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Thank you for your well-thought out and informative posting. It's Sunday morning, and I wil be teaching soon, but I would like to share the MahaNidana Sutta with you all, apologies if it has been posted on this thread before, but Elohim raises such very poignant and heart-felt points, that out of respect for the debating tradition, I feel I am requred to be thorough - thank you;
On one occasion the Blessed One was living among the Kurus. Now, the Kurus have a town named Kammasadhamma. There Ven. Ánanda approached the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to the Blessed One, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One: "It's amazing, lord, it's astounding, how deep this dependent co-arising is, and how deep its appearance, and yet to me it seems as clear as clear can be."
[The Buddha:] "Don't say that, Ánanda. Don't say that. Deep is this dependent co-arising, and deep its appearance. It's because of not understanding and not penetrating this Dhamma that this generation is like a tangled skein, a knotted ball of string, like matted rushes and reeds, and does not go beyond transmigration, beyond the planes of deprivation, woe, and bad destinations.
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for aging and death?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition do aging and death come?' one should say, 'Aging and death come from birth as their requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for birth?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does birth come?' one should say, 'Birth comes from becoming as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for becoming?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does becoming come?' one should say, 'Becoming comes from clinging as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for clinging?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does clinging come?' one should say, 'Clinging comes from craving as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for craving?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does craving come?' one should say, 'Craving comes from feeling as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for feeling?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does feeling come?' one should say, 'Feeling comes from contact as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for contact?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does contact come?' one should say, 'Contact comes from name-and-form as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for name-and-form?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does name-and-form come?' one should say, 'Name-and-form comes from consciousness as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for consciousness?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does consciousness come?' one should say, 'Consciousness comes from name-and-form as its requisite condition.'
"Thus, Ánanda, from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form. From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, aging, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress.
Aging and Death
"'From birth as a requisite condition come aging and death.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from birth as a requisite condition come aging and death. If there were no birth at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., of devas in the state of devas, of celestials in the state of celestials, of spirits in the state of spirits, of demons in the state of demons, of human beings in the human state, of quadrupeds in the state of quadrupeds, of birds in the state of birds, of snakes in the state of snakes, or of any being in its own state -- in the utter absence of birth, from the cessation of birth, would aging and death be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for aging and death, i.e., birth.
Birth
"'From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. If there were no becoming at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., sensual becoming, form becoming, or formless becoming -- in the utter absence of becoming, from the cessation of becoming, would birth be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for birth, i.e., becoming.
Becoming
"'From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. If there were no clinging at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., clinging to sensuality, clinging to precepts and practices, clinging to views, or clinging to doctrines of the self -- in the utter absence of clinging, from the cessation of clinging, would becoming be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for becoming, i.e., clinging.
Clinging
"'From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no becoming -- in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving, would clinging be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for clinging, i.e., craving.
Craving
"'From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. If there were no feeling at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., feeling born of contact at the eye, feeling born of contact at the ear, feeling born of contact at the nose, feeling born of contact at the tongue, feeling born of contact at the body, or feeling born of contact at the intellect -- in the utter absence of feeling, from the cessation of feeling, would craving be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for craving, i.e., feeling.
Dependent on Craving
"Now, craving is dependent on feeling,
seeking is dependent on craving,
acquisition is dependent on seeking,
ascertainment is dependent on acquisition,
desire and passion is dependent on ascertainment,
attachment is dependent on desire and passion,
possessiveness is dependent on attachment,
stinginess is dependent on attachment,
defensiveness is dependent on stinginess,
and because of defensiveness, dependent on defensiveness, various evil, unskillful phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies.
"And this is the way to understand how it is that because of defensiveness various evil, unskillful phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies. If there were no defensiveness at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter absence of defensiveness, from the cessation of defensiveness, would various evil, unskillful phenomena -- the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies -- come into play?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for the coming-into-play of various evil, unskillful phenomena -- the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies -- i.e., defensiveness.
"'Defensiveness is dependent on stinginess.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how defensiveness is dependent on stinginess. If there were no stinginess at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter absence of stinginess, from the cessation of stinginess, would defensiveness be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for defensiveness, i.e., stinginess.
(Similarly back through the chain of conditions: stinginess, attachment, possessiveness, desire and passion, ascertainment, acquisition, and seeking.)
"'Seeking is dependent on craving.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how seeing is dependent on craving. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no becoming -- in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving, would seeking be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for seeking, i.e., craving. Thus, Ánanda, these two phenomena [the chain of conditions leading from craving to birth, aging, and death, and the chain of conditions leading from craving to quarrels, etc.], as a duality, flow back into one place at feeling.
Feeling
"'From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. If there were no contact at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., contact at the eye, contact at the ear, contact at the nose, contact at the tongue, contact at the body, or contact at the intellect -- in the utter absence of contact, from the cessation of contact, would feeling be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for feeling, i.e., contact.
Contact
"'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes contact.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how, from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes contact. If the qualities, traits, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of name-group (mental activity) were all absent, would designation-contact with regard to the form-group (the physical body) be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of form-group were all absent, would resistance-contact with regard to the name-group be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of name-group and form-group were all absent, would designation-contact or resistance-contact be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for contact, i.e., name-and-form.
Name and Form
"'From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form. If consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?"
"No, lord."
"If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart, would name-and-form be produced for this world?"
"No, lord."
"If the consciousness of the young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name-and-form ripen, grow, and reach maturity?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for name-and-form, i.e., consciousness."
Consciousness
"'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. If consciousness were not to gain a foothold in name-and-form, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth, aging, death, and stress in the future be discerned?
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for consciousness, i.e., name-and-form.
"This is the extent to which there is birth, aging, death, passing away, and re-arising. This is the extent to which there are means of designation, expression, and delineation. This is the extent to which the sphere of discernment extends, the extent to which the cycle revolves for the manifesting (discernibility) of this world -- i.e., name-and-form together with consciousness.
Delineations of a Self
"To what extent, Ánanda, does one delineate when delineating a self? Either delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, delineating a self formless and finite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, delineating a self formless and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and infinite.'
"Now, the one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and finite, either delineates it as possessed of form and finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite lies latent [within that person].
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and infinite, either delineates it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite lies latent [within that person].
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and finite, either delineates it as formless and finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite lies latent [within that person].
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and infinite, either delineates it as formless and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite lies latent [within that person].
Non-Delineations of a Self
"To what extent, Ánanda, does one not delineate when not delineating a self? Either not delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, not delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and infinite.'
"Now, the one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite does not lie latent [within that person].
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite does not lie latent [within that person].
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and finite, does not delineate it as formless and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite does not lie latent [within that person].
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and infinite, does not delineate it as formless and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite does not lie latent [within that person].
Assumptions of a Self
"To what extent, Ánanda, does one assume when assuming a self? Assuming feeling to be the self, one assumes that 'Feeling is my self' [or] 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling]' [or] 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious to feeling, but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, one who says, 'Feeling is my self,' should be addressed as follows: 'There are these three feelings, my friend -- feelings of pleasure, feelings of pain, and feelings of neither pleasure nor pain. Which of these three feelings do you assume to be the self?' At a moment when a feeling of pleasure is sensed, no feeling of pain or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pleasure is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pain is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of pain is sensed. Only a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed at that moment.
"Now, a feeling of pleasure is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. Having sensed a feeling of pleasure as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pleasure, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pain, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, 'my self' has perished.
"Thus he assumes, assuming in the immediate present a self inconstant, entangled in pleasure and pain, subject to arising and passing away, he who says, 'Feeling is my self.' Thus in this manner, Ánanda, one does not see fit to assume feeling to be the self.
"As for the person who says, 'Feeling is not the self: My self is oblivious [to feeling],' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, where nothing whatsoever is sensed (experienced) at all, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ánanda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious to feeling.'
"As for the person who says, 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, should feelings altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with feeling completely not existing, owing to the cessation of feeling, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ánanda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, Ánanda, in as far as a monk does not assume feeling to be the self, nor the self as oblivious, nor that 'My self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by anything (does not cling to anything) in the world. Un-sustained, he is not agitated. Un-agitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'
"If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind is thus released that 'The Tathágata exists after death,' is his view, that would be mistaken; that 'The Tathágata does not exist after death'...that 'The Tathágata both exists and does not exist after death'...that 'The Tathágata neither exists nor does not exist after death' is his view, that would be mistaken. Why? Having directly known the extent of designation and the extent of the objects of designation, the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent of description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of discernment and the extent of the objects of discernment, the extent to which the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. [To say that,] 'The monk released, having directly known that, does not see, does not know is his opinion,' that would be mistaken.
Seven Stations of Consciousness
"Ánanda, there are these seven stations of consciousness and two spheres. Which seven?
"There are beings with diversity of body and diversity of perception, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms. This is the first station of consciousness.
"There are beings with diversity of body and singularity of perception, such as the devas of the Brahma hosts generated by the first [jhana]. This is the second station of consciousness.
"There are beings with singularity of body and diversity of perception, such as the Radiant Devas. This is the third station of consciousness.
"There are beings with singularity of body and singularity of perception, such as the Beautifully Lustrous Devas. This is the fourth station of consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of perceptions of [physical] form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, thinking, 'Infinite space,' arrive at the sphere of the infinitude of space. This is the fifth station of consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness,' arrive at the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the sixth station of consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness, thinking, 'There is nothing,' arrive at the sphere of nothingness. This is the seventh station of consciousness.
"The sphere of non-percipient beings and, second, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. [These are the two spheres.]
"Now, as for the first station of consciousness -- beings with diversity of body and diversity of perception, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms: If one discerns that [station of consciousness], discerns its origination, discerns its passing away, discerns its allure, discerns its drawbacks, discerns the escape from it, would it be proper, by means of that [discernment] to take delight there?"
"No, lord."
(Similarly with each of the remaining stations of consciousness and two spheres.)
"Ánanda, when knowing -- as they actually are -- the origination, passing away, allure, drawbacks of -- and escape from -- these seven stations of consciousness and two spheres, a monk is release through lack of clinging, he is said to be a monk released through discernment.
Eight Emancipations
"Ánanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight?
"Possessed of form, one sees forms. This is the first emancipation.
"Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally. This is the second emancipation.
"One is intent only on the beautiful. This is the third emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of perceptions of [physical] form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, thinking, 'Infinite space,' one enters and remains in the sphere of the infinitude of space. This is the fourth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness,' one enters and remains in the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the fifth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness, thinking, 'There is nothing,' one enters and remains in the sphere of nothingness. This is the sixth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of nothingness, one enters and remains in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. This is the seventh emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation of perception and feeling. This is the eighth emancipation.
"Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order, when he attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of the mental fermentations he enters and remains in the fermentation-free release of awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and realized it in the here and now, he is said to be a monk released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher or more sublime than this, there is none."
That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Ánanda delighted in the Blessed One's words.'
Thank you for reading, my next post deals with research regarding why 'ignorance' as a concept is not included in the above sutta.
'Before we continue with the MahaNidana Sutta, which now develops some other topics (please see above), it will be useful to add here some gleanings on the sequence of conditioned origination from the Samyukta. First a general formula for attending methodically to conditioned origination is mentioned. It gives the general form of a statement of a condition. "This being, this is. From the occurence of this, this occurs. (This not being, this is not. From the cessation of this, ceases.)
The most striking feature in the Nidana Samyukta discussions is the addition of three more members to the main sequence. Usually where the latter occurs we find next to "experience exists through the condition of contact" a new condition: "Contact exists through the condition of the six entrances." This is followed by "the six entrances exist through the condition of a sentient body" and then "a sentient body exists through the condition of consciousness" as before. This new condition in fact is little but an elucidation of "contact"....
More important are the other two NEW CONDITIONS. After a sentient body exists through the condition of consciousness we find instead of "consciousness exists through the condition of a sentient body" the NEW "consciousness exists through the condition of the forces (samskaras, plural). Finally we have "the forces exists through the condition of IGNORANCE (avidya). By way of elucidation of the two new conditions the Samyukta tells us: "There are three forces: the force of the body (i.e. physical force), the force of speech, the force of thought.." Ignorance is a lack of knowledge of the Four Truths.
It seems clear, and this is how these two conditions were interpreting by all schools Buddhism, that by taking the sequence beyond consciousness and the sentient body the Samyukta has simply carried the process back again to a previous life. The only condition for the existence of consciousness and a sentient body, besides each acting as condition for the other, as stated in the Dirgha, is previous existence, a previous life, of consciousness and a sentient body,in which a living being performed certain actions, exercised its "forces". These forces operating in the previous existence produce rebirth, produce consciousness and a sentient body in another existence, another life. There is one sutra in the Samyukta which suggests how "forces" and IGNORANCE were added to the sequence successively, since it gives the sequence with forces but OMITTING ignorance. It says: "Following it (the eightfold way) I (the Buddha) discovered ageing and dying and their origination, cessation and the practice leading to that cessation. Following it I discovered birth...existence....consciousness and its origination, etc. Following it I discovered the forces and their origination, cessation and the practice leading to that cessation." The text ends there adding merely that the Buddha has described this way, the best life, to his followers. IGNORANCE is not mentioned, and knowledge is only implied in the discovery of the sequence.'
