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Dependent Origination according to Buddhadasa Bikkhu

edited June 2010 in Philosophy
Is anyone familiar with Buddhadasa's interpretation of dependent origination, or respectively the book entitled Patticcasamuppada - Practical Dependent Origination which he wrote on the topic? In this book, Buddhadasa expresses his dissatisfaction with the traditional account of dependent origination (as elaborated by Buddhagosa and transmitted through the Mahavihara tradition), and comes to the conclusion that the division of the nidanas over three successive lifetimes is not in accordance with the original teaching. He also states that the traditional interpretation is not suitable for practice, as it (allegedly) makes it impossible to observe and affect the nidanas. Instead, he suggests that dependent origination arises momentarily, that the twelve nidanas appear in a flash so to speak, whenever suffering arises.

It sounds like a good idea at first. Of course, samsaric phenomena arise at all time scales from very brief to very long, and we can say for sure that instances of suffering can arise in a short time, and that life is full of such instances. In chapter three of this book, Buddhadasa gives a number of practical examples, a child crying over a broken doll, a student fretting over a failed exam, a girl seeing her boyfriend with a different woman, etc. To my great disappointment, these examples -which are meant to illustrate Buddhadasa's point- are worded rather unintuitively, in a way I find impossible to comprehend.

Has anyone read this? Does anyone know what on earth Buddhadasa is talking about? Unfortunately, I could not find an online copy of the text. There is a condensed excerpt on what-buddha-taught.net, but that text does not contain the examples and it is translated from the Chinese version, rather than from the original Thai. If anyone is interested, I can retype the salient passages here.

Cheers, Thomas

Comments

  • edited June 2010
    In few words, it would seem that Buddhaghosa's DO interpretation is of literal rebirth and Buddhadasa's is of metaphorical rebirth. (I may be wrong.....)

    Dependent Origination explains 'cause and effect' of more than we focus on, but to our focus it shows us how suffering originates in desire-unfulfilled, and that desire originates in ignorance. It's less difficult than most people make it, at least on the conceptual level it is presented.

    We make things too complicated. In making them complicated, we focus too much on the words (many words) and not on the simple message of how suffering arises and therefore how we can eliminate said suffering in our lives 'now'.

    Namaste
  • aMattaMatt Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Has anyone read this? Does anyone know what on earth Buddhadasa is talking about? Unfortunately, I could not find an online copy of the text. There is a condensed excerpt on what-buddha-taught.net, but that text does not contain the examples and it is translated from the Chinese version, rather than from the original Thai. If anyone is interested, I can retype the salient passages here.

    Cheers, Thomas

    I've read the excerpt at that link, what about it confuses you? It seems pretty straight forward to me.
  • edited June 2010
    .


    This is the website of Bhikkhu Santikaro who was Bhikkhu Buddhadasa's translator.

    There are studies here of Buddhadasa's teachings on Dependent Origination which might be helpful.

    http://www.liberationpark.org/study/paticca.htm


    :)



    This section of Ven P.A. Payutto's booklet on Dependent Origination at Buddhanet is also worth investigation.


    http://www.buddhanet.net/cmdsg/coarise5.htm




    Kind regards,


    Dazzle



    .
  • edited June 2010
    aMatt wrote: »
    I've read the excerpt at that link, what about it confuses you? It seems pretty straight forward to me.

    As I said, the wording of this excerpt is quite different from the English translation by Steve Schmidt and the practical examples are missing. But even in this excerpt I can find passages that cause some head scratching, such as these:
    That which conforms to the “principle of direct and immediate efficacy” (sanditthika) [primarily concerned with the world and present life] is in accord with Buddhist principle. The interpretation of dependent origination that encompasses three lifetimes does not follow the “principle of direct and immediate efficacy.” The eleven states of dependent origination must all conform to the “principle of direct and immediate efficacy” to be recognized as the Buddha's teaching.
    The argumentation here seems a little far-fetched. There is no sutta I can think of that brings dependent origination into direct context with sanditthika, not to mention makes it dependent on the latter. There are plenty of suttas that deal with things not here and now, most prominently the suttas that deal with kamma. Have I overlooked something?
    The “paticca” in paticcasamuppada means “mutually dependent,” while “samuppada” means “to occur simultaneously.”
    This appears to be a mistranslation. Samuppada does not mean to occur simultaneously. It means genesis, origin, to come about.
    The primitive Pali suttas state that whenever we experience vexation, the eleven states are mutually dependent and they advance successively to generate a dependent arising. For this reason, dependent arising does not have to encompass three lifetimes, a lifetime, a year, a month, or a day. A complete process of dependent arising and the suffering that ensues can possibly occur and end in an instant.
    The argument here only suggests only that if there are 12 factors present in dependent origination, then all of these can arise simultanously. It does not show that they must arise simultaneously. Some of them may have already arisen.
    The eleven states are mutually dependent in a complete process of dependent arising. As stated in the Pali suttas, there is no gap between any of the states. Therefore, it is not necessary to classify the first two states as belonging to the past, the next ten states to the present, the remaining state to the future, and thereby explain a process of dependent arising as encompassing three lifetimes.
    I'd call this "the argument from the gap". The problem is that it relies on a realist notion of time, which I find ultimately untenable. The gap between different lifetimes is conceptual in the same way as the gaps between cause and effect are conceptual. To argue that causality necessitates co-locality and co-temporality is not very intuitive and probably not compatible with other aspects of the dhamma such as the idea of kamma.
    Dependent arising emerges from Clinging, and not from only thought and feeling. Therefore, it is not applicable to the fetus inside the womb. This is because Ignorance, Craving, and Clinging have not yet developed in the fetus.
    Say what?

    Cheers, Thomas
  • DairyLamaDairyLama Veteran Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Javelin wrote: »
    We make things too complicated. In making them complicated, we focus too much on the words (many words) and not on the simple message of how suffering arises and therefore how we can eliminate said suffering in our lives 'now'.

    These conflicting explanations of DO are much too complicated for me! I'm going to stick with the Noble Truths, which I feel I have some chance of understanding and applying in my daily practice.;)

    P
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited June 2010
    The argumentation here seems a little far-fetched. There is no sutta I can think of that brings dependent origination into direct context with sanditthika
    MN 280 wrote:
    He who sees Dependant Origination sees the Dhamma; He who sees the Dhamma sees Dependant Origination.
    AN 6.47 wrote:
    The Dhamma is visible here-&-now, the Dhamma is visible here-&-now,

    Dependent Origination is the Dhamma the Buddha taught.
    not to mention makes it dependent on the latter. There are plenty of suttas that deal with things not here and now, most prominently the suttas that deal with kamma. Have I overlooked something?

