Some thoughts for contemplation:
- I dislike people in general (my favorite quote currently being, "People are just garbage"), even though I often wish otherwise. I agree with Epicurus and Seneca about the benefits of associating with small, like-minded communities rather than with the general population. At the very least, I find this idea to be practical considering that people are so variegated when it comes to beliefs, personalitites, likes and dislikes, etc. I also agree with Seneca that we should associate with people who are likely to improve us in some way and welcome those whom we are capable of improving (Letter 7). As with Seneca, albeit under different circumstances, I have found myself to become crueller and less humane after prolonged contact with human beings (Letter 7). We can be terribly cruel.
- Honesty is the most important virtue because it is through being honest that we are able to truly grow emotionally, spiritually, etc. When we are open to being wrong, to making mistakes, to new ideas, etc., we gain knowledge, real knowledge. We learn more from our mistakes than we do from anything else. I hear that is why hospitals ask potential brain surgeons questions like "Have you ever made a mistake" and "If so, what would you do differently next time" to determine who would make a good surgeon and who would not. It is also through honesty that we can show the world our commitment to the truth, whether relative or ultimate. It is interesting to note that in all of the past-life stories of the Buddha, which are essentially morality tales that detail the Buddha's quest for enlightenment during preceding lives, the precept against lying is the only precept he never broke. In addition, he once said to his son, Rahula, "… when anyone feels no shame in telling a deliberate lie, there is no evil, I tell you, he will not do" (MN 61).
- Even though I have no objective basis for it, ethics are very important to me. Perhaps this is because this is one of the areas where I have some semblance of control. It is one of the places where I can make a distinction between myself and the rest of society (which, from personal observation, I have little regard for); a place where I can define my individual identity in a relatively positive way.
- Happiness and freedom from pain are major motivating factors in life. I agree with the Stoics, as well as the Buddha, that people act in ways that are harmful to themselves, to others or to both out of ignorance, i.e., if they understood the nature of happiness, of the mind itself, they would never willingly act against their own happiness nor the happiness of others. Why? I would say that one reason is that we are "open-systems," and that cause and effect works both ways. Perhaps that is the idea behind kamma, the Golden Rule, the Three-fold Law, etc.
- I wonder: Are we solitary creatures who want to be social or social creatures who want to be solitary? Both? Neither? Perhaps refer to Epicurus again: Social within the proper context. This reminds me of two things I thought about just recently: (i) It seems that as travellers in life we are by nature of being "individuals" isolated from one another; yet in as much as we are able to accompany one another through our solitary journeys we can share little pieces of ourselves with each other via bonds that cannot easily be put into words. (ii) Is there something underlying phenomena, something that threads together events in an unseen way, e.g., the Stoic idea of universal reason or logos, the Buddhist idea of kamma, etc.? Perhaps life is nothing but a random series of happenstances; and yet again, perhaps not.
- Fact of nature: All living beings, all living organisms without exception, must consume/feed in order to survive. Feeding is natural; however, my ethical standards apply to all living creatures. Why? Perhaps because I see my desires for happiness and freedom from pain in all living creatures. If I do not respect that in them, how can I ever expect the same? This is especially true regarding human beings. Here I agree with the Buddha that, besides some rare and special cases, there is no one that is as dear to us as ourselves, that all beings essentially want to be happy in their own way (according to their specific capacities), and that it is a fairly decent and logical reason to desire their happiness as well as my own (SN 3.8). Why? If my happiness comes at the expense of their happiness, then they will do everything in their power to upset that happiness. Conversely, if they were to infringe upon mine, would it not follow that I would likewise do everything in my power to upset theirs? It seems like a vicious circle to me. Is this the rationale behind the Stoic logos? Maybe not, but something to keep in mind.
- Religion is, among other things, a creative expression of our search for happiness, meaning and truth. I have heard people express their desire to "kill religion" (e.g., Dawkins et al.), and I understand some of their reasoning for making such statements, but I cannot help but think that doing so would come at a great cost to humanity.
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I should love to be able to sit with you one time and just talk. Anyone who loves Seneca can't be all bad. LOL
I would take down my copy of Marcus Aurelius and we would reflect together on the world's ills. We would ask the unanswerable questions sitting in companionable silence as we watched the moon rise.
