Relativism of empathy

GeminiVI

This is an expression of the current view based on an ever refining understanding of the mind and existence. Further insight is desired and further reading on Buddhist morality is needed.

Empathy isn’t supposed to be given to all life, is it? Do you empathize with cells? I assume not and would posit that it’s only supposed to be given to things with minds, because a mind is needed to experience suffering. But isn’t the concept of mind itself relative, and the certainty of where we think it actually occurs a guess? Cells are programmed to die, and in a manner I assume relative to a pencil breaking, without feeling. Now when you put two cells together the same concept applies. It’s not until you put many cells together with a particular set of them specializing to form brain matter do you get the possibility of a mind emerging. What is a mind? Is it only a mind if it experiences suffering? Do insects have a mind, and are the capable of suffering? Bees are insects programmed to die in defense of the hive, sacrificing itself by plunging its stinger into the aggressor, which once removed causes it to die. Do you think a bee feels fear and anxiety as it’s about to sacrifice itself? What about the pain it feels? Physical pain is one of the strongest human feelings experienceable, driving some to give up life rather than to continue experiencing it. But there is a rare brain disorder where one experiences no pain at all, called congenital insensitivity to pain. They’re simply not wired for it. Another rare group feels pain, but in a completely neutral manner, they are completely unphased by it. How do we know if the bee feels as most of us do? What if we were to hold down a bee and pluck off its wings and legs with a tweezer, surely then it would suffer? We could tell by its struggling to get away, couldn’t we? If the bee doesn’t feel pain and lacks the capacity of attachment and emotion, is it really suffering or is it just programmed to struggle?

My point is not the assertion that insects or lower forms of life are incapable of suffering, but some with the simplest of brain structures probably are incapable. Also, the assertion that they are is not knowable with current falsifiable scientific knowledge, and that we operate on the chance they do.

jinzang

If you try to kill an insect it will run or fly away. That shows at some level the insect values its life and does not wish to die.

"All beings tremble before violence. All fear death. All love life. See yourself in other. Then whom can you hurt?"

Dazzle

All beings suffer fear and pain, including insects. We try to care for and not harm other beings and we try to practice loving kindness. (metta)


The Karaniya Metta Sutta: Hymn of Universal Love

Who seeks to promote his welfare,
Having glimpsed the state of perfect peace,
SHould be able, honest and upright,
Gentle in speech, meek and not proud

Contented, he ought to be easy to support,
Not over-busy, and simple in living.
Tranquil his senses, let him be prudent,
And not brazen, nor fawning on families

Also, he must refrain from any action
That gives the wise reason to reprove him.
(Then let him cultivate the thought
May all be well and secure,
May all beings be happy!

Whatever living creatures there be,
Without exception, weak or strong,
Long, huge or middle-sized,
Or short, minute or bulky,

Whether visible or invisible,
And those living far or near,
The born and those seeking birth,
May all beings be happy!

Let none deceive or decry
His fellow anywhere;
Let none wish others harm
In resentment or in hate.

Just as with her own life
A mother shields from hurt
Her own son, her only child,
Let all-embracing thoughts
For all beings be yours.

Cultivate an all-embracing mind of love
For all throughout the universe,
In all its height, depth and breadth
Love that is untroubled
And beyond hatred or enmity.

As you stand, walk, sit or lie,
So long as you are awake,
Pursue this awareness with your might:
It is deemed the Divine State here.

Holding no more to wrong beliefs,
With virtue and vision of the ultimate,
And having overcome all sensual desire,
Never in a womb is one born again.

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/buddharakkhita/wheel365.html#ch1

_/\_

Kikujiro

Relativism means nothing when your in pain. Remember that when your not in pain.

Stay on the safe side.

