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If you were to meet, I would like to think that you would embrace one another, and continue your discussions side by side.... and you'd take a walk together in the courtyard, walking round and round, deep in conversation and discussion, your heads together, your arm alternately moving to emphasise, through gestures, your salient point... and you'd be oblivious to all and sundry, and to the passing of time, and ultimately, you would wear a perfect circular path, at least three inches beneath ground level, and others would marvel at the intensity, yet friendliness of your discussion.....
As I am truly not scholarly enough to contribute to this discussion constructively, so permit the mind wandering in this fashion, while I watch, and try to learn, at least - !!
By the way, the words we are using is not really the main content being exchanged here. While we may appear to be going in circles, we are actually exploring each other's realization and sharing it with each other. And while we apparently circle round each other, we are actually coming to a greater understanding of our own positions.
Brigid,
Thank you for the invitation! When I have the time, I'll get out and stretch my legs a little. It's just that this topic has been so engrossing, and my time is limited!
O.K. Well, whenever you feel like it and have the time. We have some interesting stuff going on that might interest you and you could meet some of the other people. I know I'm biased but they're a very cool lot! LOL! I'm sure you'd like them.
Well, finally I'm taking the time out to jot down a few quick comments on the article "What the Buddha Never Taught" by By Khantichayo Bhikkhu
To start with, I'm not going to comment on any of the specifically Vedantic notions discussed at the beginning of the article. Such an examination could be useful in a thread about comparative philosophy, but for the purposes of this thread and as a devotee of Buddhism I view the teachings of the Buddha as a coherent whole without the need for reliance on other doctrines. Besides that, I'm quite inexpert in Vedanta, and barely know the first thing. I'd also like to stress that I'm not specifically speaking for any of the scholars the article points out, to avoid the necessity of quoting them or attempting to fairly represent their views. I'd like therefore to concentrate on a few problems I see in the Ven. Bhikkhu's arguments against Self in general.
The first objection I would make has been a theme of this entire thread, revisited a number of times so it need only be briefly be reiterated here. Ven. Khantichayo mentions the three marks(ti lakkhana) briefly in the context of the four noble truths, and obviously the one he wants to discuss and introduce is anatta. I believe he misdefines anatta, making the common mistake of over-generalizing (thus absolutizing and universalizing) the term glossing over its purely predicative value in favor of a total denial of Self altogether. Compare his definition of anatta (an outright denial of Self):
"Not-Self; realising that because all things are inconstant, there likewise is no constant “I” or “Mine”, eternal self or witness of the experience"
to the entirely predicative use of the word given by the Buddha (S iii. 196 Radhasamyutta 17: anatta):
"It is said, Venerable sir, 'nonself, nonself'. What now, venerable sir, is nonself?" "Form, Radha, is nonself, feeling is nonself, perception is nonself, volitional formations are nonself, consciousness is nonself. Seeing thus...He understands:...'There is no more for this state of existence.'"
The former is based on inference, and clearly the forthcoming maneuvers the author makes are all necessary to justify this inference. This is the point where the author loses some of his clarity. It begins immediately, when he discusses the famous sutta where in Vacchagotta asks the Buddha on the existence or non-existence of Self, meeting with silence. He writes:
Buddha was perhaps silent in this case out of compassion. However, the Buddha did teach anattá throughout his career… not in a negative, nihilistic way of 'non-reality', but rather by showing 'why it is' and how to see it integrated positively in the law of kamma ~ cause and effect, directing the contemplative ~ “When you see with detachment, All fabrications are inconstant…” naturally leads one to the wisdom that “...All fabrications are suffering…” ~ because of unawareness and attachment resulting in self-identification with the changing events, realization of which leads the mind to release of attachment through restraint, leading to pure awareness, seeing that ~ “...All Phenomena are not-self...” , the direct realization of the impossibility of an everlasting anything, self or witness.
Firstly, he writes as if this sutta does not teach anatta. The fact is, it does, only it mentions anatta in its rightly predicative sense, rather than the author's preferred absolute sense:
If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"
. When the author writes "not in a negative, nihilistic way of 'non-reality'" I find it quite difficult to see how this is not a contradiction of his former assertion "there likewise is no constant “I” or “Mine”, eternal self or witness of the experience" or his conclusion "the impossibility of an everlasting anything, self or witness." Is he not in truth declaring the non-reality of self in a negative way?
He then addresses some specific views by authors I won't go into here, but I would like to address his comments on the attavagga of the dhammapada. He writes:
In the philosophical context of this line ‘Attá’ does not mean Self/soul in the Brahmanical sense, but rather in the common usage as a reflexive pronoun to mean ‘oneself’. Also, ‘nátho’ does not mean ‘lord’ but as ‘protector’, ‘refuge’ or ‘support’ instead. Thus translating “Attá hi attano nátho” as “One indeed is the protector of oneself” or “One indeed is ones own support”, which is followed by, “ko hi nátho paro siyá?” meaning, “who else could the protector (support) be?”.
Now, to begin with, rather than citing some grammatical cue (that, I'm guessing, does not exist) that here specifically the 'atta' is supposed to be read as a merely conventional reflexive pronoun, he makes the question-begging assertion that the "philosophical context" is the reason. Well, it's the "philosophical context" which leads others (myself included) to see this as an affirmation of the "Self" which every other thing is not (anatta). He then plays a shell game with the issue, haggling over the translation of the word "natho" as rather protector/refuge/support than lord. This correction is all well and good, but it serves the author to take our attention away from the fact that the word "atta" is indeed in use here, and verily does nothing to change the positive character of the passage, nor the contrast such words all highlight against the three marks which plague this individuality knowable only by the five khandhas (and invariably described as not-self, never self, and would never be called a protector, refuge) and which Ven. Khantichayo would like us to believe the Buddha is here referring to as self. He caps it off by noting
Finally, the last line of this verse confirms the intended meaning of the whole: “attaná hi sudantena, nátham labhati dullabham.” which means, “With oneself fully controlled (sudantena), one gains a mastery that is hard to gain.”, Dhammapada 12 represents a standard theme found throughout Buddhist doctrine; The Buddha often admonished people to rely on themselves, on their own effort in terms of their contemplative practice.
Which seems to ignore the basic issue here. In denying Self in the Buddha's teaching, one really has to fall back on the notion that a person is nothing more than a collection of the five aggregates. What this intepretation of this passage ignores, in proclaiming self-mastery for such a "bundleman", so to speak, is the following teaching of the Buddha giving the reasons for proclaiming the khandhas to be not-self which it would be helpful to bear well in mind:
If consciousness were the self, this consciousness would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, 'Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.' But precisely because consciousness is not self, consciousness lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, 'Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.'--S iii 66 anatta lakkhana
Thus we are instructed that the khandhas are defined as not-self partly in the very lack of self-mastery which Khantichayo is here saying can be achieved by the person of the khandhas (the everyday 'self' identified only by the khandhas). The interpretation is unacceptable at least on the grounds which Khantichayo gives.
Back to the shell game with the next point the author discusses, the also famous passage of the Mahaparibbana sutta referring to atta as refuge. Obviously, Khantichayo maintains the same interpretation of "atta" as above. And again, he wants to haggle over translation of a word: "dipa" as island rather than light. Notwithstanding some slight ambiguity over the proper translation, the connotative meaning, since we can accept as quite possible that "island" is correct, remains similar to that discussed above: island as refuge from the flood of samsara, in other words, something above and safe from the water, solid ground on which one can depend. The Buddha can't here be suggesting that the individual personality, knowable as the five aggregates, which are ever in change and defined by the three marks, can relied on as solid ground, as safe refuge, nor that they can be made to become so. In the Buddha's discourse, to define something that is recognizably transitory, and subject to dissolution as a refuge would be highly anachronistic and opposite to the insistent motif of his teaching.
He goes on with the shell game in discussing the rest of the passage, this time by slight of hand palming the ball so that when all three cups are lifted, it appears to be gone altogether:
Again there is no mention of attán ~ Self as refuge.
Seeming to hope that our attention span is so brief that we would forget that the entire passage is about self as refuge and indeed opens up with the phrase, the occasion for his argument in the first place. The Buddha defines for us how one goes having self as refuge (by overcoming desire and sorrow with regard to the world --which we of course remember is not-self), but he does so, as we all learned to define things, without tautology. by saying "again no mention of Self as refuge", Khantichayo seems to want us to illogically think that just because the Buddha does not use a tautology in his definition, that somehow atta must be interpreted as a merely conventional reference to the individual personality known, as said before, by the five khandhas and not possibly as a transcendent Self. Let's be thankful that our dictionaries, like the Buddha in this instance, avoid this manner of defining concepts.
The rest of the article is basically nothing more than a quoting of passages which Khantichayo will hope the reader will have gotten the gist of interpreting as denying self altogether. Some of the issues addressed in those quotes have been discussed in this thread, including how sassatavada is defined.
The issue has already been covered, but it is worth mentioning again, that when Khantichayo asserts Nibbana is included in Sabbe Dhamma, he is assuming as established an issue that is at least at controversy. (see link below at paragraph end) Not only this, but he requires himself, in maintaining such an interpretation, to gloss on the actual phrasing and slip exegetical help not only into the translation but into the original Pali as well. The actual pali phrasing is "sabbe dhamma anatta''ti", but the author finds it necessary to add the qualifying suffix: he suggests what it really means to say is "dhamma-nijjivata". Then, in his translation, he sees fit to add to the word "things" the parenthetical commentary unsupported not only by the actual text in question, but also significantly at odds with the neatly and clearly defined scope of sabbe dhamma per the sabba sutta of "manifest or unmanifest". For an alternative discussion of the issue, see Thanissaro Bhikkhu's --Thanissaro can hardly be accused of being a crypto-vedantist-- translation of the Sabba Sutta and especially his notes: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-023.html .
I would like to conclude by focusing on the passage from S ii.96 (lump of cowdung). It's worth mentioning that this is the khandhavagga, forming the khandhas as the context and subject of suttas contained therein. The passage says:
“...Monk, there is no materiality whatsoever, no feeling…no perception…no formations of the mind…no consciousness whatsoever that is permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging or identically abiding for eternity.
Then the Bleesed One took up a bit of cowdung in his hand and said to that monk: “Monk, there is not even this much of permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging individual self-existence (attabháva), identically abiding for eternity. If even this much of permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging individual self-existence, identically abiding for eternity could be found, then this living the renounced life for the eradication of suffering would not be conceivable. But because there is not even this much of permanent, everlasting, eternal, unchanging individual self-existence, identically abiding for eternity, this living the renounced life for the eradication of suffering is conceivable...”
the words of which I couldn't agree with more, only the author wants the reader to forget that in the first part of the passage the point of reference is clearly established as the khandhas (of which we always remember the three marks), and to simply not know that the word "attabhava" does not carry the same meaning as simple "atta". "attabhava" refers, rather than to any possible atta that may transcend the existing creature, to the specific existing personality as distinct from others, past, future (one's own, former and future births) and current (that of others); the living creature, form, appearance. Compare to sanskrit equivalent "atmabhava" which means body.
ref. http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.0:1:533.pali
When "attabhava" remains unglossed, the meaning of the passage is clear: The Buddha's teaching would not be conceivable (nor even necessary) if our present form were eternal.
Those are the main points I've been wanting to respond to. Based on them I found the article to be rather unsatisfactory as an attempted clarification of the issue.
Vedanta and Buddhism
A Comparative Study
Selected essays edited by
Helmuth von Glasenapp
...
After these introductory remarks we shall now discuss systematically the relation of original Buddhism and Vedanta.
(1) First of all we have to clarify to what extent a knowledge of Upanishadic texts may be assumed for the canonical Pali scriptures. The five old prose Upanishads are, on reasons of contents and language, generally held to be pre-Buddhistic. The younger Upanishads, in any case those beginning from Maitrayana, were certainly written at a time when Buddhism already existed.
The number of passages in the Pali Canon dealing with Upanishadic doctrines, is very small. It is true that early Buddhism shares many doctrines with the Upanishads (Karma, rebirth, liberation through insight), but these tenets were so widely held in philosophical circles of those times that we can no longer regard the Upanishads are the direct source from which the Buddha has drawn. The special metaphysical concern of the Upanishads, the identity of the individual and the universal Atman, has been mentioned and rejected only in a few passages in the early Buddhist texts, for instance in the saying of the Buddha quoted earlier. Nothing shows better the great distance that separates the Vedanta and the teachings of the Buddha, than the fact that the two principal concepts of Upanishadic wisdom, Atman and Brahman, do not appear anywhere in the Buddhist texts, with the clear and distinct meaning of a "primordial ground of the world, core of existence, ens realissimum (true substance)," or similarly. As this holds likewise true for the early Jaina literature, one must assume that early Vedanta was of no great importance in Magadha, at the time of the Buddha and the Mahavira; otherwise the opposition against if would have left more distinct traces in the texts of these two doctrines.
(2) It is of decisive importance for examining the relation between Vedanta and Buddhism, clearly to establish the meaning of the words atta and anatta in Buddhist literature.
The meaning of the word attan (nominative: atta, Sanskrit: atman, nominative: atma) divides into two groups: (1) in daily usage, attan ("self") serves for denoting one's own person, and has the function of a reflexive pronoun. This usage is, for instance, illustrated in the 12th Chapter of the Dhammapada. As a philosophical term attan denotes the individual soul as assumed by the Jainas and other schools, but rejected by the Buddhists. This individual soul was held to be an eternal unchangeable spiritual monad, perfect and blissful by nature, although its qualities may be temporarily obscured through its connection with matter. Starting from this view held by the heretics, the Buddhists further understand by the term "self" (atman) any eternal, unchangeable individual entity, in other words, that which Western metaphysics calls a "substance": "something existing through and in itself, and not through something else; nor existing attached to, or inherent in, something else." In the philosophical usage of the Buddhists, attan is, therefore, any entity of which the heretics wrongly assume that it exists independently of everything else, and that it has existence on its own strength.
The word anattan (nominative: anatta) is a noun (Sanskrit: anatma) and means "not-self" in the sense of an entity that is not independent. The word anatman is found in its meaning of "what is not the Soul (or Spirit)," also in brahmanical Sanskrit sources (Bhagavadgita, 6,6; Shankara to Brahma Sutra I, 1, 1, Bibl, Indica, p 16; Vedantasara Section 158). Its frequent use in Buddhism is accounted for by the Buddhist' characteristic preference for negative nouns. Phrases like rupam anatta are therefore to be translated "corporeality is a not-self," or "corporeality is not an independent entity."
As an adjective, the word anattan (as occasionally attan too; see Dhammapada 379; Geiger, Pali Lit., Section 92) changes from the consonantal to the a-declension; anatta (see Sanskrit anatmaka, anatmya), e.g., Samyutta 22, 55, 7 PTS III p. 56), anattam rupam... anatte sankare... na pajanati ("he does not know that corporeality is without self,... that the mental formations are without self"). The word anatta is therefore, to be translated here by "not having the nature of a self, non-independent, without a (persisting) self, without an (eternal) substance," etc. The passage anattam rupam anatta rupan ti yathabhutam na pajanati has to be rendered: "With regard to corporeality having not the nature of a self, he does not know according to truth, 'Corporeality is a not-self (not an independent entity).'" The noun attan and the adjective anatta can both be rendered by "without a self, without an independent essence, without a persisting core," since the Buddhists themselves do not make any difference in the use of these two grammatical forms. This becomes particularly evident in the case of the word anatta, which may be either a singular or a plural noun. In the well-known phrase sabbe sankhara anicca... sabbe dhamma anatta (Dhp. 279), "all conditioned factors of existence are transitory... all factors existent whatever (Nirvana included) are without a self," it is undoubtedly a plural noun, for the Sanskrit version has sarve dharma anatmanah.
The fact that the Anatta doctrine only purports to state that a dharma is "void of a self," is evident from the passage in the Samyutta Nikaya (35, 85; PTS IV, p.54) where it is said rupa sunna attena va attaniyenava, "forms are void of a self (an independent essence) and of anything pertaining to a self (or 'self-like')."
Where Guenther has translated anattan or anatta as "not the self," one should use "a self" instead of "the self," because in the Pali Canon the word atman does not occur in the sense of "universal soul."
(3) It is not necessary to assume that the existence of indestructible monads is a necessary condition for a belief in life after death. The view that an eternal, immortal, persisting soul substance is the conditio sine qua non of rebirth can be refuted by the mere fact that not only in the older Upanishads, but also in Pythagoras and Empedocles, rebirth is taught without the assumption of an imperishable soul substance.
(4) Guenther can substantiate his view only through arbitrary translations which contradict the whole of Buddhist tradition. This is particularly evident in those passages where Guenther asserts that "the Buddha meant the same by Nirvana and atman" and that "Nirvana is the true nature of man." For in Udana 8,2, Nirvana is expressly described as anattam, which is rightly rendered by Dhammapala's commentary (p. 21) as atta-virahita (without a self), and in Vinaya V, p. 86, Nirvana is said to be, just as the conditioned factors of existence (sankhata), "without a self" (p. 151). Neither can the equation atman=nirvana be proved by the well-known phrase attadipa viharatha, dhammadipa, for, whether dipa here means "lamp" or "island of deliverance," this passage can, after all, only refer to the monks taking refuge in themselves and in the doctrine (dhamma),and attan and dhamma cannot possibly be interpreted as Nirvana. In the same way, too, it is quite preposterous to translate Dhammapada 160, atta hi attano natho as "Nirvana is for a man the leader" (p. 155); for the chapter is concerned only with the idea that we should strive hard and purify ourselves. Otherwise Guenther would have to translate in the following verse 161, attana va katam papam attajam attasambhavam: "By Nirvana evil is done, it arises out of Nirvana, it has its origin in Nirvana." It is obvious that this kind of interpretation must lead to manifestly absurd consequences.
(5) As far as I can see there is not a single passage in the Pali Canon where the word atta is used in the sense of the Upanishadic Atman.1 This is not surprising, since the word atman, current in all Indian philosophical systems, has the meaning of "universal soul, ens realissimum, the Absolute," exclusively in the pan-en-theistic and theopantistic Vedanta, but, in that sense, it is alien to all other brahmanical and non-Buddhist doctrines. Why, then, should it have a Vedantic meaning in Buddhism? As far as I know, no one has ever conceived the idea of giving to the term atman a Vedantic interpretation, in the case of Nyaya, Vaisesika, classical Sankhya, Yoga, Mimamsa, or Jainism.
