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What Evidence Is Present To Prove Re-Birth Exists?

AllbuddhaBoundAllbuddhaBound Veteran
edited April 2010 in Philosophy
The Buddha has been quoted as implying that if you can't see the proof for yourself, do not accept it. He reportedly also states don't even believe me. What is the proof people accept of re-incarnation here? Does anyone question this belief or is it simply accepted at face value because that is what a Buddhist does?
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Comments

  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited November 2009
    http://newbuddhist.com/forum/showthread.php?t=3833
    http://newbuddhist.com/forum/showthread.php?t=3878
    http://newbuddhist.com/forum/showthread.php?t=3861
    Does anyone question this belief or is it simply accepted at face value because that is what a Buddhist does?

    In short, some accept it at face value and believe the Buddha taught it was fact and therefore hold the belief themselves and feel there is sufficient evidence for it being true; some accept that he taught it and are open to the possibility but haven't accepted it as fact; some people don't believe he taught it as fact and only taught it as a moral teaching to those who already held the belief; some believe he taught rebirth of the false "self" and that the realms of rebirth refer to psychological states, etc. etc. Lots of discussion on this already, the above links are a start. :)
  • jinzangjinzang Veteran
    edited November 2009
    As I've said before, I believe in reincarnation because of certain experiences I had growing up. They all could be explained some other way, but they were enough to convince me.

    And Buddha never said "if you can't see the proof for yourself, do not accept it." That's a common misunderstanding of the Kalama Sutta and doesn't make much sense if you think about it. Most people can't prove E = mc^2, but they can and do accept it.
  • AllbuddhaBoundAllbuddhaBound Veteran
    edited November 2009
    jinzang wrote: »
    As I've said before, I believe in reincarnation because of certain experiences I had growing up. They all could be explained some other way, but they were enough to convince me.

    And Buddha never said "if you can't see the proof for yourself, do not accept it." That's a common misunderstanding of the Kalama Sutta and doesn't make much sense if you think about it. Most people can't prove E = mc^2, but they can and do accept it.

    That is why I said "it is quoted to Buddha". What does the Kalama Sutta say or what is the context in which it is meant?
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited November 2009
    That is where the quote is from. You can read it here: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an03/an03.065.than.html
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    jinzang wrote: »
    That's a common misunderstanding of the Kalama Sutta and doesn't make much sense if you think about it. Most people can't prove E = mc^2, but they can and do accept it.
    That's a false analogy. How many people would vociferously defend E=mc<sup>2</sup> the way literal rebirth is defended by many of its adherents? None. They would calmly explain the basis for it, or say "I don't know. Go ask a physicist." How many people's lives or conceptions of themselves are affected by their opinions of this equation? None, save a few physicists, who have lent on it relentlessly, trying to break it. How many of the adherents to the notion of literal rebirth have lent on their belief in the same way? If there are any, they aren't talking about it...

    Also, that's not a ridiculous misunderstanding of the Kalama Sutra at all. It's quite possible to live that way.
  • jinzangjinzang Veteran
    edited November 2009
    Go on a skeptic's board, say that Einstein was wrong, and watch the reaction. People are VERY invested in their world view, no matter what it might be.

    And the Kalama Sutta gives several tests for accepting an idea, including proof by authority ("these qualities are criticized by the wise.")
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited November 2009
    And the Kalama Sutta gives several tests for accepting an idea, including proof by authority ("these qualities are criticized by the wise.")

    That's not quite what it says.

    "When you know for yourselves that, .......'These qualities are praised by the wise'.... — then you should enter & remain in them."

    And sneaky, sneaky, for substituting "authority" for "the wise," and "an idea [belief]" for "qualities," too. ;)

    In fact, regarding any beliefs, the Buddha says in this very sutta:
    Now, Kalamas, one who is a disciple of the noble ones — his mind thus free from hostility, free from ill will, undefiled, & pure — acquires four assurances in the here-&-now:

    "'If there is a world after death, if there is the fruit of actions rightly & wrongly done, then this is the basis by which, with the break-up of the body, after death, I will reappear in a good destination, the heavenly world.' This is the first assurance he acquires.

    "'But if there is no world after death, if there is no fruit of actions rightly & wrongly done, then here in the present life I look after myself with ease — free from hostility, free from ill will, free from trouble.' This is the second assurance he acquires.
  • edited November 2009
    What is the proof people accept of re-incarnation here? Does anyone question this belief or is it simply accepted at face value because that is what a Buddhist does?
    I'm a gelug tibetan buddhist so I don't really know of any people who delegate rebirth to something which must be taken as faith and not heavily scrutinzed. This is because tibetan buddhism (sakya and gelug especially) is all about reasoning, debating, definitions and logic. SImply accepting something cos buddha said so wouldn't last very long because 1) you would quickly be asked to prove or defend your position 2) becoming educated in the system requires training critical thinking, logic etc 3) the material is really sophisticated and difficult and so it also addresses one's own assumptions and confusion about various things.

    The proofs for rebirth are based on understanding pramana (valid cognition), the mind, cause and effect, and logic. If a smart person hasn't investigated this stuff then they'll generally tend towards not accepting rebirth for the obvious reason that there's no good reason to consider it. In fact if you're like me, you won't really even know what to consider, because the word rebirth would sort of be like a meaningless word.

    Also there is the other side to this which is concentration. If you reach the higher dhyanas you attain special knowledges such as the existence of other types of lifeforms, past/future lives, etc . And so, instructions for this and things like this are taught.

    An mp3 course on pramana, mind, and reasonings for past and future lives:
    COURSE 4: Proof of Future Lives
    Level One of Buddhist Logic and Perception (Pramana)


    A course on buddhist logic:
    COURSE 13: The Art of Reasoning
    Level 2 of Buddhist Logic and Perception (Pramana).