You may or may not know the following poem by William Cory, a verse translation of Callimachus Epigram 2:
THEY told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,
They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed.
I wept as I remember'd how often you and I
Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky.
And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,
A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,
Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;
For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take.
I learned it at school and it still resonates with me.
It was a horrible shock for me to go from the philo-based French system to Oxford philosophy (Strawson & co.) and logical positivism which seemed arid and stale. Give me Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Master Kung and, even, Jean-Paul Sartre any day. I sat in lectures and wondered what Socrates would have made of the turgid crap being taught.
... even babes?
I'll need a cup of tea and a quiet corner too.
Please count me in for the philosophy party! I loved the philosophy courses I took in university, especially the political and legal. I didn't get my degree in philosophy but I used it time and time again for my history and politics work.
Oh, what a time we'll have! I can't wait!
And Knitwitch! SO good to see you back!
It does WONDERS for a community. Most of my very best friendships are the result of meeting a bunch of people from my other website for the first time, back in 2004.
Bit difficult getting us together though when we come from so many diverse countries.:(
No it isn't easy. If human nature were to be kind and compassionate to everyone then we wouldn't have to spend our entire lives TRYING to do it. I often wonder if HH the DL sometimes would like to take a day off, wear jeans, go to a funfair, eat ice cream and not give a fig about the state of the world. Probably not because he has done nothing else all his life ... but the rest of us just have to keep on plugging on.
I have got to the point in my life where I have realised that I am not clever, if I live ANOTHER 50 years I still won't get around to reading or understanding all the things I haven't done so far. I can probably TRY to cram more esoteric and clever stuff into my head but it won't stick ... I know this.
So I have to just make the best of what I DO understand, which is simple. Not easy but simple. Kindness and compassion do not come naturally. We can't love everyone automatically but we have to try. Giving way to anger and bitterness only harms ourselves. Speaking out in anger is counter productive. Making other people look little doesn't make the speaker look bigger - quite the reverse.
Everything passes, nothing is forever and the cycle will never stop. Nothing happens by accident, everything is meant and there is wisdom to be drawn from even the worst of experiences. If we can come out of trauma still loving and still smiling then we have made progress along the path of understanding.
The best we can hope for is to keep the light in our own hearts and send it out into the world. If we can stand in the light every day of our lives we have surpassed all expectations.
And it is going to take me the rest of my life to live up to what I have understood already ... don't give me anything else to work on because the above is quite enough for this simple knitter.
Hi Knitwitch,
That sums me up perfectly. Perhaps, in my case, it's even worse. My wife rightly accuses me of a complete lack of interest in things beyond a tiny limited scope of subjects which do interest me.
Although I know she's right, it's still not enough to make me care about that fact, or do anything about it. I must be beyond hope I guess.
I don't know Srivijaya - maybe it is better to concentrate on what you do know and understand on your path rather than try to clutter up your brain with stuff you feel you ought to study.
Well, that is how it is for me - and sometimes a new avenue opens up and I will explore it and find it interesting and then I know that I am meant to be involved with it.
Quite exciting when that happens.
So, when does this philosophy debate get started? It's just us two waffling on and dragging it down.
Milk no sugar please.
I've done a Pavolva today as it is Old Feller's birthday - would you like some with your tea? Featherlight meringue with mascarpone topping and cherries - tempted?
Where to meet? A place that isn't terribly difficult to travel to and cheap! LOL!
Okay, My two most treasured pseudo-philosophical pearls are:
1. It is axiomatic that self is corporeal... discuss.
2. Did God create man, or man create God?
Perhaps No.2 Isn't for the Buddhists here, but No.1 is quite juicy!
Yes, even babes.
