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Is Theravada "realist?"
Jason
God EmperorArrakis Moderator
It has often been asserted that Theravada, particularly "classical" Theravada in which the entire Tipitaka and its commentaries are considered authoritative, is ultimately realist. Nevertheless, this criticism, which for the most part comes from Yogacara and Madhyamika, is heavily disputed. For example, in his Introduction to Buddhism, Harvey explains, "'They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature i]sabhaava[/i. They are dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld according to their own nature' (Asl.39). Here 'own-nature' would mean characteristic nature, which is not something inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arise due to the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurrences of that dhamma. This is of significance as it makes the Mahayana critique of the Sarvastivadin's notion of own-nature largely irrelevant to the Theravada" (87).
Personally, whether or not Harvey is correct in his characterization of the Theravada position, I believe this quasi-realistic view is the result of early Abhidhammikas attempting to reify certain concepts that should never have been reified, e.g. dhammas, khandhas, etc.
In my opinion, the core of texts that constitute the Sutta Pitaka are not realist per se, but there are certain concepts found within Theravada that do appear to present themselves as such. Essentially, I think that classical Theravada, in which the entire Tipitaka and its commentaries are considered authoritative, borders on realism depending on how you understand the terms "dhamma" and "sabhava." All I can say is that Theravada does not go as far as Sarvastivada, although it does push the boundaries and can easily be interpreted as being realist, which then opens the door to accusations of nihilism.
In one of the ways that I like to look at it, the conventional viewpoint explains things through subject, verb and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint explains things through verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes. This, I think, is incredibly difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once self-identity view (sakkaya-ditthi) is removed, the duality of subject and object is also removed thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena. Nibbana would then be regarded as the end of this conditional phenomena, or in other words, the cessation of the activity of samsara (perpetual wandering).
This is where one can insert any claims of nihilism if one is able to substantiate that this cessation of activity is the destruction of something real, substantial, etc. In other words, if the five aggregates of clinging (khandhas) are real in the sense that they are concrete, existing entities, conditioned or otherwise, then their cessation would be a type of nihilism. In addition, within classical Theravada, the the goal is said to be the utter extinction of all consciousness per the verse in DN 11: "Ettha namanca rupanca, asesam uparujjhati. Vinnanassa nirodhena etthetam uparujjhati" (Here [in nibbana], nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here) (Suan Lu Zaw).
The arguments on both sides become very complex and voluminous at this point. For example, there are arguments that claim that everything is an illusion, i.e., perceived reality is ultimately unreal, hence there is no actual cessation; there are arguments that claim the complete cessation of all consciousness is only nihilistic if one takes consciousness as being "me," "mine," or "myself," etc.
For me, "real" simply means an existing cognizable experience. Going back to my statement concerning how I like to look at this, I understand the five aggregates of clinging to represent things that we do as opposed to just things. In other words, there is an act of intention that goes into our experience. In SN 56.11, for example, the Buddha summarizes stress and suffering (dukkha) as the five aggregates of clinging. Furthermore, in MN 43 the five aggregates of clinging are described in their verb forms, or in other words, not as things but as activities.
Therefore, when looking at the arising of the five aggregates of clinging in this way, we are effectively looking at the arising of [the activity of] stress and suffering; when looking at the cessation of the five aggregates of clinging in this way, we are effectively looking at the cessation of [the activity of] stress and suffering. Thus, all that ceases is [the activity of] stress and suffering, not an independently existing entity of any kind. Since this cessation is cognizable, it too can be considered "real." Moreover, since only an activity has been stopped, there is no actual destruction of any "thing."
My view is probably not in line with classical Theravada on this point, however, so please consider my thoughts with that caveat in mind.
Personally, whether or not Harvey is correct in his characterization of the Theravada position, I believe this quasi-realistic view is the result of early Abhidhammikas attempting to reify certain concepts that should never have been reified, e.g. dhammas, khandhas, etc.
