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In regards to the bolded, I think it's actually the other way around. In other words, avijja is the locus of 'I am'/'I-maker' or the Ahamkara of Samkhya philosophy. Paticca Samupadda appears to demonstrate that 'myself' and 'yourself' are only provisional terms used by the mind to discriminate one dhamma from another, and that birth, death and becoming (bhavana) are secondary to avijja. So saying that 'you' are the basis of avijja, which is the basis of 'you' is quite circular, imo. Nowhere in paticca samupadda (to my knowledge) do this 'myself' exist without the prerequisite condition of avijja. In fact, in my understanding, that is the entire gist of the teaching on paticca samupadda.
With that said, I think your logic is all based on this assumption that this 'you' has any existent qualities without avijja. This just seems like backwards buddhist logic to me, and also is possibly circular logic.
regards
_/\_
metta
It is not really circular because I did not assert that attan comes to be through avijja. That ahamkara is an expression of ignorance does not really change "what" the attan is when free of such definitive clinging. It's also important to point out that you attributed the assumption of existent qualites without avijja to my view, but I never said that. What I'm trying to say is pretty much the opposite. that we can't pin those on attan, because those belong to the phenomenality which was given rise to through paticca samupada and are not intrinsic to Self but may be left behind (which is Nibbana). I am sure that most people will say "well, then it doesn't exist". But, face to face with how the Buddha defines various ditthi, particularly the annihilationist views, it's not an acceptable conclusion to my way of looking at it.
Important to remember that when we speculate back prior to avijja we're getting into "forbidden" territory. All kinds of confusion can ensue.
My main argument is that far too many Buddhists believe that the Buddha's teachings on anatta encourage them to adopt the views "I have no Self" "There is no Self" or "'Self' is only the aggregates which break up on death") by default when clearly and explicitly he discourages this conclusion.
A great number of Buddhists would take all that you had written in that last post and add a conclusion like "therefore, it's clear that the Buddha denied the Self and it's clear to me there is no Self".
All the Buddha taught is of suffering and the way to the freedom from suffering.
I mainly continued this discussion to make clear the meanings and intentions behind my previous posts. I simply felt that they were unclear to some, and hence taken out of context. My only goal was to attempt to fix that. Now that I feel confident that I have clarified my position to the best of my ability, you may make of it what you wish. I have no desire to prove myself 'right', or to prove my views as being 'correct'. If you find my words to be in error, then please do your best to correct them. As for myself, I am content that my current understanding is in line with the Dhamma, but I am taking the time to study the entire Samyutta Nikaya, so I am open to the possibility of it being otherwise. Until such time, however, what more can I offer?
"Vaccha, the position that 'the cosmos is not eternal' [along with 'the cosmos is finite', 'the cosmos is infinite', 'the soul & the body are the same', 'the soul is one thing and the body another', 'after death a Tathagata exists', 'after death a Tathagata does not exist', 'after death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist', 'after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'] is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding. - MN 72"
It helps here to be aware that the word which is here translated as "soul" is jiva, not attan. Jiva is probably most appropriately referred to as "vitality" or the perennially mysterious property of being alive.
Here is a snip from an excellent talk - Using non-self to let goby Ajahn Brahmavamso. I bolded his clear statement that supports the traditional, correct view that there is no self. Ponder on it all.
For every statement of Buddha's that might suggest otherwise, there are many that are clear - there is no self.
=====================
I did say in an earlier talk that it's through wisdom power that you get very deep in meditation not through mere willpower and a little bit of insight, a little bit of understanding. Seeing this process from a different perspective has enormous power to quieten the mind down, and so I wanted to especially emphasise this in the latter part of this talk how anatta can be used in this process of meditation. But first of all, just the meaning of anatta should be apprehended by us and it's one of those subjects, or the subject in Buddhism, which to many people is very hard to understand and to get your mind around, and that by itself is a good point for insight to arise. Why in many parts of Buddhism when we come to the teaching of anatta there's something inside us which rebels? That is the illusion of self getting uncomfortable. This is stirring up something which is very deeply rooted inside us and something which does not want to even contemplate anatta, non-self, and that is a symptom of the whole problem. The Buddha was very uncompromising when he taught anatta and it's one of the reasons why people find it a bit difficult because there's no way around. When you read the Buddha's teachings, there's no way around coming to the conclusion that there is no-one in here. There is no controller. There is no knower. There is no doer. There is no self, no soul, no being. And this uncompromising conclusion which you get from looking at the teachings causes you to actually investigate because so much other teachings of the Buddha seem to be so powerful, so deep, so true, so effective, and this one, seems to be the hard one. It is the hard one because on the realisation of anatta, of uncovering the illusion of self that, the whole path towards enlightenment revolves. This is the insight, the discovery, the understanding which changes one from just being a person who wanders around the samsara, lifetime after lifetime, to one who is on the way out of the samsara, inevitably, certainly, surely bound for Nibbana. It's the crux, the fulcrum, of the whole practice. Why is it difficult to see? It's difficult to see because we don't want to see it, but at least we can get a handle on what the Buddha was talking about, because first of all that he asked you to not look at anatta from a philosophical point of view - which is one of the big mistakes as we intellectualise it - but to start looking at anatta from the practical point of view: how it affects our views, perceptions, thoughts, in particular, to look at what do we take to be a self, a soul, a me. And this is where we really get to grip with this teaching of anatta: how we use it. Instead of thinking "is there a self?" or "who am I?", you say "what do I perceive my self to be? What do I perceive is mine? What do I think is me? What do I think is mine? What do I know? What do I view as me? What do I view as mine?". And here the Buddha started taking apart this illusion bit by bit.
In short, the five clinging-aggregates are not-self because they are unsatisfactory and inconstant.
(Sorry for being offtopic, but I don't know where else to put it (or if I even should) and I've seen it before but never had any people to ask.)
"Inconstant > not-self" seems pretty obvious, but "unsatisfactory > not-self" just doesn't make any kind of sense at all to me. It's like saying "I need haircut, therefore the sofa cannot stand on one leg". :wtf:
Originally Posted by Elohim
In short, the five clinging-aggregates are not-self because they are unsatisfactory and inconstant.
(Sorry for being offtopic, but I don't know where else to put it (or if I even should) and I've seen it before but never had any people to ask.)
"Inconstant > not-self" seems pretty obvious, but "unsatisfactory > not-self" just doesn't make any kind of sense at all to me. It's like saying "I need haircut, therefore the sofa cannot stand on one leg".
Here we are talking about the 3 dharma seals, aka the 3 marks of existence, anicca (impermanent), dukkha (unsatisfactoriness) and anatta (not-self or without self). It seems to be regarded by the buddha that any working or meaningful definition of a 'self' implies permanence and that it is not subject to dukkha. What is being said here is that the aggregates do not meet these conditions, which would be necessary to be the considered 'self' in anything other than a provisional sense.
Also, saying that something is anatta means that it is without any fundamental or independent reality apart from conditions.
"There are these three forms of stressfulness, my friend: the stressfulness of pain, the stressfulness of fabrication, the stressfulness of change. These are the three forms of stressfulness." - SN XXXVIII.14
This is one of the main points to be understood in realization of the First Noble Truth. The tilakkhana (three characteristics of existence: dukkha, anicca, and anatta) are present in all conditioned things. The Buddha teaches that whatever is anicca (inconstant), that is whatever is subject to change and conditionality, is dukkha (stressful). To hold onto anything that is inconstant, subject to change, break-up, and dissolution is a cause for suffering. Why, then, would you want cling to something that is impermanent, and by it's very nature stressful, as a self? Perhaps listening to The Three Characteristics and The Five Aggregates by Thanissaro Bhikkhu might help to improve your understanding as to why the Buddha said:
"Birth is stressful, aging is stressful, death is stressful; sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair are stressful; association with what is not loved is stressful, separation from what is loved is stressful, not getting what is wanted is stressful. In short, the five clinging-aggregates are stressful. - AN VI.63
I hope my comments on this detail could help you clarify for yourself why this statement (why what is dukkha cannot be considered "myself") is useful.
The way I understand it, this amounts to a practical teaching. Let's look at it. We say that what is impermanent is dukkha because, having clung to it, when it changes or is annihilated that causes pain for us...and even if the thing is temporarily stable, we have an anxiety for it based on its impermanence. But why is dukkha unacceptable as self? If (for instance) something is myself or necessarily pertaining to myself, but it is also dukkha in the way the aggregates are dukkha("unsatisfactory" is one choice of translation for dukkha: more popular is just "suffering"), then that would mean that no matter how hard I tried or what I did, I could never ever escape or eliminate suffering, because that suffering is necessarily part of who I really am. Since half of the four noble truths refer to the liberation from suffering, for the Buddha, such a notion is very unacceptable.
Will,
you wrote (emphasis mine):
"Here is a snip from an excellent talk - Using non-self to let goby Ajahn Brahmavamso. I bolded his clear statement that supports the traditional, correct view that there is no self. Ponder on it all.
For every statement of Buddha's that might suggest otherwise, there are many that are clear - there is no self."
In making the above statements you ignore or contradict Buddha's teaching such as the following:
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.
The problem is the view, not that there is no self. If it's an opinion and not direct insight, it doesn't contain the reality of what's being spoken about.
It is not really circular because I did not assert that attan comes to be through avijja. That ahamkara is an expression of ignorance does not really change "what" the attan is when free of such definitive clinging. It's also important to point out that you attributed the assumption of existent qualites without avijja to my view, but I never said that. What I'm trying to say is pretty much the opposite. that we can't pin those on attan, because those belong to the phenomenality which was given rise to through paticca samupada and are not intrinsic to Self but may be left behind (which is Nibbana). I am sure that most people will say "well, then it doesn't exist". But, face to face with how the Buddha defines various ditthi, particularly the annihilationist views, it's not an acceptable conclusion to my way of looking at it.
Important to remember that when we speculate back prior to avijja we're getting into "forbidden" territory. All kinds of confusion can ensue.
By the way you are stating your arguments, saying the 'I am the locus of Avijja', it appears you are stepping into that forbidden ground. Then, by the way I am stating my arguments, it sounds like I am saying there is no self prior to avijja.
The way I understand it is that 'self' and 'no-self' do not apply and are irrelevent to Awakening. They are provisional terms which apply to the mental formations skandha (samskara). Even the thought "I am" is a just a thought. Taking on the view of 'I am' indicates clinging to this mental formation, and is therefore a source of dukkha. The thought 'there is no self' is just a thought. Taking on the view of 'there is no self' indicates clinging to this mental formation, and is therefore also a source of dukkha.
It is also important to note that the buddha said holding to the view that 'there is no self' is worse than holding onto the view that 'there is a self'. Basically this whole argument is worthless if we are just using it to establish a view one way or the other, neither way, or both ways. Establishing a view of any sort is to misunderstand the teaching of anicca and dukkha, imo.
I have heard this analogy (in the context of Zen buddhism): In eternalism they say 'there is a cat'.
In nihilism they say 'there is no cat'.
In Zen we say 'meow'.
Thanks for the response Elohim. In essence, you seem to be saying that academic scholarship is not fair to Buddhism. I would agree in some cases with your assessment especially when scholars try represent the Buddha’s message according to the analysis of a postmortem sect.
Along these same lines, I think it is important to understand that with regard to the pâtimokkha in primitive Buddhism that it may not be the same as is practiced today. A scholar would point out, for example, the treatment of the term patimokkha in the commentarial literature is not suggestive of a code which formulates and defines offenses against the regimen of the bhikkhave (cf. Udana Atthakatha 223—224). I think my point is that we might be doing an injustice with our assumptions about what is constitutive of ‘practice’.
Turning to your response in regards to ‘anatta’, I think there are clearly contexts where the implication is different from the more popular understanding of anatta especially with regard to ‘view’ (ditthi). I heartily agree with you that a permanent, everlasting self is not to be found where there is only impermanence and suffering. But I am strongly inclined to side with Pande’s analysis. For one reason, I see a great deal of apophasis in the Buddha’s instructions to his bhikkhave. This ties in with his treatment of the khandhas. From many passages I have read, it is all too clear that the khandhas are finite and woeful. The self, on the other hand, is never what the khandhas are. The Buddha says with regard to each one of them, “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self” (netam mama, neso'hamasmi, na me so atta).