Indian Buddhism: By AK Warder, Page 112-113.
Here we see quite clearly that 'ignorance' was not part of the original teaching on Nidana. This does not mean that the chain of Nidana was diminished in anyway, when 'ignorance' was added at a later date. It is simply a technical point regarding doctrine and its historical development.
Thank you
In regards to the fact that all twelve are not mentioned in every instance, I think that it is safe to say that just because in certain situations a lower number of links were referenced or enumerated does not necessarily mean that there were not other occasions where all twelve were mentioned, or that the others are unimportant. That in itself proves nothing. For example, there are many suttas where we find one of the eight factors of the path discussed without mention of the other seven, or we find places where one or two of the five aggregates are mentioned without reference to the other four or five. This does not necessarily mean that the rest were later additions.
What it does mean is that in the Pali canon, we have a maximum number of any given things mentioned, and when speaking about specific lists of those things we include the full number mentioned. In other words, when listing the Four Noble Truths, we include all four that are mentioned regardless if there are occasion where only one or two are mentioned (i.e. SN 38.17, AN 9.34, et cetera). When listing the Noble Eightfold Path, we include all eight that are mentioned regardless if there are places where only one or two are mentioned (i.e. MN 9, MN 43, et cetera). The same holds true for the aggregates, the factors for awakening, the links of dependent co-arising, et cetera.
Let's just say that I agree with you that there is possibility that doctrinal subjects like dependent co-arising developed over time, but that I do not agree that we can conclusively say this as a factual statement with any real degree of certainty. There is certainly evidence to suggest that this may have happened, but there is simply no way to verify that the Buddha or his disciples never enumerated twelve distinct links at any given time during their dispensations. Perhaps they did when the occasion called for it, and refrained when it did not. It is impossible to conclusively know which without having a record of the original teachings; we can only guess from what we do know.
Since nothing was written down for the first five hundred years or so, all we have are traditional accounts to go by in this respect. It is simply impossible to tell if certain schools added a particular sutta, or if other schools removed a particular sutta from their respective canons. For all we know, the Buddha could have used more detailed explanations of dependent co-arising when he felt the participants would benefit from them instead of placing the blame on later generations. We must remember that by traditional accounts, the suttas were spoken to whatever audience was present at that time. This meant that each discourse was tailored specifically to those present.
You make your points in a cogent and convincing manner. Philosophical debate has been apart of the Buddhist remit since the time of the Lord Buddha. The Mahayanists and the Tantrayanists all claim that the Lord Buddha taught the basis of the philosophy of their respective schools, during His lifetime, and that the Mahayana and Tantrayana vehicles WERE NOT later developments - away from the supposed 'orthodoxy' of the Pali Cannon.
Infact, much of the Pali Cannon can be read in such away so as to justify virtually any philosophical perspective upon Buddhism, and the Buddhist path. And, as you rightly say, the Cannon was not written down until about one hundred years after the passing of the Lord Buddha - and then, only the disputes that occured during 'disagreement' in interpretation of doctrine. A hundred years after that, were the pitakas put into somekind of written form.
Your assertion that the pitakas were written down hundreds of years after the Lord Buddha spoke the Dhamma, is correct. However, your assumption that the time between the spoken Dhamma and the written Dhamma (between 100 and 200 years), 'allows' for a 'vagueness' of interpretation, may need to be examined to see if that could have been the case. It is believed that certaine monks were charged with 'remembering' the actual Dhamma - passed-on from master to student over the generations. Such a feat of memory is no tunheard of amongst the Hindu people. Even now, many villages have holy men whose job it is to remember the clan history, and the various clan lineages that exist within that village. Hundeds of generations, facts and figures are involved in this feat of extraordinary memorising. Thousands of years of history are recorded.
Now, the Buddhist Sangha only had to perform this duty for 100 to 200 years. The monks chosen to 'memorise' the teachings were probably well aware of the Hindu tradition, and may have even been from families who were charged with this vital social function. This is speculation, based upon a sound understanding of culture in north India - particularly amongst the Gujaratis. But even if they were not so directly involved, developing the function of 'memory' over-time, was simply a matter of 'technique'. It can be assured, with reasonable satisfaction, that the Buddhist Sangha performed this task extraordinarily well, as the memorised texts were preserved up until there committment to writing - some 200 years following the Buddha's passing.
It is also true to say, that the earliest texts that transitioned from 'memory' to the 'written' form, did not contain 'ignorance' as a 'prime-cause' of the chain of dependent origination. Indeed, the MahaNidana Sutra, starts with 'aging and death' being a condition of 'birth' and so on, and so forth.
Ignorance does not have to be there, as the cycle of conditional origination progresses quite freely, independent of it. Ignorance does not make the cycle proceed or stop. Indeed, ingorance is only a 'temporary' Mind faculty. A temporary faculty that is removed with the enlightenment experience. It would not make philosophical sense to make a temporary Mind faculty the basis of a theory of the conditioned origination of the physical world.
So why is ignorance at the beginning of the chain? Well, even in the MahaNidana Sutra, the Buddha clearly says that it is the 'lack of knowledge' of the cycle of conditioned origination, that keeps people upon the cycle of samsara. Not 'knowing' the cycle, maybe viewed as being 'ignorant' of the chain. If one is ignorant of the chain, then one is subject to the chain, even though one is 'unaware' of its existence.
And here is the crux of the philosophical problem with placing 'ignorance' at the front of the chain. One is stuck in samsara, because one is unaware (i.e. 'ignorant') of the chain. However, when one is 'aware' of the chain, 'ignorance' of the chain ceases immediately, and 'ignorance' can not be said to be at the front of the chain. Awareness of the chain, is not 'enlightenment' at that point. So, although 'ignorance' of the chain dissolves as one becomes aware of the chain, the chain itself does not dissolve. The chain still exists, and as one proceeds through the levels of meditative insight, one can not proceed from 'ignorance', as one is fully aware of the chain, its links and how each link associates and conditions the next link. Ignorance of the chain does not exist at this point, and nor can it.
The earlier chains do not show ignorance for the reasons outlined above. The latter chains do, for the other reasons highlighted above. Ignorance serves to remind us that we do not know something. We have to work on ourselves to dissolve our own ignorance. Ignorance at the beginning of the later chain, is a pointer or signpost, rather than a concrete philosophical statement. It serves to remind us of the work to be done.
However, our progress might be hampered, if we thought that we must be 'ignorant' in someway, everytime we meditate. We can not 'unknow' the chain, once we have learned it. We can not turn acquired insight back into ignorance. Even understanding that there is 'ignorance', and that this 'ignorance' can be over-come, is itself a product of insight, and not 'ignorant' at all.
But it might also be that 'ignorance' dissolves in 'stages', more or less in proportion to the insight we gain from meditation. So we might find ourselves in a situation of 20% insight, 80% ignorance, and so on and so forth. Untill we arrive at 100% insight, and 0% ignorance. This might serve to suggest that when ignorance ceases, the chain ceases. However, the Buddha does say that we are 'freed' from the chain, rather than the chain 'disappears' when ignorance ceases, etc. Some Mahayana schools might argue that insight into the underlying 'empty' essence of phenomena, immediately makes the chain 'redundant', as the meditator with such experience, is immediately 'freed' not only from the 'chain', but even from the 'concept' of such a chain existing.
You make your points in a cogent and convincing manner.
Thank you. I do my best to try and make my points as clear as possible.
Philosophical debate has been apart of the Buddhist remit since the time of the Lord Buddha. The Mahayanists and the Tantrayanists all claim that the Lord Buddha taught the basis of the philosophy of their respective schools, during His lifetime, and that the Mahayana and Tantrayana vehicles WERE NOT later developments - away from the supposed 'orthodoxy' of the Pali Cannon.
Perhaps the penchant for debate is a genetic trait unique to humans.
Infact, much of the Pali Cannon can be read in such away so as to justify virtually any philosophical perspective upon Buddhism, and the Buddhist path.
But you can say that for almost anything. We are a very creative species.
And, as you rightly say, the Cannon was not written down until about one hundred years after the passing of the Lord Buddha - and then, only the disputes that occured during 'disagreement' in interpretation of doctrine. A hundred years after that, were the pitakas put into somekind of written form.
That is not quite right; it was written down about 400 to 500 years later.
Your assertion that the pitakas were written down hundreds of years after the Lord Buddha spoke the Dhamma, is correct. However, your assumption that the time between the spoken Dhamma and the written Dhamma (between 100 and 200 years), 'allows' for a 'vagueness' of interpretation, may need to be examined to see if that could have been the case.
I never asserted anything about vagueness, but we can examine that too.
It is believed that certaine monks were charged with 'remembering' the actual Dhamma - passed-on from master to student over the generations. Such a feat of memory is no tunheard of amongst the Hindu people.
Yes, that was the traditional account. In fact, monks still memorize parts.
Even now, many villages have holy men whose job it is to remember the clan history, and the various clan lineages that exist within that village. Hundeds of generations, facts and figures are involved in this feat of extraordinary memorising. Thousands of years of history are recorded.
I am sure they do. I think that modern man has become a bit lazy myself.
Now, the Buddhist Sangha only had to perform this duty for 100 to 200 years.
The evidence I am aware of suggests that it was more like 400-500 years.
The monks chosen to 'memorise' the teachings were probably well aware of the Hindu tradition, and may have even been from families who were charged with this vital social function. This is speculation, based upon a sound understanding of culture in north India - particularly amongst the Gujaratis. But even if they were not so directly involved, developing the function of 'memory' over-time, was simply a matter of 'technique'. It can be assured, with reasonable satisfaction, that the Buddhist Sangha performed this task extraordinarily well, as the memorised texts were preserved up until there committment to writing - some 200 years following the Buddha's passing.
I too have faith that the Canon we have today is remarkble well-preserved.
It is also true to say, that the earliest texts that transitioned from 'memory' to the 'written' form, did not contain 'ignorance' as a 'prime-cause' of the chain of dependent origination. Indeed, the MahaNidana Sutra, starts with 'aging and death' being a condition of 'birth' and so on, and so forth.
This I cannot agree with. As I said, how can one be so sure which is earlier?
Ignorance does not have to be there, as the cycle of conditional origination progresses quite freely, independent of it. Ignorance does not make the cycle proceed or stop. Indeed, ingorance is only a 'temporary' Mind faculty. A temporary faculty that is removed with the enlightenment experience. It would not make philosophical sense to make a temporary Mind faculty the basis of a theory of the conditioned origination of the physical world.
I disagree. Suffering is dependent upon ignorance of the Four Noble Truths.
So why is ignorance at the beginning of the chain? Well, even in the MahaNidana Sutra, the Buddha clearly says that it is the 'lack of knowledge' of the cycle of conditioned origination, that keeps people upon the cycle of samsara.
I believe it is at the beginning or end depending on the context of the sutta.
Not 'knowing' the cycle, maybe viewed as being 'ignorant' of the chain. If one is ignorant of the chain, then one is subject to the chain, even though one is 'unaware' of its existence.
As I said before, I believe ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths.
And here is the crux of the philosophical problem with placing 'ignorance' at the front of the chain.
I already explained why I believe that this is a false statement in post #47.
One is stuck in samsara, because one is unaware (i.e. 'ignorant') of the chain. However, when one is 'aware' of the chain, 'ignorance' of the chain ceases immediately, and 'ignorance' can not be said to be at the front of the chain.
Incorrect; it is because of ignorance of the Four Noble Truths (MN 9, DN 16).
Awareness of the chain, is not 'enlightenment' at that point. So, although 'ignorance' of the chain dissolves as one becomes aware of the chain, the chain itself does not dissolve. The chain still exists, and as one proceeds through the levels of meditative insight, one can not proceed from 'ignorance', as one is fully aware of the chain, its links and how each link associates and conditions the next link. Ignorance of the chain does not exist at this point, and nor can it.
Once again, ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths (see SN 12.2).
The earlier chains do not show ignorance for the reasons outlined above. The latter chains do, for the other reasons highlighted above. Ignorance serves to remind us that we do not know something. We have to work on ourselves to dissolve our own ignorance. Ignorance at the beginning of the later chain, is a pointer or signpost, rather than a concrete philosophical statement. It serves to remind us of the work to be done.
Again, prove to me that the suttas without ignorance are indeed "older".