(6) The fact that in the Pali Canon all worldly phenomena are said to be anatta has induced some scholars of the West to look for an Atman in Buddhism. For instance, the following "great syllogism" was formulated by George Grimm: "What I perceive to arise and to cease, and to cause suffering to me, on account of that impermanence, cannot be my ego. Now I perceive that everything cognizable in me and around me, arises and ceases, and causes me suffering on account of its impermanence. Therefore nothing cognizable is my ego." From that Grimm concludes that there must be an eternal ego-substance that is free from all suffering, and above all cognizability. This is a rash conclusion. By teaching that there is nowhere in the world a persisting Atman, the Buddha has not asserted that there must be a transcendental Atman (i.e., a self beyond the world). This kind of logic resembles that of a certain Christian sect which worships its masters as "Christs on earth," and tries to prove the simultaneous existence of several Christs from Mark 13,22, where it is said: "False Christs and false prophets shall arise"; for, if there are false Christs, there must also be genuine Christs!
The denial of an imperishable Atman is common ground for all systems of Hinayana as well as Mahayana, and there is, therefore, no reason for the assumption that Buddhist tradition, unanimous on that point, has deviated from the original doctrine of the Buddha. If the Buddha, contrary to the Buddhist tradition, had actually proclaimed a transcendental Atman, a reminiscence of it would have been preserved somehow by one of the older sects. It is remarkable that even the Pudgalavadins, who assume a kind of individual soul, never appeal to texts in which an Atman in this sense is proclaimed. He who advocates such a revolutionary conception of the Buddha's teachings, has also the duty to show evidence how such a complete transformation started and grew, suddenly or gradually. But non of those who advocate the Atta-theory has taken to comply with that demand which is indispensable to a historian.
(7) In addition to the aforementioned reasons, there are other grounds too, which speak against the supposition that the Buddha has identified Atman and Nirvana. It remains quite incomprehensible why the Buddha should have used this expression which is quite unsuitable for Nirvana and would have aroused only wrong associations in his listeners. Though it is true that Nirvana shares with the Vedantic conception of Atman the qualification of eternal peace into which the liberated ones enter forever, on the other hand, the Atman is in brahmanical opinion, something mental and conscious, a description which does not hold true for Nirvana. Furthermore, Nirvana is not, like the Atman, the primordial ground or the divine principle of the world (Aitareya Up. 1,1), nor is it that which preserves order in the world (Brhadar. Up. 3,8,9); it is also not the substance from which everything evolves, nor the core of all material elements.
(8) Since the scholarly researches made by Otto Rosenberg (published in Russian 1918, in German trs. 1924), Th. Stcherbatsky (1932), and the great work of translation done by Louis de la Vallee Poussin Abhidharmakosa (1923-31) there cannot be any doubt about the basic principle of Buddhist philosophy. In the light of these researches, all attempts to give to the Atman a place in the Buddhist doctrine, appear to be quite antiquated. We know now that all Hinayana and Mahayana schools are based on the anatma-dharma theory. This theory explains the world through the causal co-operation of a multitude of transitory factors (dharma), arising in mutual functional dependence. This theory maintains that the entire process of liberation consists in the tranquilization of these incessantly arising and disappearing factors. For that process of liberation however, is required, apart from moral restraint (sila) and meditative concentration (samadhi), the insight (prajna) that all conditioned factors of existence (samskara) are transitory, without a permanent independent existence, and therefore subject to grief and suffering. The Nirvana which the saint experiences already in this life, and which he enters for ever after death, is certainly a reality (dharma), but as it neither arises nor vanishes, it is not subject to suffering, and is thereby distinguished from all conditioned realities. Nirvana being a dharma, is likewise anatta, just as the transitory, conditioned dharmas of the Samsara which, as caused by volitions (that is, karma-producing energies (samskara)), are themselves also called samskara. Like them, Nirvana is no individual entity which could act independently. For it is the basic idea of the entire system that all dharmas are devoid of Atman, and without cogent reasons we cannot assume that the Buddha himself has thought something different from that which since more than two thousand years, his followers have considered to be the quintessence of their doctrine.
The Buddha refers to Nibbana as a 'dhamma'. For example, he says "of all dhammas, conditioned or unconditioned, the most excellent dhamma, the supreme dhamma is, Nibbana". 'Dhamma' signifies actual realities, the existing realities as opposed to conceptual things. Dhammas are of two types, conditioned and unconditioned. A conditioned dhamma is an actuality which has come into being through causes or conditions, something which arises through the workings of various conditions. The conditioned dhammas are the five aggregates: material form, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness. The conditioned dhammas, do not remain static. They go through a ceaseless process of becoming. They arise, undergo transformation and fall away due to its conditionality.
However, the unconditioned dhamma is not produced by causes and conditions. It has the opposite characteristics from the conditioned: it has no arising, no falling away and it undergoes no transformation. Nevertheless, it is an actuality, and the Buddha refers to Nibbana as an unconditioned Dhamma.
The Buddha also refers to Nibbana as an 'ayatana'. This means realm, plane or sphere. It is a sphere where there is nothing at all that correspond to our mundane experience, and therefore it has to be described by way of negations as the negation of all the limited and determinate qualities of conditioned things.
The Buddha also refers to Nibbana as a, 'Dhatu' an element, the 'deathless element'. He compares the element of Nibbana to an ocean. He says that just as the great ocean remains at the same level no matter how much water pours into it from the rivers, without increase or decrease, so the Nibbana element remains the same, no matter whether many or few people attain Nibbana.
He also speaks of Nibbana as something that can be experienced by the body, an experience that is so vivid, so powerful, that it can be described as "touching the deathless element with one's own body."
The Buddha also refers to Nibbana as a 'state' ('pada') as 'amatapada' - the deathless state - or accutapada, the imperishable state.
Another word used by the Buddha to refer to Nibbana is 'Sacca', which means 'truth', an existing reality. This refers to Nibbana as the truth, a reality that the Noble ones have known through direct experience.
So all these terms, considered as a whole, clearly establish that Nibbana is an actual reality and not the mere destruction of defilements or the cessation of existence. Nibbana is unconditioned, without any origination and is timeless.
Thanks for the replies. I found the first article to be interesting in spite of my lack of familiarity with both Guenther and Vedanta/Upanishads. As you predicted, I still found some problem areas, some of which are not much different from points of Khantichayo's article which I found problematic. Perhaps soon I will take the time to respond to it.
The second clip you made, though it be difficult to investigate since it is entirely without references to sources, feels to me as if it is only reinforcing a substantialist argument in a way that simply avoids using the word "self" (Glasenapp also seems to do this in the way he defines Nibbana towards the end), which I find to be a curious word game. Buddhists who shy away from the word "self" in the sense of the individual transcendence of the arhat don't seem hardly at all shy about attributing most of the things one would say about self (in transcendence) to Nibbana. This at least is somewhat more agreeable to my position, but I have to say I find those that are interested in mentioning these suspiciously substantialist (terms like amatam, accutam) notions of Nibbana seem fairly uncommon amongst the internet sangha. It seems to me a belief in Nibbana and a recognition of the very real not-self characteristic of the khandhas are about as close to a common ground we can arrive at between all participants of this discussion...and that's nothing to sneeze at.
Not1Not2,
I was looking at the first article you provided, when I came across something so puzzling I had to check up on it immediately.
In the Glasenapp article you cited, he claimed:
For in Udana 8,2, Nirvana is expressly described as anattam
"Hard is the infinite to see; Truth is no easy thing to see; Craving is pierced by him who knows; for him who seeth, naught remains."
Needless to say, I was having a hard time finding the "not-self" or anything like it in any of these translations, thinking it particularly strange in a translation by a Theravadin Bhikkhu to fail to highlight the use of the word anattam. Attempting to go to the Pali versions available at metta.lk, I was disappointed to find that particular page down. Then, my recollection was aroused by the words "uninclined" and "infinite" found in two of the three translations I found. Seemed to me this had been discussed before. Sure enough, going to the beginning of this very thread, we have some discussion of this very term. Things started to become clear, and I realized that Glasenapp had made a grave mistake in his bold assertion. The word Glasenapp is claiming describes Nibbana as anattam (adj. not-self) is, contrary to his suprising assertion, anantam, which is indeed the word translated above as "unaffected," "uninclined," "infinite." No wonder "not-self" could not be found in any of the translations I had at my disposal! So the thread has come almost full circle. It would be useful now to reread those first few posts in this light.
PTS dictionary entries related to ananta (infinite): http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.0:1:1256.pali http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.0:1:1257.pali
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. I'm glad at least that you found that article...without it I might never have known exactly what Nam and Elohim were talking about!
I have to agree with you that it might be useful for us all to review the original posts. Perhaps it could help to add another dimension to this discussion. However, I would also like to reiterate that while Udana VIII.2 does not say that Nibbana is anatta (not-self), it also does not say that Nibbana is a "self" either. Nibbana is the cessation of greed, hatred, and delusion; it is the ending of stress. Whatever else Nibbana may entail, that was the Buddha's sole reason for realizing it.
When the Buddha refers to Nibbana as "the Unborn", as he does in Udana VIII.3, that simply means that it is unconditioned. Being unconditioned simply means that it is free from the characteristics of conditioned phenomena [dukkha and anicca]. This would not seem to include anatta, however, because anatta is "sabbe dhamma anatta" not "sabbe sankhara anatta". This same idea would apply to the reference of "the Deathless" as well. Basically, since Nibbana is unconditioned, it is free from birth, sickness, ageing, and death. So, not being subject to birth how could it be subject to death? These concepts simply do not apply to Nibbana whatsoever.
In any case, Udana VIII.2 in no way states that Nibbana is a "self". Trying to label Nibbana as a self is a gross misuse of the Buddha's teachings. The Buddha was simply trying to lead others to the end of suffering, he did not set out to establish a doctrine of self in anyway. As I've said before, if people wish to infer that, they certainly may, but making such inferences is, in my opinion, baseless. As Sariputta himself once taught, it merely complicates the uncomplicated.
Thanks for your reply. While I can see where you are coming from, and though I might be inclined to think (in practice, such thinking may not be applicable) that Nibbana is for/by Self (something difficult to put into words), I didn't intend, by making clear Glasenapp's error, to imply simplistically that the opposite is true.
I just felt it important to investigate the suprisingly ready claim on his part that Nibbana was unequivocally named anatta by the discourses. I found out the claim was unsupported, so it be known that the discourses do not specifically name something so highly praised and valued as Nibbana to be anatta, a term which always carries a negative meaning as something unworthy of an endearing attitude, something to be laid aside for one's well-being.
The argument that maintains Nibbana is included in the scope of Sabbe Dhamma, though based on a fairly logical inference based on the distinction between "dhamma" (in the Abhidhammic sense) and "sankhara", suffers from the fact that not only is "sabba" explained comprehensively as only the eye and forms, etc, and no other in the above-mentioned "sabba sutta" (for which the translator's notes are a help: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-023.html ) but also from the fact that Nibbana would be curiously the only factor of sabbe dhamma which is never explicity named anattam individually (while all others are). That this latter problem can only be contradicted by a serious error of translation of a single passage at Udana 8.2 mistaking what is actually anantam (uninclined, infinite) for anattam (not-self) seems fairly important to this discussion.
I don't want to assert that Nibbana is described as "a self" in the discourses, but rather would point out by way of suggestion that Nibbana is suprisingly associated with atta even in close association with teaching on anatta in such passages as this: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-193.html
"It's in this way, friend, that consciousness has been pointed out, revealed, and announced by the Blessed One [with these words]: 'For this reason consciousness is not-self.''
"It's just as if a man going around wanting heartwood, seeking heartwood, searching for heartwood, would take a sharp ax and enter a forest. There he would see a large banana tree trunk: straight, young, without shoots. He would cut off the roof, cut off the crown, and unfurl the coil of the stem. There he wouldn't even find softwood, much less heartwood.
"In the same way, a monk assumes neither a self nor anything pertaining to a self in the six spheres of sensory contact. Assuming in this way, he doesn't cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"
--Which requires some investigation on its own right, for here, in Thanissaro's translation we find the expression "totally unbound right within," which in Pali is paccattanyeva parinibbayati (see "paccatta" a compound joining pati and atta meaning as "paccattanyeva", according to the PTS: "separately, individually, singly, by himself, in his own heart"). So we find, just as an example in stark contrast to the erroneous assertion that Nibbana is named anattam, an expression making use of "atta" in very intimate association with a teaching on detaching (shall we say oneself?) from anything seen to be "anatta". I find that very intriguing.
ref. http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:975.pali
The appearance of such expressions in a positive light, in close association both with Nibbana and in connection with teaching on its opposite (anatta) definitely gives me pause for reflection.
I do not disagree with everything that you are saying. I have actually never used this Sutta before, but I can clearly see that it does not say that Nibbana is anatta. Also, there is an experience of Nibbana. This is clearly stated in the Suttas. There is full knowledge when birth is destroyed. This knowledge arises immediately in the arahant. But, that all takes place while there are still khandhas present. There is still a conventional person to experience this. So, there is no need for us to take the conventional usage of a word and try to make it include something beyond that.
But, for arguments sake lets say that there is a self of some sort. You cannot find anywhere in the Canon where the Buddha states that Nibbana is a self, for a self, by a self, etc. It is never described as such in any way. While Nibbana is indeed described in positive terms as well as negative ones, it is never described in any way as a self, of a self, for a self, in a self, or containing a self. The arahant is released, and that is the end of it. The Buddha goes no further. So, while it might be fun to try and see what it there intellectually, that it not what the Buddha taught.
As for Thanissaro Bhikkhu, he is of the same mind as I. He too feels that very question is unskillful. And, while he advocates some ideas that are not considered orthodox by many Theravadins, he does not go so far as to claim a self. He completely leaves the question of self alone. For one reason, the Buddha never delared a doctrine of self. To do so now would be to declare what was undeclared by the Blessed One. Another reason is that once Nibbana is experiecened, there is no need to fabricate anything else about it. It is itself the end of all fabrications. That is it.
In regards to the conversation between not1not2 and yourself as a whole, I am not trying to discourage it in any way. It is indeed entertaining. But, what I am trying to do is to educate anybody else that is reading this that the Buddha did not teach a doctrine of self. There was a very specific purpose for the Buddha's dispensation, and he was more than clear what it was. It is my idea that this purpose is obscured by the wandering minds of others into metaphysical doctrines, and doctrines of self. I simply feel that this is a great disservice to these profound teachings.
On a side note, I am wondering about your point regarding the word "sabbe". I am not completely convinced that "Sabbe" (The All), "Sabbe sankara..." (All conditioned things...), and "Sabbe dhamma..." (All things/phenomena...) all mean the same thing. I am not an expert in Pali, however, so I cannot really say too much about it. What I do know is that "sabbe" means "all", but it seems to depend on the context it is used. In one sense, as in "The All", it refers specifically to the eye and forms, ear and sounds, nose and aromas, tongue and flavors, body and tactile sensations, and intellect and ideas. But, in another context, as in "All conditioned things", it seems to simply mean "all". We should remember that one word can often be used in more than one way, so I would be curious as to what other reputable translators and scholars have to say about it. It would certainly help to clear up a lot of confusion.
You cannot find anywhere in the Canon where the Buddha states that Nibbana is a self, for a self, by a self, etc. It is never described as such in any way. While Nibbana is indeed described in positive terms as well as negative ones, it is never described in any way as a self, of a self, for a self, in a self, or containing a self. The arahant is released, and that is the end of it. The Buddha goes no further. So, while it might be fun to try and see what it there intellectually, that it not what the Buddha taught.
Jason,
This is a quick reply, so please forgive me if it is not verbose. I appreciate your comments, but contrary to your above denials, I have already tried to show, in a single example, that Nibbana is in fact described as at least "in a self" by the Nikayan expression (which is not uncommon) paccattanyeva (a compound joining pati + atta + yeva) parinibbayati which was shown to mean "separately, individually, singly, by himself, in his own heart," keeping clearly in mind that the central element of the compound is "atta"/"self". We could discuss numerous other similar such common expressions which bear witness to the close Nikayan textual association between Nibbana, the anatta doctrine, and what we might call the interiority known as "atta"/self. For reference on this topic, I highly recommend the book Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism by Joaquin Perez-Ramon. I am sure you will certainly disagree with many of Perez-Ramon's interpretations, but I am confident that if you (or another reader of this thread) have any further interest in the issue that you would find it a highly useful book in that it will point out for you the many "hot spots" (key usages of the word "atta" in compounds and singly, well-referenced) of this very issue.
Be careful, you just may have betrayed yourself yet again my friend. As I recall, this very reference was also given by a dear friend of ours named NamThien2006. It is interesting to note some of the remarks concerning this man's dubious translations and general hypothesis. While some might find this book entertaining and convincing in it's extreme assertion of the Buddha's convictions in a self, I am not one of those people. I am sorry, but I do not consider this a reputable source. I do not say that simply because I disagree with its conclusion, but because I find it full of errors.
I also do not see how you could possible come to the conclusion that Nibbana is in fact described as at least "in a self" by the line "totally unbound right within". Perhaps it is easy to forget that although the khandhas are not-self, it is "within this fathom-long body" that there is dukkha, the origination of the dukkha, the cessation of the dukkha, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the dukkha. As I have said before, it apears to me that you are merely taking the conventional usage of a word and trying to make it reference something far beyond what was intended.
The problem that I see here is that it appears there is an attempt to place a delineation of self in relation to Nibbana in some ambiguous way. The Buddha himself does not do so, and he warns others against such a thing when they try. While some might like to dream of what is there in this experience, and there are certainly mountains of speculative ideas floating around out there, these questions are left unanswered by the Blessed One and his disciples. In the arahant, there is no more thought of self. All views, positions, attachments, and clinging to such have completely been abandoned by the Noble disciple. Now, we on the outside looking in see the arahant, and we try to label what we perceive is there. The problem is that there is no longer anything left for one to perceive. This very idea is explained some what in various Suttas throughout the Canon. What we are trying to pin down, describe, and label is free from any such signs or features that would make this possible. That is presisely why one of the descriptions for the consciousness of the arahant is "anidassanam" (signless or without feature). A quick note about this from the Ven. Nanavira Thera elaborates:
That consciousness by which the Tathágata might be manifested has been eliminated by the Tathágata, cut off at the root, dug up, made non-existent, it is incapable of future arising; the Tathágata, great king, is free from reckoning as consciousness....