I really don’t think self was the problem that concerned the Buddha of the Nikayas. I just don’t read that. What concerned the Buddha was the fact that beings (satto) find themselves living in an impermanent and unsatisfactory world; most notably clinging to the khandhas as if they were the true self in some way (i.e., eternalism). I have never, in my readings, stumbled across any passage in the Nikayas in which the self is treated as being synonymous with impermanence and suffering. It is always the five khandhas which are treated in a pejorative manner including calling them demon-aggregates (marakdhanda).
Turning to nirvana, it is transcendent. I don’t think this is in dispute. It is simply not of our world. This is evident in this marvelous passage from the Udana.
Monks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, a not-compounded. Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, there would be apparent no escape from this here that is born, become, made, compounded.
Nirvana is neither impermanent nor does it suffer. To realize it is to experience supreme bliss (nibbanam pramam sukham). This hardly denies an experiencer either.
Harking back to practice, the proper practice would be one which loosens our bonds to the khandhas so that we are not identified with them which is the base cause of suffering. Indeed, we might say as the Buddha once uttered, “na me so atta” discerning that the garment is not the true man.
Here we are talking about the 3 dharma seals, aka the 3 marks of existence, anicca (impermanent), dukkha (unsatisfactoriness) and anatta (not-self or without self). It seems to be regarded by the buddha that any working or meaningful definition of a 'self' implies permanence and that it is not subject to dukkha. What is being said here is that the aggregates do not meet these conditions, which would be necessary to be the considered 'self' in anything other than a provisional sense.
It is remarkable that atta or self is not included in the three marks of conditioned existence. The obverse would also hold true that the unconditioned is everlasting, blissful and the self (attâ).
It is remarkable that atta or self is not included in the three marks of conditioned existence. The obverse would also hold true that the unconditioned is everlasting, blissful and the self (attâ).
In Pali-Buddhism, the word ‘attan’ has two main uses, similar to the Sanskrit átman; as a reflexive (or in the genitive, possessive) pronoun it means “himself”, “myself”, “yourself” etc. And in various contexts it can refer to the body or the mind. And as a noun it means the “soul” in the Brahmanical sense. Contrary to the Brahmanical theories of his time, the Buddha chose not to assume the existence of an eternal self or soul, although he would refer to the existence of the self or person subjective to conditional phenomena and responsible for ones actions in that sense.
In distinct contrast to the Vedic theories of the ‘Átman’ contemporary to his time, the Buddha rejected these in one clean sweep in the doctrine of anattá; Reality, all phenomena, is analyzed as nothing more than a perpetual rearranging of psychophysical events, summarized in the pañca-khandha (Skt. ~ skandha) lit. ‘five bases’; 1) Matter/Corporeality ~ Rúpa, 2) Sensation/Feeling ~ Vedaná, 3) Perception/Intuitive Cognition ~ Saññá ,4) Mental Formations ~ Sankhára, 5) Consciousness/Life-Force ~ Viññána. The interaction of these factors manifest as the experience of life, and are detailed in the Law of Cause and Effect ~ kamma (Skt. karma ~ 'action') and ‘Dependant Genesis’ ~ Paticca-samuppáda , demonstrating that all events are dependant on a cause. The ‘person’ regenerates itself, conditioned by illusory self-identification with the arising of events in the present moment from previous actions (kammakkhaya), which in their decline are conditioned by present action, continuing on to likewise manifest in the next moment. This 'person' or witness of these manifestations and extinctions is likewise nothing more than an evolution of natural elements with latent tendencies of consciousness, held together by a thread of memory running through an ever-changing experience of reality, i.e. there can be no individuality outside the arrangement of components, and the arrangement of the components in one moment is different from the next, hence the impossibility of a continuous, unchanging, self or 'person'. This cycle is perpetuated by ignorance ~ avijjá of Truth ‘produced from restraint, seeing things as they truly are’ ~ yatábhúta-ñánadassana, craving/desire ~ tanhá and clinging ~ upadáná, resulting in suffering ~ dukkha which begins the process over again, ad-infinitum.
The way to liberation taught by the Buddha is summarized in the Four Noble Truths & The Noble Eightfold Path [*], the latter consisting of three sections: Virtue ~ Síla, Concentration ~ Samádhi and Wisdom ~ Paññya. Virtue frees the mind from worry and guilt, Concentration is the contemplative work based on the above analysis of all phenomena in terms of three characteristics ~ ti-lakkhana[1]; 1) Impermanence ~ Anicca, 2) Suffering or misery due to ignorance, craving & clinging ~ Dukkha, and 3) Not-Self; realising that because all things are inconstant, there likewise is no constant “I” or “Mine”, eternal self or witness of the experience ~ Anattá. This gives rise to wisdom ~ paññya and realization of Truth ~ ‘seeing things as they truly are’ ~ ñánadassana, leading to an un-prompted release of the burden of desire and self-illusion, resulting in an experience of voidness ~ suññatá (peace), which with continued effort leads to supreme voidness ~ paramam-suññam (Supreme Peace), Nibbána.
Coomaraswamy claimed that the Buddha never taught non-existence of an eternal self. This claim is literally true in the case of the paribbájako Vacchagotta who directly asked the Buddha “Is there a self” ~ “Is there not a self?” whereupon the Buddha remained silent. [2] When Ánanda later asked about his silence, the Buddha said that to affirm or deny the existence of an eternal self would have sided with secular theories and have disturbed Vacchagotta even more. It must be pointed out that Vacchagotta had repeatedly come to the Buddha with questions such as these, and although he seriously was trying to understand, he was troubled over this matter, to the point where the Buddha was perhaps silent in this case out of compassion. However, the Buddha did teach anattá throughout his career… not in a negative, nihilistic way of 'non-reality', but rather by showing 'why it is' and how to see it integrated positively in the law of kamma ~ cause and effect, directing the contemplative ~ “When you see with detachment, All fabrications are inconstant…” naturally leads one to the wisdom that “...All fabrications are suffering…” ~ because of unawareness and attachment resulting in self-identification with the changing events, realization of which leads the mind to release of attachment through restraint, leading to pure awareness, seeing that ~ “...All Phenomena are not-self...” , the direct realization of the impossibility of an everlasting anything, self or witness.
However, the denial of the Buddha’s doctrine of ‘anattá’ is in no way unique. Coomaraswamy and Horner, like the many western Indological scholars of the 19th and early 20th century, looked for any way of making this seemingly nihilistic doctrine more harmonious with the Christian belief in an eternal soul. To make this claim stick they began by stating, “the Buddhist point of view is exactly the same as the Brahmanical.” even though the number of passages in the Pali Canon dealing with Upanishadic doctrines is quite small. To safeguard this theory they altered the translation of Pali texts to demonstrate that the Buddha affirmed the existence of ‘attan’ (Skt. ‘Átman’ ~ Brahman/Absolute). Where the Pali texts refer to ‘anattá’, translated as ‘not-self’, they insert the awkward translation of “un-Selfishness” and argue that although the Buddha did claim that the five-bases of all cognizable phenomena are without permanent self, that he never directly denied the existence of ‘attan’, the ‘Brahman/Absolute’ lying outside of conditional and thus cognizable phenomena.
George Grimm, is his book “The Doctrine of the Buddha” made an identical claim with his “Great Syllogism” as follows: “Everything is not my I, not my true essence, is Anattá.” ... “But those things which alone are cognizable, he (the Buddha) has seen correctly, perfectly apprehending them as being mere objects for us, and precisely therefore, not our true I (anattá)”. From this reasoning, Grimm surmises that there must be an eternal essential “Self”, free from conditionality and consequential suffering, and above all cognoscibility. This is as if to say that although the Buddha denied the pañca-khandha as possessing a permanent self, that the Buddha implied something apart from this that we can call the Absolute-'I', to be inferred simply by his silence on the matter.
To prove this, these theorists often refer to a favored selection of texts found in the Pali canon. One example is found in a section of the Dhammapada [3]that consists of a series of admonitions from the Buddha to contemplatives, ranging from guarding ‘oneself’ against improper conduct or ‘practicing what one preaches’, to being vigilant and confidant in ones practice of the doctrine to attain the goal. Coomaraswamy and Horner preferred to extract the following out of context: “Attá hi attano nátho” which they mistranslate and interpret for us to read, “Self is the lord of self.” They imply that it means that ‘Self’ or ‘attan’ (‘Atmán’) is the lord of the little self or conditioned personality.
But they are incorrect from the start. In the philosophical context of this line ‘Attá’ does not mean Self/soul in the Brahmanical sense, but rather in the common usage as a reflexive pronoun to mean ‘oneself’. Also, ‘nátho’ does not mean ‘lord’ but as ‘protector’, ‘refuge’ or ‘support’ instead. Thus translating “Attá hi attano nátho” as “One indeed is the protector of oneself” or “One indeed is ones own support”, which is followed by, “ko hi nátho paro siyá?” meaning, “who else could the protector (support) be?”. Finally, the last line of this verse confirms the intended meaning of the whole: “attaná hi sudantena, nátham labhati dullabham.” which means, “With oneself fully controlled (sudantena), one gains a mastery that is hard to gain.”, Dhammapada 12 represents a standard theme found throughout Buddhist doctrine; The Buddha often admonished people to rely on themselves, on their own effort in terms of their contemplative practice.
Another passage altered with the same reasoning by Coomaraswamy and Horner is from the Digha Nikaya [4]: “Tasmátihánanda, attadípá viharatha attasaraná anaññasaraná,” which they again mistranslate and interpret for us to read, “Therefore, Ánanda, Self is the light of the self (attadípá)...taking Self as a refuge...” (attasaraná). However, ‘dípa’ in this context should not be translated as lamp or light but as “double-watered” into island or refuge instead. Thus making the actual translation as, “Therefore, Ánanda, be islands unto yourselves, refuges unto yourselves, seeking no external refuge…” ('atta' again, is the common usage as a reflexive pronoun to mean ‘yourself’), clarified further in the next line, “dhammadípá dhammasaraná anaññasaraná.” which means, “Dwell with the Dhamma (doctrine) as your island, the Dhamma as your refuge, seeking no other refuge.”
The setting of the ‘Mahaparinibbana Sutta’ is about facts concerning the Buddha’s last days, including his final instructions to his followers. Here he is admonishing them to rely on their own effort, to ‘strive on’ and apply the doctrine in their lives. The inference of ‘atta’ as ‘Brahman/Absolute’ is completely foreign to this passage, which is borne out when the Buddha went on to say, “Kathañcánanda, bhikkhu attadípo viharati attasarano anaññasarano, dhammadípo dhammasarano anaññasarano?” “And how, Ánanda, is a bhikkhu an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge?” The Buddha then went on to describe the Satipatthána, the four foundations of mindfulness; contemplation of the body, feelings, mind, and meditation objects, a theme the Buddha often taught on. Here he is saying to make the Dhamma (doctrine) of Satipatthána as one’s refuge, again no mention of ‘attán’ ~ ‘Brahman/Absolute’ as refuge. Furthermore, it is in the last line of this passage where the Buddha describes the result of Dhamma (doctrine) as refuge: “Those bhikkhus of mine, Ánanda, who now or after I am gone, abide as an island unto themselves,…‘it is they who will become the highest, if they have the desire to learn." ("tamatagge me te, ánanda, bhikkhu bhavissanti ye keci sikkhákámá'ti.”) Here the Pali word ‘Tamatagge’ = “the highest”, having cut every bondage of darkness, those bhikkhus will be on the very summit (ati-agge). Again there is no mention of attán ~ Self as refuge.
