Part 1:
Translation
[Non-Buddhist Opponent:] Every action depends on an agent. As, for
instance, when we say that Devadatta walks, in this case the action of walking depends on the walker, Devadatta. In the same way, consciousness is an action. Therefore, whoever is conscious must exist.
[Vasubandhu:] Who is this “Devadatta?” Is he a soul? But that’s just what
you have to prove. Now, is he what is called a “person” in everyday usage?
That’s not any single thing; that name refers to various caused entities. Devadatta is conscious in just the same way as Devadatta walks. And how is it that Devadatta walks? Devadatta is no more than momentary caused entities that form an unbroken continuum. Fools who presuppose that the cause of the appearance of the continuum in a different place is a single being, a body, say that “Devadatta walks.” They call the arising of the continuum in another location “walking.” On our view, the “walking” of Devadatta is like the propagation of sound or the spread of a fi re. In the same way, thinking that the cause of consciousness is a unitary being, fools say that “Devadatta is conscious.” Hearing them say this, the Noble Ones say the same thing, in order to conform to received usage.
A sutra does say that “Consciousness is conscious of an object.” What does the consciousness do to its object? It doesn’t do anything. But just as it is said that “the effect conforms to the cause,” it comes into existence, similar to its object, without doing anything to it. That’s what it means to say that “consciousness is conscious of an object”; it comes into existence, similar to its object, without doing anything to it. Now, in what way is it similar? In appearance. It’s because of this similarity in appearance that the consciousness represents its object, rather than the sense-faculty that is also one of its causes. Or, since there is a continuum of moments of consciousness, each one caused by the last, there is no error in saying “Consciousness is conscious of an object,” since the word “agent” can be used to refer to a cause. It’s like saying “A bell rings.” Moreover, just as a lamp moves, in that way, consciousness knows its object. And how does a lamp move? The term “lamp” is applied metaphorically to a series of fl ames. When these flames appear in different places, we say “It moves to such-and-such a place.” In the same way, the term “consciousness” is applied to a series of thoughts. When they arise with different objects, we say “Consciousness is conscious of such-and-such an object.” Just as physical form is produced and remains in existence, but has no creator that is different in substance from itself, it’s the same way with consciousness.
I am perplexed by this wording of arising consciousness as "
similar to its object". According to the text, consciousness is strictly a caused entity, or in other words, an effect. But is not this second part (bolded) a strange way of describing that?
Why not say that the consciousness arises in respect to its object, or something along those lines? Instead, Vasubandhu says simply it comes into existence (here, I think appearence means circumstantially arising in a basic sense) - and that further, in that appearence "appears similar to the object". Thus, here we find no paradigmatic explanation of the object in relation or respect to consciousness, but simply their
similarity.
What is "similar", even and especially in appearance? By appearance, is it as if we were looking at or viewing something? If that is the case, then it seems to me that at best, consciousness might be considered an abstract object, which to my mind, is dissimilar to a material object. Or rather, I do not even know how "similarity" can become any point of comparison.
What is Vasubandhu attempting to represent here?
Thoughts?
Comments
Vasubandhu seems rather ambiguous with the word appearance. Appearance could denote the circumstance, which I would call "arising". But unlike arising, appearance may also be treated as a relative term: It appears - to whom or what? Whether it is actually relative "appearance" seems to be left ambiguous. It is just said that the object and conscious are similar.
It would seem that they have some relationship though, when he goes on to describe that in this similarity, consciousness represents its object.
So to further specify my question, I am wondering how he works from one rather ambiguous verb appearance to the explicit faculty of representation. It just seems a bit slippery to me.
Why do you chain yourself with such convolutions of the intellect?
On the other hand, I am open to any way of positively conceptualizing this in english. With a broader understanding of the argument, if its perhaps a bad interpretation (on my part or the one I have received) can we by any means translate better?
For instance, as I suggest "arising" instead of "appearing", the usage just doesn't seem to have proper implications. I am looking for any working modality, but am just not seeing it.
But yea, I suppose in that sense any objection is only weighted as far as the english language "can express". Maybe it would be better to relieve some of the pressure.
By the way, Anupassī, I do tend to find mental contortions useful, as I have found for myself that language is a significant dharma.
So I do not feel chained, at least not unreasonably. This is in fact my usual manner of expansion. If you will indulge a metaphor of my own, you might say I am applying limiting pressure, maybe even using a chain or strap to pull my metaphysical limbs in towards the body. But as I pull inward on the strap, applying this pressure, I stretch out. (That's how I do my hamstrings.) So perhaps it might be more "comfortable" to consider it a kind of stretching exercise.
So if I am attempting a certain pose, where you find simple seated position works, I am open to that position. Don't necessarily feel limited by my limitations/objections. I am interested in seeing how people work with the text. If my concerns are addressed or not, that is fine. Just looking for insights.
Here is the second exchange...
http://buddhisttorrents.blogspot.com/2009/05/buddhist-philosophy-essential-readings.html
The chapter I am reading is 26
daytripper,
I imagine this as the function of 'imagination' based on memory; the conditioning of experiences with similar objects.
We have contact, sensation, perception, impression, and consciousness (imagining the object as something) and labeling it as that thing all (based on previous volitional action - karma), then we like, dislike or are neutral about what we imagine and label, and finally we act in some way toward the imagined object (volitional action - karma)
'And the wheel it goes round and round and the painted ponies go up and down...' an old song, a very old song.
I like the idea if feedback loops, myself. I find it facinating!