speaking on the conventional level of beings (satta) or persons (puggala), you can use the conventions of Jason, fofoo, et cetera. When we are speaking on the ultimate level of dhammas, however, we cannot use the same conventions. For example, can we speak of the eye-faculty as Jason, even though the eyes are a constituent of the person conventionally known as Jason? No, we would have to say Jason's eyes. This comes to the idea of Jason as the owner of his eye-faculty, and conventionally we can say this as a true statement. When we come to the Buddha's teachings on the doctrine of not-self (anatta), however, this personality-view (sakkaya-ditthi) is deconstructed and we can see that ultimately, the eye-faculty is ownerless.
Jason
language surely is convention, on this we agree. Subject and object however have a distinct role to play, since there the seperation between me and the world is made.
I think i had my words on language in the anatta thread, summarized, we cut a piece out of the whole when using words, can use more and more words to describe a certain thing at a certain time maybe even completely. Without wanting to go further away from the topic, I want to give the following link as food for thought:
Linguistic Turn
The view that language 'constitutes' reality is contrary to common sense and to most of the Western tradition of philosophy. The traditional view saw words as functioning like labels. First there seemed to be something like 'the real chair', followed by the meaning 'Chair' to which the word "chair" refers. But already the founder of structuralism, Ferdinand de Saussure, was able to show that differences between meanings cannot exist independently from differences between sounds. The differences between meanings structure our perception. We would not be able to recognize a simple chair as a chair without knowing the meaning of "chair" as opposed to "arm chair". Therefore all we can know about reality is conditioned by language.
Of course, from a Buddhist POV it must be insisted that one can trancend (this word fabricated) reality, like all did who reached Nibbana.
Regards
Might we take this one step futher and call Abhidhamma a species of Eliminative materialism?
I think for purposes of discussion it might be better treat Abhidhammism as an early form of Indian eliminativism.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Well, perhaps it would be helpful if you could define what you mean when you say "me" and "the world". There might be a distinction between you and the world in the convention of everyday, ordinary language; however, in the Buddha's teachings of dependent co-arising (paticca-samuppada), I do not think that there is such a sharp distinction between what you perceive to be you and the experience of the world (SN 12.44) since it must be remembered that our experience of the world is directly tied in to our view of self (sakkaya-ditthi).
Jason
What exactly do you mean by that?
Jason
I wasn`t talking about my views, I was talking about how language fundamentally works. See Me, World.
If you want to discuss sakkaya-ditthi further, we can maybe have a look in the anatta thread.
Regards
As I said before, there might be a distinction between you and the world in the convention of everyday, ordinary language; however, in the Buddha's teachings of dependent co-arising (paticca-samuppada), I do not think that there is such a sharp distinction between what you perceive to be you and the experience of the world as can be seen in the Loka Sutta (SN 12.44):
As for our self-identification view (sakkaya-ditthi), when speaking in a Buddhist context, our experience of the world is inherently tied in to that particular view. In Abhidhamma, the removal of this self-view is the basis for what we would call ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca)—the focus now on the analysis of the basic principles that govern mental and physical processes.
Jason
Dr. Nakamura who was perhaps one of Japan's greatest Buddhist scholars and who, by the way, was a great Vedic scholar, had this to say about what you called "self-identification view", i.e., sakkaya-ditthi.
As we can see, there is a difference between "sakkaya-ditthi", i.e., "self-identification view", and the referent self. This next passage shows that puthujjanas suffer from sakkayaditthi insofar as they regard the self to be the khandhas.
If we, therefore, regard our body (rupa) as being the self we have, using your term, fallen into "self-identification view". Our self has become identified with a body, its feelings and the rest of the khandhas. As a result, we come to suffer.
Above all, it would be incorrect to contend that sakkayaditthi means that there is no self. The problem is not with the self, in other words. The problem is with what we view (ditthi) to be the self which turns out to be conditioned, namely, our body (sakkaya).
Love ya'll,
Bobby
First, it should be noted that nowhere was it said that sakkaya-ditthi means that there is no self. What was said, however, was that when we come to the Buddha's teachings on the doctrine of not-self (anatta), personality-view (sakkaya-ditthi) is deconstructed and we can see that ultimately, these aggregates are ownerless—not assuming anything with regard to these five clinging-aggregates to be self or belonging to self until the lingering residual 'I am' conceit is fully obliterated.