In my opinion, the core of texts that constitute the Sutta Pitaka are not realist per se, but there are certain concepts found within Theravada that do appear to present themselves as such. Essentially, I think that classical Theravada, in which the entire Tipitaka and its commentaries are considered authoritative, borders on realism depending on how you understand the terms "dhamma" and "sabhava." All I can say is that Theravada does not go as far as Sarvastivada, although it does push the boundaries and can easily be interpreted as being realist, which then opens the door to accusations of nihilism.
In one of the ways that I like to look at it, the conventional viewpoint explains things through subject, verb and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint explains things through verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes. This, I think, is incredibly difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once self-identity view (sakkaya-ditthi) is removed, the duality of subject and object is also removed thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena. Nibbana would then be regarded as the end of this conditional phenomena, or in other words, the cessation of the activity of samsara (perpetual wandering).
This is where one can insert any claims of nihilism if one is able to substantiate that this cessation of activity is the destruction of something real, substantial, etc. In other words, if the five aggregates of clinging (khandhas) are real in the sense that they are concrete, existing entities, conditioned or otherwise, then their cessation would be a type of nihilism. In addition, within classical Theravada, the the goal is said to be the utter extinction of all consciousness per the verse in DN 11: "Ettha namanca rupanca, asesam uparujjhati. Vinnanassa nirodhena etthetam uparujjhati" (Here [in nibbana], nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here) (Suan Lu Zaw).
The arguments on both sides become very complex and voluminous at this point. For example, there are arguments that claim that everything is an illusion, i.e., perceived reality is ultimately unreal, hence there is no actual cessation; there are arguments that claim the complete cessation of all consciousness is only nihilistic if one takes consciousness as being "me," "mine," or "myself," etc.
For me, "real" simply means an existing cognizable experience. Going back to my statement concerning how I like to look at this, I understand the five aggregates of clinging to represent things that we do as opposed to just things. In other words, there is an act of intention that goes into our experience. In SN 56.11, for example, the Buddha summarizes stress and suffering (dukkha) as the five aggregates of clinging. Furthermore, in MN 43 the five aggregates of clinging are described in their verb forms, or in other words, not as things but as activities.
Therefore, when looking at the arising of the five aggregates of clinging in this way, we are effectively looking at the arising of [the activity of] stress and suffering; when looking at the cessation of the five aggregates of clinging in this way, we are effectively looking at the cessation of [the activity of] stress and suffering. Thus, all that ceases is [the activity of] stress and suffering, not an independently existing entity of any kind. Since this cessation is cognizable, it too can be considered "real." Moreover, since only an activity has been stopped, there is no actual destruction of any "thing."
My view is probably not in line with classical Theravada on this point, however, so please consider my thoughts with that caveat in mind.
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Comments
Thanks for an interesting post. It raises many important points which have been investigated by greater minds than mine ever will be. I come to the topic as someone who has a foot in both camps and tends to have his own (non-scholarly) slant on this comparative issue.
I give no credence to those who claim that Theravada is Hinayana, nihilistic or a school which asserts some kind of philosophically upheld view of existing phenomena. A superficial acquaintance with the Pali suttas should be more than enough to dispel these myths.
Where the Mahayana view seems to have some ‘foothold’ is on the question of liberation versus enlightenment. You mention “cessation” in your post. This state is acknowledged by the Mahayanists and is termed “the cessation of a Shravaka” (foe destroyer / arhat). It is acknowledged that such an individual has gained nirvanic cessation but that such a state is not the same thing as complete Buddhahood, or enlightenment.
There is some precedent within the Theravadan school for this, as Gotama does categorise himself differently to the arhats and this may have provided an impetus for the development of this notion within other schools.
Mahayana ‘enlightenment’ is a state which is considered to be beyond both Samsara and Nirvana. Thus, an enlightened being may manifest to teach and lead migrators but, nevertheless, is never separated from the enlightened state. Perhaps a good exposition of this idea is taught within Dzogchen (Rigpa) - The so-called Universal Monarch - from which all things manifest.