Interesting thoughts. To begin with, in theory, I do not believe in social utopias, but I am a firm believer in social progress. In addition, I do not think that all humans are the same, but I do think that we all have the same potentials. I think that a combination of nature and nurture, among other variables, helps to determine what potentials are actualized. I also think that, in a way, the same is true for most animals. For instance, I saw on Oregon Public Broadcasting called The Gorilla King, which was about a particular group of gorillas that has become one of the most tranquil groups ever observed. Gorillas live in groups and often fight other groups that live together, and male silverbacks can be especially aggressive. However, researchers discovered that after Titus, a silverback with a "mellow manner," became the dominant silverback of the group, his attitude influenced the entire group's social dynamics in a positive way, including new male additions to the group. The fighting, whether internal or external, was greatly reduced.
Another good example that comes to mind has to do with the behaviour of gray whales. They were once called "devil fish" because they would defend themselves and their calves from hunters by viciously attacking their boats. Nowadays, partially due to a combination of conservation efforts, hunting restrictions and peaceful interactions between humans and gray whales, they are quite curious and docile towards humans, so much so that they will come close enough to the boat to be touched. To me, this demonstrates that there is at least some truth to the idea that respect for another being's happiness and well-being can make a tangible difference. In other words, I do not think that we are meant to be one way or the other, but I do think that considering our innate desires for happiness and freedom from pain, logic points towards respecting other beings' happiness and well-being for the simple fact that if my happiness comes at the expense of their happiness, then they will do everything in their power to upset that happiness.
Jason
Interesting thought.
Well for me you'll have to make the definition of philosophy rather loose or wait while I rush off and read up the people you are quoting ..... but no, of course discussion is interesting.
As for meeting up - I already find it difficult enough to get to the UK to see my nearest and dearest often enough, so it might be a better idea if you all come to France and I can show you all around our hills, rivers and forests.
Then let us start with the proposition that "it is axiomatic". It isn't. It could be a hypothesis to test but it can hardly be deemed axiomatic.
So, let us restate:
Hypothesis: Self is corporeal.
Now we have two further problems of definition, without which we shall be debating at cross-purposes. What do we mean by 'self' and 'corporeal'? The latter is probably easier than the former.
Coincidentally, I have been re-reading Baruch Spinoza, reminding myself of his revolutionary ideas in contradiction with Cartesian dualism which still seems to infect so much of our thinking. (BTW, did you know that Spinoza was one of the Dutch Jews who persuaded Oliver Cromwell not only to permit the official return of Jews to England but also to make this the first country to give them full citizenship?)
So, corporeal. Do we mean that self (whatever that may mean) depends on having a body? If so, how much of a body is necessary? Does it need to be autonomous? What are the necessary and sufficient elements?
My philosophical view of self-views is that such views are in and of themselves obstacles to true spiritual awakening, that they are, as the Buddha put it, "a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views" (MN 2). As such, I think that views regarding self, which at one point is defined in the suttas as "having passesd away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change" (SN 24.3), should put aside. That being said, the Buddha gives a thorough examination of how self-identitfication views come into being, noting that such views arise when one either assumes one or more of the aggregates to be the self, the self as possessing one or more of the aggregates, one or more of the aggregates as in the self, or the self as in one or more of the aggregates (MN 109). However, unlike the Buddha's examination of self-views, which divides experience into seperate categories, modern self-views do seem to focus predominately on the body since it is commonly believed that consciousness is ultimately an emergent property of the brain; although, there are still those that consider the body one thing and the self (i.e., soul) another.
Jason
As Buddhists, we may grasp what you are saying, Jason. If anything is axiomatic in Buddhism it is that the self, like all other phenomena, is marked with the Dharma Seals and is thus without any independent self-nature.
It is, however, clear that the notion of having/being a 'self' is among the most tenacious of our beliefs. In the Vedic tradition, the Purusha says "I" and creation begins. Only Judaism among the major modern religions continues, in some schools, to question the separate existence of a 'self'. Indeed, as you show in the final words, 'self' and 'soul' have come to be co-terminous sets.
Where Buddhist writers sometimes let us down, philosophically speaking, when they avoid the question raised by statements like: "having passesd away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change" (SN 24.3)". If the self has passed away, there still remains an "I" in the statement.
So, will someone help me out, please? If there is no self, I am often asked, what suffers, what is there to be enlightened, what is this 'who'? Are we not simply changing categories? Assagioli speaks of a 'pool of clear awareness' but will not address whether the pool is self-aware. Longchenpa writes of 'universal creativity' - is it self-aware?