(Avyákata Samy. 1 <S.iv,379>). There is no longer any consciousness pointing (with feeling and the rest) to an existing 'self' and with which that 'self' might be identified. And in the Kevaddhasutta (Dígha i,11 <D.i,223>), viññánam anidassanam, which is the arahat's 'non-indicative consciousness', is also viññánassa nirodho. While the arahat yet lives, his consciousness is niruddha, or 'ceased', for the reason that it is ananuruddha-appativiruddha (Majjhima ii,1 <M.i,65>). In the same way, when there is no longer any apparent 'self' to be contacted, contact (phassa) is said to have ceased:
Contacts contact dependent on ground --
How should contacts contact a groundless one?
(Udána ii,4 <Ud.12>)
As there is nothing for one to trace, the arahant's consciousness is completely untraceable as the path of a bird in flight. When we therefore talk about a self to this experience or in this experience, we are trying to conceptualize what is featureless, signless, etc. In essence, we are trying to do the impossible when we use a doctrine of self to explain Nibbana and the experience of arahantship. When we look at the arahant all we see is the remaining khandhas, the conventional person that still appears to us as existing, and we attempt to perceive what is left. We search for the self, the experiencer, the remainder after the cessation of the six sense bases, but this only serves to complicate the uncomplicated. How can a label be placed on what cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched, or cognized? How can we label a self in what is beyond all delineation, conception, sign, or feature? It tends to make me question why we still try. Just think for a moment of a reason for us to pin down some idea of what the Buddha said was beyond delineation in the first place. This effort merely seeks to ultimately turn the Dhamma into some metaphysical doctrine of self.
After all this time you still suspect that I am someone who I am not, and based only on a book recommendation you are telling that person to "be careful." I'm quite disappointed, and I don't know what to say. Do you have a hard time believing that more than one person out there could be interpreting the suttas in a similar way? Or that maybe after years of following these debates around the internet, having seen the same arguments marshalled on either side over and over that I might have been able, as a person capable of investigating the references cited (including Perez-Ramon's book) and thinking for myself, come to my own informed opinion on the matter? Did you get reinvolved in this thread just to start again suggesting that I am a banned user?
If there's anything tiresome about this thread, for me it has to be that one thing. Just when Not1Not2 and I had a good thing going. It just doesn't feel respectful at all when someone insists on continually insinuating that you are someone other than yourself.
Sometime later I may put together some more pointed comments responding to your otherwise thoughtful replies.
When I said be careful, it was in reference to the fact that your views and references are suspiciously close to the recent Dark Zen-like participants that we've had visit this forum not so long ago. I just suspect that you are one of similar ideaology. I never said that you were the same person, though. What I was saying, however, was that you were merely offering up exactly the same ideas and references as he did. This presents to me the possibility that you are a part of that particular... cliche shall we say. Who really knows. I could be entirely wrong.
Whatever may be the case, you have so far participated in a respectful manner. I have absolutely no problems with you personally. I do not think that you are Nam, or that you deserve to be banned. I do have some issues with what you are presenting, however, and I am merely adding my thoughts on those matters. Alas, I apologize for getting reinvolved in my own thread. I shall do my best to never let it happen again. Perhaps you and not1not2 can just have a private dialogue, and I will remain a simple spectator. I will not bother to post on this thread again.
Apologies for the misunderstanding. I hope you can forgive my seeing your words in that light, since it has before been suggested in this thread. It is just that you said I was "betraying myself" when I don't see how I have been anything but openly discussing the issue at hand. Why should I "be careful" when I am honestly discussing my views? To me, even assigning me to a clique or labelling me "dark-zen-like" sounds flatly dismissive, but I can set that aside as impertinant to the topic and so not important enough to worry over. That misunderstanding cleared up, I wish to clarify another in the interest of interpersonal peace on the thread.
I wasn't trying to begrudge your participation in this thread which you rightly pointed out that you opened, and truly, it wasn't that for which I would have wanted an apology, if I had wanted one at all. Your participation is entirely up to you, and I wouldn't want you to feel unwelcome in a debate that you initiated, and there is no need for sarcasm here. I wasn't trying to drive you away. You have made some points I may respond to, but I think it better, for my part, to ignore from here on out the personal insinuations. By all means, I hope you feel free to engage in the dialogue whenever you feel there is something relevant you would like to say, and I sincerely apologize for any discouragement.
I apologize for my sarcasm, personal insinuations, and whatever else that you may have found displeasing. To be completely honest, however, what I said was dismissive. As I have said before, I know that I sound harsh and arrogant, but unless you can offer me some convincing evidence for your views, I do not see any reason to take them seriously. As for DZ, I have a very strong distaste for the Dark Zen-like participants that invade the various Buddhist forums around, for whatever reason that drives them to do so, and the havoc they intentionally seem to instigate. From my personal perspective, I have seen their views, their references, and their disruptive tactics that follow enough to come to my own conclusions about them. None of them which are favorable.
Their views posit something in the Buddha’s teachings that nobody else sees, from our modern day traditions of Buddhism to the very beginnings of each respective tradition. In the Theravada tradition, for example, it is clearly seen that the Buddha does not teach a doctrine of self in any way. The suttas and commentaries make this quite evident. I do think that they tend to get a little "no self" happy these days for my own particular taste, but it is clear that from the very beginning a doctrine of self was not the focus of the Buddha's dispensation. As to their references, they often tend to use translations that are poor to say the least. And, when it comes time to share these magical findings about a self that nobody else seems to have noticed due to the conspiracy that some how covered this great secret up over the last 2,000 years or so, they use multiple fake names, malicious speech, and b.s. to do what... I don't really know. They simply appear to be completely deluded, or just out to cause a little trouble. Whatever the case may be, when I see these same ideas and references presented, I get more than a little suspicious.
That is why when it comes to some of your accusations and references concerning this self in relation to Nibbana, they are, in my opinion, highly suspicious. It is merely the same old arguments and examples that have already been introduced by them, and placed aside in the first place for whatever reason. If you have the honest and sincere wish to be taken seriously by more than just beginners to Buddhism who have not had sufficient enough time to study the Canons and subsequent commentaries, you will have to do much, much better that Joaquin Perez-Ramon and your curious attempts at deciphering a self in the apparently conventional usage of Pali grammar. While my Pali grammar is not quite up to par, it is easy enough to seek the guidance of many well respected experts in this field through various Pali forums, grammar courses, and such.
It just seems peculiar to me that only a small handful in the fringes can "find" this self, whereas the vast majority seems to have a completely different view of the matter entirely. I also find it odd that monastics who translate these vast collections, and live the holy life themselves, do not proclaim this suppositious self either. It would, of course, be them that would have the most direct experience of this wouldn't they? Of all the masters who has trained and practice with the utmost sincerity and effort in the Sangha of monks, not one that I am aware of has ever mentioned even a hint of some everlasting self in the Canon, or their direct experience. The closest they have come is the assertion that the question itself is not relevant at all, and not the real focus of the Buddha's teachings. Even in that event, this supposed self is not seen or even heard from.
Therefore, I now have my own conclusion as to question those who posit such an ambiguous self extensively. I would first question them as to why they even attempt to posit such a self. To what purpose do they want to convince others that there is indeed a self to be found, when the Buddha says that all views of self must be abandoned before one can experience the Deathless? What insights do they think that they have gleaned, and what will these do to help other sentient beings in their practice? Where did they get their information? What evidence do they have to present? How credible are these sources? Etc. etc. What is truly tiresome for me is going through the same old arguments and references repeatedly. The focus is taken off the true path, the path to liberation, and placed instead within a realm of back-and-forth speculative argumentation. What should really be more important to all practitioners is what the Buddha actually taught. The most important of all these things is, of course, the Noble Eightfold Path along the Four Noble Truths. No matter what the truth of the matter is regarding a self, no self, or the irrelevance of the very question, the Buddha was expressively clear that this was the only way to Nibbana. It is what he called the kamma leading to the end of kamma.
With this, I shall rest my case. I do not feel that my further participation in this thread will actually matter very much one way or another. It is really up to each individual to figure this out on his or her own. All that we can offer to one another is a little guidance along the way. But, I honestly doubt that many of the members here even read this thread anymore. They are probably tired of it, and have left it behind in order to continue trying to integrate Buddhism into their daily lives--which, in my opinion, is what we should be doing. The question of the meaning of anatta shall remain open, for there will always be questions about that which we seek to understand. It is only when we touch the unconditioned for ourselves that all questions will cease. It is only then that we will truly know.
With this, I shall rest my case. I do not feel that my further participation in this thread will actually matter very much one way or another. It is really up to each individual to figure this out on his or her own. All that we can offer to one another is a little guidance along the way. But, I honestly doubt that many of the members here even read this thread anymore. They are probably tired of it, and have left it behind in order to continue trying to integrate Buddhism into their daily lives--which, in my opinion, is what we should be doing. The question of the meaning of anatta shall remain open, for there will always be questions about that which we seek to understand. It is only when we touch the unconditioned for ourselves that all questions will cease. It is only then that we will truly know.
I appreciate your honest questions and comments, and as much as we may disagree on a controversial point, you have shown there are some more basic points to agree on. The common ground is indeed heartening. And I found this last paragraph of yours to be particularly well-said.
For my part I haven't seen how our discussion has strayed overmuch from the concerns of everyday practice, for a good part of what it means to be a Buddhist is drawing near to the Blessed One and listening to his teaching. In our position as modern Buddhists, this involves seeking out the recorded discourses and attempting to understand the sense and meaning of the words for ourselves. Because we cannot put into practice what we don't have a basic understanding of--which is not to say we must have all the answers before we endeavor on the path. A debate such as this is helpful, when emotional conceits are set aside, in testing our own feeling for the meaning of the master's words and the viability of the teachings in our lives.
We may rely on traditions and teachers to any degree we choose, but ultimately the meaning has to be hammered out in each of us to the tune of our own conscience. Maybe my views are not agreeable to many, but I have tried to offer as much as I can the thinking and reasoning and the various discourses of the Buddha behind the way I am compelled to see the teaching. I have tried to be as clear as possible, but perhaps I have failed in being convincing enough, or perhaps the weight of a prejudgement in such a controversy is just too much to overcome (and I realize that it works both ways)--because such insights are really only won within. What purpose does it serve? Well, without getting too much involved in the personal confessional, let's say that for years I was a Buddhist who would have denied Self as vehemently as any of the participants in this thread, and over time this controversy kept cropping up on the internet as I ventured to continue to study the Buddha's teaching through various traditions including mainly Zen and Nyingmapa. I was then and still am definitely a "learner" endeavoring in the understanding and putting into practice of the Buddha's teachings. I will admit that often somewhere involved in the debate was this or that well-known pro-self character whose names with which we are all probably familiar, and that I butted heads with on several occasions, but I was serious enough in my own opposition to their view to check up on references, read the books that they said discussed the issue from the point of view they espoused, but most of all I went to the Pali discourses and exposed myself to these early teachings of the Buddha more than I had ever done before.
I know the pali discourses mainly from very conventional translations like those found at access and sometimes those of the PTS or metta.lk, and though I never did really subscribe to the more radical translations of which some of us are acquainted, I was always willing to compare translations, the different meanings and glosses that can be used, along with the PTS dictionary (rather than summary glossaries of which there are numerous out there) to try to get a comprehensive sense of the possibilities many key terms could hold. I am by no means an expert in Pali nor a grammarian, but the more I went to the discourses of the Buddha and asked myself what I really thought was meant, the less in agreement with a Self-denying interpretation I found myself. In all fairness, I know that both Jason and Not1Not2 have said some very appropriate things disclaiming a denial of Self, which I rather applaud and feel we hold common in spite of serious disagreements about how openly the Buddha declared "Self as man's highest value."
Vac: I just read your post. It chimes of someone who has an open mind--or perhaps, I should say, a mind which has allowed itself to become open. In either case, such a mind, for itself, has reached a degree of clarity which is free of the poisons.
I just want to share with you this passage I found in the Khuddhaka Patha from a PTS translation. It is from a discourse in which a devata (god) illumines the Jeta grove and standing next to the Buddha spoke in verse. One verse in particular which caught my attention was this one.
Dwelling in region suitable and merit wrought in the past and right aiming at the (divine, the highest) self [attasammâpa.nidhi]: this is the luck supreme (mangalam uttama.m).
The translator mentioned in the footnote that the commentary had nothing to say about the compound "attasammapi.nidhi" which is astonishing given the belief of some Buddhists who espoused anatta as the principle teaching of the Buddha.
This translation strikes me as being peculiar. This was probably taken from a very early PTS translation, the 1915 edition of the Khuddaka Patha perhaps. While people like Mr. T.W. Rhys Davids, Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, etc. were pioneers in the field of early Pali to English translations, their understanding was not as accurate as it is today. For instance, Mrs. Rhys David's understanding of Buddhism was heavily influeneced by Theosophy. This could help to explain many of her "interpretations" of many key Pali terms. As Mr. Rhys Davids was apparently not a big fan of Theosophy, I am lead to believe that this could be a translation of hers. If not, it is quite possibly the work of F.L. Woodward, who adopted many of Mrs. Rhys David's interpretations.
The Pali of this passage, which is from the Mangala (Protection) Sutta, is as follows:
Patirūpadesavāso ca pubbe ca katapuññatā
Attasammāpaṇīdhi ca etaṃ maṅgalamuttamaṃ
Here are some additional translations of this passage by various translators:
To reside in a suitable locality, to have done meritorious actions in the past and to set oneself in the right course: this is the greatest blessing. --Narada Thera
Living in a civilized land, having made merit in the past, directing oneself rightly: This is the highest protection. --Thanissaro Bhikkhu
To reside in a suitable locality, to have performed meritorious actions in the past, and to set oneself in the right direction: this is the highest blessing. --Piyadassi Thera
At my theology library (the second largest in N. America) we have all of Mrs. Davids works. I have found Mrs. Davids to do what scholars are expected to do, set aside dogma in their search for truth.
At times, I have found Theravadin clerics to be quite dogmatic. Often, for the sake of their own traditions, they gloss over problematic areas such as the relationship between Mara, the Buddhist devil, and the five khandhas which are not the self (anatta). Judging from what we know of the khandhas and Mara, this would entail that the so-called no-self (anatta) is Mara!
As for the objection that Mrs. Davids was influenced by Theosophy throughout her works, which is a popular Theravadin assertion, it is arguably a fallacious assertion otherwise known as “damning the origin”. One is reminded of Socrates in the Phaedrus who shows the error of not caring whether a thing is or is not true, but rather who the speaker is and what country he came from. For me, this objection is baseless. The real task is to take up Mrs. Davids’ assertions, one at a time, leaving aside her possible motives and influences.
I am familiar with such arguments having come from a Christian background. Christianity is not without its scholars who sharply disagree on key elements of Christian history and Christology. No Christian scholar dares claim, for example, that he knows the Christianity of Paul. In addition, what we know of the synoptic Gospels is not by any accurate measure, indubitable.
Buddhism, for the West, is still pretty much of a mystery as its stands today. From my own theological background, I have found the current siege upon the self to be misdirected by some Western Buddhists who seem to be to be accommodating to secularism. Accomodationism is, of course, another issue.
Here is another aspect of the Pali term attasammâpa.nidhi we might consider. Instead of the locative “at the (divine, the highest) self” as rendered in the PTS translation, we might use the genitive, “right aspiration of the self” where the right aspiration belongs to the self. The context would then be towards self-exertion or in Pali, pahitatto.
Here is my brief treatment of this idea.
Purification and final liberation are not naturally occurring. We must employ self-exertion if we expect to reach final liberation. This is an inner process. It is not by way of God or the five aggregates that liberation is accomplished.
As long as we are under the jurisdiction of pa.ticcasamuppâda (i.e., dependent origination) which, incidentally, is not unconditioned, we can said to be bound to the effects of samsara--most notably--suffering.
Liberation, therefore, can be said to entail the breaking of the chain of pa.ticcasamuppâda by a factor transcendent to the latter, since the chain cannot automatically break itself (the Makkhali Gosala heresy was the belief of natural exertionless liberation in time).
The transcendent factor in the Nakayas which can break the chain is our self which is independent of pa.ticcasamuppâda. It is the agent of purification and final liberation. This is why this passage, which has have been discussing, makes so much sense from the perspective of an exerting self.
“Dwelling in a befitting place, and merit acquired from previous works, and right aspiration of the self (attasammâpa.nidhi), this is the supremely good omen” (trans., Dr. Péres-Remon).
Here, instead, of a denial of self, we have its affirmation in the sense of the immediacy of our authentic being which is trying to liberate itself from what is not itself. The aspiration, on the part of the self, is to do what is necessary to transcend the bonds of samsara which are governed by the formula of pa.ticcasamuppâda. Aspiration then moves to self-exertion (pahitatto).
At my theology library (the second largest in N. America) we have all of Mrs. Davids works. I have found Mrs. Davids to do what scholars are expected to do, set aside dogma in their search for truth.
At times, I have found Theravadin clerics to be quite dogmatic. Often, for the sake of their own traditions, they gloss over problematic areas such as the relationship between Mara, the Buddhist devil, and the five khandhas which are not the self (anatta). Judging from what we know of the khandhas and Mara, this would entail that the so-called no-self (anatta) is Mara!
As for the objection that Mrs. Davids was influenced by Theosophy throughout her works, which is a popular Theravadin assertion, it is arguably a fallacious assertion otherwise known as “damning the origin”. One is reminded of Socrates in the Phaedrus who shows the error of not caring whether a thing is or is not true, but rather who the speaker is and what country he came from. For me, this objection is baseless. The real task is to take up Mrs. Davids’ assertions, one at a time, leaving aside her possible motives and influences.
I am familiar with such arguments having come from a Christian background. Christianity is not without its scholars who sharply disagree on key elements of Christian history and Christology. No Christian scholar dares claim, for example, that he knows the Christianity of Paul. In addition, what we know of the synoptic Gospels is not by any accurate measure, indubitable.
Buddhism, for the West, is still pretty much of a mystery as its stands today. From my own theological background, I have found the current siege upon the self to be misdirected by some Western Buddhists who seem to be to be accommodating to secularism. Accomodationism is, of course, another issue.