However, our progress might be hampered, if we thought that we must be 'ignorant' in someway, everytime we meditate. We can not 'unknow' the chain, once we have learned it. We can not turn acquired insight back into ignorance. Even understanding that there is 'ignorance', and that this 'ignorance' can be over-come, is itself a product of insight, and not 'ignorant' at all.
This argument is faulty. You are misunderstanding the meaning of ignorance.
But it might also be that 'ignorance' dissolves in 'stages', more or less in proportion to the insight we gain from meditation. So we might find ourselves in a situation of 20% insight, 80% ignorance, and so on and so forth. Untill we arrive at 100% insight, and 0% ignorance. This might serve to suggest that when ignorance ceases, the chain ceases. However, the Buddha does say that we are 'freed' from the chain, rather than the chain 'disappears' when ignorance ceases, etc. Some Mahayana schools might argue that insight into the underlying 'empty' essence of phenomena, immediately makes the chain 'redundant', as the meditator with such experience, is immediately 'freed' not only from the 'chain', but even from the 'concept' of such a chain existing.
He said that suffering ceases, birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, et cetera.
Thank you - your posts are very interesting.
You are welcome, and thank you as I find your posts very interesting as well.
Finally, in reference to the chain of dependent co-arising, sankhara specifically refers to fabrications in the sense of kamma formations—actions of body, speech, and mind that constitutes as cetana (volition). In this context, we are told in the Pali Canon that ignorance is the cause or condition for kammic-formations, but not the thinking process in general. Essentially, it should be distinguished that not all thought formations are kamma producing, otherwise arahants would be unable to think once they achieved nibbana.
Regards,
Jason
I don`t agree, please show me the Sutta were thinking is not an act of volition or a result of karma. The only differene exists in experiencing past karma and producing new karma. Then you do realize that every thought, speech and movement would be a result of past ignorance? Some just past, willed out ignorance and other the same plus triggering new karma? Maybe I see it wrong, I am talkling right out of my heart now, this is outright Nihilism.
I understand that I have to look closer first at the terms sankhara and kamma. I also want to thank you, Bobby, Vacha, Simon, HengYou and the rest of the people here for their effort and contribution, you all taught me much.
Perhaps you are right; nevertheless, the Venerable Nyanatiloka also states that not all thought formations are kamma producing. In essence, this would depend on the specific type of consciousness to which the sankhara belonged. I am not sure if there are any suttas which cover this explicitly, but I shall see if I can find one. I do know that this idea is covered extensively in the Theravadin Abhidhamma as well as in the commentarial literature.
As for the rest, it is a little confusing the way it is written. I am not quite sure what you are trying to say. Sankhara, in the sense of the aggregate, is defined as the six types of cetana (volition or intention); namely with regard to visual objects, to sounds, to odours, to tastes, to bodily impressions, and mental objects (SN 22.56). In relation to dependent co-arising, sankhara are the kamma producing actions of body, speech, and mind (SN 12.2).
I am not sure why you accuse me of nihilism. Perhaps you are misunderstanding what this word means as it is defined in the suttas. A nihilist is either "one who does not declare anything" (AN 10.94) or "a denier of individuality" (MN 22). As the Buddha said in MN 22, I am only concerned with suffering and the end of suffering. I apologize if anything I say disturbs you, and you are always free to disregard anything I say that you do not find helpful.
Ven.HengYu,
That is not quite right; it was written down about 400 to 500 years later.
Your assessment is incorrect on two counts:
1) The initial writing of the Dhamma occured in 326BC, some 100-200 years after the passing of the Buddha. If we take the life of the Buddha as occuring between 563 BC to 483 BC, then the initial writing of the Dhamma occured exactly 157 years after the Buddha's death.
2) This being so, the initial writing of the Dhamma was 157 years after the passing of the Buddha, and not 400 to 500 years after the Buddha, as you assert. You mistake the initial writing, with the full writing, a distinction that is important to the point I was making regarding the supplimentation of 'memory' with the 'written' format.
I believe it is at the beginning or end depending on the context of the sutta.
This is an example of the 'vagueness' of your argument. It makes your argument untenable, as no evidence is presented to support it. Mere Hear say' is not part of the Buddha's path.
I already explained why I believe that this is a false statement in post #47.
Incorrect; it is because of ignorance of the Four Noble Truths (MN 9, DN 16).
Once again, ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths (see SN 12.2).
I acknowledge your 'disagreement', but do not accept your lack of counter-argument in this matter, as a viable 'counter-argument. You simply repeat 'dogma', a reiterate the same statements, with no developmental methodolgy present.
This argument is faulty. You are misunderstanding the meaning of ignorance.
Your interpretation of my argument is faulty. Your definition of 'ignorance' is philosophically 'inconsistent' and has ebbed and flowed as the over-whelming academic evidence presented, has proved your argument 'incorrect'.
Dear Elohim
Thank you for your comment(s) and continued interest in this topic.
I can not 'convince' you about the wealth of academic Buddhist knowledge that proves your continued assertion quite incorrect. It appears, that despite the many, varied and eminant Buddhist thinkers - whose work I have conveyed and referenced above, does not satisfy your enquiring Mind in this matter.
On the other hand, you have applied what we call in philosophy, the 'Straw Dog' fallacy in our rather enjoyable debate. Briefly stated, the Straw Dog fallacy involves the deliberate misrepresentation of an opponent's argument; followed immediately by the 'refutation' of the 'misrepresentation', this avoids the 'real' and 'central' point of the opponent's argument. The Straw Dog fallacy is usually employed when an opponent's point has such a momentum behind it, that to confront the point head-on, will only end in debating failure. Some people development this method intuitively, others (like myself), have learned about during studies, etc.
But what you have shown here, leads me to a broader problem with Buddhism as it is perceived in the West, and sometimes in the East. Namely, how it is encountered. A doctrinal encountering, will depend solely upon the school one adheres to, or the books one studies, etc. The doctrinal view is a received history of events, a history that is not backed-up by indepth research.
That research, evolves out of a rich academic method, developed over-time. As you are 'unaware' of the methods of 'contextual analysis', 'deconstruction', the study of 'linguistics' the 'archaeology' of texts, the historical development of societies, and plane historical analysis of history in its purest form, then it does not matter how much evidence I present to you, as you are 'unaware' of the validity of the method that produced it. And as you are unware of the validity of the method that produced it, you decision (based upon a lack of knowledge in this area), must surely be 'flawed'. Simply repeating your position (i.e. that you are unconvinced that 'ignorance' was NOT in the original chain of conditioned dependency), whilst being shown consistant and even evidence from a diverse and varied pool of academic thinkers (both Buddhist nd non-Buddhist), does not make your argument any stronger, or indeed any less fallacious.
Your dogmatic position does not allow for 'proof' to be accepted, and draws our debate to a conclusion. (Readers will find it tedious to read and re-read points that are repetitive and do not develop the debate.) It would be a fairly easy exercise to 'deconstruct' you post into its substratum contingencies - but your intellection would simply grasp the points made, and make more endless suffering as a consequence. Intellection about the Dharma, is not penetration of it. Insight into the Dharma, through the Dharma and as a consequence of the Dharma, is very different to a mere 'idea' about the Dharma. Yes - intellection can be a mighty weapon for an open Mind, but a hindrance to one that mistakes 'ideas' about 'things', as the 'things' themselves.
However, the point of posting, is not to convince you of anything (you are just one person, like myself) but to share knowledge far and wide. And as a consequence, you are free to 'agree' or 'disgree' as the whim takes you. The presented knowledge above, is only a small amount of a substantial raft of evidence that the written sutras have evolved there ideas over-time and that 'ignorance' as a distinct 'chain' in the link of Nidana was not in the original chain. The MahaNidana Sutra above, shows this very clearly.
Thank you for the enjoyable exchange, I have found it very interesting - in more ways than one!:)
Indeed I have wondered what remains as motive for any activity if one has removed ignorance completely. These are just my thoughts about it:
It follows, that not only bad actons, but also good actions are conditioned by ignorance. Ven. Nyanatiloka Mahathera explains it by stating that bad actions also have hatred and greed as a condition, good actions only ignorance. It is quite logical since when somebody has achieved all there is to achieve, there remains nothing for him to do, so until he is there, his effort to gain enlihgtenment is also conditioned by ignorance or not knowing, which he is removing with the help of the dhammma. Still, for an enligthend being, there would remain nothing to do, except maybe help others out of compassion
I agree with your methodology here. And it does highlight the paradox of Buddhist thought, as it would mean that everything 'pre-enlightenment' is deemed 'ignorant'. That being so, even Dhammic practice is 'ignorant'. Of course, not all schools of Buddhism accept this interpretation.
This would suggest that 'ignorance' is 'lost', when 'enlightenment' is gained. As 'enlightenment' is not included in the chain, Presumably, when 'ignorance' is 'lost', the chain becomes 'obvious', but as suffering 'ceases' with enlightenment, surely the 'chain' must 'cease' also?. Enlightenment could not be included in the chain, as the chain 'ceases' upon enlightenment (although the Pali Canon suggests that the phenomenal world continues regardless), and 'enlightenment', by definition, can not 'cease'.
Your thoughts on this matter would be gratefully appreciated.
I agree with your methodology here. And it does highlight the paradox of Buddhist thought, as it would mean that everything 'pre-enlightenment' is deemed 'ignorant'. That being so, even Dhammic practice is 'ignorant'. Of course, not all schools of Buddhism accept this interpretation.
This would suggest that 'ignorance' is 'lost', when 'enlightenment' is gained. As 'enlightenment' is not included in the chain, Presumably, when 'ignorance' is 'lost', the chain becomes 'obvious', but as suffering 'ceases' with enlightenment, surely the 'chain' must 'cease' also?. Enlightenment could not be included in the chain, as the chain 'ceases' upon enlightenment (although the Pali Canon suggests that the phenomenal world continues regardless), and 'enlightenment', by definition, can not 'cease'.
Your thoughts on this matter would be gratefully appreciated.
Thank you
Following this discussion with interest, I am struck by this sentence. It opens all sorts of puzzles:
Is the phenomenal world independent of the chain of dependent co-arising?
Is the chain, however many links it may have, itself a result of mind?
Is the chain a description of the process by which we delude ourselves about the world yathabhutam?
Whilst unable (and unwilling) to engage in debate about whether 'ignorance' is or is not to be included in the chain, I notice that I have a note, taken from my reading of Thrangu Rinpoche's Buddha Nature (Rangjung Yeshe Publications, Kathmandu. 1988). The note translated the Tibetan lhan cig skyes pa'i ma rig pa as "Coemergent ignorance: The ignorance which all sentient beings are born with".
I think "ignorance" in Buddhism has a specific meaning. It is always in relation to the four noble truths. simplified it says, that removing ignorance here does not mean to know everything, but to know suffering, it`s origin, it`s end and the way to end it.
This again leads me to question the translation of "sankhāra". I did not ask without a purpose for the five skandhas in the beginning of this thread: Here we have the first: sankhara skandha. Is every volitional activity really a product of ignorance? Or ist the more apropriate translation even "mental formations"? In combination with what I said earlier here about Nyanatilokas interpretation, namely that all sankhara are a product of ignorance, wheter good or bad, this pretty much reminds me of the term "Vedanta", the end of knowledge (or is there knowledge that is nor a "mental formation"?).
Regards
Dear Fofoo
I found this extract which might be interesting;
'Another Samyukta text gives the sequence without ignorance as a series of grounds (vastu) of knowledge (jhana). In fact there are four grounds for each member of the sequence: knowledge of the condition itself, of its origination, of its cessation and of the practice leading to its cessation, this last being the eightfold way. The Sthaviravada text adds for each member of the sequence, each condition, that this knowledge, when a pupil has it, is his "knowledge about the principle (dhamma)". When he has seen, ascertained, attained "timelessly" (producing immediate results or known to be true regardless of?), plumbed this principle he draws a scheme (naya, "plan") with reference to the past and the future. Whatever sramanas or brahmans have discovered the forces (or whatever the principle, the condition, is), their origination, etc., in the past, or will discover the forces, etc., in the future, all of them have discovered or will discover them to be just as I discovered them to be now. This is the "knowledge about the reference (anvaya)". The text emphasises that the laws of nature, as we may call them, discovered by the Buddha (and checked by his pupil) are always true. The inference follows that whoever, whenever, discovers them must find them to be the same.'
Indian Buddhism: By A Warder, Page 114-115.
This analysis without 'ignorance', is inaccordance with the Four Noble Truths
Following this discussion with interest, I am struck by this sentence. It opens all sorts of puzzles:
Is the phenomenal world independent of the chain of dependent co-arising?
Is the chain, however many links it may have, itself a result of mind?
Is the chain a description of the process by which we delude ourselves about the world yathabhutam?