In Majjhima Nikaya, Vacchagotta the wanderer asks the Buddha, “Does the Master Gotama hold any speculative view at all?” The Buddha replied, “Vaccha, ‘speculative view’ (ditthigata lit. ‘theories’) is something that the Tathágata has put away. For the Tathágata, Vaccha, has seen this: Such is the material form, such its origin, such its disappearance;...'such is feeling... 'such is perception… such are mental formations… such is consciousness, such its origin, such its disappearance.’ Therefore, I say, with the destruction, fading away, cessation, giving up and relinquishing of all conceiving, all excogitations, all I-making, all mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit, the Tathágata is liberated through not clinging.” [5]
But in response to the above and many similar statements by the Buddha, Coomaraswamy and Horner, just as George Grimm in his above mentioned “Great Syllogism”, insist that the Buddha’s denial of ‘atta’ intrinsic to the khandhas is really an affirmation of the mahá-atmán ~ “Great Self”. They argue that although the Buddha stated that the five-bases are not ‘attá’, that he never specifically denied the ‘Átman’. They claim that Buddha was only directing us to see the real Self behind the personal ego, a view identical to that found in the Upanishads, reasoning that Buddha’s denial of the khandhas possessing an everlasting ‘atta’ indicates that He affirmed the true ‘Átman’ by default, i.e. when Buddha said, ‘form, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness is not-self’ these scholars make the following argument: “But a moment’s consideration of the logic of the words will show that they (the listeners) assume the reality of a Self that is not any one or all of the ‘things’ that are denied of it.” With regard to this claim the following statements by the Buddha, found in the Dhammapada [6] should be considered:
The Three Characteristics (tilakkhana): ~ Dhp. 22.277-279
277. “Sabbe sankhárá aniccá”ti, yadá paññáya passati; atha nibbindati dukkhe, esa maggo visuddhiyá.
“ When you see with discernment, ‘All conditioned things are impermanent’; you grow disenchanted with stress. This is the path to purity.
278. “Sabbe sankhárá dukkhá”ti, yadá paññáya passati; atha nibbindati dukkhe, esa maggo visuddhiyá.
“ When you see with discernment, ‘All conditioned things are suffering’; you grow disenchanted with stress. This is the path to purity. 279. “Sabbe dhammá anattá”ti, yadá paññáya passati; atha nibbindati dukkhe, esa maggo visuddhiyá.
“ When you see with discernment, ‘All things, manifest or un-manifest, are not-self’; you grow disenchanted with stress. This is the path to purity.”
The first line states, “All conditioned things (sankhárá) are impermanent…” The second line, “All conditioned things are suffering…” The third line, however, is different. Here, the Buddha does not use the word ‘sankhárá’ (formations, ‘conditioned things’) but ‘dhammá’ instead. The definition of ‘dhammá’ covers a broad range, from Doctrine or Law to nature and all phenomena. Here it is referring to 'all phenomenal reality', both tangible and evanescent ~ dhamma-nijjívatá , i.e. everything cognizable and hidden, translating this line as, “All things, (manifest or un-manifest), are not-self…” This means that even ‘Nibbána’, which is ‘asankhárá’ ~ unconditioned, is also anattá ~ without permanant self. This statement unequivocally denies the ‘attá’ ~ self or Self/Absolute of any kind, even in enlightenment, even in Nibbána.
The Buddha's teaching states clearly that ‘personality-belief’ ~ sakkáya-ditthi, or ‘ego-illusion’ ~ atta-ditthi, is wrong-view ~ miccha-ditthi, that will lead to craving, vexation and suffering, and that wrong views must be rejected because they are a source of corrupted aspirations and conduct.
In the Brahmajala Sutta (also called Ditthijala, ‘net of views’), the Buddha discusses at length 62 categories of wrong views pertaining to speculation of the past, future, both past and future and beliefs adhering or relating to these, one of which is the belief that there exists an eternal self or soul:
“ …Thus, bhikkhus, when those ascetics and Brahmins who are Eternalists (sassata-váda) proclaim the eternity of the self ‘attan’ and the world ‘loka’ in the four ways, that is merely the feeling of those who do not know and see, the worry and vacillation of those immersed in craving.” [7]
Furthermore, The Buddha stated that if there existed any amount of permanent self-existence ~ attabháva, that his Doctrine would be impracticable:
“...Monk, there is no materiality whatsoever, no feeling…no perception…no formations of the mind…no consciousness whatsoever that is permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging or identically abiding for eternity.
Then the Bleesed One took up a bit of cowdung in his hand and said to that monk: “Monk, there is not even this much of permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging individual self-existence (attabháva), identically abiding for eternity. If even this much of permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging individual self-existence, identically abiding for eternity could be found, then this living the renounced life for the eradication of suffering would not be conceivable. But because there is not even this much of permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging individual self-existence, identically abiding for eternity, this living the renounced life for the eradication of suffering is conceivable...” [8]
Will,
you wrote (emphasis mine):
"Here is a snip from an excellent talk - Using non-self to let goby Ajahn Brahmavamso. I bolded his clear statement that supports the traditional, correct view that there is no self. Ponder on it all.
For every statement of Buddha's that might suggest otherwise, there are many that are clear - there is no self."
In making the above statements you ignore or contradict Buddha's teaching such as the following:
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.
"As he attends inappropriately in this way.." Why not back up a little in the quote and see what Buddha means by "inappropriate attention"? Even without studying the earlier parts of the sutta, logic would suggest that "appropriate attention" does exist and is useful.
Even if a verbal contradiction exists, I can live with it. When given a chance to follow modern scholars, quibblers and the underinformed (I do not mean anyone specifically) I will stick with Ajahns, sages and the general understanding shared by Buddhists of all types for the last 2000 plus years.
Thanks Not1not2 for your enthusiastic comments. It is nice to learn someone is taking notice of what I posted today.
I can understand where, so to speak, you are coming from. Your comments I gather are intended to express one side of the problem with how scholars and clergy handle the khandhas and the self (attâ) in the various discourses of the Buddha. As you probably have realized, I have a different outlook than you and one which I strongly believe to be both logical and internally verifiable.
My roots, which stem from Christian mysticism, are wont to see mysticism everywhere in the Buddha's discourses. Not unlike Frederick Heiler, I see Buddhism as the only really consistent form of mysticism. How about generic mysticism? (It has a nice ring to it.)
Of the arguments you have troubled to post, I am familiar with them all. They are sectarian objections which really don't hold a lot of water with some scholars who read lots of books for a living and publish lots of stuff that gets peer reviewed the process of which can be harsh. Theravada bhantes are not given the same scrutiny. For a nice scholarly treatment of "dipa" you might enjoy this journal article by Peter Schalk at http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/10/schalk-sri-lanka-conf.html
If one is really serious about understanding what the Buddha really taught with regard to the self, it is advisable to distance oneself from the sectarian viewpoint or at least treat the arguments of the other side with some degree of academic seriousness. At this point, I have more faith in scholars than bhantes. But really I have more faith in my own capacity to reason and intuit. Both the self and the dhamma remain my light (dipa)..
I guess I'm coming from the point of view of someone who is concerned about the practice of buddhism, and so I consider the view of those actually practicing buddhism and seeing it for themselves as more relevent and correct than the opinion of even very intelligent scholars on this particular matter. This is because I consider buddhism to be a path of practice rather than one of speculation and abstract philosophy. This is, however, just my opinion and I don't have anything against scholarly disagreement.
I will take the word of Ajahn Chah and Bhikkhu Bodhi (who happens to be no lightweight in the scholarship department and holds up to plenty of 'scrutiny') over someone whom I cannot ascertain whether or not they've taken any time to actually sit and practice to any significant degree. Certainly though, a healthy sense of detachment and inquiry are important for approaching these matters, but I don't think anyone can be considered an expert on the correct interpretation of Tipitaka who doesn't put it into to practice.
Anyway, I am no scholar and will just have to say 'I don't know' on such matters. However, for now I will default to the Ajahns and, yes, even the Bhantes on these matters which as they don't just deal with speculation, and use the terms as expedient means. I guess I'll just have to take the risk of being a bit sectarian until I feel compelled to be otherwise.
BTW, for someone who can only consider themself an theologian, not a buddhist scholar, you seem to have quite a developed opinion on these matters and it is surprising that you are all too familiar with these arguments. BTW, your references to light and being influenced by Christian Mysticism reminds me of some of the posts of another member who is no longer here. I also share an affinity for the Gospel of Thomas, though I have found buddhism to be much more articulate in its approach, which suits my predisposition and also has more explicit directions as to actual practice.
Thanks Not1not2 for your enthusiastic comments. It is nice to learn someone is taking notice of what I posted today.
I can understand where, so to speak, you are coming from. Your comments I gather are intended to express one side of the problem with how scholars and clergy handle the khandhas and the self (attâ) in the various discourses of the Buddha. As you probably have realized, I have a different outlook than you and one which I strongly believe to be both logical and internally verifiable.
My roots, which stem from Christian mysticism, are wont to see mysticism everywhere in the Buddha's discourses. Not unlike Frederick Heiler, I see Buddhism as the only really consistent form of mysticism. How about generic mysticism? (It has a nice ring to it.)
Of the arguments you have troubled to post, I am familiar with them all. They are sectarian objections which really don't hold a lot of water with some scholars who read lots of books for a living and publish lots of stuff that gets peer reviewed the process of which can be harsh. Theravada bhantes are not given the same scrutiny. For a nice scholarly treatment of "dipa" you might enjoy this journal article by Peter Schalk at http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/10/schalk-sri-lanka-conf.html
If one is really serious about understanding what the Buddha really taught with regard to the self, it is advisable to distance oneself from the sectarian viewpoint or at least treat the arguments of the other side with some degree of academic seriousness. At this point, I have more faith in scholars than bhantes. But really I have more faith in my own capacity to reason and intuit. Both the self and the dhamma remain my light (dipa)..
Love ya all,
Bobby
It's nice to see I'm not the only one around here tending to this view. Your comments have been helpful.
Thanks for the replies, I feel like I'm stupid and looking at it the wrong way, seeing it as making implications of direct causality between the anicca, anatta, and dukkha (where I can only see such links between anicca and anatta, because to dukkha, there has to be the added element of not wanting things to be anicca and anatta, and I really can't see the connection *from* dukkha to anicca/anatta) when most likely such an implication doesn't exist. I apologise for bringing it up, I'm not sure that I should have.
Thanks for the replies, I feel like I'm stupid and looking at it the wrong way, seeing it as making implications of direct causality between the anicca, anatta, and dukkha (where I can only see such links between anicca and anatta, because to dukkha, there has to be the added element of not wanting things to be anicca and anatta, and I really can't see the connection *from* dukkha to anicca/anatta) when most likely such an implication doesn't exist. I apologise for bringing it up, I'm not sure that I should have.
Do keep in mind that suffering is just one translation of dukkha. It is also translated as unsatisfactory, meaning that it is not worth clinging to. I find this to be the most workable definition in regards to the dukkha as one of the 3 marks of existence. In this sense, we simply see conditioned phenomena as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self and do not cling to them as if they were otherwise. No false expectations or identifications.
Sorry if I was one of those making a mess of the answer. I still kind of suck at expressing my understanding sometimes.
_/\_
metta
P.S.- Thanks for linking that article B_Lanier, it was a good read, though I admit it was talking about a lot of things that I have not studied. As I side note I was told that dipa was used as island and the usage of dipa as light did not occur until later. Honestly, I don't really have enough Pali grammar knowledge to understand the distinctions. Anyway, take care.
Do keep in mind that suffering is just one translation of dukkha. It is also translated as unsatisfactory, meaning that it is not worth clinging to.