Love ya all,
Bobby
Well, I really don't think this falls into your 'damning the origin' fallacy, as a Theosophical influence could very well distort one's interpretation of the suttas, as Elohim is asserting it did in the case of Mrs. Rhys Davids. Unless you can demonstrate that this did not influence the way she interpreted, then there is no grounds for asserting such a logical fallacy. And I think it is safe to say that Elohim cares about the truth of this matter. Are you suggesting otherwise?
Speaking of logical fallacies, construing the non-establishment of a Self among buddhists as a 'siege on the self' borders on straw man fallacy and is at very least sensationalist. Implying that buddhists are merely accomodating secularism is also without basis. It implies that at some other time and place, Buddhists did assert or believe in a Self, and that it is only here and now that they are attacking some existent Buddhist doctrine of Selfhood.
Honestly, until we have experienced unbinding, I don't think we can assert what lies beyond the aggregates. The best we can do is take the word of those who have. None of the great masters have ever asserted there was a self beyond the aggregates and neither have any of the traditions. In fact, it is said that anatta is a verifiable experience which renders such metaphysical questions moot. I have encountered a few individuals who have said to have had direct insight into anatta. And it has already been established that the buddha said that taking any view regarding the self is a thicket of views. All words we use are simply fabrications of the conceptual mind. Relying on fabrications as anything other than expedient means and regarding them as more than a finger pointing at the moon is folly.
Anyway, I'm not really even sure why I'm still replying on this thread. I guess I'm a compulsive debater.
And Bobby, until you actually go investigate these matters directly through the methods prescribed by the Buddha, you are being an armchair buddhist whose conclusions contradict the findings of Buddhist masters throughout the past 2500 years or so. Regardless of what intellectual display you demonstrate or how you spin obscure buddhist passages in a manner inconsistent with the teachings, you are speaking from the place of avijja. And your insistence on declaring something which is inconsistent with the teachings of all the masters, suggests that all the revered buddhists have gotten it wrong and you (a proclaimed Christian theologian) have somehow gotten it right. I just do not see how this is possible. Buddhism is not meant to be speculated upon. It is meant to be practiced. All the language and teachings are specifically geared towards practice and describe the fruits of practice. If you are speaking from a place outside of practice, then it is likely you are missing the point. That said, I'm bordering on using the ignore function, which I have never used before. I will not do this lightly, but I have suspicions that you are trolling and that you may be associated with the DZ people. Honestly, your manner of speaking is accusatory on an implicit level, and seems to be intended to stir things up. Anybody who has as much knowledge of the Buddhist Canon as you do, would recognize how non-astonishing the anatta doctrine is and should be aware of how Buddhists have never accepted a Self doctrine. The fact that you are surprised indicates that either you are lying, or you are not as informed as you should be. Either way, this debate is taking a negative turn.
I agree with you both in the sense that this thread has taken on a personal nature. I do not think that this can be avoided, however. In cases like this, it is not only the information that has to be scrutinized. It should also be the person who offers that information. I am not saying that we should all place our names, addresses, and social security numbers on our profiles, but I am saying that we should dig a little bit deeper when it comes to these types of claims. On the internet, anyone can claim anything, and offer any amount of evidence to prove such a claim. And, as we have all seen before, certain people are not above being dishonest through and through. I feel that it is almost a duty for the people who have had more experience with Buddhist texts and history to try and find out who is being truthful, and who is being untruthful. Unfortunately, sometimes that can get personal.
When I see people who claim that some strange conspiracy of Theravadins are trying to cover up the Buddha's real doctrine of self... that leads me to one obvious conclusion--something fishy is going on. But, I do not stop there. I continue to participate and listen to what they have to offer. Sometimes, they really have some good information, and a different perspective which I take seriously. However, in other cases they are just doing their best to misinform people. In this case, I believe that through the evidence presented to us, the later is true. Too many things that have been said on this thread correlate with what was said by our previous members such as mujaku, NamThien2006, and M. Bolden. It is humorous as well as alarming to me that as soon as I saw this translation and knew where it came from, Mr. Lanier had to throw out the fallacy of "damning the origin" card, and the "siege upon the self" by "Western Buddhists who seem to be to be accommodating to secularism" card. To me, this is an immediate red flag.
As for Mrs. Rhys Davids, I admitted that she was a pioneer in her field. Mrs. Rhys Davids and her husband did excellent work. However, that was when the Western understanding of Pali grammar was in its rudimentary phases. Today, much more information is readily available to scholars and translators alike. Also, I believe that the rumors of Mrs. Rhys David's Theosophical biases should be seriously considered. I do not know that she was influenced by Theosophy for a fact, but I have read it enough times to take the claim seriously enough. It would certainly have a profound effect on her understanding of Buddhism in general. I encourage anyone who is unfamiliar with H. P. Blavatsky and Theosophy to research more about them. You will clearly see how their views, which were quite popular at the time, could cause some misunderstandings of a lost Buddhist language.
What confuses me the most is how something that appears to reference a conventional self is automatically taken to mean something other than that. I think that this is definitely easy enough to do if such passages stand alone, but when we look at the greater whole we can quickly get a clearer picture. The Mangala Sutta is a short Sutta in which the Buddha expounds upon the highest protections or blessings at the request of a deva. If you read the entire Sutta, and take everything into context, you will see that it is speaking of a person in conventional terms. One line that helps to show this is two lines down from the one in question. It states as follows:
Maataa-pitu-upa.t.thaana"m
putta-daarassa sa"ngaho
Anaakulaa ca kammantaa
etam-ma"ngalam-uttama"m.
Support for one's parents, assistance to one's wife & children,
Jobs that are not left unfinished:
This is the highest good fortune.
Here we can see that one of the highest blessings is the support for one's parents, wife, children, and jobs that are not left unfinished. This has nothing at all to do with some embodied self, or transcendent soul. While atta can mean soul, it can also mean oneself. It depends entirely on the context and compounds it is used in. If you look at any Pali dictionary, there are many, many words with "atta" in them. Many of them have quite conventional meanings. Here are just a few example: aggatta (pre-eminence), ajjhatta (personal; connected with the self), ajjhappatta (having fallen upon or approached unexpectedly), aññathatta (alteration; change of mind), aḍḍharatta (midnight), etc. So, as we can see, just because "atta" is in a compound does not make it automatically mean that a transcendent self is being referenced. The presence of this word alone cannot prove or disprove anything of the sort. As we shall see, the compound itself can be easily broken down in to its three constituent parts. If we take it apart, we will have atta (soul; oneself), sammâ (properly; rightly; thoroughly), and pa.nidhi (placing down [-forth]; hence; direct; fix). It is not hard to see the use of "atta" as "soul", but it is also not hard to see its use as "oneself", hence we can have the translation of "directing oneself rightly".
There are also other points in Mr. Lanier's argument which I find incorrect, but I do not have the time to pursue them further right now. It would take some time for me to find all of the necessary Sutta passages to prove my points, and I do not have the time to find them all. However, based on what we do have in front of us, I would actually have to agree with not1not2. If we look back at what the past few people who we know for sure came to cause trouble said, and then compare that with what is being presented to us here, it's just the same old wolf in sheep’s clothing. Not only is Mr. Lanier promoting that the secular Theravadin "clerics" are covering up the Buddha's true teachings of self, but he is also using the very same references as the others who previously claimed this.
For the life of me, I cannot understand why it is mostly outdated PTS translations, and Dr. Péres-Remon that they can offer to us as evidence for these claims. Many of these translations are from the early 1900's. While they are definitely good, they are not perfect. Today, we have the benefit of having other comparable texts, in other languages, to use as guides. For example, today we have the Pali version of the Samyutta Nikaya, and we also have the Chinese version of the Samyutta Agama. The same text, but in two different languages. From this, we can compare each and see how certain words and passages were used in context. It gives us a much greater understanding of how to better translate these ancient texts.
In short, if there were more reputable and current sources presented to us, I would be more inclined to take these views quite seriously. However, until then I will do my best to give the other side of the story so that others will have the necessary information to make up their own minds. While I do not claim that I am correct in all of my assertions, I am claiming that I am confident about what I say as being in line with the Dhamma. My years of study, practice, and consultations with various teachers are the sources of this confidence. I most certainly could be wrong in my interpretations of the information presented to me here, and I am willing to admit that I am wrong if-and-when those interpretations are proved to be false, but only when such evidence is provided to me shall I do so. Also, I am not stranger to this forum. I do not hide behind any masks. While I do use the name Elohim, I am completely forthright about my real identity. While this does not prove anything, it does go so far as to show that I am who I say I am. I hide behind nothing because I do not have anything to fear by sharing the truth. I am even willing to play the villain and get a little personal when I feel that others are being less than truthful. I apologize for my continued participation in the thread, and for making it personal, but I feel that this is a topic which is far too important to leave unchecked. I simply feel that I have a responsiblity to all of our memebers to do what I can to remove the wolf's disguise.
I know that everyone has a right to their own beliefs. Even if we disagree with them. If there weren't differences, there wouldn't be different factions of Buddhism.
And I honestly gave up on this thread being informative about 5 pages ago.
Maybe I'm just in this boat all by myself. And if so, I apologize. I'll refrain from any more comments on this thread.
I realize that most people probably don't care about this thread, or the majority of the things that I have to say in it, but I still feel that the Dhamma is important enough for me to put the appropriate evidence out there for those that might be interested. There will eventually come a time when the beginner will stop being a beginner, and they will subsequently need to move on to the next level of study and practice. The practice as taught in the Pali Canon is nothing less than a long process of understanding. That is why it is referred to as anupubbi-magga (gradual path), and the Buddha's way of teachings as anupubbi-katha (gradual training). If people begin this transformation of learning and experience with the wrong information, their practice will suffer greatly for it. That is why we have teachers in the first place. They help guide us towards what is truly going to be beneficial to us and our practice. I am certainly not saying that I am the authority on what that is, but I make it my duty to do the very best I can. If I didn't feel that it was important to those looking forward in their studies, I wouldn't bother doing it. I truly believe that to really understanding something, to live it with every fiber of your being, you must be passionate about it. Those are my thoughts about it anyway.
Regards,
Jason
0
federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited April 2006
*This part of the forum (Buddhism 202) was finally implemented by Brian precisely for those who insisted on, and clamoured for a place to DEBATE.
They asked for it, they wanted it - and here it is.
HOWEVER:
The Buddha encouraged his monks to teach the Dharma in a way that could be understood and comprehended by the people they taught it to.
The virtual entire content of this thread is practically double dutch to all but a few members of this forum.
I have no qualms in admitting that I am one of those.
therefore, I can only conclude that the Dharma is not being taught to me in a way that I can understand it.
Whether that's my "fault" or anyone else's, I am certainly not at liberty, or in any position to say.
Attempts have been gingerly made by others to smooth out a few ruffled feathers, and to attempt to reach a common ground of courtesy and mutual respect, but it has more often than not, been ineffective. It would seem that even gentle hints by the resident, 'yours truly' Moderator, have fallen on deaf ears.....
It is sufficient to note that the debate is truly between people who are advanced in their knowledge, and that they are well-read in this field.
I would therefore respectfully propose that the only course of action for those who can glean something from this, is to participate.
For those who know they are in way too deep over their heads, to stay away.
If it is reduced to a personal slanging match, with content of criticism, ridicule, suspiscion, derision, disbelief or vilification of whatever kind, and to whatever standard - that is up to the members of this thread to deal with.
Gentlemen, (and curiously, it is only gentlemen - !!) you know who you are.
Feel free to continue your debate in whichever vein you feel appropriate. I am so far down the ladder as to be completely redundant and ineffective here, so I wish you Joy and here's to a fruitful and animated discussion. By all means carry on, but this is as far as Moderating wise, I can go.
If however, I receive direct complaints from any member of this forum, via PM's as to content, tone, or language, I shall return.
But only then.*
I took a short time away from the thread to let it "settle down" so to speak. I find this to be helpful in what turns out to be a very lengthy and contentious dialogue. In my time away from the thread, I could not help but keep thinking about this expression "paccattamyeva parinibbayati" as in the Udayin Sutta formerly cited: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-193.html
I want to take a closer look at it. Jason wrote: "I also do not see how you could possible come to the conclusion that Nibbana is in fact described as at least "in a self" by the line "totally unbound right within"." For me it is fairly evident, and there are a few points to discuss in specific relation to this usage.
To begin with, I believe it has been established as fair (to my thinking) to say that the reference to Self (atta) in the Mahaparinibbanasutta which we discussed is at best ambivalent. I can see that the conventionalist has some ground (though by the way I see it, very narrow turf, and unsteady) to stand on in sticking to their reading by the context that the master is dying and the monks will be wondering on whom to rely. I would say that this interpretation is not even necessarily contradicted by my own (that the Buddha is teaching for the monks to go with Self as refuge in contrast to anything worldly, including the existing personality) but would rather be included under it, for in a teaching on giving up delight and sorrow with regard to the world to go towards Self as refuge, this would include reliance on other personalities as well.
So, if the conventionalist interpretation has any merit in that case based on the context, we might ask if such a context can be seen in the Udayin Sutta to aid us in interpreting the remarkable usage of the "atta" in such close connection with parinibbana in a teaching on anatta. In such a sutta, we have, so to speak, the whole package of the issues we have been discussing all together in one beautiful teaching. The sutta is very brief, and it doesn't take a very long search to come to the conclusion that no, the immediate philosophical context does not have anything whatsoever to do with putting aside reliance on other persons, in particular teachers, for one's spiritual well-being. In fact, the philosophical context is established very clearly as Udayin's question to Ananda on anatta and the extent of such doctrine. Udayin, we could imagine laboring under some uncertainty regarding the fate of consciousness beyond this individual existence, asks Ananda if consciousness too, along with body, can be declared anatta in the same manner. Ananda, of course, replies that it can, and goes on to elaborate.
Towards the conclusion of Ananda's words, we have an interesting simile. He says:
"It's just as if a man going around wanting heartwood, seeking heartwood, searching for heartwood, would take a sharp ax and enter a forest. There he would see a large banana tree trunk: straight, young, without shoots. He would cut off the roof, cut off the crown, and unfurl the coil of the stem. There he wouldn't even find softwood, much less heartwood.
Can we not agree that in this simile that 'heartwood' here stands for Self?
Now, one who would assert a merely conventional interpretation of "atta" or one who denies Self might see this simile as an affirmation that the teaching of the Buddha denies Self altogether, that the simile highlights the impossibility of Self. But it does not take much to see that this is not really the case here. The simile merely and aptly shows that a man looking for heartwood in the wrong type of tree would always fail to find it, meaning that a man assuming Self in the spheres of the senses is assuming unskillfully.
Having established the context as a teaching on anatta, and summarizing the teaching with a simile on the unskillful search for heartwood, the sutta's conclusion is striking:
"In the same way, a monk assumes neither a self nor anything pertaining to a self in the six spheres of sensory contact. Assuming in this way, he doesn't cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"
Of interest here is "Assuming in this way, he doesn't cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within." and in particular the fact that "totally unbound right within" is an expression making use of a compound built around "atta": paccattamyeva parinibbayati. We might do well to examine, if we can, the composition of this word "paccattamyeva". As was said before, the word is composed of three elements: pati + atta + yeva. When we have pati and atta together we have paccatta which means "separate, individual; usually acc. ˚&ntail; adv. separately, individually, singly, by himself, in his own heart"... and here we have yeva which is an "emphatic particle, meaning "even, just, also"" http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:1128.pali http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:975.pali http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.3:1:552.pali
Obviously to me, the paccattamyeva adds something meaningful here to the parinibbayati. For the conventionalist would be quite satisfied if the word paccattamyeva were not even here at all. But in fact we not only have atta here in direct stark contrast with a clinging to what is not-self (anatta, ie not atta) but we have it in compound form the elements of which add a particular highlight to the contrast (instead of dampening it). For pati (see PTS discussion above) at the beginning adds directionality and a kind of rhetorical rebound (as if to say "on the other hand") to the sense of the word. And yeva is a suffix of emphasis meaning "even, just, also", again highlighting the contrast implied by the appearance of the "atta" in most intimate connection with parinibbana at the ultimate conclusion of a teaching on its opposite, anatta.
Having examined all that, with all respect to Thanissaro as a bhikkhu, I am not at all convinced that "right within" as a translation clarifies the meaning of the expression very much, and to assume it as ably contradicting an interpretation which affirms that parinibbana is "in self" is not very persuasive. Instead of highlighting the rhetorical implications of emphasis found in the addition of pati and yeva to atta, it glosses the word over as an insignificant redundancy (where else would Unbinding take place but "within" and how else within but "right"?), quite easily overlooked in the english whereas its appearance is at least notable and rather striking in the Pali.
Towards the conclusion of Ananda's words, we have an interesting simile. He says:
"It's just as if a man going around wanting heartwood, seeking heartwood, searching for heartwood, would take a sharp ax and enter a forest. There he would see a large banana tree trunk: straight, young, without shoots. He would cut off the roof, cut off the crown, and unfurl the coil of the stem. There he wouldn't even find softwood, much less heartwood.
Can we not agree that in this simile that 'heartwood' here stands for Self?
Now, one who would assert a merely conventional interpretation of "atta" or one who denies Self might see this simile as an affirmation that the teaching of the Buddha denies Self altogether, that the simile highlights the impossibility of Self. But it does not take much to see that this is not really the case here. The simile merely and aptly shows that a man looking for heartwood in the wrong type of tree would always fail to find it, meaning that a man assuming Self in the spheres of the senses is assuming unskillfully.
Having established the context as a teaching on anatta, and summarizing the teaching with a simile on the unskillful search for heartwood, the sutta's conclusion is striking:
"In the same way, a monk assumes neither a self nor anything pertaining to a self in the six spheres of sensory contact. Assuming in this way, he doesn't cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"
I find your interpretation of the 'heartwood' analogy to be strange. You suggest the interpretation to be that banana trees simply don't contain heartwood, and that the person needs to look to a different kind of tree to find some. This means that for the reader to understand the analogy properly, they would have to have a proficiency in the knowledge of trees. This seems like a strange sort of analogy, as it contradicts the obvious meaning which suggests that by inspecting the tree, piece by piece in the manner described, there is no internal core left to be spoken of. Generally speaking, the buddha used more obvious analogies, as to make the teachings quite clear. The fact that he did not continue on to say that they should look for a kind of tree with heartwood speaks quite loudly on this subject, imo. It would have been quite odd for the buddha or his community of bhikkhus to leave out this important information, when there is a conclusion which is much more apparant to the hearer. Do you have any information which backs up this interpretation?