    Then there are a bunch of nice articles on berzinarchives.com:
    Search results for query rebirth
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    jinzang wrote: »
    Go on a skeptic's board, say that Einstein was wrong, and watch the reaction. People are VERY invested in their world view, no matter what it might be.

    I don't think skeptics boards contain a representative cross-section of "most people." Behaving the way you describe about a scientific proposition would be just as childish.
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    I'm a gelug tibetan buddhist so I don't really know of any people who delegate rebirth to something which must be taken as faith and not heavily scrutinzed

    Thanks, aaki, that was interesting. I read the class notes for class 7 (p 15), the class where they claim to start the proof for rebirth. At the start of the notes, they say the notes are transcribed by a student, and must be checked against the audio file for class 7. I'm listening to that, now, but there is stuff in the class notes which seems sloppy. For instance, here is the claimed proof that "outside matter" cannot be the basis for mind:
    All outside matter is composed of the four elements: air, earth, water, and fire. This doesn't refer literally to those things. They are metaphors. They describe basic types of energy which are acceptable to science as characteristics of physical matter. The same argument of one or many can be applied: if one atom is missing, would mind not occur? Must all be present for mind to occur and one missing means no mind? Or can any one atom could turn into mind, and the others are supporting causes? If it's only one element, then the mind must resemble that one element - being hot or wet or like iron atoms. If the iron atoms cause the mind, the mind should resemble the iron atoms materially. The chemicals and atoms are supporting, secondary factors and not the material cause. The mind in no way resembles any one element of matter; it's invisible, crystal clear, and aware. Physical matter is the opposite. You can't split the mind up, contain its boundaries, move it left or right, etc. The mind resides with the body, but is not caused by it.
    This doesn't seem like logic to me. As an argument for why the mind can't have a physical basis, it seems like a non sequitur. It appears to be an argument by contradiction. To paraphrase it, it's saying "If the mind had a physical basis, then either it's an aggregate of physical materials, or in some way elemental, and it's clearly not elemental. But it can't be an aggregate of physical materials, because if you take one component of it away, it won't be the mind anymore." It won't be the same mind anymore, but it could still be a mind. I mean, that's what appears to happen when someone has a stroke... What am I missing, here?
  • edited November 2009
    Im just a guest here, so please dont think I have a hidden agenda. I just want to stir up this topic a bit.

    Fivebells, so you think that everthing should have a proof. Don't you think by saying this you are going against the core philosophy of buddhism? Show me the proof that there is "no self" or no " I ". Dont you think that there is nothing that we know more intimately than our own conscious experience, or our own self? By saying that there is " no self", dont you think that that is practically counter-intuitive? Isn't the first premise to enter into any buddhist meditative practice is to accept that the self is illusion? You have to accept it as a given before you can even move on.

    Or that the "ultimate reality " is empty? Where is the proof for that? But somehow even the most rational of buddhist practitioners accept these 2 premises as givens. And these 2 premises are at the core of buddhism, aren't they?

    Although I'm not a buddhist scholar, dont you think Gautama Buddha was also influenced by his immediate culture , including of its literature, the Vedas and so might have indeed taught rebirth?

    We listen to the Buddha because we take it that he is enlightened . That's like what Jin zang is saying: proof from authority, as noted in Kalamatta Sutta. And yes that practice is really very eastern.
  • edited November 2009
    Thoughts, and ideas do not belong to the physical world, yet we know they exist in some realm. I therefore reckcon rebirth is plausible.
  • edited November 2009
    Thoughts and Ideas do not arise independently; although I would try not to make the mistake of thinking those things stay here or stick here- they merely transform.

    I think that the notion of separateness really makes that idea hard to chug down, and perhaps it's more than a case of letting go. :wtf:
  • edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    This doesn't seem like logic to me. As an argument for why the mind can't have a physical basis, it seems like a non sequitur. It appears to be an argument by contradiction. To paraphrase it..
    Firstly if you want the logical syllogisms read the readings (at least some of them are there) and listen to all the classes, because the notes are like a summary and the exact format of the syllogism is a little hard to decipher unless you are already familiar with it.

    Secondly no that's not the gist of any of the arguments. The topic isn't about physical basis, it's matter as the material cause for mind (the idea of material cause is presented a couple of paragraphs earlier, it's not difficult). Reading 7's explanation is much clearer than the notes.
    fivebells wrote:
    It won't be the same mind anymore, but it could still be a mind. I mean, that's what appears to happen when someone has a stroke... What am I missing, here?
    That's the whole point, it would no longer even be a mind because the material cause for it is not present.
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    The Kalama Sutta sutta is just one teaching, which the Buddha taught as a response to the questioning he received. Regarding non-monks, the Buddha mostly taught according to the questioning he received. We can especially see this with his rebirth teachings.

    For example, at the end of the Samyutta Nikaya (SN 55.53), there is a sutta where the laypeople of the town ask the Buddha an open question, namely, teach us something that will lead to our welfare & happiness. Usually laypeople people asked the Buddha about how they could be reborn in a heavenly world.

    So when the Buddha was asked the open question, he answered from time to time, one should enter & dwell upon those teachings that are deep in meaning, supramundane, dealing with emptiness. This is very unusual in the suttas and the laypeople replied this would be difficult for them to do.

    But in Buddhism, there is a place for faith following. The suttas make this very clear.

    The Buddha taught the Kalama Sutta once rather than always.