Whilst unable (and unwilling) to engage in debate about whether 'ignorance' is or is not to be included in the chain, I notice that I have a note, taken from my reading of Thrangu Rinpoche's Buddha Nature (Rangjung Yeshe Publications, Kathmandu. 1988). The note translated the Tibetan lhan cig skyes pa'i ma rig pa as "Coemergent ignorance: The ignorance which all sentient beings are born with".
Very interesting. From my own Ch'an training, 'emptiness' penetrates all phenomena. All phenomena - without acception - share the same equal nature 'devoid' of substantial substance. Everything up to the perception of 'emptiness', is a mere intellection designed to point one in the 'right' direction. From this perspective, 'emptiness' is not a 'meta-idea' that replaces the ideas that got one to its perception, it is a movement beyond 'intellect'. For me, knowledge of the chain - the nidana - does not free me from the cycle it elucidates. I simply become 'aware' of the chain, and intellectually 'ingest' its meaning. It is second hand knowledge acquired by myself, without necessarily 'experiencing' the reality it conveys. My 'knowledge' increases, but my ignorance does not diminish. Ignorance, then, does not have to 'disappear' for the chain to become 'known'.
The placing of 'ignorance' therefore, at the beginning of the chain is not required philosophically, as knowledge of the chain does not diminish ignorance. Just as enlightenment can not, and is not placed at the end of the chain, nor should ignorance be placed at the beginning.
When ignorance ends - the chain ends.
And both ignorance and the chain end when the Mind penetrates phenomena with insight. And in the Mahayana/Tantryana schools, samsara and nirvana share the same empty essence. Ignorance then, is not something 'separate' from 'nirvana'. It is, by definition, 'nirvana' as yet 'unknown'. With the penetration of phenomena, all categories dissolve away - good and bad included. The written Dhamma then becomes exactly what it is, a 'upaya' or 'skillful means' to point seekers in the right direction. If ignorance is to be added to the chain, then enlightenment should also be added - as they are both the essentially 'same' thing. However, such an addition would be illogical in the Buddhist philosophical sense. Ignorance transformed in 'nirvana' is not a 'chain link' to be over-come, but rather the penetration of phenomena to its essence.
"Coemergent ignorance: The ignorance which all sentient beings are born with".
This is essential as it is the same ignorance that is transformed into 'nirvana'.
Thank you so much for your input. I am very grateful.
'Ignorance is not ultimate. If ignorance were ultimate, it could never be extinguished. But if it were a complete non-entity, totally non-existent, then it would be a mere name devoid of reference; and the giving up of it would be devoid of meaning. Besides, then, it would not have any nature or function of its own.
Ignorance is indeed a power that creates objects of experience; it has its nature and function; but it cannot be held on that account to be an ultimate entity. Ignorance is not wholly determinable as either exising or not existing; it shares in this respect the nature of all mundane entities, itself being in fact "the root of all things as the common people conceive them." But there is a very important difference between the mundane entities and ignorance which is the root of misconstruction. While ignorance, when realised as ignorance, has itself totally disappeared, the mundane entities, even after being realised as unreal may continue to be experienced. This is to say that the conditioned nature of things which is their mundane nature need not itself be bound up with ignorance. The mistaking of the conditional as itself the uncondition pertains not to the continuation or the extinction of the objects of experience, but to one's belief in regard to their reality or unreality.'
Nagajuna's Philosophy: By K V Ramana, Page 111-112.
When evidence is presented, then all can benfit from its wisdom. Evidence that is not presented, remains 'unknown' and can not tbe taken into account.
For evidence of the Pali Canon being an oral tradition for the first five hundred years after the Buddha's death, I present Theravada Buddhism by Proffesor Richard Gombrich (Routledge, London, 2006), Beginnings: the Pali Suttas by Samanera Bodhesako (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1984), Buddhism in Sri Lanka by H.R. Perera (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1966), The Path of Purification by Ven. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975), and the Sinhalese chronicles where it states that the Pali Canon was written down in the reign of King Vattagamini (last century B.C.E.) in Sri Lanka, at the fourth Buddhist council.
I accept your disagreement, but not your interpretation of my argument.
With all due respect, I am not concerned with what you accept or reject in relation to my interpretation and understanding of Theravadin Buddhist doctrine. I am simply here to share what I know, and everyone is free to either accept it or reject it as they see fit.
This is an example of the 'vagueness' of your argument. It makes your argument untenable, as no evidence is presented to support it. Mere Hear say' is not part of the Buddha's path.
I fail to see how this is vague. I believe that the placement of ignorance in the various suttas mentioning it in relation to dependent co-arising are dependent upon the context of the sutta. If you wish for me to go through the entire Canon and pick specific examples to explain in further detail, then we can create a new topic in which we discuss ignorance in relation to dependent co-arising exclusively rather that dependent co-arising as a whole. However, my time is extremely limited as I am moving to Oregon in a week, so you will just have to be patient with me if you wish for a more detailed analysis in regards to ignorance and its place in dependent co-arising.
I acknowledge your 'disagreement', but do not accept your lack of counter-argument in this matter, as a viable 'counter-argument. You simply repeat 'dogma', a reiterate the same statements, with no developmental methodolgy present.
Perhaps I should be clear here. I am not an academic scholar. I am a practicing Buddhist. I am not here to prove or disprove Theravadin doctrine, especially the words of the Buddha that are — according to tradition — recorded in the Pali Canon. If that is what you expect of me, then I am sorry to disappoint you. It states very clearly in the Canon that ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths, and I have provided you with the appropriate sutta references. As I said, you are free to either accept it or reject it as you see fit.
I suggest you frequent yurself with the vast body of knolwedge on this matter, so that you develop your debating skills in this area.
I appreciate the suggestion and I will consider it; however, I do not have the time or the desire to develop my debating skills at this time. I apologize if my debating skills are not up to par. I have never learned how to formally debate, and I simply do the best that I can.
Your interpretation of my argument is faulty. Your definition of 'ignorance' is philosophically 'inconsistent' and has ebbed and flowed as the over-whelming academic evidence presented, has proved your argument 'incorrect'.
My definition of ignorance is taken directly from the Pali Canon. It is neither philosophically inconsistent nor have you proved that my argument that ignorance is in realtion to the Four Noble Truths is incorrect. In the Pali Canon, ignorance has always been in relation to the Four Noble Truths (DN 16, MN 9, SN 12.2, et cetera). If you do not accept what is presented in the Pali Canon, then of course you are going to say that whatever evidence I present from it was either added later on — or if you have no evidence of this — that you do not accept my evidence on the grounds that I am merely presenting dogma. If that is indeed the case, then what more can I say?
'Another Samyukta text gives the sequence without ignorance as a series of grounds (vastu) of knowledge (jhana). In fact there are four grounds for each member of the sequence: knowledge of the condition itself, of its origination, of its cessation and of the practice leading to its cessation, this last being the eightfold way. The Sthaviravada text adds for each member of the sequence, each condition, that this knowledge, when a pupil has it, is his "knowledge about the principle (dhamma)". When he has seen, ascertained, attained "timelessly" (producing immediate results or known to be true regardless of?), plumbed this principle he draws a scheme (naya, "plan") with reference to the past and the future. Whatever sramanas or brahmans have discovered the forces (or whatever the principle, the condition, is), their origination, etc., in the past, or will discover the forces, etc., in the future, all of them have discovered or will discover them to be just as I discovered them to be now. This is the "knowledge about the reference (anvaya)". The text emphasises that the laws of nature, as we may call them, discovered by the Buddha (and checked by his pupil) are always true. The inference follows that whoever, whenever, discovers them must find them to be the same.'
Indian Buddhism: By A Warder, Page 114-115.
This analysis without 'ignorance', is inaccordance with the Four Noble Truths
Thank you.
Firstly, I would like to say that I have by far not enough knowledge of Buddhist history in order to make a sound judgment if ignorance was later added to the chain or not, or what is a proper stratification of the sutras. My concerns so far have been solely of a logical nature and this probably isn`t much:)
Secondly, the quote you gave from Warder is quite interesting. Do we know if there exists an English translation of this sutta? If I understood the above text correctly, it must have been located in the Samyutra-collection of the Sthaviravada. It would be good if we could have a look into the grounds.
For evidence of the Pali Canon being an oral tradition for the first five hundred years after the Buddha's death, I present Theravada Buddhism by Proffesor Richard Gombrich (Routledge, London, 2006), Beginnings: the Pali Suttas by Samanera Bodhesako (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1984), Buddhism in Sri Lanka by H.R. Perera (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1966), The Path of Purification by Ven. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975), and the Sinhalese chronicles where it states that the Pali Canon was written down in the reign of King Vattagamini (last century B.C.E.) in Sri Lanka, at the fourth Buddhist council.
With all due respect, I am not concerned with what you accept or reject in relation to my interpretation and understanding of Theravadin Buddhist doctrine. I am simply here to share what I know, and everyone is free to either accept it or reject it as they see fit.
I fail to see how this is vague. I believe that the placement of ignorance in the various suttas mentioning it in relation to dependent co-arising are dependent upon the context of the sutta. If you wish for me to go through the entire Canon and pick specific examples to explain in further detail, then we can create a new topic in which we discuss ignorance in relation to dependent co-arising exclusively rather that dependent co-arising as a whole. However, my time is extremely limited as I am moving to Oregon in a week, so you will just have to be patient with me if you wish for a more detailed analysis in regards to ignorance and its place in dependent co-arising.
Perhaps I should be clear here. I am not an academic scholar. I am a practicing Buddhist. I am not here to prove or disprove Theravadin doctrine, especially the words of the Buddha that are — according to tradition — recorded in the Pali Canon. If that is what you expect of me, then I am sorry to disappoint you. It states very clearly in the Canon that ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths, and I have provided you with the appropriate sutta references. As I said, you are free to either accept it or reject it as you see fit.
I appreciate the suggestion and I will consider it; however, I do not have the time or the desire to develop my debating skills at this time. I apologize if my debating skills are not up to par. I have never learned how to formally debate, and I simply do the best that I can.
My definition of ignorance is taken directly from the Pali Canon. It is neither philosophically inconsistent nor have you proved that my argument that ignorance is in realtion to the Four Noble Truths is incorrect. In the Pali Canon, ignorance has always been in relation to the Four Noble Truths (DN 16, MN 9, SN 12.2, et cetera). If you do not accept what is presented in the Pali Canon, then of course you are going to say that whatever evidence I present from it was either added later on — or if you have no evidence of this — that you do not accept my evidence on the grounds that I am merely presenting dogma. If that is indeed the case, then what more can I say?
Respectfully,
Jason
Thank you Elohim.
Perhaps I have been too harsh in this regard. If, out of all the chaos of posting, others are inspired or indeed, motivated to practice harder or search deeper, our efforts have not been in vain. I view our exchange, (indeed, any exchange), as a symbiotic process of developmental progression.
I understand what you say, and I accept your opinion as valid. Debate is not everything. Please excuse my haste in this matter. Perhaps we can learn from one another?
I agree with your methodology here. And it does highlight the paradox of Buddhist thought, as it would mean that everything 'pre-enlightenment' is deemed 'ignorant'. That being so, even Dhammic practice is 'ignorant'. Of course, not all schools of Buddhism accept this interpretation.
Yes, any effort for enlightenment would be born out of ignorance. The paradox i think can only be resolved in seeing ignorance and enlightenment as two containers on a pair of balances, each filled with sand, and the only possibility to change the balance would be to take sand from one container and put it into the other, the "ammount" of ignorance influencing the position of enlightenment on the balance and vice versa. It would be seen more as agradual progress, the effort has to the be until the end based on faith or trust in the Dharma, since its compelete truth could only be realized afterwards.
This would suggest that 'ignorance' is 'lost', when 'enlightenment' is gained. As 'enlightenment' is not included in the chain, Presumably, when 'ignorance' is 'lost', the chain becomes 'obvious', but as suffering 'ceases' with enlightenment, surely the 'chain' must 'cease' also?. Enlightenment could not be included in the chain, as the chain 'ceases' upon enlightenment (although the Pali Canon suggests that the phenomenal world continues regardless), and 'enlightenment', by definition, can not 'cease'.
Your thoughts on this matter would be gratefully appreciated.
Thank you
I find it noteable that patticasamuppada was discovered in deep meditation. If we read the verses in udana 1.1-1.3, the Buddha says that
1.) if one truly discerns cause and effect, the last doubt vanished
2 ) having discerned it, he realizes that with the cessation of the cause follows the cessation of the effect
3) finally, he defeats mara´s army and is brightly shining forth like the sun on the bright horizon.
So, although enlightenment is not included in the formula, at least in Udana it is given as the result perfect discernments and the absence of the causes and effects. According to the verses,the discovery of the chain ,it`s deep penetration in medition by oneself, brings about the end of it, but not the end of the Buddha, since there his shining only begins.