Now, the more problematic part of this interpretation is that it suggests that the Atta is to be found in some other set of aggregates, whereas I believe the Buddha quite definitively stated that there aren't any other aggregates to speak of. Furthermore, this seems to contradict the Buddha's message that the whole of the holy life could be found 'within this fathom long body'. Now, you could still suggest that the Atta is to be found outside of this body (though I would disagree), but then such a search would fall outside of the holy life prescribed by the Buddha, and would be impossible to verify as well.
I am dismayed by your painful attempt to utilize the similes and analogies found in the Pali Canon in ways which are contrary to how they were originally intended to be used. The heartwood simile is quite prevelent throughout the Canon, and while it's meaning changes slightly depending on the various contexts it is used in, it is never used in the way you are proposing here. To attempt to make the Buddha's words mean something that they do not is to slander the Tathagata. In what way is this said? In the Buddha's own words:
"Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explains what was not said or spoken by the Tathagata as said or spoken by the Tathagata. And he who explains what was said or spoken by the Tathagata as not said or spoken by the Tathagata. These are two who slander the Tathagata." - AN II.23
Nowhere in the Pali Canon does the Buddha ever use this simile to represent a declared doctrine of self. You are misusing these teachings. In the Culasaropama Sutta, for example, the heartwood is analogous to the end of the holy life. In the Phena Sutta, it's absence, such as in the case of a banana tree, is used to signify the emptiness of experience. Either you are in dire need of more study, or you are indeed doing your best to misrepresent the Dhamma. I am sorry, but I cannot have anything more to do with this.
This is the recognized definition of "eternalism" as given in the Udana Atthakatha.
“They declare...”the self” is one khandha amidst the five upadana khandha, the rest “the world” (344)
"They declare material form to be the self and the world...they declare sensation.. perception... the formations... consciousness to be the self and the world, stating such to be not only the self and the world but also eternal" (344).
A point to remember, it is crucially significant that eternalism believes that at least one of the khandhas is the self. Neither I nor Vacchogatta have made such a case. We have essentally claimed, like the Buddha, that the khandhas are not the self, in the sense of the via negativa.
There will eventually come a time when the beginner will stop being a beginner, and they will subsequently need to move on to the next level of study and practice. The practice as taught in the Pali Canon is nothing less than a long process of understanding. That is why it is referred to as anupubbi-magga (gradual path), and the Buddha's way of teachings as anupubbi-katha (gradual training).
I'm a beginner. I sit. I read one precept everyday and use that as a tool to guide my interactions and my internal conduct. What do you recommend, Elohim, to be the first step in the gradual road of study? Where can I start to nibble at the huge meal that is the cannon of Buddhist teaching?
I find your interpretation of the 'heartwood' analogy to be strange. You suggest the interpretation to be that banana trees simply don't contain heartwood, and that the person needs to look to a different kind of tree to find some. This means that for the reader to understand the analogy properly, they would have to have a proficiency in the knowledge of trees. This seems like a strange sort of analogy, as it contradicts the obvious meaning which suggests that by inspecting the tree, piece by piece in the manner described, there is no internal core left to be spoken of. Generally speaking, the buddha used more obvious analogies, as to make the teachings quite clear. The fact that he did not continue on to say that they should look for a kind of tree with heartwood speaks quite loudly on this subject, imo. It would have been quite odd for the buddha or his community of bhikkhus to leave out this important information, when there is a conclusion which is much more apparant to the hearer. Do you have any information which backs up this interpretation?
Now, the more problematic part of this interpretation is that it suggests that the Atta is to be found in some other set of aggregates, whereas I believe the Buddha quite definitively stated that there aren't any other aggregates to speak of. Furthermore, this seems to contradict the Buddha's message that the whole of the holy life could be found 'within this fathom long body'. Now, you could still suggest that the Atta is to be found outside of this body (though I would disagree), but then such a search would fall outside of the holy life prescribed by the Buddha, and would be impossible to verify as well.
_/\_
metta
Here I must say I'm suprised you misunderstood me so much, but I apologize if it had anything to do with a failure of clarity on my part. I suspect that it is more difficult to follow the rationale of someone whom you already disagree with. Nonetheless I would like to try to elaborate such that my point is less likely to be misunderstood. To begin with, I fully understand that all similes are like cars; they all break down at some point. Har de har har. But seriously, I mean that. They usually break down exactly at the point where the speaker stops elaborating it--more on that later.
The fact that banana trees thus described don't contain heartwood (further, if one doesn't know what heartwood is, it's not the teacher's fault--face the fact, this is the simile he uses here and a 21st century person's ignorance on the terms of the simile does not change that) would have probably been quite common knowledge at the time and place of this discourse, just as it is pretty common knowledge around the north woods where I live that pine trees do, in fact, have heartwood. Even so, the simile itself skillfully makes the issue of how much you know about a banana tree a non-issue, because the description provided by Ananda itself contains an illustration of the composition of a banana tree, which you might have missed: "He would cut off the roof, cut off the crown, and unfurl the coil of the stem. There he wouldn't even find softwood, much less heartwood." There it is, Ananda has described for you that the young banana stem does not contain heartwood but is a curled form, so you really don't need any proficiency of knowledge about banana trees at all. So the fact stands, the simile is about looking for something where it cannot be found--in other words the wrong approach. So obviously, we would then ask "what's the right approach?"
Your second criticism is curious because it extends the simile beyond its intended scope. If you read back carefully you will see I did not assert that the implication of the simile on search for heartwood is that the spiritual man has to look toward other existing things to find his Self. That would have been taking the simile further than Ananda did, which is to say too far: the main point of the simile is just that if you look in the wrong place, you are guaranteed not to find what you are looking for. Ananda, seems to have understood, as I do, that all likenesses have their limits, and it only confuses the matter to extend the comparison beyond its applicability. The applicability of the simile here is to the wrong approach, and no more. Forestry has its own correct approach and the holy life another. It's why he begins to talk about the ultimate goal not in terms of the simile (which would, as you noted, imply searching amongst other hypothetical trees/khandhas in an objective way) but in terms of the man living the holy life becoming completely unagitated and thus achieving parinibbana within himself. In other words the man looking for Self would not find it with regard to the khandhas, but only by stilling his craving for all that which is other than himself.
This brings me to a point that has been persistant in this dialogue and I think needs seriously addressing. You seem to think that I am positing some existing further objective "thing" to be found that we would call "Self" if we could only find it somehow out there apart from the khandhas in the misty realm of the beyond. I tried to point out very early on that this would be an absurdity, and I never meant to imply it. Because in seeking, we are only extroverted and thus we could never find "ourselves" in an objective way (though the fact of the holy life and its goal ARE objective in a sense I could discuss below). We would be, so to speak, our own blind spot. A rough analogy would be trying to look at one's own face through a pair of binoculars. No matter where we looked or how fine the lenses of the binoculars, even if we inspected the binoculars themselves from all angles, we would never be looking upon our own face. I find that the Buddha is saying that we are objectifying ourselves (conceit) through clinging, and this is the cause of suffering. That this problem requires a different kind of approach to life than we formerly had, in other words a different approach than extroversion, was the mainstay of Buddha's entire teaching.
So, to clarify, as I believe Bobby just tried to, I am not proposing that because the khandhas are not-self that we are now to get involved in a search outside the khandhas for the objective outside-the-khandhas self in the same way that we were looking before. It is a total shift in perspective that is required, or to put it negatively and more accurately, a total stopping of the extroversion we call craving or in the case of this sutta "agitation". You can only "find" your Self when you cease to cling to that which is not your Self, including all that which we habitually cling to as our Self (the five khandhas) but have found through thorough contemplation not to be. But, let me again try to make this clear, this is not a "finding" in an objective sense like finding a shell on the beach--or heartwood in a pine tree.
I do hope that clarifies the matter somewhat. I admit it would be difficult for me to reveal more thoroughly than that what was intended there.
I am dismayed by your painful attempt to utilize the similes and analogies found in the Pali Canon in ways which are contrary to how they were originally intended to be used. The heartwood simile is quite prevelent throughout the Canon, and while it's meaning changes slightly depending on the various contexts it is used in, it is never used in the way you are proposing here. To attempt to make the Buddha's words mean something that they do not is to slander the Tathagata. In what way is this said? In the Buddha's own words:
Nowhere in the Pali Canon does the Buddha ever use this simile to represent a declared doctrine of self. You are misusing these teachings. In the Culasaropama Sutta, for example, the heartwood is analogous to the end of the holy life. In the Phena Sutta, it's absence, such as in the case of a banana tree, is used to signify the emptiness of experience. Either you are in dire need of more study, or you are indeed doing your best to misrepresent the Dhamma. I am sorry, but I cannot have anything more to do with this.
Regards,
Jason
In precisely what way am I making the simile say what it doesn't say? Are you trying to suggest that the heartwood in this simile does not stand for Self? If so what does it stand for? Or perhaps you are trying to say that a banana tree thus described does in fact have heartwood? That's interesting, because the sutta itself contains a description of the banana tree as lacking heartwood. Or maybe you are saying that a woodsman looking for heartwood in a banana tree thus described is not in fact looking unskillfully? If that were the case, we would not say he couldn't find it.
Please remember I'm not referring to the Culasaropama Sutta or the Phena sutta. Nevertheless, it should have been clear from my post that I understand the simile of the banana tree in this sutta is also about the emptiness of experience. That Self is not to be found in the eye and forms, etc, is a mainstay of the Buddha's teaching. We both know that.
I have stated my position clearly enough in the post. If you have missed it, then perhaps you simply need to reread it. Try to use your own discernment to figure it out. As I've said before, please continue this discussion without me.
I guess I never will understand it, then, because I've reread the post and still can't find the specific relevant criticism. My treatment of the heartwood simile in this sutta is actually very brief, and quite orthodox. A man looks for Self in the realm of the senses and fails to find it just as a man looking for heartwood in a banana tree will not find it. Seems pretty straightforward to me. That such a simile would be employed on those terms to illustrate a teaching on anatta should come as no suprise at all. It's really my analysis of paccattamyeva that I would have expected Jason to take issue with, not the basic simile of the banana tree. It's almost as if you would object to my saying "The Buddha teaches that the five khandhas are not-self, are empty of self"! Instead he objects so heatedly to the simile, which says what it says regardless of how one interprets the section that follows it.
"Now suppose that a man desiring heartwood, in quest of heartwood, seeking heartwood, were to go into a forest carrying a sharp ax. There he would see a large banana tree: straight, young, of enormous height. He would cut it at the root and, having cut it at the root, would chop off the top. Having chopped off the top, he would peel away the outer skin. Peeling away the outer skin, he wouldn't even find sapwood, to say nothing of heartwood. Then a man with good eyesight would see it, observe it, & appropriately examine it. To him — seeing it, observing it, & appropriately examining it — it would appear empty, void, without substance: for what substance would there be in a banana tree? In the same way, a monk sees, observes, & appropriately examines any fabrications that are past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near. To him — seeing them, observing them, & appropriately examining them — they would appear empty, void, without substance: for what substance would there be in fabrications?
This passage extends the metaphor on the emptiness of the khandhas/six sense spheres to include a clear-sighted man who stands for the monk who sees that the banana tree lacks heartwood. The sutta goes on quite beautifully, and I might say fortuitously to this discussion (this dialogue really has been enriching--I'm learning a lot), it contains that wonderful concept of self as refuge:
"Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with consciousness. Disenchanted, he grows dispassionate. Through dispassion, he's released. With release there's the knowledge, 'Released.' He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"
That is what the Blessed One said. Having said that, the One Well-Gone, the Teacher, said further:
Form is like a glob of foam;
feeling, a bubble;
perception, a mirage;
fabrications, a banana tree;
consciousness, a magic trick —
this has been taught
by the Kinsman of the Sun.
However you observe them,
appropriately examine them,
they're empty, void
to whoever sees them
appropriately.
Beginning with the body
as taught by the One
with profound discernment:
when abandoned by three things
— life, warmth, & consciousness —
form is rejected, cast aside.
When bereft of these
it lies thrown away,
senseless,
a meal for others.
That's the way it goes:
it's a magic trick,
an idiot's babbling.
It's said to be
a murderer.1
No substance here
is found.
Thus a monk, persistence aroused,
should view the aggregates
by day & by night,
mindful,
alert; should discard all fetters;
should make himself
his own refuge;
should live as if
his head were on fire —
in hopes of the state
with no falling away.
Again, I find it interesting that we have this reference to self in context of a teaching here on the emptiness of the khandhas (at Udayin on the anatta of the six senses). We here have it, unlike the Udayin sutta, in the form familiar to us in the Mahaparinibbanasutta, the concept of self as refuge, but here, as in the Udayin sutta, the reference to self is without the context that is touted in favor of a conventionalist interpretation of the Mahaparibbanasutta passage. This sutta is not at all about relying on one's own wisdom as opposed to that of others, and certainly not addressing the issue of a departing teacher. Instead, it is about the emptiness of the five khandhas. That one makes of self a refuge by abiding vigilantly with regard to what is not-self, free of all fetters (that tie one to what is not-self, empty), is pretty clearly the point here.
I just came across these quotes and they were like cool water for me in regards to this whole debate:
How long it has been since
The teaching of the pure
Essence was swept away?
Students are caught up
With the written word
And Buddhist priests are
Stubbornly obsessed with doctrine.
It's a shame that for
A thousand years
No one has spoken
Seriously of this essence.
Better to follow the children
And bounce a ball on these spring days.
- Ryokan (1758-1831)
and
The myriad differences
Resolved by sitting,
All doors opened.
In this still place I
Follow my nature,
Be what it may.
From the one hundred flowers
I wander freely,
The soaring cliff
My hall of meditation
- Reizan (1411)
Certainly Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s translation of “kareyya sara.nattano” besides being rendered “make himself his own refuge” can also be rendered more precisely as “make a refuge for the self”.
I have taken the time to include Dr. Perez-Remon’s take on this subject. Please ignore my typing errors if you see any, for I am a struggling typist.
“Thus considering the khandhas [as pithless], the bhikkhu, displaying energy,
Day and night self-controlled, mindful,
Should cast off all fetters, should make a refuge for the self (kareyya sara.nattano),
Should behave like one whole head is ablaze, aspiring to the unfailing state (accuta.m pada.m).
‘Making a refuge for the self’ is here connected with ‘casting off all fetters’ (jaheyya sabbasa.myoga.m), which is mentioned before, and the ‘aspiration for the unfailing state’ (patthaya.m accuta.m pada.m), which comes soon after. All this, added to the consideration of the khandhas as something illusory is an implicit but definite assertion of the reality of atta” (Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism, 25).
I hope this helps. At least it may show the beginner what he or she has to deal with when the canon is taken up as a whole. It may not be that self is denied but that the five khandhas are denied as being our self.
While some Buddhist schools wish to market the absence of self or sell it as illusory (I have never come across a passage which treats ‘self’ as illusory), in what Vac. and I have presented, another case can be made which, I believe, is more logical and systematic.
Ryokan was quite a lucky old man. When he turned 69, and suffering from ill health, good fortune brought him the nun, Teishin, who was forty years Ryokan's junior!
They both fell in love with each other, so the story goes. They delighted and enriched each other's company by composing poems, talking about Buddhism and maybe doing things lovers do.
The simile merely and aptly shows that a man looking for heartwood in the wrong type of tree would always fail to find it, meaning that a man assuming Self in the spheres of the senses is assuming unskillfully.
Vaccha,
Then for the simple fact of clarification alone will I contribute one more post to this lengthy discussion. I hope this explanation will satisfy your curiosity as to why I found your use of this simile so misleading.
My major discontent concerning your usage of the heartwood simile in the Udayin Sutta was how you concluded your interpretation of it. While you held true to the basic premise of the simile as regarding the experience of the six sense bases and their objects as empty of self, you ended it by assuming that this is simply due to the wrong type of tree (that of the six sense spheres). It seemed to me that you implied that the absence of heartwood in this particular usage represented the not-self nature of the six sense spheres due to the wrong type of tree, and if one were to take apart the right type of tree they would discover the heartwood of self. To me, this was bordering on implying a doctrine of self.
The main problem I had was that neither the Venerable Ananada nor the Buddha ever said this. If Ananda did in fact want to show this to be so, he would have continued with the simile in such a way as to make that image perfectly clear. The simple fact of the matter is that he does not do this. What he does do is end the simile right there, and continues on with his explanation of the simile that "a monk assumes neither a self nor anything pertaining to a self in the six spheres of sensory contact". He never says in this simile that there is any other kind of tree one could search. In this way, I thought that you were drawing inferences from statements that shouldn't have inferences drawn from them. However, the problem I had mostly appears to be cleared up by your following post to not1not2 so, I offer you my sincerest apologies.
As for the rest of the points you and Mr. Lanier have raised, I will remain silent. I do not wish to be further baited by either of you into this endless cycle of debate. Through non-attachment I shall be liberated.
Comments
By the way, the words we are using is not really the main content being exchanged here. While we may appear to be going in circles, we are actually exploring each other's realization and sharing it with each other. And while we apparently circle round each other, we are actually coming to a greater understanding of our own positions.
Anyway, take care & be well.
_/\_
metta
Brigid
Thank you for the invitation! When I have the time, I'll get out and stretch my legs a little.
Brigid
To start with, I'm not going to comment on any of the specifically Vedantic notions discussed at the beginning of the article. Such an examination could be useful in a thread about comparative philosophy, but for the purposes of this thread and as a devotee of Buddhism I view the teachings of the Buddha as a coherent whole without the need for reliance on other doctrines. Besides that, I'm quite inexpert in Vedanta, and barely know the first thing. I'd also like to stress that I'm not specifically speaking for any of the scholars the article points out, to avoid the necessity of quoting them or attempting to fairly represent their views. I'd like therefore to concentrate on a few problems I see in the Ven. Bhikkhu's arguments against Self in general.