    How can kamma not happen in the here-and-now?
    The argument here only suggests only that if there are 12 factors present in dependent origination, then all of these can arise simultanously. It does not show that they must arise simultaneously. Some of them may have already arisen.

    Yes?
    I'd call this "the argument from the gap". The problem is that it relies on a realist notion of time, which I find ultimately untenable. The gap between different lifetimes is conceptual in the same way as the gaps between cause and effect are conceptual. To argue that causality necessitates co-locality and co-temporality is not very intuitive and probably not compatible with other aspects of the dhamma such as the idea of kamma.

    This is just babbling. Observe if it illustrates the arising of each instance of dukkha in your life accurately, or if it does not.
    Dependent arising emerges from Clinging, and not from only thought and feeling. Therefore, it is not applicable to the fetus inside the womb. This is because Ignorance, Craving, and Clinging have not yet developed in the fetus.
    Say what?

    What about this confuses you? Do you think that from conception onwards, a bundle of cells has a self-concept and clings and craves things and experiences dukkha when it doesn't get what it wants?
  • edited June 2010
    This might be helpful...found at....http://drvasu.wordpress.com/2007/10/31/practical-dependent-origination-by-bhikku-buddhadasa/

    <form action="http://drvasu.wordpress.com/&quot; method="get"> <fieldset> <input value="" name="s" id="s"><input value="Go!" id="searchbutton" name="searchbutton" type="submit"></fieldset> </form>
    <!-- /navigation --> <hr class="low"> <!-- content ................................. --> Practical Dependent Origination by Bhikku Buddhadasa

    October 31, 2007<!-- at 11:48 am--> <!--drvacharya-->
    “Karma is not an ever – enduring chain; it is a chain that can be broken at any time. What was done yesterday can be undone today; there’s no permanent continuance of anything. Continuance can and must be dissipated through the understanding of its process. So when you SEE this process, when you are really aware of it without opposition, without a sense of temptation, without resistance, without justifying or judging it then you will discover that the mind is capable of receiving the new and that the new is never a sensation therefore it can never be recognized, re-experienced. It is a state of being in which creativeness comes without invitation, without memory and that is reality.” J Krishnamurthi
    During my visit to Thailand in September of this year I came across the works of Bhikku Buddhadasa. I had somehow missed him out all these years. I was aware of the Thai forest Buddhist traditions of Ajahn Chan and his disciples like Ajahn Sumedho. They were the contemplatives and the Meditators. Buddhadasa was a philosopher and reformer. He wanted to clean up Buddhism from all the ritualistic and non essential elements. He was an innovative interpreter of the Buddhist scriptures and had influenced the social revolutionaries in the overthrow of absolute monarchy in Thailand.
    While browsing through the Buddhist books in Jomtien beach in Pattaya, I found some books of Buddhadasa and one which really caught my attention was the reinterpretation of paticcasammupada or Dependent origination. I picked this book which was titled ‘Practical Dependent Origination’ and upon reading it I could see that Buddhadasa had been heavily influenced by Marxism as well as the Indian philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurthi as his explanation of dependent origination is quite similar to the way Krishnamurthi explained it. Of course there are no references to either of these in the books. I am also open to the idea that Buddhadasa reasoned his new interpretation of dependent origination all by himself but it seems a bit likely considering his association with the political and social movements of his time that he might have borrowed some ideas. But what finally matters is the intent.
    Dependent origination is one of the key aspects of the teaching of the Buddha and according to this doctrine there is nothing which is absolutely singular. A thing is nothing more than the coming together of all its causes, and no thing has a single cause. No phenomenon is independent and it depends on many causes for its existence. When applied to concepts we can deduce that no concept is primitive and basic and every concept is derived from other concepts. Every concept has meaning only within the framework of a specific context of other concepts. There are no primal ideas or axioms present through which we can derive other concepts. When applied to activities and causes of incidents in human lives there is no incident which exists without it being influenced by other dependent causes.
    This doctrine is also very strongly associated with the concept of karma and rebirth in Buddhism. Buddhadasa argues that the culprit for this association is primarily the 4th century Sri Lankan Theravada Buddhist Scholar, Buddhagosha and his seminal work Visshudhimagga. In the Vishuddhi magga, Buddhaghosa has explained the doctrine of dependent origination based on the idea of three connected lifetimes (past, present, and future). According to his idea, ignorance and action in the past gave birth to the present and the consequences of past actions are thus experienced in the present. The activities of the present influences the future even spanning across many life times.
    Buddhadasa Bhikkhu cuts across the doctrine of rebirth and strongly focuses the doctrine of dependent origination to the present moment to provide an explanation for the cause and cessation of suffering right in the present moment itself. Buddhadasa argues that If the causes of suffering exist in the previous life, as Buddhaghosa said, then freeing oneself from suffering in this life is impossible because the cause of suffering is inaccessible.
    Buddhadasa’s teachings to put it very grossly is similar to the modern new age teaching of ‘Living in the moment’. And since there is no empirical evidence for rebirth, Buddhadasa finds it very difficult to accept the teachings of Vishuddhimagga. He goes back to the tripitaka pali canon and picks up teachings of the no-self to attack Buddhagosha’s teachings of rebirth in Vishuddhimagga. Buddhadasa also claims that the doctrine of rebirth was introduced much later by the Brahmins scholars like Buddhagosha into Buddhism.
    Bhikku Buddhadasa towards the end of his life embraced a world view which rejected belief in any religion as he mentioned that those who have penetrated to the highest understanding have no use for any religion. He also has given a series of lectures on the practice of Anapanasati or mindfulness of breath meditation and his explanations are quite innovative.Buddhadasa was indeed a courageous monk and people who would like to understand religion on an empirical and rational basis can find an excellent source in his teachings.
  • edited June 2010
    Javelin wrote: »
    In few words, it would seem that Buddhaghosa's DO interpretation is of literal rebirth and Buddhadasa's is of metaphorical rebirth.

    Implicitly yes, however, because rebirth does not directly appear in dependent origination, it implies a metaphorical interpretation of all the nidanas. This means that everything from the six sense bases to birth, old age, and death must be interpreted metaphorically. I am not saying it is principally impossible to interpret dependent origination in this way; I am just saying that Buddhadhasa's account doesn't sound very consistent to me.
    Valtiel wrote: »
    How can kamma not happen in the here-and-now?

    I was referring to the relation of volitional action (kamma) and result (vipaka), which is causally related yet not always instantaneous. According to the standard interpretation, vipaka is delayed until the conditions are right, which can encompass an arbitrary amount of time, even several life times, which is why some Buddhist schools speak of kamma storage, or storage consciousness (alayavijnana). So here we have a prominent example for a causal atemporal relationship. Yet Buddhadasa claims that within the context of paticcasamuppada an atemporal causal relationship is not possible because of the "gaps".
    Valtiel wrote: »
    This is just babbling. Observe if it illustrates the arising of each instance of dukkha in your life accurately, or if it does not.

