In
MN 63, the Buddha said that he left undeclared, among other things, whether a Tathagata exists, whether a Tathagata does not exist, whether a Tathagata both exists and does not exist, and whether a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death because "it is unbeneficial, it does not belong to the fundamentals of the holy life, it does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to
Nibbana" (Bodhi). In addition, in
SN 44.3, Sariputta implies that each is undeclared due to their inappropriate nature since each one assumes either an ontology of being or of non-being based upon the five aggregates. From a purely ontological standpoint, one cannot say whether an
arahant exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist after death. Nevertheless, in the
Itivuttaka, the Buddha described two elements of
Nibbana, which literally means "extinction, to cease blowing, to become extinguished". The
Nibbana element with residue remaining is the destruction of lust, hatred, and delusion attained by a Noble One (
arahant) while still alive, with the residue itself being a reference to the five aggregates. The
Nibbana element without residue remaining is the final passing away of a Noble One in which “all that is felt, not being delighted, will become cool right here” (
Iti 44).
In my opinion, this is a very complex subject that ultimately centers around the mind, and more specifically, consciousness. In its simplest form, dependent co-arising, "When this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this is not, that is not. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that" (
AN 10.92). In regard to consciousness (
vinnana), dependent co-arising specifically states, "From the arising of name-and-form comes the arising of consciousness. From the cessation of name-and-form comes the cessation of consciousness." (SN 29.56). I, much like the Venerable Bodhi, believe that it is here, within the complex relationship between the mind, body, and consciousness, that the investigation of dependent co-arising comes to a climax by, "revealing a "hidden vortes" underlying the entire process of samsaric becoming" (Bhikkhu Bodhi,
The Great Discourse On Causation: The Mahanidana Sutta and its Commentaries).
To begin with, what is the “mind”? Simply put, the mind is generally considered to be the combination of the four immaterial aggregates of feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness. In addition, while the mind and the body are often treated as two separate categories of phenomena, one material and one immaterial, the Buddha also details the complex mutual dependency of mental and physical activity and consciousness (
DN 15). Nevertheless, even in Theravada there are diverging views in regard to the aggregate of consciousness and the consciousness of
Nibbana. I would suggest reading the Venerable Thanissaro's study guide
The Five Aggregates along with listening to the complimentary Dhamma talk
The Five Aggregates that was given at the Insight Meditation Center for a more detailed look at one interpretation. The talk is quite thorough in my opinion; however, people should at least be aware of the Venerable Thanissaro's alternate take on the Pali term "
vinnanam anidassanam" (consciousness without feature), which is one of the reasons many people tend to accuse him of holding an eternalist view (
sasata-ditthi). Whether or not his interpretation is correct, it is not an interpretation that is generally supported in the "classical" Theravada Tradition in which the enitre Tipitaka and its commentaries are considered authoritative.
Using the Kevatta Sutta (
DN 11), for example, Suan Lu Zaw, a Burmese lay-teacher of Pali and Abhidhamma,
explains that according the the Kevatta Sutta Atthakatha (i.e. the commentary to this particular sutta),
vinnanam does not refer to the usual meaning of "consciousness" here, but instead defines it as, "There, to be known specifically, so (it is) "
vinnanam". This is the name of
Nibbana." He also explains that the following line of DN 11, "Here (in
Nibbana),
nama as well as
rupa cease without remainder. By ceasing of conscousness,
nama as well as
rupa ceases here" illustrates ths point. He states that, "
Nibbana does not become a sort of consciousness just because one of the Pali names happens to be
vinnanam." And finally, he concludes by using a quote from a section of the Dhammapada Attakatha (i.e. the commentary to the Dhammapada), which apparently states that there is no consciousness component in
parinibbana after the death of an
arahant.
This view seems to be in contrast to the Venerable Thanissaro's
note to this particular sutta which suggests that this term refers to a consciousness that lies outside of space and time, and therefore, outside the consciousness-aggregate altogether. The implication of this, I imagine, being that it would not fall under the cessation of [the aggregate] of consciousness. While most people appear to lean towards Suan Lu Zaw's view of this term, I am impressed by the way that the Venerable Thanissaro explores this term—especially in his talk on the five aggregates given at the IMC. During that particular talk, he even brought up the imagery of consciousness that was mentioned in the Atthi Raga Sutta (
SN 12.64). While some might say that comparing this imagery of consciousness that "does not land or grow" to the consciousness of
Nibbana would be taking it out of context, it is certainly hard to ignore such imagery when considering the possibility. At least I think so. What this controversy boils down to is the experience of
Nibbana and the nature of that experience. The general tendency is to either describe
Nibbana as the ending of all consciousness, all awareness, or in other words, to stress the cessation aspect of
Nibbana, or to describe
Nibbana as a state of purified awareness, "consciousness without feature", or in other words, to stress the transcendent aspect of
Nibbana.
As I have already mentioned, the Buddha described two elements of
Nibbana. The second, the
Nibbana element without residue remaining, is the final passing away of a Noble One in which “all that is felt, not being delighted, will become cool right here," but as for the fate of a Noble One after death, the Buddha refused to answer in terms of existence, nonexistence, both, or neither. Reason might suggest that since the five aggregates, which are considered to be the constituents of a being's (
satta) existence, cease with the full attainment of
Nibbana,
Nibbana must be a state of nonexistence, a state of nothingness. Bhikkhu Bodhi, however, points out that, “… no text in the Nikayas ever states this. To the contrary, the Nikayas consistently refer to
Nibbana by terms that refer to actualities. It is an element (
dhatu), a base (
ayatana), a reality (
dhamma), a state (
pada), and so on” (
In the Buddha’s Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pali Canon 319).
I believe that the key to understanding the Buddha's standpoint in regard to existence, non-existence, et cetera is to contemplate and thoroughly understand what the Buddha meant when he said, "This world [keeping in mind that the Pali word "
loka" (world) was often used as a synonym for suffering, i.e., the five clinging-aggregates (
SN 12.44)], Kaccana, for the most part depends upon a duality—upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world. This world, Kaccana, is for the most part shackled by engagement, clinging, and adherence. But this one [with right view] does not become engaged and cling through that engagement and clinging, mental standpoint, adherence, underlying tendency; he does not take a stand about 'my self'." (
SN 12.15). From the perspective of one who sees the origin and the cessation of the world as it really is, with correct wisdom, it becomes clear why the Buddha left undeclared whether a Tathagata exists, whether a Tathagata does not exist, whether a Tathagata both exists and does not exist, and whether a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.
Comments
In this world (loka), there is no being at all, only becoming. I mean a "being" that is anicca is hardly a being at all, since it has no permance which would be required for being something. But then again, a Tathagata also does not "exist" (to be) even before his death. This also would imply that nibbana and parinibbana are not a state of being. From where do we get stability?
Metta