Yes, I prefer unsatisfactory myself because it's more encompassing and perhaps more appropriate since suffering has the connotation of being something "extreme". Suffering is easier to spell though
Let us look closer at the canonical usage of the word dhammadipa in the Mahaparinibanasutta. There, the dying jina is reported to have said that the disciples should not have any other sarana, refuge than the dhamma.(18) He also uses the term atta, self, in connection with dipa: atta-dipa, having oneself as dipa. It is implied by the context that the monks should have themselves as dipaand not the dying or dead jina or anybody else. Furthermore, the jina introduces the concept of dhammadipa, which here is not tatpurusa the dipa of the dhamma, but which is bahuvrihi having the dhamma as dipa. Therefore, we have four terms that are connected with each other in a semantic chain: dhamma, dipa, atta and sarana. Connecting these, the jina is reported to have said to Ananda : Tasmat ih Ananda atta-dipa viharatha atta-sarana ananna-sarana, dhamma-dipa dhamma-sarana ananna sarana(19) (Therefore, Ananda, dwell you (all), having yourselves as dipa, having yourselves as refuge, having no other refuge, having the dhamma as dipa, having the dhamma as refuge, having no other refuge). Atta is of course here not the soul, but the logical counterpart of reference to somebody else than myself, to the other, who is made explicit in the text. The atta and the dhamma have common attributes, to be a sarana and to be a dipa. It is implied that dipa is a simile for sarana. The dipa is not a physical island and is therefore of course not the island Tambapanni or Lanka/Ilam (that are never mentioned in the Mahaparinibanasutta under these names or any other name).
The monks themselves should seek no other refuge than the dhamma that is their dipa-sarana. If anything is a dipa as sarana, it is the dhamma. dhammadipa refers to a state of mind when a person has the dhamma as dipa. Those who have the dhamma as dipa-sarana can be found anywhere in the world.
Interesting stuff. I think it explains the issue quite well. And, the discussion of atta in this does seem to correspond with what I posted earlier. It indicates that attadipa means that must rely upon oneself, in the sense of oneself rather than someone else, not in any transcendental or brahmanical sense.
Take care
_/\_
metta
P.S.-Do you know why the author uses the word 'jina' to refer to the buddha here? I've never heard this term before anywhere.
P.P.S.- I have just looked up jina and it means 'one who has conquered desire'. Also, I was recently informed that dipa breaks down into 'di' (two or double) and 'pa' (water) implying the term island. Once again, it was reiterated that the translation into 'lamp' or 'light' was a later development. If you would like to show an alternative explanation as to how one should prefer to use 'light' to translate 'dipa' then I would certainly enjoy the read.
Not1not2: I would add this to your comments. The oldest meaning we have of "self" in Indo-Aryan comes from the Nirukta of Yaska (500 BCE). It generally means "omnipresent”. In this sense it bears the sense of being a universal substratum. In the Mahayana-Mahaparinirvana-Sutra is is virtually synonymous with buddhadhatu (buddha nature).
Linking this with your remarks with regard to attadipa, the immediate question of who we are can hardly be answered with "yourself" as the finite person. Rather, attadipa must be the buddhadhatu (buddha nature) which is infinite.
From a personal level, deep within each of us, through the many kleshas or sheaths of impurity, lies who we really are, the one who is free of all impurity and modification.
In making ourselves and the dharma our guiding light we are certainly going beyond (param) anything conditioned or finite. With our self and the dharma as our refuge, when facing the mortality of the khandhas, we have already given up our view that the carnal body can be a refuge.
By the way, I am not quite sure what you mean by the expression "brahmanical sense" in regard to the transcendent (paramartha). The word "brahma" is used to describe the Buddha, e.g., brahmabhuta (D. iii. 84). It is a widely used term in the canon. It is said in the canon, "tathagato...Brahmacakka.m pavattetti", that is, the "Tathagata turns the wheel of brahma." It is very seldom, if at all, used in a pejorative sense.
In a nut shell, to sum up my major idea, by making ourselves both light and refuge we are referring to our buddha nature, rather than the finite self which stands for the carnal person.
Not1not2: I would add this to your comments. The oldest meaning we have of "self" in Indo-Aryan comes from the Nirukta of Yaska (500 BCE). It generally means "omnipresent”. In this sense it bears the sense of being a universal substratum. In the Mahayana-Mahaparinirvana-Sutra is is virtually synonymous with buddhadhatu (buddha nature).
Linking this with your remarks with regard to attadipa, the immediate question of who we are can hardly be answered with "yourself" as the finite person. Rather, attadipa must be the buddhadhatu (buddha nature) which is infinite.
From a personal level, deep within each of us, through the many kleshas or sheaths of impurity, lies who we really are, the one who is free of all impurity and modification.
In making ourselves and the dharma our guiding light we are certainly going beyond (param) anything conditioned or finite. With our self and the dharma as our refuge, when facing the mortality of the khandhas, we have already given up our view that the carnal body can be a refuge.
By the way, I am not quite sure what you mean by the expression "brahmanical sense" in regard to the transcendent (paramartha). The word "brahma" is used to describe the Buddha, e.g., brahmabhuta (D. iii. 84). It is a widely used term in the canon. It is said in the canon, "tathagato...Brahmacakka.m pavattetti", that is, the "Tathagata turns the wheel of brahma." It is very seldom, if at all, used in a pejorative sense.
In a nut shell, to sum up my major idea, by making ourselves both light and refuge we are referring to our buddha nature, rather than the finite self which stands for the carnal person.
Love ya all,
Bobby
Nope, Buddha nature is not a substratum or an essence of any sort within.
Not1not2: I would add this to your comments. The oldest meaning we have of "self" in Indo-Aryan comes from the Nirukta of Yaska (500 BCE). It generally means "omnipresent”. In this sense it bears the sense of being a universal substratum. In the Mahayana-Mahaparinirvana-Sutra is is virtually synonymous with buddhadhatu (buddha nature).
Linking this with your remarks with regard to attadipa, the immediate question of who we are can hardly be answered with "yourself" as the finite person. Rather, attadipa must be the buddhadhatu (buddha nature) which is infinite.
From a personal level, deep within each of us, through the many kleshas or sheaths of impurity, lies who we really are, the one who is free of all impurity and modification.
In making ourselves and the dharma our guiding light we are certainly going beyond (param) anything conditioned or finite. With our self and the dharma as our refuge, when facing the mortality of the khandhas, we have already given up our view that the carnal body can be a refuge.
By the way, I am not quite sure what you mean by the expression "brahmanical sense" in regard to the transcendent (paramartha). The word "brahma" is used to describe the Buddha, e.g., brahmabhuta (D. iii. 84). It is a widely used term in the canon. It is said in the canon, "tathagato...Brahmacakka.m pavattetti", that is, the "Tathagata turns the wheel of brahma." It is very seldom, if at all, used in a pejorative sense.
In a nut shell, to sum up my major idea, by making ourselves both light and refuge we are referring to our buddha nature, rather than the finite self which stands for the carnal person.
Love ya all,
Bobby
If you want to consider the Mahaparinirvana sutra and Dr. Page as authoritative over the Pali Mahaparinibbana sutta, then fine. Or perhaps you prefer Coomaraswamy and the likes of AncientBuddhism of www.attan.com. Maybe you consider Ken Wheeler an excellent scholar. Heck, you may have even read the Authentic Dhammapada by Ven. Shakya Aryanatta (or maybe even authored it). If you want to mix Sanskrit and Pali together, then fine. But in regards to the passage I am referencing, atta signifies oneself in the reflexive. In other words, Not1Not2 as opposed to Bobby Lanier, rather than Not1Not2 as opposed to some infinite Self-nature. Additionally, the link you referenced supports this translation of atta, not yours. Referencing an transcendent atta or atman which you feel is implied in the Nirvana Sutras representation of Tathagathagarbha (sp?) to explain what was meant in the Pali sutta simply does not work. Additionally, you are relying on a Sutra translated by a buddhist best known for his authorship on Vegetarianism.
As far as the Brahmanical idea of Self, I have already referenced it with this quote:
In Pali-Buddhism, the word ‘attan’ has two main uses, similar to the Sanskrit átman; as a reflexive (or in the genitive, possessive) pronoun it means “himself”, “myself”, “yourself” etc. And in various contexts it can refer to the body or the mind. And as a noun it means the “soul” in the Brahmanical sense. Contrary to the Brahmanical theories of his time, the Buddha chose not to assume the existence of an eternal self or soul, although he would refer to the existence of the self or person subjective to conditional phenomena and responsible for ones actions in that sense.
In distinct contrast to the Vedic theories of the ‘Átman’ contemporary to his time, the Buddha rejected these in one clean sweep in the doctrine of anattá; Reality, all phenomena, is analyzed as nothing more than a perpetual rearranging of psychophysical events, summarized in the pañca-khandha (Skt. ~ skandha) lit. ‘five bases’; 1) Matter/Corporeality ~ Rúpa, 2) Sensation/Feeling ~ Vedaná, 3) Perception/Intuitive Cognition ~ Saññá ,4) Mental Formations ~ Sankhára, 5) Consciousness/Life-Force ~ Viññána. The interaction of these factors manifest as the experience of life, and are detailed in the Law of Cause and Effect ~ kamma (Skt. karma ~ 'action') and ‘Dependant Genesis’ ~ Paticca-samuppáda , demonstrating that all events are dependant on a cause. The ‘person’ regenerates itself, conditioned by illusory self-identification with the arising of events in the present moment from previous actions (kammakkhaya), which in their decline are conditioned by present action, continuing on to likewise manifest in the next moment. This 'person' or witness of these manifestations and extinctions is likewise nothing more than an evolution of natural elements with latent tendencies of consciousness, held together by a thread of memory running through an ever-changing experience of reality, i.e. there can be no individuality outside the arrangement of components, and the arrangement of the components in one moment is different from the next, hence the impossibility of a continuous, unchanging, self or 'person'. This cycle is perpetuated by ignorance ~ avijjá of Truth ‘produced from restraint, seeing things as they truly are’ ~ yatábhúta-ñánadassana, craving/desire ~ tanhá and clinging ~ upadáná, resulting in suffering ~ dukkha which begins the process over again, ad-infinitum
If you want to go on arguing about semantics as applied to Vedantic thought in Buddha-contemporary India, do not expect me join in. I might, but I don't plan on it, as that is not my area of emphasis.
Hi Not1not2. I think we agree, somewhat, that sectarian opinions in regard to 'brahmanism', including the definition of 'self' should be set aside.
Where we may have some disagreement is over the extent to which attadipa and attasarana are to be taken as transcendent in which oneself is to be taken as the light and the refuge.
I think some would argue that salvation from the pain of samsara, of which all of us are aware, is impossible without one who is liberated.
The theory that the Buddha, before he died, told is most devoted followers the light and the refuge are temporal is difficult to accept on any religious grounds. This would be, in a way, implicitly recognizing that the death instinct (thanatos) of Freud has been fulfilled. But this position lands us in annihilationism in which man is considered to be the sum of his biological parts, so to speak.
I am of the opinion that some sectarian Buddhism is pretty much of a misunderstanding about the role of self with respect to pain and the path leading to liberation from pain.
I have found evidence to point to a confusion between self (attâ) and asmi mâno (including sakkaya), which can be rendered in English as individuality. Most notably, individuality has clear reference to the khandhas. The self, on the other hand, lacks such reference in which a khandha is said to be the self.
Where we may have some disagreement is over the extent to which attadipa and attasarana are to be taken as transcendent in which oneself is to be taken as the light and the refuge.
Certainly, there is some disagreement here. But it seems there is scholarly agreement that atta in this context is a reflexive pronoun which does not indicate any sort of transcendent self as a refuge. I guess if you do not want to agree with the scholarship here, that is your prerogative. Personally, I do not plan on looking anywhere else than my own experience to find liberation, or awakening. I personally consider liberation to be the elimination of grasping at any state of consciousness, any sankhara, any perception, any sensation, or any materiality. The idea of Self, Transcendent and no-self, no-transcendent are all ideas and therefore are Sankharas which should not be grasped.
"There is the case where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person... does not discern what ideas are fit for attention, or what ideas are unfit for attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas fit for attention, and attends instead to ideas unfit for attention... This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?'
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.
"The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones... discerns what ideas are fit for attention, and what ideas are unfit for attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas unfit for attention, and attends [instead] to ideas fit for attention... He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices."