    I object to the babbling. Temporal and spatial proximity (i.e. contiguity) are important aspects of causality. As mentioned previously, I find that Buddhadasa's account does not illustrate the arising of dukkha well. Tomorrow when I have more time, I will type out some of the original examples given in the text. Then everyone can judge for themselves.
    Valtiel wrote: »
    Do you think that from conception onwards, a bundle of cells has a self-concept and clings and craves things and experiences dukkha when it doesn't get what it wants?

    I find the claim that a fetus does not experience ignorance, clinging, and craving somewhat unwarranted. How does Buddhadasa know that? After all, the nervous system begins to develop in the womb and from a certain stage onwards, the baby responds to external stimuli. For example, the baby might start kicking and moving in the womb when it does not receive enough nutrients. Can this be interpreted as craving? Who can tell?

    Cheers, Thomas
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited June 2010
    This means that everything from the six sense bases to birth, old age, and death must be interpreted metaphorically.
    It isn't a metaphor. Birth/death do not only mean your birth day and physical death, in English or Pali- otherwise it'd be a metaphor. And certainly the six sense bases aren't metaphors. :confused: DO illustrates the arising of tainted sense bases - likewise they don't cease with nibbana, we're -freed- from them, another distinction which isn't often made in translations.
    I was referring to the relation of volitional action (kamma) and result (vipaka),
    Where does kamma-vipaka appear in DO anyway? DO is the dhamma he taught. His other teachings were mundane.
    As mentioned previously, I find that Buddhadasa's account does not illustrate the arising of dukkha well.
    Could you offer an explanation of how it arises, then? In each moment? Can you offer an example which his explanation does not explain?
    Tomorrow when I have more time, I will type out some of the original examples given in the text. Then everyone can judge for themselves.
    Great, thanks.
    I find the claim that a fetus does not experience ignorance, clinging, and craving somewhat unwarranted. How does Buddhadasa know that? After all, the nervous system begins to develop in the womb and from a certain stage onwards, the baby responds to external stimuli. For example, the baby might start kicking and moving in the womb when it does not receive enough nutrients. Can this be interpreted as craving? Who can tell?
    So long as there is a point in time, no matter how brief, after conception, where there is not ignorance/craving, then the point remains. Surely a zygote doesn't experience them?
  • aMattaMatt Veteran
    edited June 2010
    As I said, the wording of this excerpt is quite different from the English translation by Steve Schmidt and the practical examples are missing. But even in this excerpt I can find passages that cause some head scratching, such as these:
    That which conforms to the “principle of direct and immediate efficacy” (sanditthika) [primarily concerned with the world and present life] is in accord with Buddhist principle. The interpretation of dependent origination that encompasses three lifetimes does not follow the “principle of direct and immediate efficacy.” The eleven states of dependent origination must all conform to the “principle of direct and immediate efficacy” to be recognized as the Buddha's teaching.
    The argumentation here seems a little far-fetched. There is no sutta I can think of that brings dependent origination into direct context with sanditthika, not to mention makes it dependent on the latter. There are plenty of suttas that deal with things not here and now, most prominently the suttas that deal with kamma. Have I overlooked something?

    It seems to me that he is saying: because the impetus for DO is directly related to the interlocking efficacy of each of its components, that the only place it can truly impact is the place where the components reside. In this perspective, the birth and death at the ends of the DO chain are in regards to a moment of phenomena that flares through the continuity in the mind, in the moment.
    The “paticca” in paticcasamuppada means “mutually dependent,” while “samuppada” means “to occur simultaneously.”
    This appears to be a mistranslation. Samuppada does not mean to occur simultaneously. It means genesis, origin, to come about.

    My pali is not perfect, but I suggest you look at the roots samu and pada and see how the defining of paticca-samuppada is being expanded, not necessarily mistranslated. I prefer the traditional definition myself, but I can also see the idea that is being pointed toward. I think it would be even more accurate to translate "samu-pada" as "arising-motion" or "qualities of-motion"

    We all use different words to point to concepts, and it seems that translation of paticca samuppada is intent on helping show the motion aspect, rather than a static "origin" which would be samudaya. Pada is motion, while daya is more solid.
    The primitive Pali suttas state that whenever we experience vexation, the eleven states are mutually dependent and they advance successively to generate a dependent arising. For this reason, dependent arising does not have to encompass three lifetimes, a lifetime, a year, a month, or a day. A complete process of dependent arising and the suffering that ensues can possibly occur and end in an instant.
    The argument here only suggests only that if there are 12 factors present in dependent origination, then all of these can arise simultanously. It does not show that they must arise simultaneously. Some of them may have already arisen.

    To me this seems to be saying that because they are interconnected, that they are in the process of constantly moving the cycle forward. If you throw a ball against a wall, there is not an instant that goes by that the cycle is paused... it has the illusion of taking time "away from the body" but that is only if we are not in observation of it travelling. Because the cycle is what sustains the motion, we can only turn our minds away from the karmic vibration, it never "not exists" because it cannot spontaneously regenerate at a later time. We have to sustain its existence through our connection to the world.
    The eleven states are mutually dependent in a complete process of dependent arising. As stated in the Pali suttas, there is no gap between any of the states. Therefore, it is not necessary to classify the first two states as belonging to the past, the next ten states to the present, the remaining state to the future, and thereby explain a process of dependent arising as encompassing three lifetimes.
    I'd call this "the argument from the gap". The problem is that it relies on a realist notion of time, which I find ultimately untenable. The gap between different lifetimes is conceptual in the same way as the gaps between cause and effect are conceptual. To argue that causality necessitates co-locality and co-temporality is not very intuitive and probably not compatible with other aspects of the dhamma such as the idea of kamma.

    It seems to me that he is saying that there is no gap. We might perceive a gap, because we are looking elsewhere, but cause and effect are interconnected. Because we must use our minds to sustain the imprints, the ruts, or whatever you'd like to use to describe patterns of kamma that lead into dukkha, there cannot be a gap, only ignorance into our own activities. Much like there is no gap in life when we fall asleep, but often our minds are unaware of life while we are sleeping.

    As far as this being a refuting of lifetimes, I don't think it matters or describes a lack of past and future lifetimes, only stating that the arising of the next cycle of DO is already happening, because it is a cycle without a pause.
    Dependent arising emerges from Clinging, and not from only thought and feeling. Therefore, it is not applicable to the fetus inside the womb. This is because Ignorance, Craving, and Clinging have not yet developed in the fetus.
    Say what?

    Because it is the mind that sustains the cycle of DO, until the mind is observing independent events, there is no impetus to the cycle. Much as a brain dead body would not be experiencing the cycles of DO.... neither would a fetus. I think as some point though, a baby becomes aware to some degree and would begin cycling.