Firstly, I would like to say that I have by far not enough knowledge of Buddhist history in order to make a sound judgment if ignorance was later added to the chain or not, or what is a proper stratification of the sutras. My concerns so far have been solely of a logical nature and this probably isn`t much:)
Secondly, the quote you gave from Warder is quite interesting. Do we know if there exists an English translation of this sutta? If I understood the above text correctly, it must have been located in the Samyutra-collection of the Sthaviravada. It would be good if we could have a look into the grounds.
I think this might be the sutta in question. Bear in Mind that the author is quoting a specific translation, which might not be available on the Net. However, the general gist of his statement above may be gleamed from the above, together with ignorance occuring later in the Sutta.
If anyone can find the exact reference, I would be very grateful.
Perhaps you are right; nevertheless, the Venerable Nyanatiloka also states that not all thought formations are kamma producing. In essence, this would depend on the specific type of consciousness to which the sankhara belonged. I am not sure if there are any suttas which cover this explicitly, but I shall see if I can find one. I do know that this is covered extensively in the Theravadin Abhidhamma as well as the commentarial literature.
As for the rest, it is a little confusing the way it is written. I am not quite sure what you are trying to say. Sankhara, in the sense of the aggregate, is defined as the six types of cetana (volition or intention); namely with regard to visual objects, to sounds, to odours, to tastes, to bodily impressions, and mental objects (SN 22.56). In relation to dependent co-arising, sankhara are the kamma producing actions of body, speech, and mind (SN 12.2).
I am not sure why you accuse me of nihilism, but there is nothing nihilistic about what I am saying. Perhaps you are misunderstanding what this word means as it is defined in the suttas. A nihilist is, "one who does not declare anything" (AN 10.94) or, "a denier of individuality" (MN 22). I do not recall doing either. I apologize if anything I say disturbs you, and you are always free to disregard anything I say that you do not find helpful.
Jason
I did not "accuse" you of Nihilism, Jason. In my reasoning, I came to the conclusion that what I get from paticasamuppada, is nihlism since i equate kamma with volition and the end of kamma would be the end of me wanting anything. My fault, it is a rather emotional topic for me and I agree with you that my post was not very skillfull.
I did not say that your post was unskillful, I said that your post was a little confusing the way it was written. What I meant was that I was unsure about what you were trying to say. For example, you started out by saying that you did not agree with my previous post, and after three sentences that were confusing to me, said that you felt this was outright nihilism.
I assumed that from the way it was written, you were referring to the ideas in my previous post as being nihilistic. I apologize for my assumption that you were referring to my post instead of your assessment of dependent co-arising. Sometimes it is easy for me to misunderstand what is being implied without specific references. Try not to hold it against me.
Equating volitional action (kamma) with volition (cetana) is correct (AN 6.63). Nevertheless, equating the end of kamma with the end of wanting anything is incorrect. The Venerable Kassapa, for example, chose to continue practicing meditation in the forest — even though he had already attained arahantship — out of a desire to inspire later generations (SN 16.5).
Perhaps this short excerpt that is taken from the Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi's critique of the Venerable Nanavira Thera's notes on paticca-samuppada will help you to understand this idea a little better:
For the saṅkhāra of the PS formula must be dependent upon ignorance as their necessary condition and must cease with the cessation of ignorance, but the three saṅkhāra of the Cūḷavedalla Sutta do not meet this requirement. These saṅkhāra are not necessarily dependent upon ignorance and do not cease with the ceasing of ignorance. Though the arahant has completely eradicated ignorance, he continues to breathe in and out (except when in the fourth jhāna and higher attainments), to think and ponder (except when in the second and higher jhānas), and to perceive and feel (except when in the cessation of perception and feeling). But what does cease for the arahant with the cessation of ignorance are volitional formations — saṅkhāra understood as sañcetanā. Whereas the non-arahant’s bodily, verbal, and mental activities are constructive forces conditioned by ignorance that sustain the round of rebirths, the arahant’s activities are kammically extinct. They no longer sustain the continuation of the round, no longer project consciousness into any new mode of becoming.
The full article has been made available for download by the Venerable Dhammanando on E-sangha if you are interested in reading it in its entirety. The link to original thread is here, and the article here.
I did not say that your post was unskillful, I said that your post was a little confusing the way it was written. What I meant was that I was unsure about what you were trying to say. For example, you started out by saying that you did not agree with my previous post, and after three sentences that were confusing to me, said that you felt this was outright nihilism.
I assumed that from the way it was written, you were referring to the ideas in my previous post as being nihilistic. I apologize for my assumption that you were referring to my post instead of your assessment of dependent co-arising. Sometimes it is easy for me to misunderstand what is being implied without specific references. Try not to hold it against me.
Equating volitional action (kamma) with volition (cetana) is correct (AN 6.63). Nevertheless, equating the end of kamma with the end of wanting anything is incorrect. The Venerable Kassapa, for example, chose to continue practicing meditation in the forest — even though he had already attained arahantship — out of a desire to inspire later generations (SN 16.5).
Jason
Thanks for the link. It is actually inline with the Buddha teaching out of compassion and brings me to the idea that one might think in terms of egoism and altruism concerning activities that produce new karma and activities that don`t since the motive seems to be the decisive part.
Whereas the non-arahant’s bodily, verbal, and mental activities are constructive forces conditioned by ignorance that sustain the round of rebirths, the arahant’s activities are kammically extinct.
What he says here is that the Arhants activities are volitional extinct, there is no volition(cetana) at all. I have reached the point where debate does not bring me any further because points have become too subtle, terms being used are partly redundant, partly only valid in contexts. This exceeds the knowledge I currently have. For now, I will focus more on the attainment of the jhanas
This might be the departure point for Nagarjuna and his Madhyamaka philosophy. His treatise is clear and concise about things as they are in the enlightened state. Excessive intellection obscures the perception of 'sunyata'. Making a 'chain' to put on a 'chain'. For the chain to be fully usefel on the path, it must serve two distinct purposes;
1) Free us from delusion.
2) Free us from the need for a chain.
For the chain to be worthwhile, it must contain its own redundancy. What seems to be happening in the above debate, is that the 'edge' of the intellect is reached, but the sunyata that lies beyond, can not be fully conveyed in owrds, or at least in owrds that make logocal sense. If words continue to make logical sense, then the intellection has been reactivated, and 'obscuration' is the result.
Without that necassary and crucial cognative 'leap' the intellect, fueled by craving for more knowledge, makes up ever more and confusing loops of expression, designed to keep the thinking process going in EXACTLY the same way as it has always done, but with the added delusive 'screen' that by doing so, enlightenment is being gained.
Understanding an idea, is crucial to a point; and that point, when reached, should represent a 'breakthrough' in meditative insight, that serves to transcend the old habits and structures of the conditioned Mind. If that 'point' does not culminate in an 'insightful' breakthrough, then one simple remains having 'interesting' ideas about a philosophical concept, that is nolonger working to free the Mind from its own contradictions and delusive habits. Dhamma becomes aDhamma.
The chain does not 'disappear'. it does not disappear, as it neve existed. The essence of all phenomena - the chain including, is 'sunyata'. It is the direct perception, without hindrance, of the underlying 'empty' nature of phenomena. An emptiness that contains all things.
Delusion makes the chain appear real and solid. It does not disappear as such, but one's insight penetrates the delusion and the emptiness is realised. In this state, the false boundaries between 'subject' and 'object' dissolve into 'oneness' and there is no more karma produced, and the casual nexus (i.e. the the base dualism of a subject that creates karma that is experienced through the object) has been thoroughly 'smashed'.
Agreement and disagreement are irrelevant to the act of insightful penetration. The empty Mind is nolonger functioning upon the premise of a false dichtotomy of 'subject' - 'object'. If the chain does not 'free' you from the tyranny of 'knowning', then it is not doing its Dhammic job. The problem resides not in the chain, but rather the Mind that views the chain.
Concerning Nagarjuna, I have almost zero knowledge, only second hand knowledge from Frauwallner, who basically wrote that for Nagarjuna, dependent origination is unreal, since it consists of the contradicory pairs of origination and cessation, which in reality, do not apply. As far as I understood, it is basically derived from the insuffiency of words in describing reality and nagarjuna`s method to "relativize" a pair of opposite terms, allowing no absolutes. As I said, no profound knowledge on my side but I am glad you mentioned Nagarjuna at this point. Can you recommend a good resource for studying dependent origination according to Nagarjuna? Many thanks.
Concerning Nagarjuna, you might want to start with Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), Mahayanavimsika (Verses on the Great Vehicle), and Pratityasamutpadahrdayakarika (Heart of Dependent Origination).
Comments
MahaNidana sutta
http://www.buddhistinformation.com/ida_b_wells_memorial_sutra_library/mahanidana_sutta.htm
'This is what I heard:
On one occasion the Blessed One was living among the Kurus. Now, the Kurus have a town named Kammasadhamma. There Ven. Ánanda approached the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to the Blessed One, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One: "It's amazing, lord, it's astounding, how deep this dependent co-arising is, and how deep its appearance, and yet to me it seems as clear as clear can be."
[The Buddha:] "Don't say that, Ánanda. Don't say that. Deep is this dependent co-arising, and deep its appearance. It's because of not understanding and not penetrating this Dhamma that this generation is like a tangled skein, a knotted ball of string, like matted rushes and reeds, and does not go beyond transmigration, beyond the planes of deprivation, woe, and bad destinations.
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for aging and death?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition do aging and death come?' one should say, 'Aging and death come from birth as their requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for birth?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does birth come?' one should say, 'Birth comes from becoming as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for becoming?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does becoming come?' one should say, 'Becoming comes from clinging as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for clinging?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does clinging come?' one should say, 'Clinging comes from craving as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for craving?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does craving come?' one should say, 'Craving comes from feeling as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for feeling?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does feeling come?' one should say, 'Feeling comes from contact as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for contact?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does contact come?' one should say, 'Contact comes from name-and-form as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for name-and-form?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does name-and-form come?' one should say, 'Name-and-form comes from consciousness as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for consciousness?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does consciousness come?' one should say, 'Consciousness comes from name-and-form as its requisite condition.'
"Thus, Ánanda, from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form. From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, aging, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress.
Aging and Death
"'From birth as a requisite condition come aging and death.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from birth as a requisite condition come aging and death. If there were no birth at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., of devas in the state of devas, of celestials in the state of celestials, of spirits in the state of spirits, of demons in the state of demons, of human beings in the human state, of quadrupeds in the state of quadrupeds, of birds in the state of birds, of snakes in the state of snakes, or of any being in its own state -- in the utter absence of birth, from the cessation of birth, would aging and death be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for aging and death, i.e., birth.
Birth
"'From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. If there were no becoming at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., sensual becoming, form becoming, or formless becoming -- in the utter absence of becoming, from the cessation of becoming, would birth be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for birth, i.e., becoming.
Becoming
"'From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. If there were no clinging at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., clinging to sensuality, clinging to precepts and practices, clinging to views, or clinging to doctrines of the self -- in the utter absence of clinging, from the cessation of clinging, would becoming be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for becoming, i.e., clinging.
Clinging
"'From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no becoming -- in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving, would clinging be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for clinging, i.e., craving.
Craving
"'From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. If there were no feeling at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., feeling born of contact at the eye, feeling born of contact at the ear, feeling born of contact at the nose, feeling born of contact at the tongue, feeling born of contact at the body, or feeling born of contact at the intellect -- in the utter absence of feeling, from the cessation of feeling, would craving be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for craving, i.e., feeling.
Dependent on Craving
"Now, craving is dependent on feeling,
seeking is dependent on craving,
acquisition is dependent on seeking,
ascertainment is dependent on acquisition,
desire and passion is dependent on ascertainment,
attachment is dependent on desire and passion,
possessiveness is dependent on attachment,
stinginess is dependent on attachment,
defensiveness is dependent on stinginess,
and because of defensiveness, dependent on defensiveness, various evil, unskillful phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies.
"And this is the way to understand how it is that because of defensiveness various evil, unskillful phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies. If there were no defensiveness at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter absence of defensiveness, from the cessation of defensiveness, would various evil, unskillful phenomena -- the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies -- come into play?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for the coming-into-play of various evil, unskillful phenomena -- the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies -- i.e., defensiveness.
"'Defensiveness is dependent on stinginess.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how defensiveness is dependent on stinginess. If there were no stinginess at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter absence of stinginess, from the cessation of stinginess, would defensiveness be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for defensiveness, i.e., stinginess.
(Similarly back through the chain of conditions: stinginess, attachment, possessiveness, desire and passion, ascertainment, acquisition, and seeking.)