    Kind regards

    DD :)
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    Reading 7's explanation is much clearer than the notes.
    Can you point me at the document you're referring to, here?
  • edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    Can you point me at the document you're referring to, here?
    In this course's readings pdf, reading 7 (starts pg 47)
    C4Reading.pdf
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    Nini wrote: »
    Fivebells, so you think that everthing should have a proof. Don't you think by saying this you are going against the core philosophy of buddhism? Show me the proof that there is "no self" or no " I ".

    It's not that everything should have a proof, it's that people should take personal responsibility for personal beliefs, and avoid inferences which have no basis in their own experience. "No self" is not a positive ontological assertion, it's a gloss for the fact that practitioners come up empty when they go looking for a reason to believe in a coherent personal identity based in direct experience. Similarly for "ultimate reality."

    Actually,reifying "no self" or "emptiness"as some kind of belief would itself be a corruption of Buddhist practice. Any kind of belief is.
    Nini wrote: »
    Thoughts, and ideas do not belong to the physical world, yet we know they exist in some realm. I therefore reckcon rebirth is plausible.

    We know we experience them. We also know we experience dreams. To assert the existence of thoughts and ideas like that is a bit lazy. For starters, what does that even mean, that they exist? What would it mean for them not to exist? If they exist, do dreams exist?
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    Nini wrote: »
    We listen to the Buddha because we take it that he is enlightened . That's like what Jin zang is saying: proof from authority, as noted in Kalamatta Sutta. And yes that practice is really very eastern.

    Maybe that's what you do. That's not the only approach, as demonstrated by the sutras themselves. (The Pali sutras, anyway.)
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    In this course's readings pdf, reading 7 (starts pg 47)
    C4Reading.pdf

    Thank you
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    Nini wrote: »
    That's like what Jin zang is saying: proof from authority, as noted in Kalamatta Sutta. And yes that practice is really very eastern.
    Not that it matters, but that's not specifically Eastern at all. It occurs in all organized religion.
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    In this course's readings pdf, reading 7 (starts pg 47)
    C4Reading.pdf

    I read through this. The argument is still unclear. It proceeds by contradiction, and goes down several branches. For simplicity, let's concentrate on one branch. To reject the argument, we only have to show that it fails on one branch of its tree. Let's be modern and stipulate that the mind has a cause, and the cause is material. I'm not saying this stipulation is true or false, I'm just saying that the argument's job is to show that it leads to a contradiction, and if it fails on this branch it fails completely. The branch below this stipulation, the sense-material/outer-material dichotomy which is presented next, makes no sense to me. I listened to the talk, and as I understand it, it suggests that the sense-material branch refers to sensory tissue; e.g. light-sensitive cells in the eyes. How is that different from "outer material?" This suggests that I may be missing something important. However, this dichotomy also seems irrelevant, because the same argument is used on both branches, and the "sense/outer" distinction seems to have no bearing on the argument. This apparent redundancy also suggests that I may be missing something important. I'd be grateful if you could point out what I'm missing.

    So, given the stipulation that the mind has a material basis, the argument proceeds regardless of the sense/outer choice with another dichotomy, that the material basis for the mind is unitary or an aggregate. Again, let's be modern and stipulate that it's aggregate. Again, I'm not saying this is true or false, I'm just stipulating it to explore the argument. Here is the document's argument that this leads to a contradiction:
    ...then one's thoughts would have to be able to capture visible objects with the same kind of clarity that the consciousness of the eye does.
    How does this follow, and why would it lead to a contradiction? Clearly I'm still missing some crucial aspect of the argument. But frankly, it still seems like a total non sequitur.

    Also, what does "mind" mean in this case?
  • edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    it suggests that the sense-material branch refers to sensory tissue; e.g. light-sensitive cells in the eyes. How is that different from "outer material?"
    Right, those cells are the eye sense power. Same for the other physical sense powers. They're different to "outer" because outer includes everything other than those sense powers.

    What's the point of setting it up like that? Because if you can dismiss the sense powers and other then you've dismissed all matter that could have been the material cause. The reason the sense powers are singled out in the first place is because of their obvious significance in cognition (ie. everyone knows no eye no visual experience).
    Again, let's be modern and stipulate that it's aggregate.
    The "whole substance" can also have parts. The neural correlate for consciousness which is going to have to be pretty small to have escaped our notice so far would be an example of a whole substance with parts. The "atoms" aspect would be something with a less substantial structure, much smaller, and a bunch of them working together. So aggregate isn't really a good word to use here.
    How does this follow? The most favorable interpretation I can come up with is that it's set up as a straw man the position that all components of the aggregate are essential to cause the mind.
    Did you read/listen to what a material cause is? The whole presentation is based on material causes.

    For example, workers cause/produce a house. But workers are not the material cause for the house because the house is not made out of workers. Clay is the material cause for a clay cup. The clay is what flops over into being the cup. The material cause for a house is the mixture of rocks, cement, dirt etc or whatever the case may be.

    So what's the material cause for mind? If you assert that just one or a combination of some (we just went through disproving that all the sense powers together could be the material cause) of the sense powers are the material cause, then the mind will be able to know what the sense powers which are not a material cause would have known (but do not, since they are just sense powers).

    In other words even the mental consciousness which names colours and shapes must be directly apprehending those colours and shapes, because the eye sense power which we would ordinarily say is necessary for conscious experience is not a material cause for conscious experience (and thus can never become conscious experience). This is supposing that we take the eye sense power to not be a material cause and something else is/are.
    Also, what does "mind" mean in this case?
    Always refers to the 5th heap/aggregate/skandha.

    However for this sort of personal contemplation we don't really need fancy definitions, we rely on our own direct experience of for example our experience of sights to be our definition of eye consciousness. Then there are times when it is appropriate to learn complex definitions and contemplate from that angle as well, in which case we go and study definitions.
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    The reason the sense powers are singled out in the first place is because of their obvious significance in cognition (ie. everyone knows no eye no visual experience).