    I am not convinced that all of his interpretations of DO are 100% accurate, because there might be a downplay of forces of nature I have yet to observe, such as that which happens between birth and death, or in a mind with a complete cessation of dukkha. It does seem to be a direct accounting of how the mind sustains the cycles of DO in the present moment. I think it is important to be able to abandon your view in order to take in another person's, rather than try to compare it to concepts you already own. In this case, the observations of DO seem relatively clear for what they are.

    With warmth,

    Matt
  • edited June 2010
    Thank you, Matt, that was interesting.

    I find Buddhadasa's point of view appealing, but I have some difficulties wrapping my head around it. What is more, from reading his text I am left with the impression that he has developed a pronounced distaste for Buddhaghosa's interpretation, as he keeps bashing it on almost every page of the book. He writes like a philosopher who tries to out-argue another philosopher's views. I find this unnecessary, because the two interpretations complement rather than contradict each other.

    To my ears, the translation of the samuppada as "arising motion" is still quite removed from "occurring simultaneously", but I won't argue this any further since I lack knowledge of the Pali language. It appears that drawing an argument on account of this in favour of co-temporality of the arising of all nidanas is a bit of a stretch and I haven't yet come across any sutta that spells this out. Likewise, arguing that dependent origination cannot arise prenatally seems a bit of a stretch, since what we know about the developing baby in the uterus suggests otherwise, but I will leave it at that because these points are just incidental to the main argument.

    The principal difficulty for the momentary interpretation of dependent origination is to explain how the the nidanas no. 1, 3, 4 and 5 arise momentarily, that is ignorance (avijja), consciousness (vinnana), name-and-form (namarupa, psychophysicality), and the six sense gates (salayatana). I have no problems with a metaphorical understanding of the nidanas 10-13, namely becoming (bhava), birth (jati), and decay and death (jaramarana), as they can relate to the metaphorical birth and death of any phenomenon that we fancy conceptualising. I have also no problems with the other nidanas 2 and 6-9, namely mental formations (sankhara), contact (phassa), feeling (vedana), craving (tanha), and attachment (updana), because these can obviously arise spontaneously, although it could be argued that sankhara, tanha, and upadana tend to become persistent features of the mind that survive and exceed the moments of dukkha experiences.

    Perhaps it is useful to come back to the ball game example that you introduced. If you throw or hit a ball against the wall -say you have a tennis racket- it comes back and cycles between you and the wall until you end the game and walk away. If one attempts to analyse this in the style of dependent origination, one can point out a number of supporting conditions for this game, such as the wall, the racket, the swing of the racket, contact of the ball with the surfaces, gravity, elastic properties, mechanical forces, and so on.

    Obviously, some of the features of the ball game arise momentarily and are repeated over and over, such as contact of the ball with the wall, contact with the racket, the swing of the racket, and the mechanical forces acting on the ball. Other features, such as the wall, the floor, and the racket are of a more permanent nature. They do not arise spontaneously, but they stay in place between individual cycles of the ball game. Now, the outrageous claim in Buddhadasa's interpretation is that all conditions are of momentary nature and he makes no distinction between spontaneous and more permanent ones. He states that all twelve nidanas arise in a moment of dukkha. This is a bit like claiming that the wall comes into existence momentarily as the ball makes contact with it, or that the racket comes into existence only when it plays the ball. Just not very intuitive...

    Cheers, Thomas
  • edited June 2010
    Here is an excerpt of Paticcasamuppda - Practical Dependent Origination by Buddhadasa Bikkhu that illustrates the momentary account of dependent origination. It is one of four examples cited in the book on page 32-35. English translation by Steve Schmidt, 1986.

    The Birth Of The Flow Of Dependent Origination

    Example 1

    Now I would like to give a few examples from everyday life to show how dependent origination arises. A little child cries loudly because her doll is broken. Think carefully for a moment about this and then I will explain how dependent origination arises.

    A little child cries loudly because her doll is broken. When she sees the broken doll, there is contact between eye and the visual object, in this case, the form (shape and color) of the doll in a broken condition. At that momen, eye consciousness arises and knows that the doll is broken.

    As a matter of course, the child is filled with ignorance because she doesn't know anything about dhamma. When her doll breaks, her mind is full of ignorance. Ignorance gives rise to volitional formations, a kind of power that gives rise to an idea or thought, which is consciousness.

    That which is called consciousness is seeing the broken doll and knowing that it is a broken doll. This is eye consciousness, because it depends on the eye seeing the broken doll.

    There is ignorance, or no mindfullness, at that moment because the child has no knowledge of dhamma. Because of this lack of mindfulness, there arises the power to give rise to consciousness, which sees form in a way that will be suffering.

    The meeting of the eye and the form (the doll) and the consciousness that knows this are all three together called contact.

    Now eye contact arises in that girl. And, if we are to be detailed, that contact gives rise to mentality/materiality: the girl's body and mind conditioned to experience suffering arise.

    Please understand that ordinarily our body and mind are not in a condition to experience suffering. There must be ignorance, or something to condition it to become receptive to the possibility of suffering. And so it is saud that the mind/body only now arises in this case. It measn that ignorance conditions consciousness and this consciousness helps the mind/body change and arise to action and become capable of experiencing suffering.

    In this kind of mind/body, at this moment, the sense bases arise which are also primed to experience suffering. They are not asleep, as is usually the case, so there will be perfected contact which is ready for suffering. The arises vedana or feeling which is unpleasant. Then this unpleasant feeling gives rise to grasping, the desire to follow the power of that unpleasantness. Next, attachment clings to the feeling as "mine". This is where the "I" concept arises, which is called becoming. When this blossoms fully, it is called birth. Then there is suffering in seeing the broken doll - there is crying. That's what is known as tribulation, which means extreme frustration.

    Now about birth (jati): it has a wide range of meaning, which includes such things as old age and death. If there were no ignorance, there would not arise the belief that the doll broke or that the doll died or some such belief. If that were the case, no suffering at all would have arisen. But now suffering has arisen fully because there arose attachment to self: my doll. When the doll broke, there was incorrect action because of ignorance, and so the girl cried. Crying is a symptom of completed suffering: the end of dependent origination has been reached.

    Here is the point that most people fail to understand. It's the hidden part of the topic called the language of ultimate truth, or the language of dependent origination. Most people don't believe that people are born all the time or that mind/body is born or that the sense bases are born. They don't believe that the normal state is equivalent to not yet being born, in which there has yet been no action according to functions.