"'Seeking is dependent on craving.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how seeing is dependent on craving. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no becoming -- in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving, would seeking be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for seeking, i.e., craving. Thus, Ánanda, these two phenomena [the chain of conditions leading from craving to birth, aging, and death, and the chain of conditions leading from craving to quarrels, etc.], as a duality, flow back into one place at feeling.
Feeling
"'From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. If there were no contact at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., contact at the eye, contact at the ear, contact at the nose, contact at the tongue, contact at the body, or contact at the intellect -- in the utter absence of contact, from the cessation of contact, would feeling be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for feeling, i.e., contact.
Contact
"'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes contact.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how, from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes contact. If the qualities, traits, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of name-group (mental activity) were all absent, would designation-contact with regard to the form-group (the physical body) be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of form-group were all absent, would resistance-contact with regard to the name-group be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of name-group and form-group were all absent, would designation-contact or resistance-contact be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for contact, i.e., name-and-form.
Name and Form
"'From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form. If consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?"
"No, lord."
"If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart, would name-and-form be produced for this world?"
"No, lord."
"If the consciousness of the young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name-and-form ripen, grow, and reach maturity?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for name-and-form, i.e., consciousness."
Consciousness
"'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. If consciousness were not to gain a foothold in name-and-form, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth, aging, death, and stress in the future be discerned?
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for consciousness, i.e., name-and-form.
"This is the extent to which there is birth, aging, death, passing away, and re-arising. This is the extent to which there are means of designation, expression, and delineation. This is the extent to which the sphere of discernment extends, the extent to which the cycle revolves for the manifesting (discernibility) of this world -- i.e., name-and-form together with consciousness.
Delineations of a Self
"To what extent, Ánanda, does one delineate when delineating a self? Either delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, delineating a self formless and finite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, delineating a self formless and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and infinite.'
"Now, the one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and finite, either delineates it as possessed of form and finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite lies latent [within that person].
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and infinite, either delineates it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite lies latent [within that person].
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and finite, either delineates it as formless and finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite lies latent [within that person].
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and infinite, either delineates it as formless and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite lies latent [within that person].
Non-Delineations of a Self
"To what extent, Ánanda, does one not delineate when not delineating a self? Either not delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, not delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and infinite.'
"Now, the one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite does not lie latent [within that person].
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite does not lie latent [within that person].
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and finite, does not delineate it as formless and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite does not lie latent [within that person].
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and infinite, does not delineate it as formless and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite does not lie latent [within that person].
Assumptions of a Self
"To what extent, Ánanda, does one assume when assuming a self? Assuming feeling to be the self, one assumes that 'Feeling is my self' [or] 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling]' [or] 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious to feeling, but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, one who says, 'Feeling is my self,' should be addressed as follows: 'There are these three feelings, my friend -- feelings of pleasure, feelings of pain, and feelings of neither pleasure nor pain. Which of these three feelings do you assume to be the self?' At a moment when a feeling of pleasure is sensed, no feeling of pain or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pleasure is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pain is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of pain is sensed. Only a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed at that moment.
"Now, a feeling of pleasure is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. Having sensed a feeling of pleasure as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pleasure, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pain, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, 'my self' has perished.
"Thus he assumes, assuming in the immediate present a self inconstant, entangled in pleasure and pain, subject to arising and passing away, he who says, 'Feeling is my self.' Thus in this manner, Ánanda, one does not see fit to assume feeling to be the self.
"As for the person who says, 'Feeling is not the self: My self is oblivious [to feeling],' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, where nothing whatsoever is sensed (experienced) at all, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ánanda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious to feeling.'
"As for the person who says, 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, should feelings altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with feeling completely not existing, owing to the cessation of feeling, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ánanda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, Ánanda, in as far as a monk does not assume feeling to be the self, nor the self as oblivious, nor that 'My self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by anything (does not cling to anything) in the world. Un-sustained, he is not agitated. Un-agitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'
"If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind is thus released that 'The Tathágata exists after death,' is his view, that would be mistaken; that 'The Tathágata does not exist after death'...that 'The Tathágata both exists and does not exist after death'...that 'The Tathágata neither exists nor does not exist after death' is his view, that would be mistaken. Why? Having directly known the extent of designation and the extent of the objects of designation, the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent of description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of discernment and the extent of the objects of discernment, the extent to which the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. [To say that,] 'The monk released, having directly known that, does not see, does not know is his opinion,' that would be mistaken.
Seven Stations of Consciousness
"Ánanda, there are these seven stations of consciousness and two spheres. Which seven?
"There are beings with diversity of body and diversity of perception, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms. This is the first station of consciousness.
"There are beings with diversity of body and singularity of perception, such as the devas of the Brahma hosts generated by the first [jhana]. This is the second station of consciousness.
"There are beings with singularity of body and diversity of perception, such as the Radiant Devas. This is the third station of consciousness.
"There are beings with singularity of body and singularity of perception, such as the Beautifully Lustrous Devas. This is the fourth station of consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of perceptions of [physical] form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, thinking, 'Infinite space,' arrive at the sphere of the infinitude of space. This is the fifth station of consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness,' arrive at the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the sixth station of consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness, thinking, 'There is nothing,' arrive at the sphere of nothingness. This is the seventh station of consciousness.
"The sphere of non-percipient beings and, second, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. [These are the two spheres.]
"Now, as for the first station of consciousness -- beings with diversity of body and diversity of perception, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms: If one discerns that [station of consciousness], discerns its origination, discerns its passing away, discerns its allure, discerns its drawbacks, discerns the escape from it, would it be proper, by means of that [discernment] to take delight there?"
"No, lord."
(Similarly with each of the remaining stations of consciousness and two spheres.)
"Ánanda, when knowing -- as they actually are -- the origination, passing away, allure, drawbacks of -- and escape from -- these seven stations of consciousness and two spheres, a monk is release through lack of clinging, he is said to be a monk released through discernment.
Eight Emancipations
"Ánanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight?
"Possessed of form, one sees forms. This is the first emancipation.
"Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally. This is the second emancipation.
"One is intent only on the beautiful. This is the third emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of perceptions of [physical] form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, thinking, 'Infinite space,' one enters and remains in the sphere of the infinitude of space. This is the fourth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness,' one enters and remains in the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the fifth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness, thinking, 'There is nothing,' one enters and remains in the sphere of nothingness. This is the sixth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of nothingness, one enters and remains in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. This is the seventh emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation of perception and feeling. This is the eighth emancipation.
"Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order, when he attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of the mental fermentations he enters and remains in the fermentation-free release of awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and realized it in the here and now, he is said to be a monk released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher or more sublime than this, there is none."
That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Ánanda delighted in the Blessed One's words.'
Thank you for reading, my next post deals with research regarding why 'ignorance' as a concept is not included in the above sutta.
Thank you
'Before we continue with the MahaNidana Sutta, which now develops some other topics (please see above), it will be useful to add here some gleanings on the sequence of conditioned origination from the Samyukta. First a general formula for attending methodically to conditioned origination is mentioned. It gives the general form of a statement of a condition. "This being, this is. From the occurence of this, this occurs. (This not being, this is not. From the cessation of this, ceases.)
The most striking feature in the Nidana Samyukta discussions is the addition of three more members to the main sequence. Usually where the latter occurs we find next to "experience exists through the condition of contact" a new condition: "Contact exists through the condition of the six entrances." This is followed by "the six entrances exist through the condition of a sentient body" and then "a sentient body exists through the condition of consciousness" as before. This new condition in fact is little but an elucidation of "contact"....
More important are the other two NEW CONDITIONS. After a sentient body exists through the condition of consciousness we find instead of "consciousness exists through the condition of a sentient body" the NEW "consciousness exists through the condition of the forces (samskaras, plural). Finally we have "the forces exists through the condition of IGNORANCE (avidya). By way of elucidation of the two new conditions the Samyukta tells us: "There are three forces: the force of the body (i.e. physical force), the force of speech, the force of thought.." Ignorance is a lack of knowledge of the Four Truths.
It seems clear, and this is how these two conditions were interpreting by all schools Buddhism, that by taking the sequence beyond consciousness and the sentient body the Samyukta has simply carried the process back again to a previous life. The only condition for the existence of consciousness and a sentient body, besides each acting as condition for the other, as stated in the Dirgha, is previous existence, a previous life, of consciousness and a sentient body,in which a living being performed certain actions, exercised its "forces". These forces operating in the previous existence produce rebirth, produce consciousness and a sentient body in another existence, another life. There is one sutra in the Samyukta which suggests how "forces" and IGNORANCE were added to the sequence successively, since it gives the sequence with forces but OMITTING ignorance. It says: "Following it (the eightfold way) I (the Buddha) discovered ageing and dying and their origination, cessation and the practice leading to that cessation. Following it I discovered birth...existence....consciousness and its origination, etc. Following it I discovered the forces and their origination, cessation and the practice leading to that cessation." The text ends there adding merely that the Buddha has described this way, the best life, to his followers. IGNORANCE is not mentioned, and knowledge is only implied in the discovery of the sequence.'
Indian Buddhism: By AK Warder, Page 112-113.
Here we see quite clearly that 'ignorance' was not part of the original teaching on Nidana. This does not mean that the chain of Nidana was diminished in anyway, when 'ignorance' was added at a later date. It is simply a technical point regarding doctrine and its historical development.
Thank you
In regards to the fact that all twelve are not mentioned in every instance, I think that it is safe to say that just because in certain situations a lower number of links were referenced or enumerated does not necessarily mean that there were not other occasions where all twelve were mentioned, or that the others are unimportant. That in itself proves nothing. For example, there are many suttas where we find one of the eight factors of the path discussed without mention of the other seven, or we find places where one or two of the five aggregates are mentioned without reference to the other four or five. This does not necessarily mean that the rest were later additions.
What it does mean is that in the Pali canon, we have a maximum number of any given things mentioned, and when speaking about specific lists of those things we include the full number mentioned. In other words, when listing the Four Noble Truths, we include all four that are mentioned regardless if there are occasion where only one or two are mentioned (i.e. SN 38.17, AN 9.34, et cetera). When listing the Noble Eightfold Path, we include all eight that are mentioned regardless if there are places where only one or two are mentioned (i.e. MN 9, MN 43, et cetera). The same holds true for the aggregates, the factors for awakening, the links of dependent co-arising, et cetera.
Let's just say that I agree with you that there is possibility that doctrinal subjects like dependent co-arising developed over time, but that I do not agree that we can conclusively say this as a factual statement with any real degree of certainty. There is certainly evidence to suggest that this may have happened, but there is simply no way to verify that the Buddha or his disciples never enumerated twelve distinct links at any given time during their dispensations. Perhaps they did when the occasion called for it, and refrained when it did not. It is impossible to conclusively know which without having a record of the original teachings; we can only guess from what we do know.
Since nothing was written down for the first five hundred years or so, all we have are traditional accounts to go by in this respect. It is simply impossible to tell if certain schools added a particular sutta, or if other schools removed a particular sutta from their respective canons. For all we know, the Buddha could have used more detailed explanations of dependent co-arising when he felt the participants would benefit from them instead of placing the blame on later generations. We must remember that by traditional accounts, the suttas were spoken to whatever audience was present at that time. This meant that each discourse was tailored specifically to those present.
Respectfully,
Jason
You make your points in a cogent and convincing manner. Philosophical debate has been apart of the Buddhist remit since the time of the Lord Buddha. The Mahayanists and the Tantrayanists all claim that the Lord Buddha taught the basis of the philosophy of their respective schools, during His lifetime, and that the Mahayana and Tantrayana vehicles WERE NOT later developments - away from the supposed 'orthodoxy' of the Pali Cannon.
Infact, much of the Pali Cannon can be read in such away so as to justify virtually any philosophical perspective upon Buddhism, and the Buddhist path. And, as you rightly say, the Cannon was not written down until about one hundred years after the passing of the Lord Buddha - and then, only the disputes that occured during 'disagreement' in interpretation of doctrine. A hundred years after that, were the pitakas put into somekind of written form.
Your assertion that the pitakas were written down hundreds of years after the Lord Buddha spoke the Dhamma, is correct. However, your assumption that the time between the spoken Dhamma and the written Dhamma (between 100 and 200 years), 'allows' for a 'vagueness' of interpretation, may need to be examined to see if that could have been the case. It is believed that certaine monks were charged with 'remembering' the actual Dhamma - passed-on from master to student over the generations. Such a feat of memory is no tunheard of amongst the Hindu people. Even now, many villages have holy men whose job it is to remember the clan history, and the various clan lineages that exist within that village. Hundeds of generations, facts and figures are involved in this feat of extraordinary memorising. Thousands of years of history are recorded.