    Still, the same argument seems to apply to both, so I don't understand the basis for the distinction.
    aaki wrote: »
    The "whole substance" can also have parts. The neural correlate for consciousness which is going to have to be pretty small to have escaped our notice so far would be an example of a whole substance with parts.

    The implicit assumption here is that there is some single component responsible for consciousness. Why couldn't it arise from the aggregate behavior of the central nervous system as a whole, or from the behavior of a substantial chunk of the CNS?

    I'm getting the impression from your response that there's an implicit assumption in the argument that consciousness must have a single prime cause. Where does it exclude the possibility that consciousness arises from an aggregate of complex interactions?
    aaki wrote: »
    ...aggregate isn't really a good word to use here.

    I don't understand your objection, here. Can you elaborate, please?
    aaki wrote: »
    Quote:
    <table border="0" cellpadding="6" cellspacing="0" width="100%"> <tbody><tr> <td class="alt2" style="border: 1px inset ;"> How does this follow? The most favorable interpretation I can come up with is that it's set up as a straw man the position that all components of the aggregate are essential to cause the mind. </td> </tr> </tbody></table>

    I excised this part about 15 minutes after I posted. I got confused referring back to the text, and I wound up responding to the neighboring cause-as-unitary-material branch. Sorry for the confusion. In future, I will PM you if I make such a change.
    aaki wrote: »
    So what's the material cause for mind? If you assert that just one or a combination of some (we just went through disproving that all the sense powers together could be the material cause) of the sense powers are the material cause, then the mind will be able to know what the sense powers which are not a material cause would have known (but do not, since they are just sense powers).

    Well, I still don't understand why the bifurcation between "sense matter" and "other matter." In fact, it seems to suggest a branch which the argument hasn't covered: that consciousness arises from the aggregate behavior of all matter comprising an animal, and those aspects of its immediate environment which impinge on its senses.

    Also, I still don't understand your argument, except as a non sequitur. You seem to be saying that if the eye is not necessary for consciousness, then the mind could apprehend visual data independently of it. Why? Where would blind people fit into this picture?

    The elephant in this room is the brain. It's not surprising that the Tibetans don't refer to it in an ancient text like this, but have they updated their argument to address the obvious impact brain trauma can have on consciousness?
    aaki wrote: »
    Always refers to the 5th heap/aggregate/skandha.
    Thanks for clarifying. I was assuming a much more general meaning.
  • jinzangjinzang Veteran
    edited November 2009
    That's not quite what it says.
    "When you know for yourselves that, .......'These qualities are praised by the wise'.... — then you should enter & remain in them."

    And sneaky, sneaky, for substituting "authority" for "the wise," and "an idea [belief]" for "qualities," too. ;)

    This is an argument from authority even if it does not say so in so many words. A wise person functions as authority, as they know what you do not and you accept what they say. There's nothing problematic about accepting a statement on authority, we do it many times a day. Ultimately its not valid, but provisionally we can.
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    Let's be modern and stipulate that the mind has a cause, and the cause is material.
    FB

    What is "modern" about your statement?

    :)
    Bhikkhus, consciousness is reckoned by the particular condition (paccaya) dependent upon which it arises. When consciousness arises dependent on eye and forms, it is reckoned as eyeconsciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on ear and sounds, it is reckoned as earconsciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on nose and odours, it is reckoned as noseconsciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on tongue and flavours, it is reckoned as tongueconsciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on body and tangibles, it is reckoned as bodyconsciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on mind and phenomena, it is reckoned as mind-consciousness.

    Just as fire is reckoned by the particular condition dependent on which it burns - when fire burns dependent on logs, it is reckoned as a log fire; when fire burns dependent on sticks, it is reckoned as a stick fire; when fire burns dependent on grass, it is reckoned as a grass fire; when fire burns dependent on cowdung, it is reckoned as a cowdung fire; when fire burns dependent on chaff, it is reckoned as a chaff fire; when fire burns dependent on rubbish, it is reckoned as a rubbish fire - so too, consciousness is reckoned by the particular condition dependent on which it arises. When consciousness arises dependent on eye and forms, it is reckoned as eye-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on nose and odours, it is reckoned as nose-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on tongue and flavours, it is reckoned as tongue-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on body and tangibles, it is reckoned as body-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on mind and phenomena, it is reckoned as mind-consciousness.

    “Good, bhikkhus. It is good that you understand in this way the dhamma taught by me. For in many discourses I have stated that consciousness is dependently arisen, since without a condition consciousness does not come into being. But this Bhikkhu Sàti, the fisherman’s son, misrepresents us by his wrong grasp and injures himself and stores up much demerit; for this will lead to the harm and suffering of this foolish fellow for a long time.

    Mahàtanhàsankhaya Sutta
    <O:p
    :)<O:p</O:p
  • ValtielValtiel Veteran
    edited November 2009
    This is an argument from authority even if it does not say so in so many words. A wise person functions as authority, as they know what you do not and you accept what they say. There's nothing problematic about accepting a statement on authority, we do it many times a day. Ultimately its not valid, but provisionally we can.

    Jinzang,

    The Buddha does not say "take what the wise say at face value." The entire sutta is a result of a bunch of supposedly "wise" people teaching the Kalamas contradictory views. He tells the Kalamas that when they know for themselves (your quote omitted this essential clause) that certain qualities are praised by the wise, to "enter and remain in them." He teaches in this sutta that one should be a good person for the sake of being a good person, regardless of what happens after death. That's very different from what you're suggesting.
    There's nothing problematic about accepting a statement on authority, we do it many times a day.