— MN 2
I have found evidence to point to a confusion between self (attâ) and asmi mâno (including sakkaya), which can be rendered in English as individuality. Most notably, individuality has clear reference to the khandhas. The self, on the other hand, lacks such reference in which a khandha is said to be the self.
I already said what I have to say on this. There is atta in the reflexive sense, and atta in the transcendent/brahmanical sense. Here, scholarship agrees that atta indicates the reflexive (in the attadipa, dhammadipa passage). Also, see the above quote. I hope you don't mind these Nikaya references.
Hi Not1not2. I think we agree, somewhat, that sectarian opinions in regard to 'brahmanism', including the definition of 'self' should be set aside.
Where we may have some disagreement is over the extent to which attadipa and attasarana are to be taken as transcendent in which oneself is to be taken as the light and the refuge.
I think some would argue that salvation from the pain of samsara, of which all of us are aware, is impossible without one who is liberated.
The theory that the Buddha, before he died, told is most devoted followers the light and the refuge are temporal is difficult to accept on any religious grounds. This would be, in a way, implicitly recognizing that the death instinct (thanatos) of Freud has been fulfilled. But this position lands us in annihilationism in which man is considered to be the sum of his biological parts, so to speak.
I am of the opinion that some sectarian Buddhism is pretty much of a misunderstanding about the role of self with respect to pain and the path leading to liberation from pain.
I have found evidence to point to a confusion between self (attâ) and asmi mâno (including sakkaya), which can be rendered in English as individuality. Most notably, individuality has clear reference to the khandhas. The self, on the other hand, lacks such reference in which a khandha is said to be the self.
Love ya all,
Bobby
I think there is a further context to be seen in the Mahaparinibbanasutta for this notion of Self as refuge (either as island or as light). The context we mainly see discussed is the physical death of the Buddha and the community of monks, who have taken refuge in him as their teacher, face to face primarily with his impending absence and wondering what they are going to do without him.
I agree that clearly, this is a major theme of the discourse, but if we look at the immediate context of the "attadipa" passage we can see another point being made:
"Now I am frail, Ananda, old, aged, far gone in years. This is my eightieth year, and my life is spent. Even as an old cart, Ananda, is held together with much difficulty, so the body of the Tathagata is kept going only with supports. It is, Ananda, only when the Tathagata, disregarding external objects, with the cessation of certain feelings, attains to and abides in the signless concentration of mind, 19 that his body is more comfortable.
33. "Therefore, Ananda, be islands unto yourselves, refuges unto yourselves, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as your island, the Dhamma as your refuge, seeking no other refuge.
"And how, Ananda, is a bhikkhu an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge?
34. "When he dwells contemplating the body in the body, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world; when he dwells contemplating feelings in feelings, the mind in the mind, and mental objects in mental objects, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; having the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge.
35. "Those bhikkhus of mine, Ananda, who now or after I am gone, abide as an island unto themselves, as a refuge unto themselves, seeking no other refuge; having the Dhamma as their island and refuge, seeking no other refuge: it is they who will become the highest, 20 if they have the desire to learn."
The Buddha is here clearly referring to the transience of his existing nama-rupa individuality. He's saying this old cart is going to fall apart soon, using his own physical death as an object lesson on the unreliability of the khandhas which we remember are what? Anatta: not-self. In contrast, he says, be a refuge unto yourself (Self) by "overcoming desire and sorrow in regard to the world" ("The World" is defined in terms of aggregated experience, and is interchangeable with "sabbe dhamma," "Nama-rupa," "Sakkaya," and "the five khandhas" equally.). Also of note is the point that this is a teaching not only for a time when the teacher is absent, but is also a teaching for "Those bhikkhus of mine, Ananda, who now or after I am gone, abide as an island unto themselves..."
Now a note about this purported "mere" reflexivity. I feel that from my perspective the "merely reflexive" argument here willfully does not address a couple of important issues surrounding anatta. Let's look at them. Firstly that Self, if worthy at all of the word, is already to be recognized as reflexive. Going to the Dhammapada, the AttaVagga states "Atta is Lord of Atta," referring that one Self excercises a reflexivity, a self-determination, over itSElf. Well, one who adheres to the "merely reflexive" usage would stick to his guns at this and say that the AttaVagga of the Dhp is also only using the word in the conventional, "merely" reflexive sense. But we must duly note that the statement here cited from the Dhp is very heavily reminiscent of one of those criteria by which the khandhas are said to fail to pass muster in being called Self: specifically that: "Form, monks, is not self. If form were the self, this form would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' But precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'"
So the khandhas, individually or taken together, which a conventionalist interpreter who denies a transcendent Self would argue encompass the totality of man, by definition lack this fundamental soteriological (soteriological in that one who makes refuge of oneself "will become the highest"--and one could even say that without this capability there is no liberation from samsara) feature: that of self-determination, of reflexivity. We would have to ask how one can take refuge in oneself if there is in fact no Self and if the remaining totality of our being is fraught with the unsatisfactory feature of not having any reflexive, self-determining power (ie is actually incapable by definition of making a refuge of itself) to begin with. So the way I see it, the argument that the word is used in a merely conventional, reflexive sense sort of collapses in on itself in two ways, not by adhering to the teaching of anatta but actually by ignoring one of its key points.
In response to your post, Vac, I have always found the logic of the conventionalists to be fraught with implicit contradictions, especially with regard to the purpose of religion, itself, and the Buddha's own salvific mission.
Buddhism would not be amazing to any of the villagers in ancient India if he taught all is in vain. I can't imagine anyone praising his sagely reputation as one who teaches destruction. Nor can I imagine much of a need for a path if he taught anattâ or the same, the khandhas. Most, I think, would assume that nirvana is just death.
But then it doesn't make much sense to have a huge section of the Samyutta Nikaya devoted to the topic of the khandhas which stresses, ad nauseam, that the finite khandhas, which are impermanent and suffering, are not the self. In addition to this, the logic of this particular section is transparent: the five khandhas are refuted by the Buddha as being the self or atta.
From the Samyutta Nikaya iii. 45:
Bhikkhus, form is impermanent ... Feeling is impermanent ... Perception is impermanent ...Volitional formations are impermanent ... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is not a self (yam dukkham tad an-atta). What is not a self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self (netam mama, neso'hamasmi, na me so atta).
Nevertheless, I am not so naive to assume the conventionalists will allow themselves to open their minds to the logic of Khandhasamyutta section. If I can use this colloquialism, they have it "bassackwards". They are convinced that what is affirmed are the khandhas and what is to be rejected is the self. Naturally the consequences of such a viewpoint leads one, not to nirvana, but leads one, instead, to samsara. Almost by default, if we reject the self we have affirmed the sakaya, that is, I am this, the five khandhas which not only suffer, but are also the Buddhist devil, i.e., mara-khandhas!
Who's who, Genryu? (Dam, that rhymed! Must be something I can do with that.)
I can't figure it out because I don't know enough about AE or the subject at hand.
For this I'm pretty grateful. LOL!
I don't even know what the subject at hand is.
I'm just a little bored.
The old tactic of trying to make out that the Buddha taught some sort of transcendant self, using obscurist and mistranslated suttas and relying on people not knowing enough about Buddha Nature to confuse it with some sort of essence is the give away.
It gets kind of worry when people end up talking to themselves, in an effort to convince others that black is white. :rolleyesc
I'm not talking to myself. Who are you talking to?
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federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited March 2006
* He may be referring to Bobby Lanier's post.
The problem is when people get into long diatribes, and endless quotations, there's a danger that many 'switch off'. It becomes a discussion between two or maybe at a push, three people, and it frankly goes over the heads of many... the discussion invariably goes way off topic too, and it becomes a matter of semantics, translation and personal interpretation.
More often than not, the simple rules of the Eightfold Path are completely forgotten, and occasionally, these discussions have required Moderation....Sometimes these discussions would be better engaged in as PM's...... *
This is supposed to be an open discussion of the meaning of the term "anatta". I'm only trying to offer my own view and some of how I arrived at that view. Sometimes I feel like people come to a thread like this just to scoff at others' views, but that's not my intention at all. I realize that to come to the Buddhadhamma is not an easy thing, and it takes a lot of reflection and effort, and I can feel a great deal of affection for that in itself even if I don't share an individual's views. Returning to the theme of self-reliance, the Dhamma is something that each has to find in themselves. Now, I believe the Dhamma is one teaching with one intended meaning. But I respect very seriously that individuals' opinions and insights, especially about a very deep teaching like anatta, on either side of the aisle (and in the middle, of course), are probably quite hard-won, often years, sometimes decades in the making (sometimes, even, coming in a "flash"), so all I can do is say why I see things the way I do for my own sake without trying to trod down the strivings of others. I actually used to believe I understood the anatta teaching from the "no-self" point of view. But as I looked deeper inward, and more into the discourses of the Buddha, I found myself agreeing on a very intimate level with an emerging, more "Self-friendly" interpretation that I was beginning to see as a real possibility and now I feel reflects a very foundational truth for Buddhism. I was finding that for me this way of seeing the teachings cleared more of the way for me than what I was beginning to see as the (for me) unskillful contradictions of the "no-self" view. So I just offer some of my reasons, (mainly from the textual/rational side of it since its very difficult to communicate our innermost personal reasons) and if I find someone agreeing with it, or my thoughts on the subject helps clarify something for somebody, that's good. If not, okay. Why you don't respect this I don't know. But I guess I'm not looking for anybody's respect.
Thanks for the interesting discussion. I'm not writing this to close my participation in the thread but to try to step back and regain a perspective on how people will inevitably find themselves in strict polarity on this issue and the need for a continuing respectful attitude about the whole thing.
That was refreshing.
in friendliness,
V.
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federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited March 2006
We certainly have had 'scoffers' in the past, as you term them..., and my personal problem has been to distinguish between those who truly feel they have a lucid, valid and worthwhile contribution to make, and those who really are just looking for a verbal sparring or intellectual fisticuffs... all wrapped up in long quotations, personal viewpoints and carefully disguised inflammatory, and condescending remarks. As i remarked to someone elsewhere, from my inexperienced viewpoint, there is a huge difference between those who are able to contribute long and complex dharma-quotes, but to all intents and purposes, do not 'walk the talk', and those who are still in the embryonic stages of their Path, but do their best with Right Effort....
But I like your comments, and would be pleased if bearing everything in mind, you don't step too far back.
Vac, I remember a few years ago reading Walpola Rahula’s book What the Buddha Taught. I can’t say I was that impressed with his logic of anatta. To be sure, it was all too sectarian in which dogma rather than reason is called for.
In the history of the translation of the Pali canon into English, the early translators, who were in many respects quite gifted, held their judgment about the matter of ‘self’. Some, like C.A.F. Rhys Davids and I.B. Horner were adamant that, in fact, Gotama did not deny the self. Of course, nowadays, it is almost academic suicide to be a strong advocate of self theory, although Joaquin Perez-Remon comes to mind who did a hefty dissertation at the University of Bombay for his Doctor of Philosophy. The thesis tile was, The Anattavada in the Suttpitaka. It has, since that time, been published in an abridged work, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism.
I am sure our discussions have be disconcerting for some members who may not be aware of what is generally at stake if the current theory of anatta or no self is overturned. I am convinced it will not happen peacefully.
Over the years, I think there has been a huge investment among Western Buddhists in the dogma of no self or anatta. Unfortunately, it has been carelessly recontextualized into egoism which, in simplest terms, is synonymous with ‘self-interest’. In this light, we see self treated in popular Buddhist literature as a label by which to describe behavior which is non-altruistic. But self has never been used in this sense in Buddhism, at least never in the sense of ‘egotism’.
There is more than meets the eye in discussions about self and why it is so rejected by popular Buddhism. Personally, having read Baumeister’s book, Escaping the Self, it seems clear to me that there is an escapist element behind the rejection of self. Baumeister informs the reader that “the escapist is focused on immediate stimuli, and so it is preoccupied with concrete things. It stays on the surface of things rather than delving into deeper meanings, mysteries, implications, and contexts.”