Now, the Buddhist Sangha only had to perform this duty for 100 to 200 years. The monks chosen to 'memorise' the teachings were probably well aware of the Hindu tradition, and may have even been from families who were charged with this vital social function. This is speculation, based upon a sound understanding of culture in north India - particularly amongst the Gujaratis. But even if they were not so directly involved, developing the function of 'memory' over-time, was simply a matter of 'technique'. It can be assured, with reasonable satisfaction, that the Buddhist Sangha performed this task extraordinarily well, as the memorised texts were preserved up until there committment to writing - some 200 years following the Buddha's passing.
It is also true to say, that the earliest texts that transitioned from 'memory' to the 'written' form, did not contain 'ignorance' as a 'prime-cause' of the chain of dependent origination. Indeed, the MahaNidana Sutra, starts with 'aging and death' being a condition of 'birth' and so on, and so forth.
Ignorance does not have to be there, as the cycle of conditional origination progresses quite freely, independent of it. Ignorance does not make the cycle proceed or stop. Indeed, ingorance is only a 'temporary' Mind faculty. A temporary faculty that is removed with the enlightenment experience. It would not make philosophical sense to make a temporary Mind faculty the basis of a theory of the conditioned origination of the physical world.
So why is ignorance at the beginning of the chain? Well, even in the MahaNidana Sutra, the Buddha clearly says that it is the 'lack of knowledge' of the cycle of conditioned origination, that keeps people upon the cycle of samsara. Not 'knowing' the cycle, maybe viewed as being 'ignorant' of the chain. If one is ignorant of the chain, then one is subject to the chain, even though one is 'unaware' of its existence.
And here is the crux of the philosophical problem with placing 'ignorance' at the front of the chain. One is stuck in samsara, because one is unaware (i.e. 'ignorant') of the chain. However, when one is 'aware' of the chain, 'ignorance' of the chain ceases immediately, and 'ignorance' can not be said to be at the front of the chain. Awareness of the chain, is not 'enlightenment' at that point. So, although 'ignorance' of the chain dissolves as one becomes aware of the chain, the chain itself does not dissolve. The chain still exists, and as one proceeds through the levels of meditative insight, one can not proceed from 'ignorance', as one is fully aware of the chain, its links and how each link associates and conditions the next link. Ignorance of the chain does not exist at this point, and nor can it.
The earlier chains do not show ignorance for the reasons outlined above. The latter chains do, for the other reasons highlighted above. Ignorance serves to remind us that we do not know something. We have to work on ourselves to dissolve our own ignorance. Ignorance at the beginning of the later chain, is a pointer or signpost, rather than a concrete philosophical statement. It serves to remind us of the work to be done.
However, our progress might be hampered, if we thought that we must be 'ignorant' in someway, everytime we meditate. We can not 'unknow' the chain, once we have learned it. We can not turn acquired insight back into ignorance. Even understanding that there is 'ignorance', and that this 'ignorance' can be over-come, is itself a product of insight, and not 'ignorant' at all.
But it might also be that 'ignorance' dissolves in 'stages', more or less in proportion to the insight we gain from meditation. So we might find ourselves in a situation of 20% insight, 80% ignorance, and so on and so forth. Untill we arrive at 100% insight, and 0% ignorance. This might serve to suggest that when ignorance ceases, the chain ceases. However, the Buddha does say that we are 'freed' from the chain, rather than the chain 'disappears' when ignorance ceases, etc. Some Mahayana schools might argue that insight into the underlying 'empty' essence of phenomena, immediately makes the chain 'redundant', as the meditator with such experience, is immediately 'freed' not only from the 'chain', but even from the 'concept' of such a chain existing.
Thank you - your posts are very interesting.
Thank you. I do my best to try and make my points as clear as possible.
Perhaps the penchant for debate is a genetic trait unique to humans.
But you can say that for almost anything. We are a very creative species.
That is not quite right; it was written down about 400 to 500 years later.
I never asserted anything about vagueness, but we can examine that too.
Yes, that was the traditional account. In fact, monks still memorize parts.
I am sure they do. I think that modern man has become a bit lazy myself.
The evidence I am aware of suggests that it was more like 400-500 years.
I too have faith that the Canon we have today is remarkble well-preserved.
This I cannot agree with. As I said, how can one be so sure which is earlier?
I disagree. Suffering is dependent upon ignorance of the Four Noble Truths.
I believe it is at the beginning or end depending on the context of the sutta.
As I said before, I believe ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths.
I already explained why I believe that this is a false statement in post #47.
Incorrect; it is because of ignorance of the Four Noble Truths (MN 9, DN 16).
Once again, ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths (see SN 12.2).
Again, prove to me that the suttas without ignorance are indeed "older".
This argument is faulty. You are misunderstanding the meaning of ignorance.
He said that suffering ceases, birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, et cetera.
You are welcome, and thank you as I find your posts very interesting as well.
Respectfully,
Jason
Give me time Jason, I yet have to find out if metaphysics is a poison to be cured with naive realism or not :-p
I don`t agree, please show me the Sutta were thinking is not an act of volition or a result of karma. The only differene exists in experiencing past karma and producing new karma. Then you do realize that every thought, speech and movement would be a result of past ignorance? Some just past, willed out ignorance and other the same plus triggering new karma? Maybe I see it wrong, I am talkling right out of my heart now, this is outright Nihilism.
I understand that I have to look closer first at the terms sankhara and kamma. I also want to thank you, Bobby, Vacha, Simon, HengYou and the rest of the people here for their effort and contribution, you all taught me much.
Regards
Perhaps you are right; nevertheless, the Venerable Nyanatiloka also states that not all thought formations are kamma producing. In essence, this would depend on the specific type of consciousness to which the sankhara belonged. I am not sure if there are any suttas which cover this explicitly, but I shall see if I can find one. I do know that this idea is covered extensively in the Theravadin Abhidhamma as well as in the commentarial literature.
As for the rest, it is a little confusing the way it is written. I am not quite sure what you are trying to say. Sankhara, in the sense of the aggregate, is defined as the six types of cetana (volition or intention); namely with regard to visual objects, to sounds, to odours, to tastes, to bodily impressions, and mental objects (SN 22.56). In relation to dependent co-arising, sankhara are the kamma producing actions of body, speech, and mind (SN 12.2).
I am not sure why you accuse me of nihilism. Perhaps you are misunderstanding what this word means as it is defined in the suttas. A nihilist is either "one who does not declare anything" (AN 10.94) or "a denier of individuality" (MN 22). As the Buddha said in MN 22, I am only concerned with suffering and the end of suffering. I apologize if anything I say disturbs you, and you are always free to disregard anything I say that you do not find helpful.
Jason
Your assessment is incorrect on two counts:
1) The initial writing of the Dhamma occured in 326BC, some 100-200 years after the passing of the Buddha. If we take the life of the Buddha as occuring between 563 BC to 483 BC, then the initial writing of the Dhamma occured exactly 157 years after the Buddha's death.
2) This being so, the initial writing of the Dhamma was 157 years after the passing of the Buddha, and not 400 to 500 years after the Buddha, as you assert. You mistake the initial writing, with the full writing, a distinction that is important to the point I was making regarding the supplimentation of 'memory' with the 'written' format.
Buddhist Councils
http://www.urbandharma.org/udharma/councils.html
When evidence is presented, then all can benfit from its wisdom. Evidence that is not presented, remains 'unknown' and can not tbe taken into account.
You must strive for your own account, to augment your knowledge in this area.
I accept your disagreement, but not your interpretation of my argument.
This is an example of the 'vagueness' of your argument. It makes your argument untenable, as no evidence is presented to support it. Mere Hear say' is not part of the Buddha's path.
I acknowledge your 'disagreement', but do not accept your lack of counter-argument in this matter, as a viable 'counter-argument. You simply repeat 'dogma', a reiterate the same statements, with no developmental methodolgy present.
I suggest you frequent yurself with the vast body of knolwedge on this matter, so that you develop your debating skills in this area.
Your interpretation of my argument is faulty. Your definition of 'ignorance' is philosophically 'inconsistent' and has ebbed and flowed as the over-whelming academic evidence presented, has proved your argument 'incorrect'.
Dear Elohim
Thank you for your comment(s) and continued interest in this topic.
I can not 'convince' you about the wealth of academic Buddhist knowledge that proves your continued assertion quite incorrect. It appears, that despite the many, varied and eminant Buddhist thinkers - whose work I have conveyed and referenced above, does not satisfy your enquiring Mind in this matter.
On the other hand, you have applied what we call in philosophy, the 'Straw Dog' fallacy in our rather enjoyable debate. Briefly stated, the Straw Dog fallacy involves the deliberate misrepresentation of an opponent's argument; followed immediately by the 'refutation' of the 'misrepresentation', this avoids the 'real' and 'central' point of the opponent's argument. The Straw Dog fallacy is usually employed when an opponent's point has such a momentum behind it, that to confront the point head-on, will only end in debating failure. Some people development this method intuitively, others (like myself), have learned about during studies, etc.
But what you have shown here, leads me to a broader problem with Buddhism as it is perceived in the West, and sometimes in the East. Namely, how it is encountered. A doctrinal encountering, will depend solely upon the school one adheres to, or the books one studies, etc. The doctrinal view is a received history of events, a history that is not backed-up by indepth research.
That research, evolves out of a rich academic method, developed over-time. As you are 'unaware' of the methods of 'contextual analysis', 'deconstruction', the study of 'linguistics' the 'archaeology' of texts, the historical development of societies, and plane historical analysis of history in its purest form, then it does not matter how much evidence I present to you, as you are 'unaware' of the validity of the method that produced it. And as you are unware of the validity of the method that produced it, you decision (based upon a lack of knowledge in this area), must surely be 'flawed'. Simply repeating your position (i.e. that you are unconvinced that 'ignorance' was NOT in the original chain of conditioned dependency), whilst being shown consistant and even evidence from a diverse and varied pool of academic thinkers (both Buddhist nd non-Buddhist), does not make your argument any stronger, or indeed any less fallacious.
Your dogmatic position does not allow for 'proof' to be accepted, and draws our debate to a conclusion. (Readers will find it tedious to read and re-read points that are repetitive and do not develop the debate.) It would be a fairly easy exercise to 'deconstruct' you post into its substratum contingencies - but your intellection would simply grasp the points made, and make more endless suffering as a consequence. Intellection about the Dharma, is not penetration of it. Insight into the Dharma, through the Dharma and as a consequence of the Dharma, is very different to a mere 'idea' about the Dharma. Yes - intellection can be a mighty weapon for an open Mind, but a hindrance to one that mistakes 'ideas' about 'things', as the 'things' themselves.
However, the point of posting, is not to convince you of anything (you are just one person, like myself) but to share knowledge far and wide. And as a consequence, you are free to 'agree' or 'disgree' as the whim takes you. The presented knowledge above, is only a small amount of a substantial raft of evidence that the written sutras have evolved there ideas over-time and that 'ignorance' as a distinct 'chain' in the link of Nidana was not in the original chain. The MahaNidana Sutra above, shows this very clearly.
Thank you for the enjoyable exchange, I have found it very interesting - in more ways than one!:)
Metta.
I agree with your methodology here. And it does highlight the paradox of Buddhist thought, as it would mean that everything 'pre-enlightenment' is deemed 'ignorant'. That being so, even Dhammic practice is 'ignorant'. Of course, not all schools of Buddhism accept this interpretation.
This would suggest that 'ignorance' is 'lost', when 'enlightenment' is gained. As 'enlightenment' is not included in the chain, Presumably, when 'ignorance' is 'lost', the chain becomes 'obvious', but as suffering 'ceases' with enlightenment, surely the 'chain' must 'cease' also?. Enlightenment could not be included in the chain, as the chain 'ceases' upon enlightenment (although the Pali Canon suggests that the phenomenal world continues regardless), and 'enlightenment', by definition, can not 'cease'.
Your thoughts on this matter would be gratefully appreciated.
Thank you
Following this discussion with interest, I am struck by this sentence. It opens all sorts of puzzles:
- Is the phenomenal world independent of the chain of dependent co-arising?
- Is the chain, however many links it may have, itself a result of mind?
- Is the chain a description of the process by which we delude ourselves about the world yathabhutam?