An appeal to 'authority' only serves to entrench the questioner in the question.
Having the view that there is no self is also a form of self-view. Unfortunately, the Buddha refused to answer such questions stating that he did not see "any such supporting (argument) for views [of self] from the reliance on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair" (MN 22). Instead, he focuses on events in and of themselves, as they are experienced, bypassing the question of self altogether. The Buddha said, Who suffers?, is not a valid question, and suggests the alternative, From what as a requisite condition comes suffering? (SN 12.35). Hence, my understanding is that the teachings on not-self are ultimately pragmatic, soteriological methods; although, they do hint at the impermanent and nonsubstantial ontological status of beings in regard to the lack of a permanent self and the existence of a sequence of dependently arising moments of sensory consciousness (MN 38, SN 12.67, SN 22.59, SN 22.97). (A discussion regarding what the Buddha termed "conscious without feature" (vinnanam anidassanam), the awareness of awakening, is a topic in and of itself.) So, it may very well be that we are simply changing categories, but it is a necessary strategy. As Thanissaro Bhikkhu explains in his introduction to MN 22:
Two mistaken inferences are particularly relevant here. The first concerns the range of the not-self teaching. Some have argued that, because the Buddha usually limits his teachings on not-self to the five aggregates — form, feeling, perceptions, fabrications, and consciousness — he leaves open the possibility that something else may be regarded as self. Or, as the argument is often phrased, he denies the limited, temporal self as a means of pointing to one's identity with the larger, unlimited, cosmic self. However, in this discourse the Buddha explicitly phrases the not-self teaching in such a way as to refute any notion of cosmic self. Instead of centering his discussion of not-self on the five aggregates, he focuses on the first four aggregates plus two other possible objects of self-identification, both more explicitly cosmic in their range: (1) all that can be seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, pondered by the intellect; and (2) the cosmos as a whole, eternal and unchanging. In fact, the Buddha holds this last view up to particular ridicule, as the teaching of a fool, for two reasons that are developed at different points in this discourse: (1) If the cosmos were "me," then it must also be "mine," which is obviously not the case. (2) There is nothing in the experience of the cosmos that fits the bill of being eternal, unchanging, or that deserves to be clung to as "me" or "mine."
The second mistaken inference is that, given the thoroughness with which the Buddha teaches not-self, one should draw the inference that there is no self. This inference is treated less explicitly in this discourse, although it is touched upon briefly in terms of what the Buddha teaches here and how he teaches.
In terms of what: He explicitly states he cannot envision a doctrine of self that, if clung to, would not lead to sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair. He does not list all the possible doctrines of self included under this statement, but MN 2 provides at least a partial list:
Thus the view "I have no self" is just as much a doctrine of self as the view "I have a self." Because the act of clinging involves what the Buddha calls "I-making" — the creation of a sense of self — if one were to cling to the view that there is no self, one would be creating a very subtle sense of self around that view (see AN 4.24). But, as he says, the Dhamma is taught for "the elimination of all view-positions, determinations, biases, inclinations, & obsessions; for the stilling of all fabrications; for the relinquishing of all acquisitions; the ending of craving; dispassion; cessation; Unbinding."
Thus it is important to focus on how the Dhamma is taught: Even in his most thoroughgoing teachings about not-self, the Buddha never recommends replacing the assumption that there is a self with the assumption that there is no self. Instead, he only goes so far as to point out the drawbacks of various ways of conceiving the self and then to recommend dropping them. For example, in his standard series of questions building on the logic of the inconstancy and stress of the aggregates, he does not say that because the aggregates are inconstant and stressful there is no self. He simply asks, When they are inconstant and stressful, is it proper to assume that they are "me, my self, what I am"? Now, because the sense of self is a product of "I-making," this question seeks to do nothing more than to induce disenchantment and dispassion for that process of I-making, so as to put a stop to it. Once that is accomplished, the teaching has fulfilled its purpose in putting an end to suffering and stress. That's the safety of the further shore. As the Buddha says in this discourse, "Both formerly and now, monks, I declare only stress and the cessation of stress." As he also says here, when views of self are finally dropped, one is free from agitation; and as MN 140 points out, when one is truly unagitated one is unbound. The raft has reached the shore, and one can leave it there — free to go where one likes, in a way that cannot be traced.