    Accepting that McDonald's is out of ketchup when that omniscient, faceless voice in the speaker says so is very different from suggesting that we take it at face value when a person with a robe tells us that the Buddha taught rebirth and as a neccessary belief on the Path to Nibbana and therefore adopt that belief ourselves.
  • edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    You seem to be saying that if the eye is not necessary for consciousness, then the mind could apprehend visual data independently of it. Why? Where would blind people fit into this picture?
    It's not a non sequitur. Blind people would not fit in. It makes no sense to say that one or a combination of just some of the sense powers are the material cause of mind. It makes no sense to say that all of the sense powers are the material cause, because then someone without one of the sense powers could never have a mind.

    I don't know how to summarize the reasoning more simply. I think you're overlooking the import of material causes, and therefore overlooking the ridiculous implications of saying that just one of the sense powers could be the material cause. Basically, because the ear sense power can only pick up sounds, and yet is the material cause for the mind, then the resultant mind is somehow experiencing what the ear cannot experience, and so even our very thoughts of sights must be apprehending sights, which is ridiculous.
    The elephant in this room is the brain. It's not surprising that the Tibetans don't refer to it in an ancient text like this, but have they updated their argument to address the obvious impact brain trauma can have on consciousness?
    It's already covered by the buddha and the reasonings by indian masters 400AD. That's what the text we're reading is based on. Also that if you make parts of the brain disappear the experience of the mind changes is obvious, but it's an obvious non sequitur. It would be like saying that just because a car has stopped moving the driver must be dead. Maybe the driver is dead, maybe there is no driver, but there's nothing about that logical statement which proves it. It lacks that logical pervasion.
    I'm getting the impression from your response that there's an implicit assumption in the argument that consciousness must have a single prime cause. Where does it exclude the possibility that consciousness arises from an aggregate of complex interactions?
    You're right I suppose, but the reason I say that is because the neural correlate is the base experience of consciousness, and so it must maintain itself and be held in common to all situations, including those when we stop thinking, stop seeing, etc but are still aware. But this is a distraction from the topic so nevermind.
    Still, the same argument seems to apply to both, so I don't understand the basis for the distinction.
    It's not difficult to understand why. If we just took everything as a whole and reasoned that out, someone would come along and whinge and complain that it's not the whole, it's just the sense powers (or some other particular batch of flesh), and so why didn't we examine the sense powers. So we do, and then all other, and then that's everything. Now you want to say that everything is the material cause.... but if you think for a moment maybe you'll realize that you don't really want to be saying that. Doubly so with including the "immediate envirnoment".
    FB
    What is "modern" about your statement?
    Condition and cause are not synonymous. The matter of the body, both sense powers and other, are part of the definition of consciousness, namely as unique and general conditions.
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    I don't know how to summarize the reasoning more simply. I think you're overlooking the import of material causes, and therefore overlooking the ridiculous implications of saying that just one of the sense powers could be the material cause.

    Simplicity isn't really the issue. The problem is that the logical connections of the argument are murky. You could really make the argument's reasoning concrete if you took the contemporary view that consciousness arises from physical neural activity and explained where that fits on the argument's tree and how that branch of the argument refutes that viewpoint.
  • edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    Simplicity isn't really the issue. The problem is that the logical connections of the argument are murky. You could really make the argument's reasoning concrete if you took the contemporary view that consciousness arises from physical neural activity and explained where that fits on the argument's tree and how that branch of the argument refutes that viewpoint.
    The topic of material cause of the mind is as fundamental as it gets. It would really help neuroscientists etc who struggle to come up with a definition of the mind and who do not even know how to begin formulating questions in order to investigate the mind further.
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    Can you explain to me how this argument rebuts that common viewpoint?

    It's definitely true that neuroscientists should study the mind further. They are doing so.
  • edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    It's definitely true that neuroscientists should study the mind further. They are doing so.
    Well, until you have a precise definition you are not investigating the object, you are collecting data. So it would be better to say studying the brain. You can be smug and call the data / study of the brain 'knowledge of the mind' if you really feel the need to. For all we know this could be entirely the wrong way to go about finding out about the mind and we will only come to know this when we have collected a tremendous amount of data - kind of like what happened in linguistics.

    In the meantime we will ignore other methods which claim results, such as for example perfect single-pointed concentration, and theories of pramana (valid cognition) based on these superhuman capacities of introspection and investigation. And we will do this mainly because certain barbaric systems of thought have never even known that such things could exist, and therefore marvel at the fact that when you get hit on (in? on? :lol:) the head you feel dizzy.
    Can you explain to me how this argument rebuts that common viewpoint?
    It does it by dividing all matter which could be the material cause into 2 groups, and then disproving each of them in each of their various possibilities by showing their ridiculous implications.

    As for the exact reasoning I can't really break it down any further then I have. If you want to go particular part by particular part of a paragraph I will help to clarify, because I don't know how to summarize the paragraph as a whole any more clearly than I have. An advice is to get the meaning of material cause clear, so that you have it clearly in mind what it means to say 'the material cause of x moment of mind'. Clay is a material cause for the clay cup, even though the production of the cup relies on the person, the machine, etc. The material cause is what flops over into being the cup before it was the cup.

    Maybe you don't want to say that anything flops over into the mind. Maybe you want to say the mind only appears to exist substantially, but doesn't actually. Then we would really have to consider the opening salvo, "Suppose you say that the mind of a person who was just born has no cause. You are disproven by the fact that this mind is variable."
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    Condition and cause are not synonymous. The matter of the body, both sense powers and other, are part of the definition of consciousness, namely as unique and general conditions.
    In Pali, the word for consciousness is vinnana.

    Vi = direct. Nana = knowing.

    Consciousness is knowing or cognition. It is not a life force or energy.

    This is why the Buddha taught there are six types of consciousness and this is why the Buddha never ever taught (unlike some) there is a stream of consciousness.