    When any natural event causes these things to function, then we can say that birth has occurred. For example, take our eyeball. We believe that it already exists, that it already has been born. But in the sense of the dhamma, it has not yet been born until that eye sees some form. When it performs its functions, the seeing of forms, it can be said that the eye is born and the form is born and then eye consciousness is born. These three help each other to give rise to what is called contact. Contact gives rise to feeling, grasping and all the other elements, all the way up to the completion of the cycle.

    Now, if later on, that young girl goes to bed and thinks about the broken doll, she will cry again. At that time, it is a matter of mind consciousness, not eye consciousness. When she thinks about the broken doll, the thought is the object of perception, and that object contacts the mind, giving rise to mind consciousness. She thinks about the broken doll. This gives rise to the body and mind at that moment and causes them instantly to change into body and mind which are the condition for the sense bases which will experience suffering.

    Those sense bases will give rise to contact of a kind that will experience suffering. Then feeling arises, followed by grasping, attachment, and finally suffering. At this point, the little girl is crying again, even though the doll broke many days or eveb many weeks ago. These thoughts which are concocted one after another, are called Paticcasamuppada and they are in all of us as a rule.
  • aMattaMatt Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Obviously, some of the features of the ball game arise momentarily and are repeated over and over, such as contact of the ball with the wall, contact with the racket, the swing of the racket, and the mechanical forces acting on the ball. Other features, such as the wall, the floor, and the racket are of a more permanent nature. They do not arise spontaneously, but they stay in place between individual cycles of the ball game. Now, the outrageous claim in Buddhadasa's interpretation is that all conditions are of momentary nature and he makes no distinction between spontaneous and more permanent ones. He states that all twelve nidanas arise in a moment of dukkha. This is a bit like claiming that the wall comes into existence momentarily as the ball makes contact with it, or that the racket comes into existence only when it plays the ball. Just not very intuitive...

    Cheers, Thomas

    Thomas,

    I really like your breakdown of the nidanas here in reference to the ball game. I think you're right in that the wall and the ground, the racket have form that are in existence before and after the ball traverses its surface. However, they are empty of motion, and do not further, by themselves, the DO cycle. The ball hitting the wall has an impetus that is unrelated to the wall... rather, the ball applies its own force against the wall, and its rebound is predicted by the physics that dictate the DO.

    Much like the broken doll story in the example you gave, the doll itself does not further the cycle, rather its the girl's mind bouncing off the doll that perpetuates the cycle. So you can say that the wall or doll exists, but they are completely neutral to the DO. The wall does not play the game, the racket does not play the game... the moment the ball hits the wall, we think the wall is playing because we are ignorant to our active impetus of the cycle.

    We think the doll being broken is the karma, and that is what is dependently arising... but its the sadness at its breaking that is in the cycle, not the breaking itself. This sadness was directly dependent upon the clinging to the sensations... the actual "breaking doll" was the "wall" and completely empty of the cycle, or the pattern of meaning. Right?

    If the girl observes the broken doll after she has stilled the DO pattern of clinging to its permanence, then she observes it without dukkha. If she is suffering, then she is actively maintaining the cycle of the DO by continuing to actively cling in the moment. Just because its habituated clinging, does not make it passive, it just makes her ignorant of her action.

    It could also be equated to light, where if you disperse the energy that is sustaining it in the moment, everything goes dark. Its not that the light creates the form of the walls, but it illumines the forms into sense perceptions and so forth. The walls themselves are not an active part of the process, they just reflect.

    What do you think?

    I'm not convinced that every word of Buddhadasa Bikkhu is 100% accurate or translated perfectly, but it does seem to point to a decently logical interpretation of how it works.

    With warmth,

    Matt
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Can't type a lot- on my iPod- but the example explains your issue with say the sense bases; they aren't being taken metaphorically. And rather than, say, the physical eye emerging, it is an eye now tainted with ignorance arising. Whether you see clearly or with ignorance happens in a moment.

    Now, what is your specific issue with the example you cited above?
  • edited June 2010
    If it was ever in doubt, I'll just throw in that dukkha is entirely in and of the mind. Ciao.....

    :)
  • edited June 2010
    Please let me summarise the issues. There are several statements in the above text from Buddhadasa Bikkhu I fail to understand:
    When she sees the broken doll, there is contact between eye and the visual object, in this case, the form (shape and color) of the doll in a broken condition. At that momen, eye consciousness arises and knows that the doll is broken.
    I can see a number of problems with this statement. First, the sequence is confused: contact, name-and-form, consciousness, whereas the original sequence is consciousness, name and form, six senses, contact. Second, Buddhadasa relates form to the perceived object rather than to the perceiver. Third, it is awkward to say that eye consciousness (vision) "arises", as vision is a continuous process and does in no sense arise from the sight of the broken doll. There is even a Pali word: vinnanasota -the stream of consciousness- which implies continuity. It is also awkward to say that eye consciousness "knows", as the process of vision is different from the process of recognition and knowing.
    Ignorance gives rise to volitional formations, a kind of power that gives rise to an idea or thought, which is consciousness.
    This statement appears very muddled. Consciousness is an idea or thought? I don't think so. What exactly is the nature of the volitional formation Buddhadasa refers to?
    Now eye contact arises in that girl. And, if we are to be detailed, that contact gives rise to mentality/materiality: the girl's body and mind conditioned to experience suffering arise.
    It appears as if Buddhadasa is trying to shoehorn namarupa into the process with this sentence. Unfortunately, he fails to point out the correct function of namarupa: "The girls body and mind conditioned to experience suffering". This sounds like a circular argument, since suffering is what we expect to conclude at the end of the process, not what namarupa contributes to it.
    There must be ignorance, or something to condition it to become receptive to the possibility of suffering. And so it is said that the mind/body only now arises in this case.
    Circular reasoning again.
    In this kind of mind/body, at this moment, the sense bases arise which are also primed to experience suffering. They are not asleep, as is usually the case, so there will be perfected contact which is ready for suffering.
    If it is awkward to say that consciousness arises momentarily, it is even more awkward to say that the six senses arise momentarily. The only way to argue this coherently is to introduce a quantised model of mind, such as the cittakhana theory of mind which breaks down the stream of consciousness into discrete moments of citta. However, this concept does not appear in the early discourses as the khanavada doctrine was only developed later in the Abidhamma. Furthermore, Buddhadasa does at no point appeal to it as to base his exposition on such an understanding of mind. Without it, it is utterly strange and unintuitive to claim that the six sense bases arise momentarily. He does it again later in the text:
    For example, take our eyeball. We believe that it already exists, that it already has been born. But in the sense of the dhamma, it has not yet been born until that eye sees some form.
    Again, this is not only a counter-intuitive, it is also self-contradictory, because neither the eyeball nor vision suddenly ceases when there is no suffering. This, however, should be expected if one follows Buddhadasa's argument. No suffering -> no dependent origination -> no vision -> no eyeball? I don't think so.