Jason
Hi Jason,
A wonderful post and thorough exposition. I'm in full agreement with you on that. My 'axiom' came from a friend of mine who studied philosophy during the time I was studying the Tibetan schools; the four schools, which culminate in the Prasangika (according to the Gelugpas). It's nothing to do with them btw.
It is interesting to see how they handle this paradox, which they present in order to refute the mistaken views of the lower schools. The three lower schools all posit some kind of existent, ie. some basis in "reality" for our mistaken duality.
The Prasangika discard this with the notion of the 'Two Truths', conventional and ultimate. So whilst everything (even self) can be said to exist as we see it in a conventional manner, its ultimate state is emptiness - the emptiness of its inherent existence - a non-affirming negation.
Like a chariot not being the sum of its parts, or any of them individually. Not to be found within or outside of them. So the 'self' cannot be found upon investigation. It is merely name-only or a working designation, fine for that purpose but without existence beyond that.
Regards
Kris
I was tempted to start a new thread and entitle it "Was Spinoza the first Bu-Jew?" Has anyone else here encountered his Ethics?
I am currently reading Betraying Spinoza - The Renegade Jew Who Gave Us Modernity by Rebecca Goldstein. It is in a series called Jewish Encounters and that, as I searched for books on Spinoza, as much as her qualifications, fascinated me. Some weeks ago, I had heard a Radio 4 play about him and had re-learned something about this extraordinary man. I dredged up memories from my philo year at school. Who was this person? Why did my memory prick me that he was supremely important and should be revisited?
As I have gone back into his life and thought, I am constantly astonished. The ideas are so revolutionary and, at the same time, so familiar. I recall that Blaise Pascal rediscovered Euclid's axioms despite having been kept away from all mathematical concepts and language: he simply - as a small child - made up his own words! Spinoza feels like the same: he has 'heard' the Dharma but without the language, the (dare I say it?) jargon.
Palzang
I've seen the occasional episode but have not made the time to watch regularly. I have, however, met a few Bu-Jews (or Jew-Bus) and been very impressed. They certainly don't need instruction in the First Noble Truth!
The questions arising out of Spinoza, both personally and philosophically, have real resonance for me as the son of an epikoros. As I have often siad, I am Jewish enough for the gas chamber but not enough for the synagogue.
I love the show. Have since the very beginning, tho I rarely watch it nowadays. I don't even have TV here, don't really want it. And like most shows that have been on a long time, it wears thin after a while. But they are masters of satire.
Palzang
Hi Simon,
In any case I'm relieved that you have some justification for your interest in things Jewish. During my childhood I used to avidly listen to my gran's stories of her youth (no computer games then see). I'd get all the goss about how "young Hattie Awlshaw ran off with that no good Albert Uggins - all came to no good of course" but you knew that anyway, right?
Every so often there'd be an interlude, something like:
Well that was were old Mrs Whatshername lived... they were... they were a Jewish family you see...
(Interminable pregnant pause)...
(heavy meaningful silence)...
I'd be thinking, yeah? well? okay but?
But mysteriously no further statement was ever made. After a time I came to realise that not only my gran but other people of her generation had a 'thing' about Jews. I used to belong to a local history society and a nice chap there used to do a lot of research on local Jews. He wasn't one himself but used to deliver his nuggets in a similar manner:
"Well that was in 1925 and they... (meaningful look) they were a Jewish company... you see...
(pause etc.)
Well, I never did "see". It's all very odd. It wasn't until years later that I understood my beloved Wombles of Wimbeldon were in fact obviously Eastern European Jewish Immigrants. Uncle Bulgaria etc.
So, no I haven't got a single thing of value to add to the Bu-Jews debate but at least I'm certain this thread doesn't fall into the above category.
Your story reminds me of a similar attitude I encountered in Mongolia. Not with Jews, but with Chinese.
