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Justice is just another mundane worry. If one believes rebirth and the consequences of karma, one will realise how pointless this mundane desire for justice is. Perpertrators of crime ends up suffering way more than the victim when they end up with rebirth in the lower realms.
"Rawls imagines rational, mutually disinterested individuals meeting in a certain situation, or abstracted from their other features not provided for in this situation. In this hypothetical situation of choice, which Rawls calls 'the original position,' they choose the first principles of a conception of justice that is to regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of their institutions. While making this choice, no one knows his place in society, his class positions or social status, or his natural assets and abilities, his strength, intelligence, and so forth. As Rawls puts it:
'The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain' [A Theory of Justice, p. 12].
What would persons in the original position agree to?
'Persons in the initial situation would choose two . . . principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and, in particular for the least advantaged members of society. These principles rule out justifying institutions on the grounds that the hardships of some are offset by a greater good in the aggregate. It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper. But there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved. The intuitive idea is that since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less will situated. Yet this can be expected only if reasonable terms are proposed. The two principles mentioned seem to be a fair agreement on the basis of which those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social position, neither of which we can be said to deserve, could expect the willing cooperation of others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the welfare of all' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 14-15).
This second principle, which Rawls specifies as the difference principle, holds that the institutional structure is to be so designed so that the worst-off group under it is at least as well off as the worst-off group (not necessarily the same group) would be under any alternative institutional structure" (Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State & Utopia, pp. 189-190).
"Deontological liberalism, is above all a theory about justice, and in particular about the primacy of justice among moral and political ideals. Is core thesis can be stated as follows: society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not THEMSELVES presuppose any particular conception of the good; what justifies these regulative principles above all is not that they maximize the social welfare or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of RIGHT, a moral category given prior to the good and independent of it.
This is the liberalism of Kant and of much contemporary moral and political philosophy, and it is this liberalism I propose to challenge. Against the primacy of justice, I argue for the limits of justice, and, by implication, for the limits of liberalism as well. The limits I have in mind are not practical but conceptual. My point is not that justice, however noble a principle, is unlikely ever fully to be realized in practice, but rather that the limits reside in the ideal itself" (Michale J. Sandel, Liberalism & the Limits of Justice, p. 1).
Reminds me of my college sociology courses. My ability to summarize a point that great thinkers spend thousands of words obfuscating is rusty, but Mr. Sandel seems to have hit my objection on the head in his last sentence. The limits of justice are in the ideal itself.
Justice says the same rules apply to everyone in a society, irregardless of station or wealth. Good in theory, and easy to write into law. Fatally flawed in practice. A poor woman who steals groceries to feed her family and a rich man who steals millions of dollars he doesn't need from a trust fund simply because he's greedy are both stealing what doesn't belong to them. The rules don't even begin to apply equally. They should both get the same punishment? Or should different rules apply to different social and economic classes of people?
Justice applied means the same rules must be equally enforced, irregardless of station or wealth. So lets say the punishment for theft is giving back twice what you stole. The poor woman above is made to give back twice the value of the food that she stole and her family starves to death. The rich man is forced to give back twice what he stole and he has to sell one of his homes while keeping the rest. Power and wealth and station insulates people from consequences, always has and always will.
So justice is a wonderful ideal that will never survive the real world. It is, simply, an unjust world we live in. We can strive for fairness, as much as possible. But reality wins, in the end.
There’s no such thing as justice, imho. It is a crazy concept, but it fits some basic wiring in our brain. This wiring probably was established when – being social primates – we would beat up the monkey who stole the banana. It kind of worked, but only in those conditions. It doesn’t mean such a thing as “justice” exists in our universe. Also it isn’t necessarily the right approach to managing a complex modern society.
Yes justice doest not exist outside your mind or will. Is you who acts in a just way not caring if the universe or the others are just, what matter is what you do and think, wich i guess is a great gift of this meaningless existence wich makes it not boring and amazing.
Should different rules apply to different social and economic classes of people?
Nice to see you again Cinorjer, Rawls' original position want's regulative principles that benefit all regardless of social position (and one of the ways he attempts to justify this is with Kant's maxim that each person is end in herself).
Rawls, Nozick & Sandel all argue for different points, and their implicit duties, along a deontological continuum of "the right"/"rights" versus "the good" in connection with the individual's relation to the state, community, group, etc.... Rawls aligns himself with welfare liberalism, Nozick with libertarianism (classical liberalism), and Sandel with communitarianism (not to be confused with communism).
Comments
"People often ask why there's so much killing. I'm surprised we don't kill each other more" (Ajahn Sundara)!
:eek2:
'The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain' [A Theory of Justice, p. 12].
What would persons in the original position agree to?
'Persons in the initial situation would choose two . . . principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and, in particular for the least advantaged members of society. These principles rule out justifying institutions on the grounds that the hardships of some are offset by a greater good in the aggregate. It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper. But there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved. The intuitive idea is that since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less will situated. Yet this can be expected only if reasonable terms are proposed. The two principles mentioned seem to be a fair agreement on the basis of which those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social position, neither of which we can be said to deserve, could expect the willing cooperation of others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the welfare of all' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 14-15).
This second principle, which Rawls specifies as the difference principle, holds that the institutional structure is to be so designed so that the worst-off group under it is at least as well off as the worst-off group (not necessarily the same group) would be under any alternative institutional structure" (Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State & Utopia, pp. 189-190).
This is the liberalism of Kant and of much contemporary moral and political philosophy, and it is this liberalism I propose to challenge. Against the primacy of justice, I argue for the limits of justice, and, by implication, for the limits of liberalism as well. The limits I have in mind are not practical but conceptual. My point is not that justice, however noble a principle, is unlikely ever fully to be realized in practice, but rather that the limits reside in the ideal itself" (Michale J. Sandel, Liberalism & the Limits of Justice, p. 1).
Justice says the same rules apply to everyone in a society, irregardless of station or wealth. Good in theory, and easy to write into law. Fatally flawed in practice. A poor woman who steals groceries to feed her family and a rich man who steals millions of dollars he doesn't need from a trust fund simply because he's greedy are both stealing what doesn't belong to them. The rules don't even begin to apply equally. They should both get the same punishment? Or should different rules apply to different social and economic classes of people?
Justice applied means the same rules must be equally enforced, irregardless of station or wealth. So lets say the punishment for theft is giving back twice what you stole. The poor woman above is made to give back twice the value of the food that she stole and her family starves to death. The rich man is forced to give back twice what he stole and he has to sell one of his homes while keeping the rest. Power and wealth and station insulates people from consequences, always has and always will.
So justice is a wonderful ideal that will never survive the real world. It is, simply, an unjust world we live in. We can strive for fairness, as much as possible. But reality wins, in the end.
Rawls' original position want's regulative principles that benefit all regardless of social position (and one of the ways he attempts to justify this is with Kant's maxim that each person is end in herself).
Rawls, Nozick & Sandel all argue for different points, and their implicit duties, along a deontological continuum of "the right"/"rights" versus "the good" in connection with the individual's relation to the state, community, group, etc.... Rawls aligns himself with welfare liberalism, Nozick with libertarianism (classical liberalism), and Sandel with communitarianism (not to be confused with communism).
May all beings find peace in their lives.
bucky
nothing is unfair.