    I am also disappointed by the treatment of feeling, craving, attachment, becoming and birth:
    Then arises vedana or feeling which is unpleasant. Then this unpleasant feeling gives rise to grasping, the desire to follow the power of that unpleasantness. Next, attachment clings to the feeling as "mine". This is where the "I" concept arises, which is called becoming. When this blossoms fully, it is called birth.
    Unpleasant feeling arises from the sight of the broken doll? Alright, but does this happen before or after the identification of the doll as "mine"? If it is before, the feeling should be neutral, not unpleasant. The unpleasantness comes from the identification of the doll as mine, doesn't it? And why would the girl grasp on to a negative feeling? Negative feelings are repelling rather than attracting, aren't they? This doesn't make sense at all. Ultimately, I have to say that I find the entire exposition of Buddhadasa's momentary arising quite unconvincing, not only in this example, but also in the other three (which I haven't reproduced here, because they essentially repeat the same message).

    Is it possible give a convincing account of metaphorical and momentary codependent arising without appealing to mind moments? I am not sure about that. I am not even sure if it is possible with the theory if mind moments (cittakhana). Perhaps there are other works or other authors who have attempted this. I'd be glad to look into it.

    Cheers, Thomas
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Firstly if you find his explanation of the arising of each instance of dukkha unconvincing, it would help if you provided a better alternative explanation... it's difficult to practice if one doesn't know the Second Noble Truth...
    When she sees the broken doll, there is contact between eye and the visual object, in this case, the form (shape and color) of the doll in a broken condition. At that moment, eye consciousness arises and knows that the doll is broken.
    I can see a number of problems with this statement. First, the sequence is confused: contact, name-and-form, consciousness, whereas the original sequence is consciousness, name and form, six senses, contact. Second, Buddhadasa relates form to the perceived object rather than to the perceiver.
    The word "form" here is not referring to nama-rupa. It is referring to a sense-object for the eye to see. [MN 148]

    The word "contact" here is simply referring to the meeting of a sense base and object. It is not capitalized. As stated in the suttas and by Buddhadhasa in the very example you just provided, -C-ontact refers to a sense base, object, -and- corresponding consciousness arising. [MN 148]

    so nothing is out of the traditional order here.

    The Buddha presented the Nidanas in "incomplete" ways, such as in DN 15, for the sake of clarity in relating the cycle of samsara. However he does go on to explain rupa in the traditional order in this example as well.
    Third, it is awkward to say that eye consciousness (vision) "arises", as vision is a continuous process and does in no sense arise from the sight of the broken doll.
    Have you ever noticed a background noise fade away after some time? Or a physical sensation disappear until you happen to notice it again? It's the same thing. The ear might be present, the sound might be present, but only with the meeting of the two AND ear-consciousness is there Contact. Likewise with the other senses. You are again not arguing against Buddhadhasa's words but against the Buddha's. [MN 148] Which is fine, but I'd just like to point that out.
    There is even a Pali word: vinnanasota -the stream of consciousness- which implies continuity.
    Please point to a sutta in the sutta pitaka which contains this term. MN 38 denies this. But, it's fairly easy, as in the examples I provided, to look and see for yourself. You may be conscious, but the senses, even when in contact with a sense object, are not always "on" or "active." There is a difference between being conscious, and the consciousness the Buddha taught of.

    Will respond to the rest later...
  • DairyLamaDairyLama Veteran Veteran
    edited June 2010
    If it is awkward to say that consciousness arises momentarily, it is even more awkward to say that the six senses arise momentarily. The only way to argue this coherently is to introduce a quantised model of mind, such as the cittakhana theory of mind which breaks down the stream of consciousness into discrete moments of citta.

    But if we accept that the underlying principle of DO is conditionality, then consciousness arises in dependence on cause and condition, one of which is presumably the preceding moment of consciousness. Without this momentary approach I don't see how the continuity of consciousness in the post-mortem rebirth approach to DO could be explained either.

    P
  • edited June 2010
    Valtiel wrote: »
    Firstly if you find his explanation of the arising of each instance of dukkha unconvincing, it would help if you provided a better alternative explanation... it's difficult to practice if one doesn't know the Second Noble Truth...

    Good point, Valtiel. Actually, I spent the first years of my practice disregarding dependent origination entirely, as I found it too difficult. I studied other aspects that appeared more accessible. From this experience I can say that it is possible to practice without the whole apparatus of dependent origination. The Buddha was kind enough to put the most important aspect right into the four noble truths: tanha. -- I understand tanha as the predetermined breaking point of dependent origination. That is, if one is mindful of tanha and prevents the arising of upadana, then one can proceed quite well with practice without ever having to call the entire cycle of dependent origination into mind.

    Now, as to whether there is an alternative to Buddhadasa's interpretation, there is of course the traditional Buddhaghosa interpretation. In addition, one can also conceive of an alternative view of momentary dependent origination. One merely needs to let go of the postulate that all twelve nidanas arise simultaneously. That is to say that some factors of dependent origination arise momentarily while other don't, as they already have arisen. On could say that the mind/body and the sense bases have already arisen, while contact arises and ceases continuously, depending on the former. Ignorance and sankhara may or may not have arisen. If they have arisen, then the causal chain sustains dependent origination, and then the other nidanas also arise.
    Valtiel wrote: »
    Have you ever noticed a background noise fade away after some time? Or a physical sensation disappear until you happen to notice it again? It's the same thing. The ear might be present, the sound might be present, but only with the meeting of the two AND ear-consciousness is there Contact.

    Yes, the brain filters information that it does not consider important and thus sensory input does not necessarily result in conscious awareness of the same, hence, no contact. However, this process is involuntary and we have limited conscious control over phassa/contact. If I clap my hands in front of you, do you have a choice whether to hear it or not?
    Valtiel wrote: »
    Likewise with the other senses. You are again not arguing against Buddhadhasa's words but against the Buddha's. [MN 148] Which is fine, but I'd just like to point that out.

    Can you point out the argument against the Buddha's word and the part of the sutta, please?
    Valtiel wrote: »
    Please point to a sutta in the sutta pitaka which contains this term. (vinnanasota) MN 38 denies this.

    Valtiel, I assume that you know the suttas well. The term vinnanasota appears after the sutta pitaka. I believe the word sotavinnana or sotavinannam (not vinnanasota) can be found somewhere in the suttas, because it is cited in the abidhamma, but I wouldn't know where. The full concept of the "stream of consciousness" was developed later. I don't see MN 38 contradicting such a concept.
    porpoise wrote:
    But if we accept that the underlying principle of DO is conditionality, then consciousness arises in dependence on cause and condition, one of which is presumably the preceding moment of consciousness. Without this momentary approach I don't see how the continuity of consciousness in the post-mortem rebirth approach to DO could be explained either.