GeminiVI

Two: Do insects experience pain? Yes. Well actually, this concept has been disputed, but I think recent evidence suggests that they do experience what is defined as pain. Vertebrates have nociceptors, which are specialized neurons that sense painful stimuli. Painful stimuli are described as noxious heat, mechanical or chemical stimuli that could potentially cause tissue damage. Tracey Jr. et al. (2003, sited above) found the following:

In models of nociception, noxious heat is often used as the stimulus to elicit a defensive motor output, as in the tail flick response of the rat. Since heat has also been shown to be an effective negatively reinforcing stimulus in adult Drosophila learning (Brembs and Heisenberg 2000 and Mariath 1985), we conjectured that heat might also be used to study nociception per se. A normal, undisturbed Drosophila larva moves through its environment with a rhythmic motion (Figure 1A). In response to light touch with a probe, a larva will pause (Figure 1B) or make one or more contractile waves, moving away from the stimulus (Kernan et al., 1994). In contrast, when touched with the same probe heated above a threshold temperature, larvae are seen to vigorously roll sideways in a corkscrew-like motion (Figure 1C). The threshold probe temperature for eliciting this behavior is 39°C–41°C (noxious heat), at which temperature several seconds of stimulation are required to induce rolling, but at 42°C or higher, the response occurs in as little as 0.4 s (Figure 1D). Importantly, the temperature threshold for firing of nociceptors in vertebrates, including primates, is similar, 39°C–41°C (Tillman et al., 1995). Since vertebrate nociceptors also respond to noxious mechanical stimuli (Beck et al. 1974; Bessou and Perl 1969 and Van Hees and Gybels 1981), we examined the response of Drosophila larvae to strong punctate stimuli or pinching of the cuticle with forceps, and these elicited the same rolling behavior as noxious heat.

But, like I said, there is some contention to the matter. Here is a nice little review on insect pain. If you don’t want to read the whole thing, below is an excerpt.

In the majority of examples of invertebrate nociception noted above, there seems to be little, if any, evidence that the animals’ responses persist in anything akin to the manner described for mammals. As Eisemann et al. (1984) have described in a review of the “biological evidence” concerning pain in insects, “No example is known to us of an insect showing protective behavior towards injured parts, such as by limping after leg injury or declining to feed or mate because of general abdominal injuries. On the contrary, our experience has been that insects will continue with normal activities even after severe injury or removal of body parts.”

Eisemann et al. (1984) use a variety of examples to support this contention, including:

* an insect walking with a crushed tarsus continues “applying it to the substrate with undiminished force”;
* a locust carries on feeding while being eaten by a mantis;
* a tsetse fly, although half-dissected, flies in to feed.

Although some insect behavior, such as the writhing of insects poisoned by insecticides, or the struggling of restrained living insects, resembles that of “higher animals responding to painful stimuli,” Eisemann et al. conclude that the resemblance is superficial and that it “no more requires the presence of a pain sense than do reflexive withdrawal responses.” Similarly, although it has been shown that fruit flies can be trained to avoid certain odors and colored lights when these are associated with impending electric shock (Quinn et al., 1974), such learning is open to explanation in terms of neural mechanisms, without the need to postulate subjective experience on the part of flies.

The “relatively simple organization” of the insect central nervous system, Elsemann et al. argue, “raises the question of whether any experience akin to human pain could be generated” in these animals (and by implication in other invertebrates with a similar or less complex nervous organization). On the analysis of Gould and Gould (1982), the answer to such a question would be “no,” for these authors can find no evidence for conscious experience in insects. Certainly, on the limited amount of evidence presented here, it seems very difficult to imagine that insects and the other simpler invertebrates mentioned above can “suffer” pain in anything like the vertebrate sense. Nevertheless, the issue certainly is not closed, and further questions should be asked.

Perhaps such a view simply reflects a paucity of (human) imagination. Griffin (1984) surely would urge us to maintain an open mind on the issue, having provided behavioral evidence which, he argues, should challenge “the widespread belief’ that an insect, for example, “is too small and its central nervous system too differently organized from ours to be capable of conscious thinking and planning or subjective feelings.” Indeed, to take a more radical view, perhaps “it is presumptuous for us to assume that because our suffering involves self-awareness, this should also be true of other species” (McFarland, 1989).