I plan to pull back too from our discussions. I have to admit I have enjoyed them. I don’t have a good feeling about the present situation. It was not my intention to make others uncomfortable.
Love ya all,
Bobby
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federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited March 2006
I personally have not felt uncomfortable. Confused, at times, maybe, but not uncomfortable. I would not say your posts have made me feel that way either. I was describing the type of contributions which may not be constructive, but I was not referencing anyone in particular.
I'm further very sorry that you 'don't have a good feeling about the present situation.' I for one don't like anyone to feel that way about anything here.
Your last post made perfect sense, you see....And I can understand how the definition of 'Self' has become distorted in the West.... and I can see that this would be due to incorrect interpretation by those transmitting the Dharma, having perhaps themselves misinterpreted it before-hand. therefore I am also able to appreciate that the Dharma risks becoming watered-down or misconstrued....
Hence the difficulty for many in the West in finding reliable, suitable and 'Bona Fide' Teachers.....
Vac, I remember a few years ago reading Walpola Rahula’s book What the Buddha Taught. I can’t say I was that impressed with his logic of anatta. To be sure, it was all too sectarian in which dogma rather than reason is called for.
I'm sure Ven. Rahula is suitably chastened, along with all other recognised scholars and practitioners. What's being missed here is that it isn't just Ven. Rahula's view, it's what Buddhism teaches, like it or not, and what thousands of men and women have confirmed for themselves when they have come to awakening. You can argue as you like, you can cite outdated and obscure texts, mistranslate and just plain ignore the obvious, but you can't change the simple fact that there is no enduring self.
In the history of the translation of the Pali canon into English, the early translators, who were in many respects quite gifted, held their judgment about the matter of ‘self’. Some, like C.A.F. Rhys Davids and I.B. Horner were adamant that, in fact, Gotama did not deny the self.
LOL yes and they were lousy translators, far too attached to their own ideas of what the Buddha taught. This gets really tedious after a while.
From MN 22:
Alagaddupama Sutta
Translated from the Pali by
Nyanaponika Thera
Impermanence and Not-self
22. "You may well take hold of a possession, O monks, that is permanent, stable, eternal, immutable, that abides eternally the same in its very condition. (But) do you see, monks, any such possession?" — "No, Lord." — "Well, monks, I, too, do not see any such possession that is permanent, stable, eternal, immutable, that abides eternally the same in its very condition."
23. "You may well accept, monks, the assumption of a self-theory from the acceptance of which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. (But) do you see, monks, any such assumption of a self-theory?" — "No, Lord." — "Well, monks, I, too, do not see any such assumption of a self-theory from the acceptance of which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair."
24. "You may well rely, monks, on any supporting (argument) for views from the reliance on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair. (But) do you see, monks, any such supporting (argument) for views?" — "No, Lord." — "Well, monks, I, too, do not see any such supporting (argument) for views from the reliance on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair."
25. "If there were a self, monks, would there be my self's property?" — "So it is, Lord." — "Or if there is a self's property, would there by my self?" — "So it is, Lord." — "Since in truth and in fact, self and self's property do not obtain, O monks, then this ground for views, 'The universe is the Self. That I shall be after death; permanent, stable, eternal, immutable; eternally the same shall I abide, in that very condition' — is it not, monks, an entirely and perfectly foolish idea?" — "What else should it be, Lord? It is an entirely and perfectly foolish idea."
An alternate translation from Thanissaro Bhikkhu:
"Monks, you would do well to possess that possession, the possession of which would be constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change, that would stay just like that for an eternity. But do you see that possession, the possession of which would be constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change, that would stay just like that for an eternity?"
"No, lord."
"Very good, monks. I, too, do not envision a possession, the possession of which would be constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change, that would stay just like that for an eternity.
"Monks, you would do well to cling to that clinging to a doctrine of self, clinging to which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair. But do you see a clinging to a doctrine of self, clinging to which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair?"
"No, lord."
"Very good, monks. I, too, do not envision a clinging to a doctrine of self, clinging to which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair.
"Monks, you would do well to depend on a view-dependency (ditthi-nissaya), depending on which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair. But do you see a view-dependency, depending on which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair?"
"No, lord."
"Very good, monks. I, too, do not envision a view-dependency, depending on which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair.
"Monks, where there is a self, would there be [the thought,] 'belonging to my self'?"
"Yes, lord."
"Or, monks, where there is what belongs to self, would there be [the thought,] 'my self'?"
"Yes, lord."
"Monks, where a self or what belongs to self are not pinned down as a truth or reality, then the view-position — 'This cosmos is the self. After death this I will be constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change. I will stay just like that for an eternity' — Isn't it utterly & completely a fool's teaching?"
"What else could it be, lord? It's utterly & completely a fool's teaching."
Granted, you could simply argue that these are sectarian interpretations, but the translations seem to negate the buddha implying a self-position quite unequivocally. In other words, these would have to be MAJOR errors in translation OR major fudgings by the community of disciples including Maha Kashapa and so on. And I honestly don't see how we can see the later Indian Sutras to be more representative of what the Buddha actually said/taught than the Tipitaka. That is just my opinion though. And I'm just saying that "I don't see how".
Additionally, I would like to state that this is a difficult subject to debate because invariably we end up taking one position or the other on the self, and seem to be saying that either there is or isn't a self. Both positions are beside the point, IMO. What I personally am trying to argue is that the Buddha did not assert a Self-Doctrine. I would also say that the Buddha did not intend to set down a no-self doctrine which is annihilationist. The buddha himself declared his way to be between the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. He also basically said that pondering such matters to begin with is an incorrect approach.
The key here is to see what is, and penetrate the nature of what is thoroughly. What the buddha proclaimed in his own thorough penetration of 'what is' is that all form, perception, feelings, formations, and consciousnesses are impermanent, unsatisfactory and has no absolute reality. Hence 'Sabbe dhamma anatta', not just 'sabbe sankhara anatta'. This is where the doctrine of 'conditional (or dependent) co-arising' comes in as a fundamental insight of the buddha.
We do have the unborn, unconditioned, but we need not add any conceptual entanglement of 'Self' or 'no-self' to realize it.
Anyway, that's my take, and I am not wishing to stir things up too much. My main concern is based on past experience with a certain individual and his associates, coming onto boards under various guises disparaging the tipitaka and 'Nikaya views' as inferior, forged, incorrect and so on, also implying that Theravadans are nihilists. It is unfortunate that such disruptive individuals continually make their way onto forums after repeated banishments and compromise the integrity of discussion. I have reasons to believe that this is what is occuring now, though it may just be projection based on past experiences. I sincerely apologize for making implicit (though masked) accusations of this at Bobby Lanier (& perhaps towards Vacchagota by association), if I am wrong on these matters.
Comments
It is not really circular because I did not assert that attan comes to be through avijja. That ahamkara is an expression of ignorance does not really change "what" the attan is when free of such definitive clinging. It's also important to point out that you attributed the assumption of existent qualites without avijja to my view, but I never said that. What I'm trying to say is pretty much the opposite. that we can't pin those on attan, because those belong to the phenomenality which was given rise to through paticca samupada and are not intrinsic to Self but may be left behind (which is Nibbana). I am sure that most people will say "well, then it doesn't exist". But, face to face with how the Buddha defines various ditthi, particularly the annihilationist views, it's not an acceptable conclusion to my way of looking at it.
Important to remember that when we speculate back prior to avijja we're getting into "forbidden" territory. All kinds of confusion can ensue.
My main argument is that far too many Buddhists believe that the Buddha's teachings on anatta encourage them to adopt the views "I have no Self" "There is no Self" or "'Self' is only the aggregates which break up on death") by default when clearly and explicitly he discourages this conclusion.
A great number of Buddhists would take all that you had written in that last post and add a conclusion like "therefore, it's clear that the Buddha denied the Self and it's clear to me there is no Self".
All the Buddha taught is of suffering and the way to the freedom from suffering.
I mainly continued this discussion to make clear the meanings and intentions behind my previous posts. I simply felt that they were unclear to some, and hence taken out of context. My only goal was to attempt to fix that. Now that I feel confident that I have clarified my position to the best of my ability, you may make of it what you wish. I have no desire to prove myself 'right', or to prove my views as being 'correct'. If you find my words to be in error, then please do your best to correct them. As for myself, I am content that my current understanding is in line with the Dhamma, but I am taking the time to study the entire Samyutta Nikaya, so I am open to the possibility of it being otherwise. Until such time, however, what more can I offer?
Sincerely,
Jason
It helps here to be aware that the word which is here translated as "soul" is jiva, not attan. Jiva is probably most appropriately referred to as "vitality" or the perennially mysterious property of being alive.
For every statement of Buddha's that might suggest otherwise, there are many that are clear - there is no self.
=====================
I did say in an earlier talk that it's through wisdom power that you get very deep in meditation not through mere willpower and a little bit of insight, a little bit of understanding. Seeing this process from a different perspective has enormous power to quieten the mind down, and so I wanted to especially emphasise this in the latter part of this talk how anatta can be used in this process of meditation. But first of all, just the meaning of anatta should be apprehended by us and it's one of those subjects, or the subject in Buddhism, which to many people is very hard to understand and to get your mind around, and that by itself is a good point for insight to arise. Why in many parts of Buddhism when we come to the teaching of anatta there's something inside us which rebels? That is the illusion of self getting uncomfortable. This is stirring up something which is very deeply rooted inside us and something which does not want to even contemplate anatta, non-self, and that is a symptom of the whole problem. The Buddha was very uncompromising when he taught anatta and it's one of the reasons why people find it a bit difficult because there's no way around. When you read the Buddha's teachings, there's no way around coming to the conclusion that there is no-one in here. There is no controller. There is no knower. There is no doer. There is no self, no soul, no being. And this uncompromising conclusion which you get from looking at the teachings causes you to actually investigate because so much other teachings of the Buddha seem to be so powerful, so deep, so true, so effective, and this one, seems to be the hard one. It is the hard one because on the realisation of anatta, of uncovering the illusion of self that, the whole path towards enlightenment revolves. This is the insight, the discovery, the understanding which changes one from just being a person who wanders around the samsara, lifetime after lifetime, to one who is on the way out of the samsara, inevitably, certainly, surely bound for Nibbana. It's the crux, the fulcrum, of the whole practice. Why is it difficult to see? It's difficult to see because we don't want to see it, but at least we can get a handle on what the Buddha was talking about, because first of all that he asked you to not look at anatta from a philosophical point of view - which is one of the big mistakes as we intellectualise it - but to start looking at anatta from the practical point of view: how it affects our views, perceptions, thoughts, in particular, to look at what do we take to be a self, a soul, a me. And this is where we really get to grip with this teaching of anatta: how we use it. Instead of thinking "is there a self?" or "who am I?", you say "what do I perceive my self to be? What do I perceive is mine? What do I think is me? What do I think is mine? What do I know? What do I view as me? What do I view as mine?". And here the Buddha started taking apart this illusion bit by bit.
(Sorry for being offtopic, but I don't know where else to put it (or if I even should) and I've seen it before but never had any people to ask.)
"Inconstant > not-self" seems pretty obvious, but "unsatisfactory > not-self" just doesn't make any kind of sense at all to me. It's like saying "I need haircut, therefore the sofa cannot stand on one leg". :wtf:
Here we are talking about the 3 dharma seals, aka the 3 marks of existence, anicca (impermanent), dukkha (unsatisfactoriness) and anatta (not-self or without self). It seems to be regarded by the buddha that any working or meaningful definition of a 'self' implies permanence and that it is not subject to dukkha. What is being said here is that the aggregates do not meet these conditions, which would be necessary to be the considered 'self' in anything other than a provisional sense.
Also, saying that something is anatta means that it is without any fundamental or independent reality apart from conditions.
Does this help??