The question of anatta seems to be heading towards asking whom or what realizes Nibbana. Perhaps what should also be remembered here is that the Buddha said that any sense of self, any self-identification view, any process of I-making and my-making, is based on either one or all of the five khandhas (MN 44, MN 109, SN 22.1). When speaking about a self, agent, referent, et cetera, you must do so in reference to something that cannot be touched, felt, perceived, thought about, or cognized in any way whatsoever.
Please correct me if I am wrong, but effectively, you are speaking about something that, as far as experience goes, cannot be said to exist because if it cannot be experienced, how can it be said to exist. That is why, when it comes to Nibbana, such a thing is beyond words, beyond concepts, beyond existing or even not existing, as it is the final end of phenomena (AN 10.58). Logically speaking, what could be said to observe this final end of phenomena? How could it observe this? Where is it? The questions are endless.
As for Dr. Nakamura, I am sure he held the view that the Buddha originally taught the elimination of all false views of self regarding the aggregates in order to uncover what was the self; nevertheless, if there was a self, what on earth was there to prevent the Buddha from saying so? I fail to see a single sutta where the Buddha explicitly declares this self, so I cannot agree entirely with what you have said with regard to the referent self, although I agree with the majority of the rest.
Jason
When you say something doesn't exist, what do you mean? Do you mean that it doesn't exist as a khandha?
Love ya'll,
Bobby
"Then in that case, householder, listen & pay close attention. I will speak."
I think the phrases "I-making" and "my-making" can be questioned. What was Sariputta thinking when he said "I will speak"?
isn`t it more that the section is about not to mistake the skandhas for an eternal self?
Slightly confused
Regards
Let us begin with the SN 35.23 where the Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range." According to this sutta, anything that lies outside the range of the five aggregates cannot be said to exist, not exist, both, or neither can it?
The Buddha also said in SN 22.86 that, "when you can't pin down the Tathagata as a truth or reality even in the present life — is it proper for you to declare, 'Friends, the Tathagata — the supreme man, the superlative man, attainer of the superlative attainment — being described, is described otherwise than with these four positions: The Tathagata exists after death, does not exist after death, both does & does not exist after death, neither exists nor does not exist after death'?" Therefore, just according to these two suttas alone, can you say that as far as this referent self goes, it can be said to exist, etc.?
Jason
Is that supposed to be a joke?
Jason
Jason
I was seriously thinking how I can express "I will speak" without using "I". ( no, "will speak" doesn`t count, i thought more of psycho-physical processes, or dhammas, that were involved.) Sorry, did not want you two to distract from the debate, just forget sleepy fofoo`s comment
Regards
something intersting came out of my comment, or more precicely, out of your second response.
is the world in you quote the same as the all? I presume the pali term was Loka Sorry if this has been discussed already somewhere.
edit: feel free to move this post into a new topic "All vs Loka"
One can us conventional language without attaching to the concepts involved. I believe that it is in this sense that the Buddha sometimes said, "These are the world's designations, the world's expressions, the world's ways of speaking, the world's descriptions, with which the Tathagata expresses himself but without grasping to them." Also, since we are on the subject of I-making and my-making, perhaps you would like to read this excerpt from MN 109:
This particular subject has been discussed before, but not in this particular thread. Unfortunately, I cannot recall precisely where. If you are truly unaware of the answer, may I suggest that you take the time to read the suttas in question (such as AN 4.45, SN 12.44, and SN 35.23 for starters) and see if you can discover the answer on your own? I must take my leave of you all and retire for the night. Perhaps we can continue this discussion tomorrow.
Jason
Regards
The term 'all' is therefore not exhaustive—it doesn't include everything. It doesn't include, for example, the transcendent nirvana; nor does it even seem to include the 'detached mind' as evidenced from the following passage.
Also in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta (26) of the Majjhima-Nikaya the Buddha states that,
At this point, it appears that the Buddha is not using common speech because he is making statements about the transcendent which is paramarthsatya.
Love ya'll,
Bobby