    Instead, the Buddha taught consciousness is impermanent, that the arising & passing of consciousness has been discerned (eg. MN 148 or 149).

    For knowing to occur, there must be sense organs. Sense organs are the condition (paccaya) for consciousness.

    As for the cause (hetu) of consciousness, the Buddha was not interested in psycho-biology or meta-physics. The Budddha was concerned with remedying suffering. Thus he taught about the sense spheres because for a practitioner to be able to both develop concentration and ending suffering, they must have great intimacy with and vigilance over the sense spheres.

    So regarding the cause (hetu) of consciousness, whilst the Buddha said nothing about it, it is neurons, electricity, the nervous system and all that stuff.

    Consciousness is like an image reflected is still clear water. But this is inanimate. For the human being, there is the same reflection in the sense organs & brain but also a 'knowing', 'cognition', 'basic recognition' or 'acknowledgement'. This is human consciousness.

    :)
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    Condition and cause are not synonymous. The matter of the body, both sense powers and other, are part of the definition of consciousness, namely as unique and general conditions.
    Also Aaaaki

    If you attempt to repudiate a quote from the Lord Buddha himself, it is best to offer an alternative quote in its place supporting your alternative position.

    Please...the quote should be from the Lord Buddha himself, from the suttas, (rather than from Berzin).

    :o
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    The topic of material cause of the mind is as fundamental as it gets. It would really help neuroscientists etc who struggle to come up with a definition of the mind and who do not even know how to begin formulating questions in order to investigate the mind further.
    Sure Aaaaki. Your point is easily said. But what is the alternative? Some mere speculative theories?

    In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna tells Arajuna the soul cannot be cut and, after death in war & battle, it simply finds another body.

    The Buddha did not teach like this. The Buddha exclusively sided rebirth with morality. The Buddha taught karma like this, rebirth like this, karma like that, rebirth like that.

    The Buddha did not provide any meta-physical explanation for rebirth. For the Buddha, rebirth was a moral principle.

    :)
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    In the meantime we will ignore other methods which claim results, such as for example perfect single-pointed concentration, and theories of pramana (valid cognition) based on these superhuman capacities of introspection and investigation. :lol:
    Hi Aaaaki

    For starters, single-pointed concentration does not facilitate insight (vipassana) into the true nature of things. In fact, single-pointed concentration is an obstacle to clear introspection because consciousness is unmoving. It is one.

    The Buddha did not teach the experience of 'oneness' and single-pointed concentration is enlightenment. The Buddha taught penetrating impermanence, unsatisfactoriness & not-self is enlightenment.

    Prince Siddharta first attained single-pointed concentration when he was four or six years old (whatever). Yet later spend six year searching for what is true.

    Your deferring to "superhuman" powers probably does not come from your own meditative experience. Rather, it is usually the same kind of blind faith like when one defers their reasoning to "God".

    Basically, you appear to be saying: "This is true because the great yogis have said it is true".

    :o
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    An advice is to get the meaning of material cause clear, so that you have it clearly in mind what it means to say 'the material cause of x moment of mind'. Clay is a material cause for the clay cup, even though the production of the cup relies on the person, the machine, etc. The material cause is what flops over into being the cup before it was the cup.
    Dear Aaaaki

    Your example is unsound. The cup is not caused by the clay. Clay is earth & water. The cup is earth & heat. The clay does not flop over into being the cup. When the water is removed from the clay, the clay comes to an end.

    In the quote I provide above, the Buddha compared consciousness to fire sustained by fuel, such as logs, wood, grass, etc. When the fuel ends, consciousness ends.

    For example, if the physical eyes are removed, eye consciousness ends. If the physical ears are removed, ear consciousness ends. If certain parts of the brain are removed, mind consciousness will end.

    For example, each night in sleep, when the mind is not dreaming, all states of consciousness end.
    aaki wrote: »
    Maybe you don't want to say that anything flops over into the mind. Maybe you want to say the mind only appears to exist substantially, but doesn't actually. Then we would really have to consider the opening salvo, "Suppose you say that the mind of a person who was just born has no cause. You are disproven by the fact that this mind is variable.
    Science has proven enough about what enables and disables the mind. Removing some brainy matter can disable the mind. Or receiving an anethesia will disable consciousness.

    I have advised previously, consciousness is just 'knowing'. A sight reflected on the retina/brain is like a form reflected in a dew drop. But the human being 'knows'.

    However, a baby's knowing is weak, just like the knowing of an old person is often weak.

    Various life forms have different levels of consciousness. For example, a plant that grows towards to sun must have some primitive consciousness of heat & light.

    :)
  • edited November 2009
    So regarding the cause (hetu) of consciousness, whilst the Buddha said nothing about it, it is neurons, electricity, the nervous system and all that stuff.
    That's a serious distortion of buddhadharma. The buddha spoke many times of cognition as nonphysical and explained why, and how it works. Every tenet system, every commentator, and every scholastic entry on the topic say this.

    The buddha debated against nihilists (the Chravakas) who said that experience is caused by the sense powers, and so persons are totally annihilated at death. You cannot find anything more explicit than that. If you don't want to listen to the totally stupid, superstitious "hindu-buddhists", just read scholarly works. This is a non-negotiable point and any deviation asserted as being the words of the buddha are a serious corruption of buddhadharma.

    What you are doing again and what seems to be the fashion around here is supporting your newage nihilistic assertions with impermanence and hiding behind pali terms, even though every single pali and sanskrit scholar I know of disagrees with what you think the words mean. The lineages of today which are continuations of the same lineages 1800+ years ago certainly don't agree with your meanings of the words. I guess you can read pali and sanskrit better than they can.
    Sure Aaaaki. Your point is easily said. But what is the alternative? Some mere speculative theories?
    The buddha's instructions are not speculative, they are asserted as being verifiable and knowable. To know this however you would need to have actually investigated buddhism.