_/\_
metta
This is one of the main points to be understood in realization of the First Noble Truth. The tilakkhana (three characteristics of existence: dukkha, anicca, and anatta) are present in all conditioned things. The Buddha teaches that whatever is anicca (inconstant), that is whatever is subject to change and conditionality, is dukkha (stressful). To hold onto anything that is inconstant, subject to change, break-up, and dissolution is a cause for suffering. Why, then, would you want cling to something that is impermanent, and by it's very nature stressful, as a self? Perhaps listening to The Three Characteristics and The Five Aggregates by Thanissaro Bhikkhu might help to improve your understanding as to why the Buddha said:
Jason
I hope my comments on this detail could help you clarify for yourself why this statement (why what is dukkha cannot be considered "myself") is useful.
The way I understand it, this amounts to a practical teaching. Let's look at it. We say that what is impermanent is dukkha because, having clung to it, when it changes or is annihilated that causes pain for us...and even if the thing is temporarily stable, we have an anxiety for it based on its impermanence. But why is dukkha unacceptable as self? If (for instance) something is myself or necessarily pertaining to myself, but it is also dukkha in the way the aggregates are dukkha("unsatisfactory" is one choice of translation for dukkha: more popular is just "suffering"), then that would mean that no matter how hard I tried or what I did, I could never ever escape or eliminate suffering, because that suffering is necessarily part of who I really am. Since half of the four noble truths refer to the liberation from suffering, for the Buddha, such a notion is very unacceptable.
you wrote (emphasis mine):
"Here is a snip from an excellent talk - Using non-self to let goby Ajahn Brahmavamso. I bolded his clear statement that supports the traditional, correct view that there is no self. Ponder on it all.
For every statement of Buddha's that might suggest otherwise, there are many that are clear - there is no self."
In making the above statements you ignore or contradict Buddha's teaching such as the following:
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.
By the way you are stating your arguments, saying the 'I am the locus of Avijja', it appears you are stepping into that forbidden ground. Then, by the way I am stating my arguments, it sounds like I am saying there is no self prior to avijja.
The way I understand it is that 'self' and 'no-self' do not apply and are irrelevent to Awakening. They are provisional terms which apply to the mental formations skandha (samskara). Even the thought "I am" is a just a thought. Taking on the view of 'I am' indicates clinging to this mental formation, and is therefore a source of dukkha. The thought 'there is no self' is just a thought. Taking on the view of 'there is no self' indicates clinging to this mental formation, and is therefore also a source of dukkha.
It is also important to note that the buddha said holding to the view that 'there is no self' is worse than holding onto the view that 'there is a self'. Basically this whole argument is worthless if we are just using it to establish a view one way or the other, neither way, or both ways. Establishing a view of any sort is to misunderstand the teaching of anicca and dukkha, imo.
I have heard this analogy (in the context of Zen buddhism):
In eternalism they say 'there is a cat'.
In nihilism they say 'there is no cat'.
In Zen we say 'meow'.
Not a perfect analogy, but I still like it.
Anyway, just some thoughts.
take care
_/\_
metta
Along these same lines, I think it is important to understand that with regard to the pâtimokkha in primitive Buddhism that it may not be the same as is practiced today. A scholar would point out, for example, the treatment of the term patimokkha in the commentarial literature is not suggestive of a code which formulates and defines offenses against the regimen of the bhikkhave (cf. Udana Atthakatha 223—224). I think my point is that we might be doing an injustice with our assumptions about what is constitutive of ‘practice’.
Turning to your response in regards to ‘anatta’, I think there are clearly contexts where the implication is different from the more popular understanding of anatta especially with regard to ‘view’ (ditthi). I heartily agree with you that a permanent, everlasting self is not to be found where there is only impermanence and suffering. But I am strongly inclined to side with Pande’s analysis. For one reason, I see a great deal of apophasis in the Buddha’s instructions to his bhikkhave. This ties in with his treatment of the khandhas. From many passages I have read, it is all too clear that the khandhas are finite and woeful. The self, on the other hand, is never what the khandhas are. The Buddha says with regard to each one of them, “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self” (netam mama, neso'hamasmi, na me so atta).
I really don’t think self was the problem that concerned the Buddha of the Nikayas. I just don’t read that. What concerned the Buddha was the fact that beings (satto) find themselves living in an impermanent and unsatisfactory world; most notably clinging to the khandhas as if they were the true self in some way (i.e., eternalism). I have never, in my readings, stumbled across any passage in the Nikayas in which the self is treated as being synonymous with impermanence and suffering. It is always the five khandhas which are treated in a pejorative manner including calling them demon-aggregates (marakdhanda).
Turning to nirvana, it is transcendent. I don’t think this is in dispute. It is simply not of our world. This is evident in this marvelous passage from the Udana.
Nirvana is neither impermanent nor does it suffer. To realize it is to experience supreme bliss (nibbanam pramam sukham). This hardly denies an experiencer either.
Harking back to practice, the proper practice would be one which loosens our bonds to the khandhas so that we are not identified with them which is the base cause of suffering. Indeed, we might say as the Buddha once uttered, “na me so atta” discerning that the garment is not the true man.
Love ya all,
Bobby
It is remarkable that atta or self is not included in the three marks of conditioned existence. The obverse would also hold true that the unconditioned is everlasting, blissful and the self (attâ).
Love ya all,
Bobby
Have you been reading Coomaraswamy??
Expanded excerpt from earlier link
http://www.watflorida.org/What%20the%20Buddha%20Never%20Taught.htm
Sorry for the length all.
Hope this clears things up.
take care
_/\_
metta
P.S.-ever heard of www.attan.com, bobby?
"As he attends inappropriately in this way.." Why not back up a little in the quote and see what Buddha means by "inappropriate attention"? Even without studying the earlier parts of the sutta, logic would suggest that "appropriate attention" does exist and is useful.
Even if a verbal contradiction exists, I can live with it. When given a chance to follow modern scholars, quibblers and the underinformed (I do not mean anyone specifically) I will stick with Ajahns, sages and the general understanding shared by Buddhists of all types for the last 2000 plus years.
I can understand where, so to speak, you are coming from. Your comments I gather are intended to express one side of the problem with how scholars and clergy handle the khandhas and the self (attâ) in the various discourses of the Buddha. As you probably have realized, I have a different outlook than you and one which I strongly believe to be both logical and internally verifiable.
My roots, which stem from Christian mysticism, are wont to see mysticism everywhere in the Buddha's discourses. Not unlike Frederick Heiler, I see Buddhism as the only really consistent form of mysticism. How about generic mysticism? (It has a nice ring to it.)
Of the arguments you have troubled to post, I am familiar with them all. They are sectarian objections which really don't hold a lot of water with some scholars who read lots of books for a living and publish lots of stuff that gets peer reviewed the process of which can be harsh. Theravada bhantes are not given the same scrutiny. For a nice scholarly treatment of "dipa" you might enjoy this journal article by Peter Schalk at http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/10/schalk-sri-lanka-conf.html
If one is really serious about understanding what the Buddha really taught with regard to the self, it is advisable to distance oneself from the sectarian viewpoint or at least treat the arguments of the other side with some degree of academic seriousness. At this point, I have more faith in scholars than bhantes. But really I have more faith in my own capacity to reason and intuit. Both the self and the dhamma remain my light (dipa)..
Love ya all,
Bobby
I will take the word of Ajahn Chah and Bhikkhu Bodhi (who happens to be no lightweight in the scholarship department and holds up to plenty of 'scrutiny') over someone whom I cannot ascertain whether or not they've taken any time to actually sit and practice to any significant degree. Certainly though, a healthy sense of detachment and inquiry are important for approaching these matters, but I don't think anyone can be considered an expert on the correct interpretation of Tipitaka who doesn't put it into to practice.
Anyway, I am no scholar and will just have to say 'I don't know' on such matters. However, for now I will default to the Ajahns and, yes, even the Bhantes on these matters which as they don't just deal with speculation, and use the terms as expedient means. I guess I'll just have to take the risk of being a bit sectarian until I feel compelled to be otherwise.
BTW, for someone who can only consider themself an theologian, not a buddhist scholar, you seem to have quite a developed opinion on these matters and it is surprising that you are all too familiar with these arguments. BTW, your references to light and being influenced by Christian Mysticism reminds me of some of the posts of another member who is no longer here. I also share an affinity for the Gospel of Thomas, though I have found buddhism to be much more articulate in its approach, which suits my predisposition and also has more explicit directions as to actual practice.
Anyway, take care.
_/\_
metta
You wrote:
Can you not, as strongly, argue that it is immanent? or a subtending 'sea'?
It's nice to see I'm not the only one around here tending to this view. Your comments have been helpful.
Do keep in mind that suffering is just one translation of dukkha. It is also translated as unsatisfactory, meaning that it is not worth clinging to. I find this to be the most workable definition in regards to the dukkha as one of the 3 marks of existence. In this sense, we simply see conditioned phenomena as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self and do not cling to them as if they were otherwise. No false expectations or identifications.
Sorry if I was one of those making a mess of the answer. I still kind of suck at expressing my understanding sometimes.
_/\_
metta
P.S.- Thanks for linking that article B_Lanier, it was a good read, though I admit it was talking about a lot of things that I have not studied. As I side note I was told that dipa was used as island and the usage of dipa as light did not occur until later. Honestly, I don't really have enough Pali grammar knowledge to understand the distinctions. Anyway, take care.
Yes, I prefer unsatisfactory myself because it's more encompassing and perhaps more appropriate since suffering has the connotation of being something "extreme". Suffering is easier to spell though
Interesting stuff. I think it explains the issue quite well. And, the discussion of atta in this does seem to correspond with what I posted earlier. It indicates that attadipa means that must rely upon oneself, in the sense of oneself rather than someone else, not in any transcendental or brahmanical sense.
Take care
_/\_
metta
P.S.-Do you know why the author uses the word 'jina' to refer to the buddha here? I've never heard this term before anywhere.
P.P.S.- I have just looked up jina and it means 'one who has conquered desire'. Also, I was recently informed that dipa breaks down into 'di' (two or double) and 'pa' (water) implying the term island. Once again, it was reiterated that the translation into 'lamp' or 'light' was a later development. If you would like to show an alternative explanation as to how one should prefer to use 'light' to translate 'dipa' then I would certainly enjoy the read.
Linking this with your remarks with regard to attadipa, the immediate question of who we are can hardly be answered with "yourself" as the finite person. Rather, attadipa must be the buddhadhatu (buddha nature) which is infinite.
From a personal level, deep within each of us, through the many kleshas or sheaths of impurity, lies who we really are, the one who is free of all impurity and modification.
In making ourselves and the dharma our guiding light we are certainly going beyond (param) anything conditioned or finite. With our self and the dharma as our refuge, when facing the mortality of the khandhas, we have already given up our view that the carnal body can be a refuge.
By the way, I am not quite sure what you mean by the expression "brahmanical sense" in regard to the transcendent (paramartha). The word "brahma" is used to describe the Buddha, e.g., brahmabhuta (D. iii. 84). It is a widely used term in the canon. It is said in the canon, "tathagato...Brahmacakka.m pavattetti", that is, the "Tathagata turns the wheel of brahma." It is very seldom, if at all, used in a pejorative sense.
In a nut shell, to sum up my major idea, by making ourselves both light and refuge we are referring to our buddha nature, rather than the finite self which stands for the carnal person.
Love ya all,
Bobby
Nope, Buddha nature is not a substratum or an essence of any sort within.
If you want to consider the Mahaparinirvana sutra and Dr. Page as authoritative over the Pali Mahaparinibbana sutta, then fine. Or perhaps you prefer Coomaraswamy and the likes of AncientBuddhism of www.attan.com. Maybe you consider Ken Wheeler an excellent scholar. Heck, you may have even read the Authentic Dhammapada by Ven. Shakya Aryanatta (or maybe even authored it). If you want to mix Sanskrit and Pali together, then fine. But in regards to the passage I am referencing, atta signifies oneself in the reflexive. In other words, Not1Not2 as opposed to Bobby Lanier, rather than Not1Not2 as opposed to some infinite Self-nature. Additionally, the link you referenced supports this translation of atta, not yours. Referencing an transcendent atta or atman which you feel is implied in the Nirvana Sutras representation of Tathagathagarbha (sp?) to explain what was meant in the Pali sutta simply does not work. Additionally, you are relying on a Sutra translated by a buddhist best known for his authorship on Vegetarianism.