The first objection I would make has been a theme of this entire thread, revisited a number of times so it need only be briefly be reiterated here. Ven. Khantichayo mentions the three marks(ti lakkhana) briefly in the context of the four noble truths, and obviously the one he wants to discuss and introduce is anatta. I believe he misdefines anatta, making the common mistake of over-generalizing (thus absolutizing and universalizing) the term glossing over its purely predicative value in favor of a total denial of Self altogether. Compare his definition of anatta (an outright denial of Self): to the entirely predicative use of the word given by the Buddha (S iii. 196 Radhasamyutta 17: anatta):
The former is based on inference, and clearly the forthcoming maneuvers the author makes are all necessary to justify this inference. This is the point where the author loses some of his clarity. It begins immediately, when he discusses the famous sutta where in Vacchagotta asks the Buddha on the existence or non-existence of Self, meeting with silence. He writes: Firstly, he writes as if this sutta does not teach anatta. The fact is, it does, only it mentions anatta in its rightly predicative sense, rather than the author's preferred absolute sense: . When the author writes "not in a negative, nihilistic way of 'non-reality'" I find it quite difficult to see how this is not a contradiction of his former assertion "there likewise is no constant “I” or “Mine”, eternal self or witness of the experience" or his conclusion "the impossibility of an everlasting anything, self or witness." Is he not in truth declaring the non-reality of self in a negative way?
He then addresses some specific views by authors I won't go into here, but I would like to address his comments on the attavagga of the dhammapada. He writes: Now, to begin with, rather than citing some grammatical cue (that, I'm guessing, does not exist) that here specifically the 'atta' is supposed to be read as a merely conventional reflexive pronoun, he makes the question-begging assertion that the "philosophical context" is the reason. Well, it's the "philosophical context" which leads others (myself included) to see this as an affirmation of the "Self" which every other thing is not (anatta). He then plays a shell game with the issue, haggling over the translation of the word "natho" as rather protector/refuge/support than lord. This correction is all well and good, but it serves the author to take our attention away from the fact that the word "atta" is indeed in use here, and verily does nothing to change the positive character of the passage, nor the contrast such words all highlight against the three marks which plague this individuality knowable only by the five khandhas (and invariably described as not-self, never self, and would never be called a protector, refuge) and which Ven. Khantichayo would like us to believe the Buddha is here referring to as self. He caps it off by noting Which seems to ignore the basic issue here. In denying Self in the Buddha's teaching, one really has to fall back on the notion that a person is nothing more than a collection of the five aggregates. What this intepretation of this passage ignores, in proclaiming self-mastery for such a "bundleman", so to speak, is the following teaching of the Buddha giving the reasons for proclaiming the khandhas to be not-self which it would be helpful to bear well in mind: Thus we are instructed that the khandhas are defined as not-self partly in the very lack of self-mastery which Khantichayo is here saying can be achieved by the person of the khandhas (the everyday 'self' identified only by the khandhas). The interpretation is unacceptable at least on the grounds which Khantichayo gives.
Back to the shell game with the next point the author discusses, the also famous passage of the Mahaparibbana sutta referring to atta as refuge. Obviously, Khantichayo maintains the same interpretation of "atta" as above. And again, he wants to haggle over translation of a word: "dipa" as island rather than light. Notwithstanding some slight ambiguity over the proper translation, the connotative meaning, since we can accept as quite possible that "island" is correct, remains similar to that discussed above: island as refuge from the flood of samsara, in other words, something above and safe from the water, solid ground on which one can depend. The Buddha can't here be suggesting that the individual personality, knowable as the five aggregates, which are ever in change and defined by the three marks, can relied on as solid ground, as safe refuge, nor that they can be made to become so. In the Buddha's discourse, to define something that is recognizably transitory, and subject to dissolution as a refuge would be highly anachronistic and opposite to the insistent motif of his teaching.
He goes on with the shell game in discussing the rest of the passage, this time by slight of hand palming the ball so that when all three cups are lifted, it appears to be gone altogether: Seeming to hope that our attention span is so brief that we would forget that the entire passage is about self as refuge and indeed opens up with the phrase, the occasion for his argument in the first place. The Buddha defines for us how one goes having self as refuge (by overcoming desire and sorrow with regard to the world --which we of course remember is not-self), but he does so, as we all learned to define things, without tautology. by saying "again no mention of Self as refuge", Khantichayo seems to want us to illogically think that just because the Buddha does not use a tautology in his definition, that somehow atta must be interpreted as a merely conventional reference to the individual personality known, as said before, by the five khandhas and not possibly as a transcendent Self. Let's be thankful that our dictionaries, like the Buddha in this instance, avoid this manner of defining concepts.
The rest of the article is basically nothing more than a quoting of passages which Khantichayo will hope the reader will have gotten the gist of interpreting as denying self altogether. Some of the issues addressed in those quotes have been discussed in this thread, including how sassatavada is defined.
The issue has already been covered, but it is worth mentioning again, that when Khantichayo asserts Nibbana is included in Sabbe Dhamma, he is assuming as established an issue that is at least at controversy. (see link below at paragraph end) Not only this, but he requires himself, in maintaining such an interpretation, to gloss on the actual phrasing and slip exegetical help not only into the translation but into the original Pali as well. The actual pali phrasing is "sabbe dhamma anatta''ti", but the author finds it necessary to add the qualifying suffix: he suggests what it really means to say is "dhamma-nijjivata". Then, in his translation, he sees fit to add to the word "things" the parenthetical commentary unsupported not only by the actual text in question, but also significantly at odds with the neatly and clearly defined scope of sabbe dhamma per the sabba sutta of "manifest or unmanifest". For an alternative discussion of the issue, see Thanissaro Bhikkhu's --Thanissaro can hardly be accused of being a crypto-vedantist-- translation of the Sabba Sutta and especially his notes: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-023.html .
I would like to conclude by focusing on the passage from S ii.96 (lump of cowdung). It's worth mentioning that this is the khandhavagga, forming the khandhas as the context and subject of suttas contained therein. The passage says: the words of which I couldn't agree with more, only the author wants the reader to forget that in the first part of the passage the point of reference is clearly established as the khandhas (of which we always remember the three marks), and to simply not know that the word "attabhava" does not carry the same meaning as simple "atta". "attabhava" refers, rather than to any possible atta that may transcend the existing creature, to the specific existing personality as distinct from others, past, future (one's own, former and future births) and current (that of others); the living creature, form, appearance. Compare to sanskrit equivalent "atmabhava" which means body.
ref. http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.0:1:533.pali
When "attabhava" remains unglossed, the meaning of the passage is clear: The Buddha's teaching would not be conceivable (nor even necessary) if our present form were eternal.
Those are the main points I've been wanting to respond to. Based on them I found the article to be rather unsatisfactory as an attempted clarification of the issue.
in friendliness,
V.
Here is a more scholarly presentation of the matter. I imagine you will just find more problems with this, but I found it to be a good & enlightening read:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/vonglasenapp/wheel002.html
_/\_
metta
http://www.beyondthenet.net/dhamma/nibbanaReal.htm
_/\_
Thanks for the replies. I found the first article to be interesting in spite of my lack of familiarity with both Guenther and Vedanta/Upanishads. As you predicted, I still found some problem areas, some of which are not much different from points of Khantichayo's article which I found problematic. Perhaps soon I will take the time to respond to it.
The second clip you made, though it be difficult to investigate since it is entirely without references to sources, feels to me as if it is only reinforcing a substantialist argument in a way that simply avoids using the word "self" (Glasenapp also seems to do this in the way he defines Nibbana towards the end), which I find to be a curious word game. Buddhists who shy away from the word "self" in the sense of the individual transcendence of the arhat don't seem hardly at all shy about attributing most of the things one would say about self (in transcendence) to Nibbana. This at least is somewhat more agreeable to my position, but I have to say I find those that are interested in mentioning these suspiciously substantialist (terms like amatam, accutam) notions of Nibbana seem fairly uncommon amongst the internet sangha. It seems to me a belief in Nibbana and a recognition of the very real not-self characteristic of the khandhas are about as close to a common ground we can arrive at between all participants of this discussion...and that's nothing to sneeze at.
In friendliness,
V.
I was looking at the first article you provided, when I came across something so puzzling I had to check up on it immediately.
In the Glasenapp article you cited, he claimed:
The kind of claim I am not familiar with. I thought that, if true, it would be a hard one to get around in this discussion, would probably require too many logical gyrations to explain away satisfactorily, so I thought to check the Udana for verification. What I discovered was curious:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/udana/ud8-02a.html
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/udana/ud8-02.html
alternate translation from PTS:
Needless to say, I was having a hard time finding the "not-self" or anything like it in any of these translations, thinking it particularly strange in a translation by a Theravadin Bhikkhu to fail to highlight the use of the word anattam. Attempting to go to the Pali versions available at metta.lk, I was disappointed to find that particular page down. Then, my recollection was aroused by the words "uninclined" and "infinite" found in two of the three translations I found. Seemed to me this had been discussed before. Sure enough, going to the beginning of this very thread, we have some discussion of this very term. Things started to become clear, and I realized that Glasenapp had made a grave mistake in his bold assertion. The word Glasenapp is claiming describes Nibbana as anattam (adj. not-self) is, contrary to his suprising assertion, anantam, which is indeed the word translated above as "unaffected," "uninclined," "infinite." No wonder "not-self" could not be found in any of the translations I had at my disposal! So the thread has come almost full circle. It would be useful now to reread those first few posts in this light.
PTS dictionary entries related to ananta (infinite):
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.0:1:1256.pali
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.0:1:1257.pali
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. I'm glad at least that you found that article...without it I might never have known exactly what Nam and Elohim were talking about!
I have to agree with you that it might be useful for us all to review the original posts. Perhaps it could help to add another dimension to this discussion. However, I would also like to reiterate that while Udana VIII.2 does not say that Nibbana is anatta (not-self), it also does not say that Nibbana is a "self" either. Nibbana is the cessation of greed, hatred, and delusion; it is the ending of stress. Whatever else Nibbana may entail, that was the Buddha's sole reason for realizing it.
When the Buddha refers to Nibbana as "the Unborn", as he does in Udana VIII.3, that simply means that it is unconditioned. Being unconditioned simply means that it is free from the characteristics of conditioned phenomena [dukkha and anicca]. This would not seem to include anatta, however, because anatta is "sabbe dhamma anatta" not "sabbe sankhara anatta". This same idea would apply to the reference of "the Deathless" as well. Basically, since Nibbana is unconditioned, it is free from birth, sickness, ageing, and death. So, not being subject to birth how could it be subject to death? These concepts simply do not apply to Nibbana whatsoever.
In any case, Udana VIII.2 in no way states that Nibbana is a "self". Trying to label Nibbana as a self is a gross misuse of the Buddha's teachings. The Buddha was simply trying to lead others to the end of suffering, he did not set out to establish a doctrine of self in anyway. As I've said before, if people wish to infer that, they certainly may, but making such inferences is, in my opinion, baseless. As Sariputta himself once taught, it merely complicates the uncomplicated.
Jason
Thanks for your reply. While I can see where you are coming from, and though I might be inclined to think (in practice, such thinking may not be applicable) that Nibbana is for/by Self (something difficult to put into words), I didn't intend, by making clear Glasenapp's error, to imply simplistically that the opposite is true.
I just felt it important to investigate the suprisingly ready claim on his part that Nibbana was unequivocally named anatta by the discourses. I found out the claim was unsupported, so it be known that the discourses do not specifically name something so highly praised and valued as Nibbana to be anatta, a term which always carries a negative meaning as something unworthy of an endearing attitude, something to be laid aside for one's well-being.
The argument that maintains Nibbana is included in the scope of Sabbe Dhamma, though based on a fairly logical inference based on the distinction between "dhamma" (in the Abhidhammic sense) and "sankhara", suffers from the fact that not only is "sabba" explained comprehensively as only the eye and forms, etc, and no other in the above-mentioned "sabba sutta" (for which the translator's notes are a help: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-023.html ) but also from the fact that Nibbana would be curiously the only factor of sabbe dhamma which is never explicity named anattam individually (while all others are). That this latter problem can only be contradicted by a serious error of translation of a single passage at Udana 8.2 mistaking what is actually anantam (uninclined, infinite) for anattam (not-self) seems fairly important to this discussion.
I don't want to assert that Nibbana is described as "a self" in the discourses, but rather would point out by way of suggestion that Nibbana is suprisingly associated with atta even in close association with teaching on anatta in such passages as this:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-193.html --Which requires some investigation on its own right, for here, in Thanissaro's translation we find the expression "totally unbound right within," which in Pali is paccattanyeva parinibbayati (see "paccatta" a compound joining pati and atta meaning as "paccattanyeva", according to the PTS: "separately, individually, singly, by himself, in his own heart"). So we find, just as an example in stark contrast to the erroneous assertion that Nibbana is named anattam, an expression making use of "atta" in very intimate association with a teaching on detaching (shall we say oneself?) from anything seen to be "anatta". I find that very intriguing.
ref. http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:975.pali
The appearance of such expressions in a positive light, in close association both with Nibbana and in connection with teaching on its opposite (anatta) definitely gives me pause for reflection.
in friendliness,
V.
I do not disagree with everything that you are saying. I have actually never used this Sutta before, but I can clearly see that it does not say that Nibbana is anatta. Also, there is an experience of Nibbana. This is clearly stated in the Suttas. There is full knowledge when birth is destroyed. This knowledge arises immediately in the arahant. But, that all takes place while there are still khandhas present. There is still a conventional person to experience this. So, there is no need for us to take the conventional usage of a word and try to make it include something beyond that.
But, for arguments sake lets say that there is a self of some sort. You cannot find anywhere in the Canon where the Buddha states that Nibbana is a self, for a self, by a self, etc. It is never described as such in any way. While Nibbana is indeed described in positive terms as well as negative ones, it is never described in any way as a self, of a self, for a self, in a self, or containing a self. The arahant is released, and that is the end of it. The Buddha goes no further. So, while it might be fun to try and see what it there intellectually, that it not what the Buddha taught.
As for Thanissaro Bhikkhu, he is of the same mind as I. He too feels that very question is unskillful. And, while he advocates some ideas that are not considered orthodox by many Theravadins, he does not go so far as to claim a self. He completely leaves the question of self alone. For one reason, the Buddha never delared a doctrine of self. To do so now would be to declare what was undeclared by the Blessed One. Another reason is that once Nibbana is experiecened, there is no need to fabricate anything else about it. It is itself the end of all fabrications. That is it.
In regards to the conversation between not1not2 and yourself as a whole, I am not trying to discourage it in any way. It is indeed entertaining. But, what I am trying to do is to educate anybody else that is reading this that the Buddha did not teach a doctrine of self. There was a very specific purpose for the Buddha's dispensation, and he was more than clear what it was. It is my idea that this purpose is obscured by the wandering minds of others into metaphysical doctrines, and doctrines of self. I simply feel that this is a great disservice to these profound teachings.
Jason
On a side note, I am wondering about your point regarding the word "sabbe". I am not completely convinced that "Sabbe" (The All), "Sabbe sankara..." (All conditioned things...), and "Sabbe dhamma..." (All things/phenomena...) all mean the same thing. I am not an expert in Pali, however, so I cannot really say too much about it. What I do know is that "sabbe" means "all", but it seems to depend on the context it is used. In one sense, as in "The All", it refers specifically to the eye and forms, ear and sounds, nose and aromas, tongue and flavors, body and tactile sensations, and intellect and ideas. But, in another context, as in "All conditioned things", it seems to simply mean "all". We should remember that one word can often be used in more than one way, so I would be curious as to what other reputable translators and scholars have to say about it. It would certainly help to clear up a lot of confusion.
Jason
Jason,
This is a quick reply, so please forgive me if it is not verbose. I appreciate your comments, but contrary to your above denials, I have already tried to show, in a single example, that Nibbana is in fact described as at least "in a self" by the Nikayan expression (which is not uncommon) paccattanyeva (a compound joining pati + atta + yeva) parinibbayati which was shown to mean "separately, individually, singly, by himself, in his own heart," keeping clearly in mind that the central element of the compound is "atta"/"self". We could discuss numerous other similar such common expressions which bear witness to the close Nikayan textual association between Nibbana, the anatta doctrine, and what we might call the interiority known as "atta"/self. For reference on this topic, I highly recommend the book Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism by Joaquin Perez-Ramon. I am sure you will certainly disagree with many of Perez-Ramon's interpretations, but I am confident that if you (or another reader of this thread) have any further interest in the issue that you would find it a highly useful book in that it will point out for you the many "hot spots" (key usages of the word "atta" in compounds and singly, well-referenced) of this very issue.
in friendliness,
V.
Be careful, you just may have betrayed yourself yet again my friend. As I recall, this very reference was also given by a dear friend of ours named NamThien2006. It is interesting to note some of the remarks concerning this man's dubious translations and general hypothesis. While some might find this book entertaining and convincing in it's extreme assertion of the Buddha's convictions in a self, I am not one of those people. I am sorry, but I do not consider this a reputable source. I do not say that simply because I disagree with its conclusion, but because I find it full of errors.
I also do not see how you could possible come to the conclusion that Nibbana is in fact described as at least "in a self" by the line "totally unbound right within". Perhaps it is easy to forget that although the khandhas are not-self, it is "within this fathom-long body" that there is dukkha, the origination of the dukkha, the cessation of the dukkha, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the dukkha. As I have said before, it apears to me that you are merely taking the conventional usage of a word and trying to make it reference something far beyond what was intended.
My apologizes.
Jason
The problem that I see here is that it appears there is an attempt to place a delineation of self in relation to Nibbana in some ambiguous way. The Buddha himself does not do so, and he warns others against such a thing when they try. While some might like to dream of what is there in this experience, and there are certainly mountains of speculative ideas floating around out there, these questions are left unanswered by the Blessed One and his disciples. In the arahant, there is no more thought of self. All views, positions, attachments, and clinging to such have completely been abandoned by the Noble disciple. Now, we on the outside looking in see the arahant, and we try to label what we perceive is there. The problem is that there is no longer anything left for one to perceive. This very idea is explained some what in various Suttas throughout the Canon. What we are trying to pin down, describe, and label is free from any such signs or features that would make this possible. That is presisely why one of the descriptions for the consciousness of the arahant is "anidassanam" (signless or without feature). A quick note about this from the Ven. Nanavira Thera elaborates:
As there is nothing for one to trace, the arahant's consciousness is completely untraceable as the path of a bird in flight. When we therefore talk about a self to this experience or in this experience, we are trying to conceptualize what is featureless, signless, etc. In essence, we are trying to do the impossible when we use a doctrine of self to explain Nibbana and the experience of arahantship. When we look at the arahant all we see is the remaining khandhas, the conventional person that still appears to us as existing, and we attempt to perceive what is left. We search for the self, the experiencer, the remainder after the cessation of the six sense bases, but this only serves to complicate the uncomplicated. How can a label be placed on what cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched, or cognized? How can we label a self in what is beyond all delineation, conception, sign, or feature? It tends to make me question why we still try. Just think for a moment of a reason for us to pin down some idea of what the Buddha said was beyond delineation in the first place. This effort merely seeks to ultimately turn the Dhamma into some metaphysical doctrine of self.