    Furthermore just because you do not have any good evidence does not mean you adopt an unestablished position or a position shown to be unsustainable.

    "rebirth was a moral principle"
    Yes, it's clear why you would say so.
    Please...the quote should be from the Lord Buddha himself, from the suttas, (rather than from Berzin)
    I choose to quote Berzin, but I can just as easily quote 100 other buddhist practitioner scholars. And they are quoting Dharmakirti, and Dignaga, and Shantideva, and Vasubhandu, etc, who themselves are quoting the sutras. Who can you quote?
  • edited November 2009
    Basically, you appear to be saying: "This is true because the great yogis have said it is true".
    I never said single-pointedness was vipashyana. Nor did I refer to something as having to be true just because yogis said so.

    What I am eluding to is how stupid a culture of thinking needs to be to be oblivious to perfect single-pointedness.

    Thanks for wasting my time with the multiple ridiculous nonexistent implications you conjured up.
  • edited November 2009
    Your example is unsound. The cup is not caused by the clay. Clay is earth & water. The cup is earth & heat. The clay does not flop over into being the cup. When the water is removed from the clay, the clay comes to an end.
    I never said it was caused by the clay. I specifically said it was not produced (caused) by the clay. I said the clay is the material cause for the clay cup. The entire reasoning is based on material causes.
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    In the meantime we will ignore other methods which claim results, such as for example perfect single-pointed concentration...
    Hi Aaaaki

    One fact learned from developing single-pointed concentration is when consciousness or awareness comes into clear & distinct contact with mental defilements, those mental defilements are purified and cleansed.

    It is like consciousness is a solvent of mental defilements. Consciousness is like acid.

    Now mental defilements are created by and stored in the citta. The citta is not consciousness. The citta is sankhara khanda rather than vinnana khanda.

    The citta creates mental defilements and consciousness destroys mental defilements.

    This one learns from perfect single-pointed concentration and superhuman introspection.

    Therefore, that consciousness, being a solvent or acid, can carry mental defilements from "life to life", from "body to body", that is impossible.

    Defilement or kilesa are part of the psycho-biological organism. For example, children generally do not have strong sexual lusts. But when puberity occurs, the mind explodes with the defilement of lust. This is due to the changes in the body.

    Thus to associate consciousness with mental defilements or fruits of action, that makes no sense at all.

    :o
  • DhammaDhatuDhammaDhatu Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    I said the clay is the material cause for the clay cup. The entire reasoning is based on material causes.
    Clay is not the material cause for the cup.

    Clay is one of many causes and conditions and as I said, the clay ceases to be in the cup because the water element ceases.

    Clay is water element & earth element and the cup is heat element & earth element.

    Clay in itself has no intrinstic existence.

    :)
  • edited November 2009
    In the quote I provide above, the Buddha compared consciousness to fire sustained by fuel, such as logs, wood, grass, etc. When the fuel ends, consciousness ends.
    There is no problem with saying consciousness is conditioned by the sense power. The sutra you quote says this, and all the tenets systems define this.
    Your error is in asserting that the consciousness is produced by these conditions. Furthermore to say a thing is a condition is to imply it is not the direct cause.
    For example, each night in sleep, when the mind is not dreaming, all states of consciousness end.
    It's possible to maintain single-pointed concentration while sleeping without dreaming.
    I have advised previously, consciousness is just 'knowing'. A sight reflected on the retina/brain is like a form reflected in a dew drop. But the human being 'knows'.
    What is 'knowing'?
    Now mental defilements are created by and stored in the citta. The citta is not consciousness. The citta is sankhara khanda rather than vinnana khanda.
    No, the function of citta is not to store anything. You should study abhidharma and read proper explanations.
  • edited November 2009
    Clay is not the material cause for the cup.
    I guess it must be something else then. What is the material cause for a clay cup then? Perhaps clay cups don't exist?
    Clay is water element & earth element and the cup is heat element & earth element.
    Firstly, all objects are comprised of each of the elements. Secondly, just because the earth element is increased and the water element has decreased, does not the make the cup not constructed out of clay.
    Clay in itself has no intrinstic existence.
    Excuse me?
  • edited November 2009
    Therefore, that consciousness, being a solvent or acid, can carry mental defilements from "life to life", from "body to body", that is impossible.
    It seems to be that if you were to have it carefully explained to you how both karmic seeds and citta are sankharas, and that these impact the mental consciousness, and that this mental consciousness is not a result of direct physical causation, then you would accept how at the last moment at the time of death, due to various ripening sankharas there is a new set of 5 skandhas produced out of those very causes and conditions. These act just as you would expect a material cause to act, and how you would expect a dependent arising to act, with there being nothing superstitious or hindu about it. It acts just like the mind actually acts right now, and we can investigate and observe this.
  • Love-N-PeaceLove-N-Peace Veteran
    edited November 2009
    Does anyone question this belief or is it simply accepted at face value because that is what a Buddhist does?

    I don't have full faith that reincarnation is true although I think it's most like likely, I believe the possibilities of each outcome is;
    Reincarnation: 60%
    Endless 'sleep': 39%
    Heaven or Hell: 1%

    I'm never 100% sure about any belief I have that's not scientific proof, I could maybe be a polytheist but I'm not 100% certain so I just say I'm an agnostic....