As far as the Brahmanical idea of Self, I have already referenced it with this quote:
If you want to go on arguing about semantics as applied to Vedantic thought in Buddha-contemporary India, do not expect me join in. I might, but I don't plan on it, as that is not my area of emphasis.
take care & be well
_/\_
metta
hope any of it is helpful!:
Discussion of Dukkha:
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.1:1:2641.pali
Discussion of Dipa(1):
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.1:1:2624.pali
Discussion of Dipa(2):
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.1:1:2625.pali
Discussion of Dipa(3):
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.1:1:2626.pali
Where we may have some disagreement is over the extent to which attadipa and attasarana are to be taken as transcendent in which oneself is to be taken as the light and the refuge.
I think some would argue that salvation from the pain of samsara, of which all of us are aware, is impossible without one who is liberated.
The theory that the Buddha, before he died, told is most devoted followers the light and the refuge are temporal is difficult to accept on any religious grounds. This would be, in a way, implicitly recognizing that the death instinct (thanatos) of Freud has been fulfilled. But this position lands us in annihilationism in which man is considered to be the sum of his biological parts, so to speak.
I am of the opinion that some sectarian Buddhism is pretty much of a misunderstanding about the role of self with respect to pain and the path leading to liberation from pain.
I have found evidence to point to a confusion between self (attâ) and asmi mâno (including sakkaya), which can be rendered in English as individuality. Most notably, individuality has clear reference to the khandhas. The self, on the other hand, lacks such reference in which a khandha is said to be the self.
Love ya all,
Bobby
I already said what I have to say on this. There is atta in the reflexive sense, and atta in the transcendent/brahmanical sense. Here, scholarship agrees that atta indicates the reflexive (in the attadipa, dhammadipa passage). Also, see the above quote. I hope you don't mind these Nikaya references.
_/\_
metta
I think there is a further context to be seen in the Mahaparinibbanasutta for this notion of Self as refuge (either as island or as light). The context we mainly see discussed is the physical death of the Buddha and the community of monks, who have taken refuge in him as their teacher, face to face primarily with his impending absence and wondering what they are going to do without him.
I agree that clearly, this is a major theme of the discourse, but if we look at the immediate context of the "attadipa" passage we can see another point being made:
The Buddha is here clearly referring to the transience of his existing nama-rupa individuality. He's saying this old cart is going to fall apart soon, using his own physical death as an object lesson on the unreliability of the khandhas which we remember are what? Anatta: not-self. In contrast, he says, be a refuge unto yourself (Self) by "overcoming desire and sorrow in regard to the world" ("The World" is defined in terms of aggregated experience, and is interchangeable with "sabbe dhamma," "Nama-rupa," "Sakkaya," and "the five khandhas" equally.). Also of note is the point that this is a teaching not only for a time when the teacher is absent, but is also a teaching for "Those bhikkhus of mine, Ananda, who now or after I am gone, abide as an island unto themselves..."
Now a note about this purported "mere" reflexivity. I feel that from my perspective the "merely reflexive" argument here willfully does not address a couple of important issues surrounding anatta. Let's look at them. Firstly that Self, if worthy at all of the word, is already to be recognized as reflexive. Going to the Dhammapada, the AttaVagga states "Atta is Lord of Atta," referring that one Self excercises a reflexivity, a self-determination, over itSElf. Well, one who adheres to the "merely reflexive" usage would stick to his guns at this and say that the AttaVagga of the Dhp is also only using the word in the conventional, "merely" reflexive sense. But we must duly note that the statement here cited from the Dhp is very heavily reminiscent of one of those criteria by which the khandhas are said to fail to pass muster in being called Self: specifically that: "Form, monks, is not self. If form were the self, this form would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' But precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'"
So the khandhas, individually or taken together, which a conventionalist interpreter who denies a transcendent Self would argue encompass the totality of man, by definition lack this fundamental soteriological (soteriological in that one who makes refuge of oneself "will become the highest"--and one could even say that without this capability there is no liberation from samsara) feature: that of self-determination, of reflexivity. We would have to ask how one can take refuge in oneself if there is in fact no Self and if the remaining totality of our being is fraught with the unsatisfactory feature of not having any reflexive, self-determining power (ie is actually incapable by definition of making a refuge of itself) to begin with. So the way I see it, the argument that the word is used in a merely conventional, reflexive sense sort of collapses in on itself in two ways, not by adhering to the teaching of anatta but actually by ignoring one of its key points.
in friendliness,
V.
Buddhism would not be amazing to any of the villagers in ancient India if he taught all is in vain. I can't imagine anyone praising his sagely reputation as one who teaches destruction. Nor can I imagine much of a need for a path if he taught anattâ or the same, the khandhas. Most, I think, would assume that nirvana is just death.
But then it doesn't make much sense to have a huge section of the Samyutta Nikaya devoted to the topic of the khandhas which stresses, ad nauseam, that the finite khandhas, which are impermanent and suffering, are not the self. In addition to this, the logic of this particular section is transparent: the five khandhas are refuted by the Buddha as being the self or atta.
Nevertheless, I am not so naive to assume the conventionalists will allow themselves to open their minds to the logic of Khandhasamyutta section. If I can use this colloquialism, they have it "bassackwards". They are convinced that what is affirmed are the khandhas and what is to be rejected is the self. Naturally the consequences of such a viewpoint leads one, not to nirvana, but leads one, instead, to samsara. Almost by default, if we reject the self we have affirmed the sakaya, that is, I am this, the five khandhas which not only suffer, but are also the Buddhist devil, i.e., mara-khandhas!
Love ya all,
Bobby
I can't figure it out because I don't know enough about AE or the subject at hand.
For this I'm pretty grateful. LOL!
I don't even know what the subject at hand is.
I'm just a little bored.
You point out the quick sand and I avoid it.
But soon I'll be able to tell by myself, maybe. LOL.
Brigid
I'm not talking to myself. Who are you talking to?
The problem is when people get into long diatribes, and endless quotations, there's a danger that many 'switch off'. It becomes a discussion between two or maybe at a push, three people, and it frankly goes over the heads of many... the discussion invariably goes way off topic too, and it becomes a matter of semantics, translation and personal interpretation.
More often than not, the simple rules of the Eightfold Path are completely forgotten, and occasionally, these discussions have required Moderation....Sometimes these discussions would be better engaged in as PM's...... *
Thanks for the interesting discussion. I'm not writing this to close my participation in the thread but to try to step back and regain a perspective on how people will inevitably find themselves in strict polarity on this issue and the need for a continuing respectful attitude about the whole thing.
That was refreshing.
in friendliness,
V.
But I like your comments, and would be pleased if bearing everything in mind, you don't step too far back.
Nice post, V. Thanks.
In the history of the translation of the Pali canon into English, the early translators, who were in many respects quite gifted, held their judgment about the matter of ‘self’. Some, like C.A.F. Rhys Davids and I.B. Horner were adamant that, in fact, Gotama did not deny the self. Of course, nowadays, it is almost academic suicide to be a strong advocate of self theory, although Joaquin Perez-Remon comes to mind who did a hefty dissertation at the University of Bombay for his Doctor of Philosophy. The thesis tile was, The Anattavada in the Suttpitaka. It has, since that time, been published in an abridged work, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism.
I am sure our discussions have be disconcerting for some members who may not be aware of what is generally at stake if the current theory of anatta or no self is overturned. I am convinced it will not happen peacefully.
Over the years, I think there has been a huge investment among Western Buddhists in the dogma of no self or anatta. Unfortunately, it has been carelessly recontextualized into egoism which, in simplest terms, is synonymous with ‘self-interest’. In this light, we see self treated in popular Buddhist literature as a label by which to describe behavior which is non-altruistic. But self has never been used in this sense in Buddhism, at least never in the sense of ‘egotism’.
There is more than meets the eye in discussions about self and why it is so rejected by popular Buddhism. Personally, having read Baumeister’s book, Escaping the Self, it seems clear to me that there is an escapist element behind the rejection of self. Baumeister informs the reader that “the escapist is focused on immediate stimuli, and so it is preoccupied with concrete things. It stays on the surface of things rather than delving into deeper meanings, mysteries, implications, and contexts.”
I plan to pull back too from our discussions. I have to admit I have enjoyed them. I don’t have a good feeling about the present situation. It was not my intention to make others uncomfortable.
Love ya all,
Bobby
I'm further very sorry that you 'don't have a good feeling about the present situation.' I for one don't like anyone to feel that way about anything here.
Your last post made perfect sense, you see....And I can understand how the definition of 'Self' has become distorted in the West.... and I can see that this would be due to incorrect interpretation by those transmitting the Dharma, having perhaps themselves misinterpreted it before-hand. therefore I am also able to appreciate that the Dharma risks becoming watered-down or misconstrued....
Hence the difficulty for many in the West in finding reliable, suitable and 'Bona Fide' Teachers.....
Thanks for coming back.
I'm sure Ven. Rahula is suitably chastened, along with all other recognised scholars and practitioners. What's being missed here is that it isn't just Ven. Rahula's view, it's what Buddhism teaches, like it or not, and what thousands of men and women have confirmed for themselves when they have come to awakening. You can argue as you like, you can cite outdated and obscure texts, mistranslate and just plain ignore the obvious, but you can't change the simple fact that there is no enduring self.
LOL yes and they were lousy translators, far too attached to their own ideas of what the Buddha taught. This gets really tedious after a while.
-bf
I like a arguement as much as the next man. However, I am completely lost.............What are you all talking about.
Idiot guide please.
HH
No you don't. You know exactly what they're talking about.
-bf
Alagaddupama Sutta
Translated from the Pali by
Nyanaponika Thera
An alternate translation from Thanissaro Bhikkhu:
Granted, you could simply argue that these are sectarian interpretations, but the translations seem to negate the buddha implying a self-position quite unequivocally. In other words, these would have to be MAJOR errors in translation OR major fudgings by the community of disciples including Maha Kashapa and so on. And I honestly don't see how we can see the later Indian Sutras to be more representative of what the Buddha actually said/taught than the Tipitaka. That is just my opinion though. And I'm just saying that "I don't see how".
Additionally, I would like to state that this is a difficult subject to debate because invariably we end up taking one position or the other on the self, and seem to be saying that either there is or isn't a self. Both positions are beside the point, IMO. What I personally am trying to argue is that the Buddha did not assert a Self-Doctrine. I would also say that the Buddha did not intend to set down a no-self doctrine which is annihilationist. The buddha himself declared his way to be between the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. He also basically said that pondering such matters to begin with is an incorrect approach.
The key here is to see what is, and penetrate the nature of what is thoroughly. What the buddha proclaimed in his own thorough penetration of 'what is' is that all form, perception, feelings, formations, and consciousnesses are impermanent, unsatisfactory and has no absolute reality. Hence 'Sabbe dhamma anatta', not just 'sabbe sankhara anatta'. This is where the doctrine of 'conditional (or dependent) co-arising' comes in as a fundamental insight of the buddha.
We do have the unborn, unconditioned, but we need not add any conceptual entanglement of 'Self' or 'no-self' to realize it.
Anyway, that's my take, and I am not wishing to stir things up too much. My main concern is based on past experience with a certain individual and his associates, coming onto boards under various guises disparaging the tipitaka and 'Nikaya views' as inferior, forged, incorrect and so on, also implying that Theravadans are nihilists. It is unfortunate that such disruptive individuals continually make their way onto forums after repeated banishments and compromise the integrity of discussion. I have reasons to believe that this is what is occuring now, though it may just be projection based on past experiences. I sincerely apologize for making implicit (though masked) accusations of this at Bobby Lanier (& perhaps towards Vacchagota by association), if I am wrong on these matters.
take care all
_/\_
metta