Jason
After all this time you still suspect that I am someone who I am not, and based only on a book recommendation you are telling that person to "be careful." I'm quite disappointed, and I don't know what to say. Do you have a hard time believing that more than one person out there could be interpreting the suttas in a similar way? Or that maybe after years of following these debates around the internet, having seen the same arguments marshalled on either side over and over that I might have been able, as a person capable of investigating the references cited (including Perez-Ramon's book) and thinking for myself, come to my own informed opinion on the matter? Did you get reinvolved in this thread just to start again suggesting that I am a banned user?
If there's anything tiresome about this thread, for me it has to be that one thing. Just when Not1Not2 and I had a good thing going. It just doesn't feel respectful at all when someone insists on continually insinuating that you are someone other than yourself.
Sometime later I may put together some more pointed comments responding to your otherwise thoughtful replies.
chagrined but respectfully,
V.
Tongue in cheek V.
When I said be careful, it was in reference to the fact that your views and references are suspiciously close to the recent Dark Zen-like participants that we've had visit this forum not so long ago. I just suspect that you are one of similar ideaology. I never said that you were the same person, though. What I was saying, however, was that you were merely offering up exactly the same ideas and references as he did. This presents to me the possibility that you are a part of that particular... cliche shall we say. Who really knows. I could be entirely wrong.
Whatever may be the case, you have so far participated in a respectful manner. I have absolutely no problems with you personally. I do not think that you are Nam, or that you deserve to be banned. I do have some issues with what you are presenting, however, and I am merely adding my thoughts on those matters. Alas, I apologize for getting reinvolved in my own thread. I shall do my best to never let it happen again. Perhaps you and not1not2 can just have a private dialogue, and I will remain a simple spectator. I will not bother to post on this thread again.
Au revoir mon ami.
Jason
Apologies for the misunderstanding. I hope you can forgive my seeing your words in that light, since it has before been suggested in this thread. It is just that you said I was "betraying myself" when I don't see how I have been anything but openly discussing the issue at hand. Why should I "be careful" when I am honestly discussing my views? To me, even assigning me to a clique or labelling me "dark-zen-like" sounds flatly dismissive, but I can set that aside as impertinant to the topic and so not important enough to worry over. That misunderstanding cleared up, I wish to clarify another in the interest of interpersonal peace on the thread.
I wasn't trying to begrudge your participation in this thread which you rightly pointed out that you opened, and truly, it wasn't that for which I would have wanted an apology, if I had wanted one at all. Your participation is entirely up to you, and I wouldn't want you to feel unwelcome in a debate that you initiated, and there is no need for sarcasm here. I wasn't trying to drive you away. You have made some points I may respond to, but I think it better, for my part, to ignore from here on out the personal insinuations. By all means, I hope you feel free to engage in the dialogue whenever you feel there is something relevant you would like to say, and I sincerely apologize for any discouragement.
in friendliness,
V.
I apologize for my sarcasm, personal insinuations, and whatever else that you may have found displeasing. To be completely honest, however, what I said was dismissive. As I have said before, I know that I sound harsh and arrogant, but unless you can offer me some convincing evidence for your views, I do not see any reason to take them seriously. As for DZ, I have a very strong distaste for the Dark Zen-like participants that invade the various Buddhist forums around, for whatever reason that drives them to do so, and the havoc they intentionally seem to instigate. From my personal perspective, I have seen their views, their references, and their disruptive tactics that follow enough to come to my own conclusions about them. None of them which are favorable.
Their views posit something in the Buddha’s teachings that nobody else sees, from our modern day traditions of Buddhism to the very beginnings of each respective tradition. In the Theravada tradition, for example, it is clearly seen that the Buddha does not teach a doctrine of self in any way. The suttas and commentaries make this quite evident. I do think that they tend to get a little "no self" happy these days for my own particular taste, but it is clear that from the very beginning a doctrine of self was not the focus of the Buddha's dispensation. As to their references, they often tend to use translations that are poor to say the least. And, when it comes time to share these magical findings about a self that nobody else seems to have noticed due to the conspiracy that some how covered this great secret up over the last 2,000 years or so, they use multiple fake names, malicious speech, and b.s. to do what... I don't really know. They simply appear to be completely deluded, or just out to cause a little trouble. Whatever the case may be, when I see these same ideas and references presented, I get more than a little suspicious.
That is why when it comes to some of your accusations and references concerning this self in relation to Nibbana, they are, in my opinion, highly suspicious. It is merely the same old arguments and examples that have already been introduced by them, and placed aside in the first place for whatever reason. If you have the honest and sincere wish to be taken seriously by more than just beginners to Buddhism who have not had sufficient enough time to study the Canons and subsequent commentaries, you will have to do much, much better that Joaquin Perez-Ramon and your curious attempts at deciphering a self in the apparently conventional usage of Pali grammar. While my Pali grammar is not quite up to par, it is easy enough to seek the guidance of many well respected experts in this field through various Pali forums, grammar courses, and such.
It just seems peculiar to me that only a small handful in the fringes can "find" this self, whereas the vast majority seems to have a completely different view of the matter entirely. I also find it odd that monastics who translate these vast collections, and live the holy life themselves, do not proclaim this suppositious self either. It would, of course, be them that would have the most direct experience of this wouldn't they? Of all the masters who has trained and practice with the utmost sincerity and effort in the Sangha of monks, not one that I am aware of has ever mentioned even a hint of some everlasting self in the Canon, or their direct experience. The closest they have come is the assertion that the question itself is not relevant at all, and not the real focus of the Buddha's teachings. Even in that event, this supposed self is not seen or even heard from.
Therefore, I now have my own conclusion as to question those who posit such an ambiguous self extensively. I would first question them as to why they even attempt to posit such a self. To what purpose do they want to convince others that there is indeed a self to be found, when the Buddha says that all views of self must be abandoned before one can experience the Deathless? What insights do they think that they have gleaned, and what will these do to help other sentient beings in their practice? Where did they get their information? What evidence do they have to present? How credible are these sources? Etc. etc. What is truly tiresome for me is going through the same old arguments and references repeatedly. The focus is taken off the true path, the path to liberation, and placed instead within a realm of back-and-forth speculative argumentation. What should really be more important to all practitioners is what the Buddha actually taught. The most important of all these things is, of course, the Noble Eightfold Path along the Four Noble Truths. No matter what the truth of the matter is regarding a self, no self, or the irrelevance of the very question, the Buddha was expressively clear that this was the only way to Nibbana. It is what he called the kamma leading to the end of kamma.
With this, I shall rest my case. I do not feel that my further participation in this thread will actually matter very much one way or another. It is really up to each individual to figure this out on his or her own. All that we can offer to one another is a little guidance along the way. But, I honestly doubt that many of the members here even read this thread anymore. They are probably tired of it, and have left it behind in order to continue trying to integrate Buddhism into their daily lives--which, in my opinion, is what we should be doing. The question of the meaning of anatta shall remain open, for there will always be questions about that which we seek to understand. It is only when we touch the unconditioned for ourselves that all questions will cease. It is only then that we will truly know.
Sincerely,
Jason
I appreciate your honest questions and comments, and as much as we may disagree on a controversial point, you have shown there are some more basic points to agree on. The common ground is indeed heartening. And I found this last paragraph of yours to be particularly well-said.
For my part I haven't seen how our discussion has strayed overmuch from the concerns of everyday practice, for a good part of what it means to be a Buddhist is drawing near to the Blessed One and listening to his teaching. In our position as modern Buddhists, this involves seeking out the recorded discourses and attempting to understand the sense and meaning of the words for ourselves. Because we cannot put into practice what we don't have a basic understanding of--which is not to say we must have all the answers before we endeavor on the path. A debate such as this is helpful, when emotional conceits are set aside, in testing our own feeling for the meaning of the master's words and the viability of the teachings in our lives.
We may rely on traditions and teachers to any degree we choose, but ultimately the meaning has to be hammered out in each of us to the tune of our own conscience. Maybe my views are not agreeable to many, but I have tried to offer as much as I can the thinking and reasoning and the various discourses of the Buddha behind the way I am compelled to see the teaching. I have tried to be as clear as possible, but perhaps I have failed in being convincing enough, or perhaps the weight of a prejudgement in such a controversy is just too much to overcome (and I realize that it works both ways)--because such insights are really only won within. What purpose does it serve? Well, without getting too much involved in the personal confessional, let's say that for years I was a Buddhist who would have denied Self as vehemently as any of the participants in this thread, and over time this controversy kept cropping up on the internet as I ventured to continue to study the Buddha's teaching through various traditions including mainly Zen and Nyingmapa. I was then and still am definitely a "learner" endeavoring in the understanding and putting into practice of the Buddha's teachings. I will admit that often somewhere involved in the debate was this or that well-known pro-self character whose names with which we are all probably familiar, and that I butted heads with on several occasions, but I was serious enough in my own opposition to their view to check up on references, read the books that they said discussed the issue from the point of view they espoused, but most of all I went to the Pali discourses and exposed myself to these early teachings of the Buddha more than I had ever done before.
I know the pali discourses mainly from very conventional translations like those found at access and sometimes those of the PTS or metta.lk, and though I never did really subscribe to the more radical translations of which some of us are acquainted, I was always willing to compare translations, the different meanings and glosses that can be used, along with the PTS dictionary (rather than summary glossaries of which there are numerous out there) to try to get a comprehensive sense of the possibilities many key terms could hold. I am by no means an expert in Pali nor a grammarian, but the more I went to the discourses of the Buddha and asked myself what I really thought was meant, the less in agreement with a Self-denying interpretation I found myself. In all fairness, I know that both Jason and Not1Not2 have said some very appropriate things disclaiming a denial of Self, which I rather applaud and feel we hold common in spite of serious disagreements about how openly the Buddha declared "Self as man's highest value."
sincerely,
V.
I just want to share with you this passage I found in the Khuddhaka Patha from a PTS translation. It is from a discourse in which a devata (god) illumines the Jeta grove and standing next to the Buddha spoke in verse. One verse in particular which caught my attention was this one.
Dwelling in region suitable and merit wrought in the past and right aiming at the (divine, the highest) self [attasammâpa.nidhi]: this is the luck supreme (mangalam uttama.m).
The translator mentioned in the footnote that the commentary had nothing to say about the compound "attasammapi.nidhi" which is astonishing given the belief of some Buddhists who espoused anatta as the principle teaching of the Buddha.
Love ya all,
Bobby
This translation strikes me as being peculiar. This was probably taken from a very early PTS translation, the 1915 edition of the Khuddaka Patha perhaps. While people like Mr. T.W. Rhys Davids, Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, etc. were pioneers in the field of early Pali to English translations, their understanding was not as accurate as it is today. For instance, Mrs. Rhys David's understanding of Buddhism was heavily influeneced by Theosophy. This could help to explain many of her "interpretations" of many key Pali terms. As Mr. Rhys Davids was apparently not a big fan of Theosophy, I am lead to believe that this could be a translation of hers. If not, it is quite possibly the work of F.L. Woodward, who adopted many of Mrs. Rhys David's interpretations.
The Pali of this passage, which is from the Mangala (Protection) Sutta, is as follows:
Here are some additional translations of this passage by various translators:
Jason
This is a common enough chant in Theravada Buddhism:
Perhaps you've even heard it when visiting a monastery.
Jason
At times, I have found Theravadin clerics to be quite dogmatic. Often, for the sake of their own traditions, they gloss over problematic areas such as the relationship between Mara, the Buddhist devil, and the five khandhas which are not the self (anatta). Judging from what we know of the khandhas and Mara, this would entail that the so-called no-self (anatta) is Mara!
As for the objection that Mrs. Davids was influenced by Theosophy throughout her works, which is a popular Theravadin assertion, it is arguably a fallacious assertion otherwise known as “damning the origin”. One is reminded of Socrates in the Phaedrus who shows the error of not caring whether a thing is or is not true, but rather who the speaker is and what country he came from. For me, this objection is baseless. The real task is to take up Mrs. Davids’ assertions, one at a time, leaving aside her possible motives and influences.
I am familiar with such arguments having come from a Christian background. Christianity is not without its scholars who sharply disagree on key elements of Christian history and Christology. No Christian scholar dares claim, for example, that he knows the Christianity of Paul. In addition, what we know of the synoptic Gospels is not by any accurate measure, indubitable.
Buddhism, for the West, is still pretty much of a mystery as its stands today. From my own theological background, I have found the current siege upon the self to be misdirected by some Western Buddhists who seem to be to be accommodating to secularism. Accomodationism is, of course, another issue.
Love ya all,
Bobby
Here is my brief treatment of this idea.
Purification and final liberation are not naturally occurring. We must employ self-exertion if we expect to reach final liberation. This is an inner process. It is not by way of God or the five aggregates that liberation is accomplished.
As long as we are under the jurisdiction of pa.ticcasamuppâda (i.e., dependent origination) which, incidentally, is not unconditioned, we can said to be bound to the effects of samsara--most notably--suffering.
Liberation, therefore, can be said to entail the breaking of the chain of pa.ticcasamuppâda by a factor transcendent to the latter, since the chain cannot automatically break itself (the Makkhali Gosala heresy was the belief of natural exertionless liberation in time).
The transcendent factor in the Nakayas which can break the chain is our self which is independent of pa.ticcasamuppâda. It is the agent of purification and final liberation. This is why this passage, which has have been discussing, makes so much sense from the perspective of an exerting self.
“Dwelling in a befitting place, and merit acquired from previous works, and right aspiration of the self (attasammâpa.nidhi), this is the supremely good omen” (trans., Dr. Péres-Remon).
Here, instead, of a denial of self, we have its affirmation in the sense of the immediacy of our authentic being which is trying to liberate itself from what is not itself. The aspiration, on the part of the self, is to do what is necessary to transcend the bonds of samsara which are governed by the formula of pa.ticcasamuppâda. Aspiration then moves to self-exertion (pahitatto).
Love ya all,
Bobby
Well, I really don't think this falls into your 'damning the origin' fallacy, as a Theosophical influence could very well distort one's interpretation of the suttas, as Elohim is asserting it did in the case of Mrs. Rhys Davids. Unless you can demonstrate that this did not influence the way she interpreted, then there is no grounds for asserting such a logical fallacy. And I think it is safe to say that Elohim cares about the truth of this matter. Are you suggesting otherwise?
Speaking of logical fallacies, construing the non-establishment of a Self among buddhists as a 'siege on the self' borders on straw man fallacy and is at very least sensationalist. Implying that buddhists are merely accomodating secularism is also without basis. It implies that at some other time and place, Buddhists did assert or believe in a Self, and that it is only here and now that they are attacking some existent Buddhist doctrine of Selfhood.
Honestly, until we have experienced unbinding, I don't think we can assert what lies beyond the aggregates. The best we can do is take the word of those who have. None of the great masters have ever asserted there was a self beyond the aggregates and neither have any of the traditions. In fact, it is said that anatta is a verifiable experience which renders such metaphysical questions moot. I have encountered a few individuals who have said to have had direct insight into anatta. And it has already been established that the buddha said that taking any view regarding the self is a thicket of views. All words we use are simply fabrications of the conceptual mind. Relying on fabrications as anything other than expedient means and regarding them as more than a finger pointing at the moon is folly.
Anyway, I'm not really even sure why I'm still replying on this thread. I guess I'm a compulsive debater.
And Bobby, until you actually go investigate these matters directly through the methods prescribed by the Buddha, you are being an armchair buddhist whose conclusions contradict the findings of Buddhist masters throughout the past 2500 years or so. Regardless of what intellectual display you demonstrate or how you spin obscure buddhist passages in a manner inconsistent with the teachings, you are speaking from the place of avijja. And your insistence on declaring something which is inconsistent with the teachings of all the masters, suggests that all the revered buddhists have gotten it wrong and you (a proclaimed Christian theologian) have somehow gotten it right. I just do not see how this is possible. Buddhism is not meant to be speculated upon. It is meant to be practiced. All the language and teachings are specifically geared towards practice and describe the fruits of practice. If you are speaking from a place outside of practice, then it is likely you are missing the point. That said, I'm bordering on using the ignore function, which I have never used before. I will not do this lightly, but I have suspicions that you are trolling and that you may be associated with the DZ people. Honestly, your manner of speaking is accusatory on an implicit level, and seems to be intended to stir things up. Anybody who has as much knowledge of the Buddhist Canon as you do, would recognize how non-astonishing the anatta doctrine is and should be aware of how Buddhists have never accepted a Self doctrine. The fact that you are surprised indicates that either you are lying, or you are not as informed as you should be. Either way, this debate is taking a negative turn.
take care & be well
_/\_
metta
It has become a little more personal than theoretical.
Both sides have posted a lot of interesting material for everyone to absorb - I think it might be best to finally agree to disagree.
I wouldn't want to see a loss of participation of ~any~ members due to what might possibly be construed as a personal attack.
-bf
I agree with you both in the sense that this thread has taken on a personal nature. I do not think that this can be avoided, however. In cases like this, it is not only the information that has to be scrutinized. It should also be the person who offers that information. I am not saying that we should all place our names, addresses, and social security numbers on our profiles, but I am saying that we should dig a little bit deeper when it comes to these types of claims. On the internet, anyone can claim anything, and offer any amount of evidence to prove such a claim. And, as we have all seen before, certain people are not above being dishonest through and through. I feel that it is almost a duty for the people who have had more experience with Buddhist texts and history to try and find out who is being truthful, and who is being untruthful. Unfortunately, sometimes that can get personal.