I would be interested to hear what your considerations are regarding this point.
Best Regards
Kris
I appreciate your interest. I would say that not long after the Buddha's death, various trends began to emerge such as making increasingly sharper distinctions between arahants and Buddhas, systematizing the teachings, solidifying dogmas, et cetera. An examination of the textual evidence does suggests, for example, that some later traditions attempted to transform the Buddha into a transcendent being, and eventually, an emanation of the supramundane Buddha. This process can be traced, beginning with such works as the Mahavastu, and continuing on through works such as the Lalitavistara and the Saddharmapundarikasutra. Furthermore, it is true that in certain Mahayana texts, e.g., the Threefold Lotus Sutra, the arahant is said to have not yet reached final nirvana. Essentially, they are seen as being intoxicated with the samadhi of cessation, not the nirvana that is attained by a fully enlightened Buddha. Moreover, it is said that Buddhas are then able to awaken these individuals from their temporary cessation in order for them to continue towards complete Buddhahood, which is characterized by omniscience. This is said to be due to Buddhahood being the result of wisdom and merit accumulation, and not just the eradication of afflictions.
To be honest, I believe that there is ample evidence to support that this idea that an arahant's awakening (sambodhi) differs fundamentally from that of a Buddha's has no basis in the early teachings. My personal opinion is that this evolution began to occur within a hundred years of the Buddha's death, with each side attempting to solidify their own dogmas and interpretations. As Bhikkhu Bodhi echoes in In the Buddha's Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pali Canon, "Later forms of Buddhism draw extreme distinctions between the Buddhas and the arahants, but in the Nikayas this distinction is not as sharp as one might expect if one takes the later texts as the benchmark of interpretation. On the one hand, the Buddha is an arahant, as is evident from the standard verse of homage to the Blessed One; on the other, arahants are buddhas, in the sense that they have attainted full enlightenment, sambodhi, by awakening to the same truths that the Buddha himself realized... A Buddha has the function of discovering and expounding the path, and he also possesses a unique familiarity with the intricacies of the path not shared by his disciples. His disciples follow the path he reveals and attain enlightenment afterward, under his guidance" (382).
Jason
This is pretty much my own opinion on the matter too. On the one hand there were hefty doctrinal disputes concerning the fallibility (and nocturnal emissions) of arhats. On the other hand it appears as if the transmission of Buddha’s ‘siddhic’ teachings left the mainstream. I have only ever encountered anecdotal evidence of them within the current Theravada and have often wondered if the doctrinal splits and the demise of teachings better known today as ‘tantra’ were not parallel components within the same process.
The attainment of the mind-made-body was taught by the historical Buddha. This may have its equivalent in Tibetan Powah and other similar practices. Within the doctrinal disputes I detect a sense of disappointment in the worldly elements of the arhat - almost as if the very ‘flesh’ of the arhat was an inadequate expression of the enlightened state. Perhaps it was expected to transform, somewhat along the lines of the things one reads within the esoteric practices of the Dzogchen tradition.
This is, obviously, pure speculation on my part but I can’t help considering whether doctrinal matters had their parallels in experiential (or aspirational) meditative practice.
Regards
Kris
It is certainly possible. I have found myself moving farther and farther away form any of the "Buddhist" institutions, and more towards discovering the roots of Buddhism. It is certainly a difficult process considering that almost three thousand years has passed since the "first turning of the wheel."
Jason
Same thing here Jason. I just use results I gain in meditation as the benchmark. As far as I'm concerned, whatever I can't experience myself remains (for me at least) speculation.
I've found it more productive to carefully investigate what actually manifests, as opposed to musing on what someone has told me "should" or "could" be happening.
Regards
Kris
Beyond that, I think it is a pretty interesting thing to consider to exactly whether and how we should consider the aggregates beyond being a helpful way of categorizing experience.
_/\_