Alternatively, perhaps, as Mather (1989) suggests, we should simply accept that these animals “are different from us, and wait for more data.”

jinzang wrote: »

If you try to kill an insect it will run or fly away. That shows at some level the insect values its life and does not wish to die.

The word "value" is too strong. It's still possible this could be a rote programmed response.

Dazzle wrote: »

All beings suffer fear and pain, including insects.

Fear is a complex emotion not attributable to simpler life forms.

I notice, no one has replied saying "I feel sorry for my skin cells", which too where once alive. Why is this?

There is a continuity to the complexity of life and the complexity of the brain that houses our concept of mind. To say fear, pain, let alone "suffering" as we know it, applies uniformly to ALL life is unfounded absolutism. Cells are little more than protein machines, what is to say more complex life aren't as well?

Kikujiro

GeminiVI wrote: »

I notice, no one has replied saying "I feel sorry for my skin cells", which too where once alive. Why is this?

Because we can't see this causing pain. If we could then then we would. But also, if I'm right, you also didn't ask about this either. You spoke about insects. If I knew that cells knew sorrow and pain at dying I would feel for them too, because I really know what that contemplation is really like.

aaki

GeminiVI wrote: »

Cells are little more than protein machines, what is to say more complex life aren't as well?

Because you already said "many cells together with a particular set of them specializing to form brain matter do you get the possibility of a mind emerging".

The only question then is is mind produced in such a fashion or is this sophistication what is needed for mind to grow alongside with. The question is really one of embryology which is just as stuck as research into mind.

GeminiVI

Let me go back through and distill my key questions:
1. Empathy isn’t supposed to be given to all life, is it?
2. What is the criteria empathy is supposed to be given on?
3. If pain and fear are lacking, let alone higher cognitive functions, can there be suffering?
4. Can a mind be incapable of suffering?
5. Even if a life form is incapable of suffering should it be given empathy?

Ethics, in the Buddhist context, is right conduct, which brings happiness and peace of mind, and never gives rise to remorse, worry or restlessness of mind. This is the immediate psychological benefit. Right conduct also leads to a happy rebirth, enabling an aspirant to progress further on the onward path to spiritual liberation. It is also the basis for progress in Dhamma here and now. In other words, right speech, right action and right livelihood of the Buddha's Noble Eightfold Path constitute right conduct in the best sense.

Not knowing if an insect suffers or not, means killing it wantlessly cannot be right action. What about spraying insecticides, especially en masse, to prevent the spread of disease, like malaria? Or is something common sense like that, taking the view too literal and to an extreme?

federica

GeminiVI wrote: »

Let me go back through and distill my key questions:
1. Empathy isn’t supposed to be given to all life, is it?

why not?

2. What is the criteria empathy is supposed to be given on?

That's for the individual to decide. There is no 'supposed', as far as I can tell, other than that you conclude through the Four and the Eight....

3. If pain and fear are lacking, let alone higher cognitive functions, can there be suffering?

can you tell that there isn't? Are you taking yours into consideration?

4. Can a mind be incapable of suffering?

no, and yes.

5. Even if a life form is incapable of suffering should it be given empathy?

name me a life form that is definitely, unarguably incapable of suffering.

Not knowing if an insect suffers or not, means killing it wantlessly cannot be right action. What about spraying insecticides, especially en masse, to prevent the spread of disease, like malaria? Or is something common sense like that, taking the view too literal and to an extreme?

Not too literal or extreme.
The bottom line is, intention is the key to the kamma accrued.

Subjectivity9

Gemini,

I read where a master said, (para) "Compassion only comes, when we can see our self in the other."

This struck me as true. Compassion isn’t something we do. It is a natural outcome.

I have been afraid, and so I can feel for an insect. But, skins cells would be too far removed from our own personal experience. So, I cannot relate to their problems.

No doubt they have them. ; ^ )

I am pretty sure that cells feel pain, or how else could they relate their distress to our nervous system?

Or you might even ask, "Are all cells created equal?"

Also, responding instinctively in order to increase chances of survival would not disprove pain. It might only prove that the instinct was stronger than the pain reflex.

Just my take,
S9