    Hmmm...:wtf:

    Joe
  • fivebellsfivebells Veteran
    edited November 2009
    aaki wrote: »
    As for the exact reasoning I can't really break it down any further then I have. If you want to go particular part by particular part of a paragraph I will help to clarify, because I don't know how to summarize the paragraph as a whole any more clearly than I have. An advice is to get the meaning of material cause clear, so that you have it clearly in mind what it means to say 'the material cause of x moment of mind'. Clay is a material cause for the clay cup, even though the production of the cup relies on the person, the machine, etc. The material cause is what flops over into being the cup before it was the cup.

    Why don't we start there, then? You've presented an argument by contradiction that the mind can have no physical basis. The standard modern view of consciousness is that it arises from physical (largely neurochemical) interactions. For your argument by contradiction to be effective, it must address this view in some way. What part of this view plays the role of your argument's "material cause" of the consciousness you most recently experienced? (The most recent could be the consciousness you're experiencing as you read this...)
    aaki wrote: »
    Maybe you don't want to say that anything flops over into the mind. Maybe you want to say the mind only appears to exist substantially, but doesn't actually. Then we would really have to consider the opening salvo, "Suppose you say that the mind of a person who was just born has no cause. You are disproven by the fact that this mind is variable."

    If you want to fit the modern view into a different branch of the argument, that's fine, but this doesn't seem like a very good fit. The modern view would be that the cause is the neurochemical interactions of the brain.
  • edited November 2009
    Fivebells,

    I think your reply is a cop-out. If the “no-self”, “reality is empty” are not ontological assertions, are you willing to accept that Buddhism is no different from Advaita Vedanta afterall both schools of thought are based on the position that the self is an illusion. I”m sure you won’t because ontological claims are stuff that helps make things make sense to us.

    Abstract concepts are reified or concretized into an understandable notion as in language because we have no other alternative. Why else are we talking in a language we can all understand here in this forum? You can call that belief , I call that understanding , or engaging in a meaningful conversation.

    You seem to think that only objects which have physical basis exist. Do you think a non-spatial mountain exist or not? What about multi-dimensional objects in the realm of mathematics? Does mathematics exist at all? What about the law of nature. Eg. Law of Gravity, or electromagnetism? (All physicist always say natural laws are discovered, not invented acknowledging its existence before they even have thought of it). Abstract concepts exist that are external to the physical world.

    Besides mental states, what we are thinking, seeing red, as far as scientists are concerned exist because they have neural correlates in the brain. And dreaming is one of them.

    What Im saying about proof from authority is that it is being naive to suppose that Buddhism as we know it today evolved from “historical/traditional vacuum”.

    Aaki, good posts but I’d like to note that logic itself is not proof or evidence. Different schools of thoughts have different ways of approaching a subject. And one way is yours and being respectful to this site I will not discuss what way I subscribe to.

    Fivebells said: Well, I still don't understand why the bifurcation between "sense matter" and "other matter." In fact, it seems to suggest a branch which the argument hasn't covered: that consciousness arises from the aggregate behavior of all matter comprising an animal, and those aspects of its immediate environment which impinge on its senses.

    Also, I still do't understand your argument, except as a non sequitur. You seem to be saying that if the eye is not necessary for consciousness, then the mind could apprehend visual data independently of it. Why? Where would blind people fit into this picture?

    The elephant in this room is the brain. It's not surprising that the Tibetans don't refer to it in an ancient text like this, but have they updated their argument to address the obvious impact brain trauma can have on consciousness?


    Fivebells, I think your points makes sense, but the big question as noted by Sam Harris when commenting on a cutting edge studies on neuroscience (which i have just read today) is on the” connection between unconscious physical events and there being "something that it is like" to be the totality of those events seems likely to always appear brute — and, therefore, mysterious. I personally think he has made a strong point here.

    About the blind person point you made, on the contrary, there is a recent newsitem about a patient in a vegetative state, which neuroscientists also called a locked-in state, who was fully aware the whole of 20 years eg. can hear, can see, can recognize family members but had no way of communicating to the external world. In my opinion, consciousness is fundamental.

    Aaki and Fivebells, I can’t exactly make heads and tails of the differences in your positions, i wonder if you can restate your respective positions. Or better yet please comment on the comments I made regarding consciousness so I’ll have a better idea whose opinions somewhat match mine or if I’m alone among you here in this regard.

    Dhamma Dhatu, I have read the Bhagavad Gita a few times but explaining the idea like that in one sweep does not do justice to the essence of the Gita.

    Namaste
  • edited November 2009
    Aaki said: The buddha debated against nihilists (the Chravakas) who said that experience is caused by the sense powers, and so persons are totally annihilated at death.

    I agree with this. If persons are annihilated at death where does karma fit in? This ties in with karma.
  • edited November 2009
    fivebells wrote: »
    For your argument by contradiction to be effective, it must address this view in some way. What part of this view plays the role of your argument's "material cause" of the consciousness you most recently experienced? (The most recent could be the consciousness you're experiencing as you read this...)
    None, if matter cannot be the material cause of mind then it cannot be a direct cause of mind. It would be alright to say it is a condition (contributing factor), which is the way it's always been defined.
    If you want to fit the modern view into a different branch of the argument, that's fine, but this doesn't seem like a very good fit. The modern view would be that the cause is the neurochemical interactions of the brain.
    Theories of mind being emergent properties are more sophisticted than the idea that physical particles themselves produce other particles which are the experience.

    Yes, those particles would be variable, but a much cooler question is whether the emergent property is variable.
    Nini wrote:
    Aaki and Fivebells, I can’t exactly make heads and tails of the differences in your positions, i wonder if you can restate your respective positions.
    My position is like this:
    COURSE 4: Proof of Future Lives
    Level One of Buddhist Logic and Perception (Pramana)


    In particular we are addressing reading 7 (starts pg 47) of the readings, and class 7+8+9 is the mp3 audio. That should give the discussion more context.
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