Whilst unable (and unwilling) to engage in debate about whether 'ignorance' is or is not to be included in the chain, I notice that I have a note, taken from my reading of Thrangu Rinpoche's Buddha Nature (Rangjung Yeshe Publications, Kathmandu. 1988). The note translated the Tibetan lhan cig skyes pa'i ma rig pa as "Coemergent ignorance: The ignorance which all sentient beings are born with".Dear Fofoo
I found this extract which might be interesting;
'Another Samyukta text gives the sequence without ignorance as a series of grounds (vastu) of knowledge (jhana). In fact there are four grounds for each member of the sequence: knowledge of the condition itself, of its origination, of its cessation and of the practice leading to its cessation, this last being the eightfold way. The Sthaviravada text adds for each member of the sequence, each condition, that this knowledge, when a pupil has it, is his "knowledge about the principle (dhamma)". When he has seen, ascertained, attained "timelessly" (producing immediate results or known to be true regardless of?), plumbed this principle he draws a scheme (naya, "plan") with reference to the past and the future. Whatever sramanas or brahmans have discovered the forces (or whatever the principle, the condition, is), their origination, etc., in the past, or will discover the forces, etc., in the future, all of them have discovered or will discover them to be just as I discovered them to be now. This is the "knowledge about the reference (anvaya)". The text emphasises that the laws of nature, as we may call them, discovered by the Buddha (and checked by his pupil) are always true. The inference follows that whoever, whenever, discovers them must find them to be the same.'
Indian Buddhism: By A Warder, Page 114-115.
This analysis without 'ignorance', is inaccordance with the Four Noble Truths
Thank you.
Very interesting. From my own Ch'an training, 'emptiness' penetrates all phenomena. All phenomena - without acception - share the same equal nature 'devoid' of substantial substance. Everything up to the perception of 'emptiness', is a mere intellection designed to point one in the 'right' direction. From this perspective, 'emptiness' is not a 'meta-idea' that replaces the ideas that got one to its perception, it is a movement beyond 'intellect'. For me, knowledge of the chain - the nidana - does not free me from the cycle it elucidates. I simply become 'aware' of the chain, and intellectually 'ingest' its meaning. It is second hand knowledge acquired by myself, without necessarily 'experiencing' the reality it conveys. My 'knowledge' increases, but my ignorance does not diminish. Ignorance, then, does not have to 'disappear' for the chain to become 'known'.
The placing of 'ignorance' therefore, at the beginning of the chain is not required philosophically, as knowledge of the chain does not diminish ignorance. Just as enlightenment can not, and is not placed at the end of the chain, nor should ignorance be placed at the beginning.
When ignorance ends - the chain ends.
And both ignorance and the chain end when the Mind penetrates phenomena with insight. And in the Mahayana/Tantryana schools, samsara and nirvana share the same empty essence. Ignorance then, is not something 'separate' from 'nirvana'. It is, by definition, 'nirvana' as yet 'unknown'. With the penetration of phenomena, all categories dissolve away - good and bad included. The written Dhamma then becomes exactly what it is, a 'upaya' or 'skillful means' to point seekers in the right direction. If ignorance is to be added to the chain, then enlightenment should also be added - as they are both the essentially 'same' thing. However, such an addition would be illogical in the Buddhist philosophical sense. Ignorance transformed in 'nirvana' is not a 'chain link' to be over-come, but rather the penetration of phenomena to its essence.
"Coemergent ignorance: The ignorance which all sentient beings are born with".
This is essential as it is the same ignorance that is transformed into 'nirvana'.
Thank you so much for your input. I am very grateful.
Thank you
Ignorance is indeed a power that creates objects of experience; it has its nature and function; but it cannot be held on that account to be an ultimate entity. Ignorance is not wholly determinable as either exising or not existing; it shares in this respect the nature of all mundane entities, itself being in fact "the root of all things as the common people conceive them." But there is a very important difference between the mundane entities and ignorance which is the root of misconstruction. While ignorance, when realised as ignorance, has itself totally disappeared, the mundane entities, even after being realised as unreal may continue to be experienced. This is to say that the conditioned nature of things which is their mundane nature need not itself be bound up with ignorance. The mistaking of the conditional as itself the uncondition pertains not to the continuation or the extinction of the objects of experience, but to one's belief in regard to their reality or unreality.'
Nagajuna's Philosophy: By K V Ramana, Page 111-112.
Thank you
For evidence of the Pali Canon being an oral tradition for the first five hundred years after the Buddha's death, I present Theravada Buddhism by Proffesor Richard Gombrich (Routledge, London, 2006), Beginnings: the Pali Suttas by Samanera Bodhesako (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1984), Buddhism in Sri Lanka by H.R. Perera (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1966), The Path of Purification by Ven. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975), and the Sinhalese chronicles where it states that the Pali Canon was written down in the reign of King Vattagamini (last century B.C.E.) in Sri Lanka, at the fourth Buddhist council.
With all due respect, I am not concerned with what you accept or reject in relation to my interpretation and understanding of Theravadin Buddhist doctrine. I am simply here to share what I know, and everyone is free to either accept it or reject it as they see fit.
I fail to see how this is vague. I believe that the placement of ignorance in the various suttas mentioning it in relation to dependent co-arising are dependent upon the context of the sutta. If you wish for me to go through the entire Canon and pick specific examples to explain in further detail, then we can create a new topic in which we discuss ignorance in relation to dependent co-arising exclusively rather that dependent co-arising as a whole. However, my time is extremely limited as I am moving to Oregon in a week, so you will just have to be patient with me if you wish for a more detailed analysis in regards to ignorance and its place in dependent co-arising.
Perhaps I should be clear here. I am not an academic scholar. I am a practicing Buddhist. I am not here to prove or disprove Theravadin doctrine, especially the words of the Buddha that are — according to tradition — recorded in the Pali Canon. If that is what you expect of me, then I am sorry to disappoint you. It states very clearly in the Canon that ignorance is in relation to the Four Noble Truths, and I have provided you with the appropriate sutta references. As I said, you are free to either accept it or reject it as you see fit.
I appreciate the suggestion and I will consider it; however, I do not have the time or the desire to develop my debating skills at this time. I apologize if my debating skills are not up to par. I have never learned how to formally debate, and I simply do the best that I can.
My definition of ignorance is taken directly from the Pali Canon. It is neither philosophically inconsistent nor have you proved that my argument that ignorance is in realtion to the Four Noble Truths is incorrect. In the Pali Canon, ignorance has always been in relation to the Four Noble Truths (DN 16, MN 9, SN 12.2, et cetera). If you do not accept what is presented in the Pali Canon, then of course you are going to say that whatever evidence I present from it was either added later on — or if you have no evidence of this — that you do not accept my evidence on the grounds that I am merely presenting dogma. If that is indeed the case, then what more can I say?
Respectfully,
Jason
Firstly, I would like to say that I have by far not enough knowledge of Buddhist history in order to make a sound judgment if ignorance was later added to the chain or not, or what is a proper stratification of the sutras. My concerns so far have been solely of a logical nature and this probably isn`t much:)
Secondly, the quote you gave from Warder is quite interesting. Do we know if there exists an English translation of this sutta? If I understood the above text correctly, it must have been located in the Samyutra-collection of the Sthaviravada. It would be good if we could have a look into the grounds.
Thanks for sharing.
Thank you Elohim.
Perhaps I have been too harsh in this regard. If, out of all the chaos of posting, others are inspired or indeed, motivated to practice harder or search deeper, our efforts have not been in vain. I view our exchange, (indeed, any exchange), as a symbiotic process of developmental progression.
I understand what you say, and I accept your opinion as valid. Debate is not everything. Please excuse my haste in this matter. Perhaps we can learn from one another?
Three bows.
Metta.
I find it noteable that patticasamuppada was discovered in deep meditation. If we read the verses in udana 1.1-1.3, the Buddha says that
1.) if one truly discerns cause and effect, the last doubt vanished
2 ) having discerned it, he realizes that with the cessation of the cause follows the cessation of the effect
3) finally, he defeats mara´s army and is brightly shining forth like the sun on the bright horizon.
So, although enlightenment is not included in the formula, at least in Udana it is given as the result perfect discernments and the absence of the causes and effects. According to the verses,the discovery of the chain ,it`s deep penetration in medition by oneself, brings about the end of it, but not the end of the Buddha, since there his shining only begins.
Dear Fofoo
The reference given is;
S II 56 ff, T99 section 14 No. 15
I hope this is of some help.
Metta
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanananda/wheel183.html#passage-15
I think this might be the sutta in question. Bear in Mind that the author is quoting a specific translation, which might not be available on the Net. However, the general gist of his statement above may be gleamed from the above, together with ignorance occuring later in the Sutta.
If anyone can find the exact reference, I would be very grateful.
Thank you.
I did not "accuse" you of Nihilism, Jason. In my reasoning, I came to the conclusion that what I get from paticasamuppada, is nihlism since i equate kamma with volition and the end of kamma would be the end of me wanting anything. My fault, it is a rather emotional topic for me and I agree with you that my post was not very skillfull.
Regards
I did not say that your post was unskillful, I said that your post was a little confusing the way it was written. What I meant was that I was unsure about what you were trying to say. For example, you started out by saying that you did not agree with my previous post, and after three sentences that were confusing to me, said that you felt this was outright nihilism.
I assumed that from the way it was written, you were referring to the ideas in my previous post as being nihilistic. I apologize for my assumption that you were referring to my post instead of your assessment of dependent co-arising. Sometimes it is easy for me to misunderstand what is being implied without specific references. Try not to hold it against me.
Equating volitional action (kamma) with volition (cetana) is correct (AN 6.63). Nevertheless, equating the end of kamma with the end of wanting anything is incorrect. The Venerable Kassapa, for example, chose to continue practicing meditation in the forest — even though he had already attained arahantship — out of a desire to inspire later generations (SN 16.5).
Jason
Perhaps this short excerpt that is taken from the Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi's critique of the Venerable Nanavira Thera's notes on paticca-samuppada will help you to understand this idea a little better:
The full article has been made available for download by the Venerable Dhammanando on E-sangha if you are interested in reading it in its entirety. The link to original thread is here, and the article here.
Jason
Thanks for the link. It is actually inline with the Buddha teaching out of compassion and brings me to the idea that one might think in terms of egoism and altruism concerning activities that produce new karma and activities that don`t since the motive seems to be the decisive part.
Regards
What he says here is that the Arhants activities are volitional extinct, there is no volition(cetana) at all. I have reached the point where debate does not bring me any further because points have become too subtle, terms being used are partly redundant, partly only valid in contexts. This exceeds the knowledge I currently have. For now, I will focus more on the attainment of the jhanas
Regards
1) Free us from delusion.
2) Free us from the need for a chain.
For the chain to be worthwhile, it must contain its own redundancy. What seems to be happening in the above debate, is that the 'edge' of the intellect is reached, but the sunyata that lies beyond, can not be fully conveyed in owrds, or at least in owrds that make logocal sense. If words continue to make logical sense, then the intellection has been reactivated, and 'obscuration' is the result.
Without that necassary and crucial cognative 'leap' the intellect, fueled by craving for more knowledge, makes up ever more and confusing loops of expression, designed to keep the thinking process going in EXACTLY the same way as it has always done, but with the added delusive 'screen' that by doing so, enlightenment is being gained.
Understanding an idea, is crucial to a point; and that point, when reached, should represent a 'breakthrough' in meditative insight, that serves to transcend the old habits and structures of the conditioned Mind. If that 'point' does not culminate in an 'insightful' breakthrough, then one simple remains having 'interesting' ideas about a philosophical concept, that is nolonger working to free the Mind from its own contradictions and delusive habits. Dhamma becomes aDhamma.
The chain does not 'disappear'. it does not disappear, as it neve existed. The essence of all phenomena - the chain including, is 'sunyata'. It is the direct perception, without hindrance, of the underlying 'empty' nature of phenomena. An emptiness that contains all things.
Delusion makes the chain appear real and solid. It does not disappear as such, but one's insight penetrates the delusion and the emptiness is realised. In this state, the false boundaries between 'subject' and 'object' dissolve into 'oneness' and there is no more karma produced, and the casual nexus (i.e. the the base dualism of a subject that creates karma that is experienced through the object) has been thoroughly 'smashed'.
Agreement and disagreement are irrelevant to the act of insightful penetration. The empty Mind is nolonger functioning upon the premise of a false dichtotomy of 'subject' - 'object'. If the chain does not 'free' you from the tyranny of 'knowning', then it is not doing its Dhammic job. The problem resides not in the chain, but rather the Mind that views the chain.
May you all be happy and free from suffering!
Metta
Concerning Nagarjuna, I have almost zero knowledge, only second hand knowledge from Frauwallner, who basically wrote that for Nagarjuna, dependent origination is unreal, since it consists of the contradicory pairs of origination and cessation, which in reality, do not apply. As far as I understood, it is basically derived from the insuffiency of words in describing reality and nagarjuna`s method to "relativize" a pair of opposite terms, allowing no absolutes. As I said, no profound knowledge on my side but I am glad you mentioned Nagarjuna at this point. Can you recommend a good resource for studying dependent origination according to Nagarjuna? Many thanks.
Metta
Concerning Nagarjuna, you might want to start with Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), Mahayanavimsika (Verses on the Great Vehicle), and Pratityasamutpadahrdayakarika (Heart of Dependent Origination).
Jason