    Sorry, porpoise, perhaps I did not express it clearly enough. I don't have problems with the idea of consciousness arising from moment to moment. This would be arising in the sense of an interconnected stream of consciousness as in vinnanasota, where one conscious moment follows another conscious moment. However, this is not the way Buddhadasa puts it. Buddhadasa says that consciousness arises spontaneously if and only if the other nidanas also arise. According to this view, consciousness appears to pop out of thin air along with the other nidanas. It is this account of momentary consciousness that I have trouble understanding.

    Cheers, Thomas
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Hi,
    Now, as to whether there is an alternative to Buddhadasa's interpretation, there is of course the traditional Buddhaghosa interpretation. In addition, one can also conceive of an alternative view of momentary dependent origination. One merely needs to let go of the postulate that all twelve nidanas arise simultaneously. That is to say that some factors of dependent origination arise momentarily while other don't, as they already have arisen. On could say that the mind/body and the sense bases have already arisen, while contact arises and ceases continuously, depending on the former. Ignorance and sankhara may or may not have arisen. If they have arisen, then the causal chain sustains dependent origination, and then the other nidanas also arise.

    So dukkha arises as a result of a past life? The last Nidana is death and the entire mass of suffering, so only in-between one life and the next does dukkha arise? Sankhara (in- and out-breaths, directed thought, and perception and feelings) [MN 44] may not arise in this life? And if it does, then that sustains the chain? That would make it difficult to break the cycle.
    Yes, the brain filters information that it does not consider important and thus sensory input does not necessarily result in conscious awareness of the same, hence, no contact. However, this process is involuntary and we have limited conscious control over phassa/contact. If I clap my hands in front of you, do you have a choice whether to hear it or not?

    What's your point? You claimed that eye-consciousness is ever-present, the point is that it is not, which you seem to concede. Where did anyone suggest we have control over this or that that would be relevant?
    Can you point out the argument against the Buddha's word and the part of the sutta, please?

    You stated: "Third, it is awkward to say that eye consciousness (vision) "arises", as vision is a continuous process and does in no sense arise from the sight of the broken doll. "

    MN 148: ""'The six classes of consciousness should be known.' Thus was it said. In reference to what was it said? Dependent on the eye & forms [not nama-rupa] there arises consciousness at the eye."

    The Buddha always spoke in this way.
    Valtiel, I assume that you know the suttas well. The term vinnanasota appears after the sutta pitaka. I believe the word sotavinnana or sotavinannam (not vinnanasota) can be found somewhere in the suttas, because it is cited in the abidhamma, but I wouldn't know where. The full concept of the "stream of consciousness" was developed later. I don't see MN 38 contradicting such a concept.

    No, I mean where the term "stream of consciousness" is used. I don't know why you're suggesting the Pali term means "stream of consciousness." When has it ever been translated as this?

    In MN 38 the Buddha states he has only ever described consciousness in one way, and that is, there are 6 kinds, and it arises dependent on the sense base + object.
    Sorry, porpoise, perhaps I did not express it clearly enough. I don't have problems with the idea of consciousness arising from moment to moment. This would be arising in the sense of an interconnected stream of consciousness as in vinnanasota, where one conscious moment follows another conscious moment. However, this is not the way Buddhadasa puts it. Buddhadasa says that consciousness arises spontaneously if and only if the other nidanas also arise.

    Are you conscious in your sleep? What happens to the "stream" then?

    Where does Buddhadasa state that consciousness arises only if the other nidanas arise? :wtf: Which nidanas are you talking about specifically? :wtf:
  • DairyLamaDairyLama Veteran Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Valtiel wrote: »
    In MN 38 the Buddha states he has only ever described consciousness in one way, and that is, there are 6 kinds, and it arises dependent on the sense base + object.

    Yes, the implication is that we are always conscious of something, ie consciousness is always subject to conditionality ( like the other nidanas ) and not some kind of independent property.
    I'm not sure if that's relevant to the discussion though.:lol:

    P
  • edited June 2010
    Valtiel wrote: »
    What's your point? You claimed that eye-consciousness is ever-present, the point is that it is not, which you seem to concede. Where did anyone suggest we have control over this or that that would be relevant?

    First, I think you mix up ear-consciousness (hearing) with eye-consciousness (vision), since your example was about fading background noises, which relates to hearing. Second, I did not concede that consciousness ceases in this example, but that contact ceases in this example. The point is somewhat subtle, as it relates to different types of causation, namely the distinction between necessary and sufficient causes. A functioning sense organ and a sensory stimulus within the range of the sense organ are sufficient causes for perception (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc.), which means the presence of the former implies the presence of the latter, but it is only a necessary cause for contact (phassa), which means that contact implies the presence of perception and form, but the presence of perception and form does not imply contact. (Perception means in this case salayatana plus vinnana). This is something we can deduce from the example you mentioned, as well as from the study of pathologically impaired perception, such as agnosia.
    Valtiel wrote: »
    You stated: "Third, it is awkward to say that eye consciousness (vision) "arises", as vision is a continuous process and does in no sense arise from the sight of the broken doll. "

    MN 148: ""'The six classes of consciousness should be known.' Thus was it said. In reference to what was it said? Dependent on the eye & forms [not nama-rupa] there arises consciousness at the eye."

    Again, this is subtle. I understand that what MN 148 says here is that the faculties of vision and visual qualia arise in tandem with the phenomena eye and form. This is different from saying that an event A is the cause for event B. The latter could be described as billiard ball causality with a strict temporal sequence. MN 148 does not describe billiard ball causality, and that is the difficulty I have with Buddhadasa's interpretation. Buddhadasa describes appears to describe dependent origination as a kind of billiard ball causality, as if there is an event of a broken doll, followed by an event of vision, consciousness, etc.
    Valtiel wrote: »
    I don't know why you're suggesting the Pali term means "stream of consciousness." When has it ever been translated as this?

    Sota means stream (as in stream enterer, sotapanna) and vinnana means consciousness, so together it's vinnanasota, stream of consciousness, stream of mind, mindstream, or something similar. Just google it or lookup up a Pali dictionary. It's not a secret. As previously mentioned, the term was fully developed in post-canonical Buddhism, prominently in Yogacara Buddhism, as far as I know.

    Cheers, Thomas
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited June 2010
    Porpoise,
    Yes, the implication is that we are always conscious of something, ie consciousness is always subject to conditionality ( like the other nidanas ) and not some kind of independent property.
    I'm not sure if that's relevant to the discussion though.

    What are you conscious of in your sleep? When we stare off into space and drift off to la-la land? "Consciousness" does not simply mean "conscious."