We met a really fine Buddhist artist over there who has done incredible things in reestablishing Buddhist art in Mongolia after the downfall of the commies, including the restoration of the 20 meter statue of Chenrezig in Ganden Monastery in Ulaan Baatar that had been destroyed by the reds and the establishment of a 10 year college of art for aspiring artists. They produce some incredible stuff. He's also a really nice person and has done a lot to help us in our project there, very generous and friendly
However, the Mongolians have a long-standing hatred of all things Chinese, mostly due to two hundreds years of oppression at the hands of the Manchus. One day someone was talking about this lama, and he added, "Well, he's half-Chinese, you know," and then added the pregnant pause that is supposed to make it all clear. In other words, no matter how great this lama was, he'd never get over being "half-Chinese"!
I guess we all have our prejudices, both overt and covert.
Palzang
In my case things weren't so clear. I think there was some kind of prejudice but I'm not completely sure whether it was negative or something else. I can generally read negative stuff but this seemed to be in a category of its own.
Perhaps it was a mixture of xenophobia, fascination, obsession, awe, distrust and who knows what. Back then I guess a British Jew was as close as anyone ever got to 'oriental exotica' and 'dark eastern mystery'.
Actually the Manchus are more closely related to the Mongolians than the Chinese. They became sinified after centuries as the rulers of China, though they never really mixed with the Chinese people. Actually, interestingly, the Forbidden City is so-called because it was meant to keep the Chinese out and the Manchus separate from their subjects!
Anyway, I suspect there is a bit of envy, distrust, awe, xenophobia and all that mixed into the Mongolian response as well. They never say it, but it's obvious they look back on Chinggis and his empire with more than a little nostalgia and envy.
Palzang
I did like that film The Last Emperor.
I find it's easier if you stick your finger down your throat!!! Hahahaha!!
(Sorry, couldn't resist that)
Count me in on the Philosophy Group... now where did I put that PhD? I know it's around here somewhere... :crazy:
Alas, nobody appears to want to discuss Spinoza with me.
Any starting points for a beginner at it like me? Plus I'm still waiting for an answer from a question I asked you months ago. You must have forgotten it, but that's okay as I figured it out for myself. Common sense does work some times.
Damn... nothin's easy... :rant:
I haven't forgotten, J. The fact is that I think there is no absolute answer. The painful fact is that it must be a case-by-case decision.
I do want to be clever .... honestly.
A bit of history, perhaps:
Spinoza was born in 1632 into a family of Portuguese Jews who had escaped the Spanish/Portuguese Inquisition and moved to Amsterdam. They were part of the Sephardic, forcibly 'converted' Marranos community which were taking advantage of the more liberal attitudes of the new Dutch Republic to re-discover their Jewish identity and practice. He was a remarkable yeshiva student but was 'excommunicated' in 1656, two years after his father's death. This expulsion from the whole Jewish community is still in effect! His works and even his name is forbidden to the Orthodox.
From the time of his excommunication, Spinoza began to publish. He had read Descartes and had decided that the Cartesian separation between matter and spirit was unproven and untrue. He did, however, understand that philosophy, as pursuit of understanding, required a method which was as solid and verifiable as the new 'science' which was emerging. This was the Enlightenment from the inside. And the method he chose was the mathematical model, the formal, Euclidean approach.
In Betraying Spinoza, Goldstein summarises:
Paradoxically, Spinoza's writings stress the illusory nature of the 'self' and of what we imagine 'reality' to be, eschewing the 'personal' and anecdotal, whilst, at the same time, giving us a biography which illuminates so much more. His indifference to his status as outcast mirrors the words of that great philosopher proponent of the personal, Marge Simpson: "There's no shame being a pariah."
Whilst there are all sorts of strands to Spinoza's work which are particularly relevant to our current dilemmas, including secularisation, 'hermeneutics', fanaticism and general misery. But here's the thing, the question that I offer for general consideration:
The Buddha taught the reality of dukkha, its origin and how to escape from it, as Jason has often reminded us. In the process, we are taught a method which leads to *****, a 'state' of reality or however we want to attempt a description.
Spinoza examines the nature of reality and describes a method to arrive at a direct grasp of reality through the rigorous application of reason. The result is the extinction of all 'self-ness'.
Is there a difference? If so, what is it? And, if not, what must be the effect on us?