    The sutta states that consciousness is not reborn as truthseeker has claimed in the past, and the Buddha unequivocally states that he has only ever described consciousness in one way, and repeats that there are six kinds dependent on a sense organ and object - that is, no "stream of consciousness."

    How is that not relevant? :confused:

    Truthseeker,
    First, I think you mix up ear-consciousness (hearing) with eye-consciousness (vision), since your example was about fading background noises, which relates to hearing.

    It applies to all six senses including thought. Are you always consciously aware of your sense of vision, or does visual sensory data sometimes fade into the background? Have you ever stared off and become absorbed in another sense, such as thought, without taking any note of visual sensory data?
    A functioning sense organ and a sensory stimulus within the range of the sense organ are sufficient causes for perception (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc.)

    Vision, and eye-consciousness, are not one-in-the-same. From the Pali-English dictionary: "vinnana (vi~n~naa.na): Consciousness; cognizance; the act of taking note of sense data and ideas as they occur."
    Sota means stream (as in stream enterer, sotapanna) and vinnana means consciousness, so together it's vinnanasota, stream of consciousness, stream of mind, mindstream, or something similar. Just google it or lookup up a Pali dictionary. It's not a secret.

    I asked where in the suttas the term "stream of consciousness" is used. You said it was not used in the suttas but that you believed "sotavinnana or sotavinannam (not vinnanasota) can be found somewhere in the suttas, because it is cited in the abidhamma," as if that were relevant; the term refers to ear-consciousness so of course it appears in the suttas, but it has nothing to do with "stream of consciousness." :confused:
    As previously mentioned, the term was fully developed in post-canonical Buddhism

    Exactly. :buck:
    prominently in Yogacara Buddhism, as far as I know.

    And to you and I as Theravadans, how is that relevent?
  • edited June 2010
    Valtiel, please allow me to review the argument from the larger context of this discussion, as I believe we are getting lost in details. What I stated was this: I believe it is difficult to construct an interpretation of momentary dependent origination without employing the concept of the mindstream (= stream of consciousness). The mindstream involves the idea that there is a continuum of moments of citta with certain qualities. Only in this way could it be argued that consciousness, birth, and death arise spontaneously in the moment, because then it can be argued that consciousness comes into being and ceases, that there is birth and death in different moments. However, Buddhadasa does not employ this concept, which is one of the reasons why his exposition appears incoherent. Thus Buddhadasa put himself into an awkward position. On one hand, he argues against the orthodox Theravadan interpretation of dependent origination, on the other hand he refuses to use instruments outside of the orthodox Theravadan repertoire. The resulting argument comes across unconvincing.

    I find it difficult to say that because I am Theravadan, I don't admit the concept of mindstream. Such a position appears too dogmatic to me. In Theravada, the concept of mind moments has sprung up from the canonical contraposition of annihilism versus eternalism, but it was fully developed only in Mahayana Buddhism. One might say that in the context of the suttas, the concept is unnecessary and instead we might just employ our intuitive/naive understanding of mind. That is OK, as far as the suttas are concerned. However, when it comes to developing an exegesis of dependent origination -as Buddhadasa did- then it may be necessary to leave the intuitive/naive interpretation of mind behind and utilise a more elaborate concept, especially when this exegesis happens to employ terms such as birth (jati) and old age, decay, death (jaramarana) as metaphors. Otherwise, it must be argued that we should likewise employ the intuitive/naive understanding of these terms and apply them in their literal meaning, in which case Buddhadasa's interpretation falls apart.

    Cheers, Thomas
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited June 2010
    On one hand, he argues against the orthodox Theravadan interpretation of dependent origination.../QUOTE]
    I find it difficult to say that because I am Theravadan, I don't admit the concept of mindstream. Such a position appears too dogmatic to me.

    Well, really don't know what to say after this.

    Can you tell me what happens to this "mindstream" in sleep?
    That is OK, as far as the suttas are concerned. However, when it comes to developing an exegesis of dependent origination -as Buddhadasa did-

    Let's not forget: As Buddhaghosa did, too. However, Buddhadasa and those that take his or a similar interpretation are able to extensively back up their claims with sutta citations and it's an interpretation that can be verified in the here-and-now for each person for themselves, a quality of the Buddhadhamma. Whereas, even the suttas state that psychic powers such as recalling past lives is not necessary to attaining Nibbana, that is, "verifying" rebirth-belief isn't necessary to the path. The belief is in fact a hindrance to the path as you have been told elsewhere as per MN 117. Buddhaghosa, on the other hand, admitted the Buddha's teachings didn't make sense to him but that he hoped his attempts in dhamma work would provide him with a favourable rebirth with his Brahmin gods until the Metteyya came and could properly explain it to him. :B
  • edited June 2010
    Valtiel wrote: »
    Well, really don't know what to say after this.

    The reason for this might be that you have ideas about my ideas that aren't quite accurate. The fact that I find the orthodox Theravadan interpretation of dependent origination satisfactory and useful, does not automatically make me an orthodox Theravadan. Eating a salad does not automatically make one a vegetarian, right?
    Valtiel wrote: »
    Can you tell me what happens to this "mindstream" in sleep?

    Interesting question. I do not remember sleep being expounded by any Buddhist school, but I might just lack knowledge of it. Perhaps there are theories of sleep in Buddism. I don't know. At any rate, I can only tell you my own understanding. There isn't any gap in the mindstream during sleep. The mind continues during sleep. As the body slowly relaxes, it experiences the fading away of sense impressions. Then at some point, there is no more contact from any of the five senses, only impressions that come from the mind itself, the sixth sense. These experiences naturally flow into dreams and then there is dream experience. This continues until the time the body wakes up again at which point the sense impressions arise again. So, from the mind's point of view, the is no gap.

    The gap only arise conceptually, namely from comparing objective consensual time with mental experience. When one wakes up and establishes that so and so many hours have passed in the physical world, it appears that almost no time has passed from a mental point of view. I remember a flight from America to Europe where I fell asleep shortly after the plane had taken off and I woke up at Gatwick airport. So from my mind's perspective, I had crossed the Atlantic in just a few minutes. This is possible, because the mind is nonphysical and it is synchronised with objective consensual time only during waking. Physical time only applies to physical objects, such as our body.

    Cheers, Thomas
  • DeshyDeshy Veteran
    edited June 2010
    To my great disappointment, these examples -which are meant to illustrate Buddhadasa's point- are worded rather unintuitively, in a way I find impossible to comprehend.

    If it was easy to see then the Buddha wouldn't say it was profound and worldings get entangled in it like a ball of strings. DO is supposed to be seen in this moment. All the causes and conditions of your suffering are in this moment, which is why you can free yourself from suffering.

    I see this conversation has gone a long way and I unfortunately don't have time to read all of it. But if you state your doubts in point form and shortened maybe I can help you better
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