When I see people who claim that some strange conspiracy of Theravadins are trying to cover up the Buddha's real doctrine of self... that leads me to one obvious conclusion--something fishy is going on. But, I do not stop there. I continue to participate and listen to what they have to offer. Sometimes, they really have some good information, and a different perspective which I take seriously. However, in other cases they are just doing their best to misinform people. In this case, I believe that through the evidence presented to us, the later is true. Too many things that have been said on this thread correlate with what was said by our previous members such as mujaku, NamThien2006, and M. Bolden. It is humorous as well as alarming to me that as soon as I saw this translation and knew where it came from, Mr. Lanier had to throw out the fallacy of "damning the origin" card, and the "siege upon the self" by "Western Buddhists who seem to be to be accommodating to secularism" card. To me, this is an immediate red flag.
As for Mrs. Rhys Davids, I admitted that she was a pioneer in her field. Mrs. Rhys Davids and her husband did excellent work. However, that was when the Western understanding of Pali grammar was in its rudimentary phases. Today, much more information is readily available to scholars and translators alike. Also, I believe that the rumors of Mrs. Rhys David's Theosophical biases should be seriously considered. I do not know that she was influenced by Theosophy for a fact, but I have read it enough times to take the claim seriously enough. It would certainly have a profound effect on her understanding of Buddhism in general. I encourage anyone who is unfamiliar with H. P. Blavatsky and Theosophy to research more about them. You will clearly see how their views, which were quite popular at the time, could cause some misunderstandings of a lost Buddhist language.
What confuses me the most is how something that appears to reference a conventional self is automatically taken to mean something other than that. I think that this is definitely easy enough to do if such passages stand alone, but when we look at the greater whole we can quickly get a clearer picture. The Mangala Sutta is a short Sutta in which the Buddha expounds upon the highest protections or blessings at the request of a deva. If you read the entire Sutta, and take everything into context, you will see that it is speaking of a person in conventional terms. One line that helps to show this is two lines down from the one in question. It states as follows:
Here we can see that one of the highest blessings is the support for one's parents, wife, children, and jobs that are not left unfinished. This has nothing at all to do with some embodied self, or transcendent soul. While atta can mean soul, it can also mean oneself. It depends entirely on the context and compounds it is used in. If you look at any Pali dictionary, there are many, many words with "atta" in them. Many of them have quite conventional meanings. Here are just a few example: aggatta (pre-eminence), ajjhatta (personal; connected with the self), ajjhappatta (having fallen upon or approached unexpectedly), aññathatta (alteration; change of mind), aḍḍharatta (midnight), etc. So, as we can see, just because "atta" is in a compound does not make it automatically mean that a transcendent self is being referenced. The presence of this word alone cannot prove or disprove anything of the sort. As we shall see, the compound itself can be easily broken down in to its three constituent parts. If we take it apart, we will have atta (soul; oneself), sammâ (properly; rightly; thoroughly), and pa.nidhi (placing down [-forth]; hence; direct; fix). It is not hard to see the use of "atta" as "soul", but it is also not hard to see its use as "oneself", hence we can have the translation of "directing oneself rightly".
There are also other points in Mr. Lanier's argument which I find incorrect, but I do not have the time to pursue them further right now. It would take some time for me to find all of the necessary Sutta passages to prove my points, and I do not have the time to find them all. However, based on what we do have in front of us, I would actually have to agree with not1not2. If we look back at what the past few people who we know for sure came to cause trouble said, and then compare that with what is being presented to us here, it's just the same old wolf in sheep’s clothing. Not only is Mr. Lanier promoting that the secular Theravadin "clerics" are covering up the Buddha's true teachings of self, but he is also using the very same references as the others who previously claimed this.
For the life of me, I cannot understand why it is mostly outdated PTS translations, and Dr. Péres-Remon that they can offer to us as evidence for these claims. Many of these translations are from the early 1900's. While they are definitely good, they are not perfect. Today, we have the benefit of having other comparable texts, in other languages, to use as guides. For example, today we have the Pali version of the Samyutta Nikaya, and we also have the Chinese version of the Samyutta Agama. The same text, but in two different languages. From this, we can compare each and see how certain words and passages were used in context. It gives us a much greater understanding of how to better translate these ancient texts.
In short, if there were more reputable and current sources presented to us, I would be more inclined to take these views quite seriously. However, until then I will do my best to give the other side of the story so that others will have the necessary information to make up their own minds. While I do not claim that I am correct in all of my assertions, I am claiming that I am confident about what I say as being in line with the Dhamma. My years of study, practice, and consultations with various teachers are the sources of this confidence. I most certainly could be wrong in my interpretations of the information presented to me here, and I am willing to admit that I am wrong if-and-when those interpretations are proved to be false, but only when such evidence is provided to me shall I do so. Also, I am not stranger to this forum. I do not hide behind any masks. While I do use the name Elohim, I am completely forthright about my real identity. While this does not prove anything, it does go so far as to show that I am who I say I am. I hide behind nothing because I do not have anything to fear by sharing the truth. I am even willing to play the villain and get a little personal when I feel that others are being less than truthful. I apologize for my continued participation in the thread, and for making it personal, but I feel that this is a topic which is far too important to leave unchecked. I simply feel that I have a responsiblity to all of our memebers to do what I can to remove the wolf's disguise.
Sincerely,
Jason
I understand what you're saying.
I understand how you feel.
I know how passionate you are about this.
I know that everyone has a right to their own beliefs. Even if we disagree with them. If there weren't differences, there wouldn't be different factions of Buddhism.
And I honestly gave up on this thread being informative about 5 pages ago.
Maybe I'm just in this boat all by myself. And if so, I apologize. I'll refrain from any more comments on this thread.
-bf
I realize that most people probably don't care about this thread, or the majority of the things that I have to say in it, but I still feel that the Dhamma is important enough for me to put the appropriate evidence out there for those that might be interested. There will eventually come a time when the beginner will stop being a beginner, and they will subsequently need to move on to the next level of study and practice. The practice as taught in the Pali Canon is nothing less than a long process of understanding. That is why it is referred to as anupubbi-magga (gradual path), and the Buddha's way of teachings as anupubbi-katha (gradual training). If people begin this transformation of learning and experience with the wrong information, their practice will suffer greatly for it. That is why we have teachers in the first place. They help guide us towards what is truly going to be beneficial to us and our practice. I am certainly not saying that I am the authority on what that is, but I make it my duty to do the very best I can. If I didn't feel that it was important to those looking forward in their studies, I wouldn't bother doing it. I truly believe that to really understanding something, to live it with every fiber of your being, you must be passionate about it. Those are my thoughts about it anyway.
Regards,
Jason
They asked for it, they wanted it - and here it is.
HOWEVER:
The Buddha encouraged his monks to teach the Dharma in a way that could be understood and comprehended by the people they taught it to.
The virtual entire content of this thread is practically double dutch to all but a few members of this forum.
I have no qualms in admitting that I am one of those.
therefore, I can only conclude that the Dharma is not being taught to me in a way that I can understand it.
Whether that's my "fault" or anyone else's, I am certainly not at liberty, or in any position to say.
Attempts have been gingerly made by others to smooth out a few ruffled feathers, and to attempt to reach a common ground of courtesy and mutual respect, but it has more often than not, been ineffective. It would seem that even gentle hints by the resident, 'yours truly' Moderator, have fallen on deaf ears.....
It is sufficient to note that the debate is truly between people who are advanced in their knowledge, and that they are well-read in this field.
I would therefore respectfully propose that the only course of action for those who can glean something from this, is to participate.
For those who know they are in way too deep over their heads, to stay away.
If it is reduced to a personal slanging match, with content of criticism, ridicule, suspiscion, derision, disbelief or vilification of whatever kind, and to whatever standard - that is up to the members of this thread to deal with.
Gentlemen, (and curiously, it is only gentlemen - !!) you know who you are.
Feel free to continue your debate in whichever vein you feel appropriate. I am so far down the ladder as to be completely redundant and ineffective here, so I wish you Joy and here's to a fruitful and animated discussion. By all means carry on, but this is as far as Moderating wise, I can go.
If however, I receive direct complaints from any member of this forum, via PM's as to content, tone, or language, I shall return.
But only then.*
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-193.html
I want to take a closer look at it. Jason wrote: "I also do not see how you could possible come to the conclusion that Nibbana is in fact described as at least "in a self" by the line "totally unbound right within"." For me it is fairly evident, and there are a few points to discuss in specific relation to this usage.
To begin with, I believe it has been established as fair (to my thinking) to say that the reference to Self (atta) in the Mahaparinibbanasutta which we discussed is at best ambivalent. I can see that the conventionalist has some ground (though by the way I see it, very narrow turf, and unsteady) to stand on in sticking to their reading by the context that the master is dying and the monks will be wondering on whom to rely. I would say that this interpretation is not even necessarily contradicted by my own (that the Buddha is teaching for the monks to go with Self as refuge in contrast to anything worldly, including the existing personality) but would rather be included under it, for in a teaching on giving up delight and sorrow with regard to the world to go towards Self as refuge, this would include reliance on other personalities as well.
So, if the conventionalist interpretation has any merit in that case based on the context, we might ask if such a context can be seen in the Udayin Sutta to aid us in interpreting the remarkable usage of the "atta" in such close connection with parinibbana in a teaching on anatta. In such a sutta, we have, so to speak, the whole package of the issues we have been discussing all together in one beautiful teaching. The sutta is very brief, and it doesn't take a very long search to come to the conclusion that no, the immediate philosophical context does not have anything whatsoever to do with putting aside reliance on other persons, in particular teachers, for one's spiritual well-being. In fact, the philosophical context is established very clearly as Udayin's question to Ananda on anatta and the extent of such doctrine. Udayin, we could imagine laboring under some uncertainty regarding the fate of consciousness beyond this individual existence, asks Ananda if consciousness too, along with body, can be declared anatta in the same manner. Ananda, of course, replies that it can, and goes on to elaborate.
Towards the conclusion of Ananda's words, we have an interesting simile. He says: Can we not agree that in this simile that 'heartwood' here stands for Self?
Now, one who would assert a merely conventional interpretation of "atta" or one who denies Self might see this simile as an affirmation that the teaching of the Buddha denies Self altogether, that the simile highlights the impossibility of Self. But it does not take much to see that this is not really the case here. The simile merely and aptly shows that a man looking for heartwood in the wrong type of tree would always fail to find it, meaning that a man assuming Self in the spheres of the senses is assuming unskillfully.
Having established the context as a teaching on anatta, and summarizing the teaching with a simile on the unskillful search for heartwood, the sutta's conclusion is striking: Of interest here is "Assuming in this way, he doesn't cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within." and in particular the fact that "totally unbound right within" is an expression making use of a compound built around "atta": paccattamyeva parinibbayati. We might do well to examine, if we can, the composition of this word "paccattamyeva". As was said before, the word is composed of three elements: pati + atta + yeva. When we have pati and atta together we have paccatta which means "separate, individual; usually acc. ˚&ntail; adv. separately, individually, singly, by himself, in his own heart"... and here we have yeva which is an "emphatic particle, meaning "even, just, also""
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:1128.pali
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:975.pali
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.3:1:552.pali
Obviously to me, the paccattamyeva adds something meaningful here to the parinibbayati. For the conventionalist would be quite satisfied if the word paccattamyeva were not even here at all. But in fact we not only have atta here in direct stark contrast with a clinging to what is not-self (anatta, ie not atta) but we have it in compound form the elements of which add a particular highlight to the contrast (instead of dampening it). For pati (see PTS discussion above) at the beginning adds directionality and a kind of rhetorical rebound (as if to say "on the other hand") to the sense of the word. And yeva is a suffix of emphasis meaning "even, just, also", again highlighting the contrast implied by the appearance of the "atta" in most intimate connection with parinibbana at the ultimate conclusion of a teaching on its opposite, anatta.
Having examined all that, with all respect to Thanissaro as a bhikkhu, I am not at all convinced that "right within" as a translation clarifies the meaning of the expression very much, and to assume it as ably contradicting an interpretation which affirms that parinibbana is "in self" is not very persuasive. Instead of highlighting the rhetorical implications of emphasis found in the addition of pati and yeva to atta, it glosses the word over as an insignificant redundancy (where else would Unbinding take place but "within" and how else within but "right"?), quite easily overlooked in the english whereas its appearance is at least notable and rather striking in the Pali.
in friendliness,
V.
I find your interpretation of the 'heartwood' analogy to be strange. You suggest the interpretation to be that banana trees simply don't contain heartwood, and that the person needs to look to a different kind of tree to find some. This means that for the reader to understand the analogy properly, they would have to have a proficiency in the knowledge of trees. This seems like a strange sort of analogy, as it contradicts the obvious meaning which suggests that by inspecting the tree, piece by piece in the manner described, there is no internal core left to be spoken of. Generally speaking, the buddha used more obvious analogies, as to make the teachings quite clear. The fact that he did not continue on to say that they should look for a kind of tree with heartwood speaks quite loudly on this subject, imo. It would have been quite odd for the buddha or his community of bhikkhus to leave out this important information, when there is a conclusion which is much more apparant to the hearer. Do you have any information which backs up this interpretation?
Now, the more problematic part of this interpretation is that it suggests that the Atta is to be found in some other set of aggregates, whereas I believe the Buddha quite definitively stated that there aren't any other aggregates to speak of. Furthermore, this seems to contradict the Buddha's message that the whole of the holy life could be found 'within this fathom long body'. Now, you could still suggest that the Atta is to be found outside of this body (though I would disagree), but then such a search would fall outside of the holy life prescribed by the Buddha, and would be impossible to verify as well.
_/\_
metta
I am dismayed by your painful attempt to utilize the similes and analogies found in the Pali Canon in ways which are contrary to how they were originally intended to be used. The heartwood simile is quite prevelent throughout the Canon, and while it's meaning changes slightly depending on the various contexts it is used in, it is never used in the way you are proposing here. To attempt to make the Buddha's words mean something that they do not is to slander the Tathagata. In what way is this said? In the Buddha's own words:
Nowhere in the Pali Canon does the Buddha ever use this simile to represent a declared doctrine of self. You are misusing these teachings. In the Culasaropama Sutta, for example, the heartwood is analogous to the end of the holy life. In the Phena Sutta, it's absence, such as in the case of a banana tree, is used to signify the emptiness of experience. Either you are in dire need of more study, or you are indeed doing your best to misrepresent the Dhamma. I am sorry, but I cannot have anything more to do with this.
Regards,
Jason
A point to remember, it is crucially significant that eternalism believes that at least one of the khandhas is the self. Neither I nor Vacchogatta have made such a case. We have essentally claimed, like the Buddha, that the khandhas are not the self, in the sense of the via negativa.
Love ya all,
Bobby
Thank you for the reminder.
Jason
Please carry on this discussion without me.
Best regards,
Jason
I'm a beginner. I sit. I read one precept everyday and use that as a tool to guide my interactions and my internal conduct. What do you recommend, Elohim, to be the first step in the gradual road of study? Where can I start to nibble at the huge meal that is the cannon of Buddhist teaching?
questZENer,
The Best Way To Learn? A Search Through The Pali Canon.
Best wishes,
Jason
Here I must say I'm suprised you misunderstood me so much, but I apologize if it had anything to do with a failure of clarity on my part. I suspect that it is more difficult to follow the rationale of someone whom you already disagree with. Nonetheless I would like to try to elaborate such that my point is less likely to be misunderstood. To begin with, I fully understand that all similes are like cars; they all break down at some point. Har de har har.
The fact that banana trees thus described don't contain heartwood (further, if one doesn't know what heartwood is, it's not the teacher's fault--face the fact, this is the simile he uses here and a 21st century person's ignorance on the terms of the simile does not change that) would have probably been quite common knowledge at the time and place of this discourse, just as it is pretty common knowledge around the north woods where I live that pine trees do, in fact, have heartwood. Even so, the simile itself skillfully makes the issue of how much you know about a banana tree a non-issue, because the description provided by Ananda itself contains an illustration of the composition of a banana tree, which you might have missed: "He would cut off the roof, cut off the crown, and unfurl the coil of the stem. There he wouldn't even find softwood, much less heartwood." There it is, Ananda has described for you that the young banana stem does not contain heartwood but is a curled form, so you really don't need any proficiency of knowledge about banana trees at all. So the fact stands, the simile is about looking for something where it cannot be found--in other words the wrong approach. So obviously, we would then ask "what's the right approach?"
Your second criticism is curious because it extends the simile beyond its intended scope. If you read back carefully you will see I did not assert that the implication of the simile on search for heartwood is that the spiritual man has to look toward other existing things to find his Self. That would have been taking the simile further than Ananda did, which is to say too far: the main point of the simile is just that if you look in the wrong place, you are guaranteed not to find what you are looking for. Ananda, seems to have understood, as I do, that all likenesses have their limits, and it only confuses the matter to extend the comparison beyond its applicability. The applicability of the simile here is to the wrong approach, and no more. Forestry has its own correct approach and the holy life another. It's why he begins to talk about the ultimate goal not in terms of the simile (which would, as you noted, imply searching amongst other hypothetical trees/khandhas in an objective way) but in terms of the man living the holy life becoming completely unagitated and thus achieving parinibbana within himself. In other words the man looking for Self would not find it with regard to the khandhas, but only by stilling his craving for all that which is other than himself.
This brings me to a point that has been persistant in this dialogue and I think needs seriously addressing. You seem to think that I am positing some existing further objective "thing" to be found that we would call "Self" if we could only find it somehow out there apart from the khandhas in the misty realm of the beyond. I tried to point out very early on that this would be an absurdity, and I never meant to imply it. Because in seeking, we are only extroverted and thus we could never find "ourselves" in an objective way (though the fact of the holy life and its goal ARE objective in a sense I could discuss below). We would be, so to speak, our own blind spot. A rough analogy would be trying to look at one's own face through a pair of binoculars. No matter where we looked or how fine the lenses of the binoculars, even if we inspected the binoculars themselves from all angles, we would never be looking upon our own face. I find that the Buddha is saying that we are objectifying ourselves (conceit) through clinging, and this is the cause of suffering. That this problem requires a different kind of approach to life than we formerly had, in other words a different approach than extroversion, was the mainstay of Buddha's entire teaching.
So, to clarify, as I believe Bobby just tried to, I am not proposing that because the khandhas are not-self that we are now to get involved in a search outside the khandhas for the objective outside-the-khandhas self in the same way that we were looking before. It is a total shift in perspective that is required, or to put it negatively and more accurately, a total stopping of the extroversion we call craving or in the case of this sutta "agitation". You can only "find" your Self when you cease to cling to that which is not your Self, including all that which we habitually cling to as our Self (the five khandhas) but have found through thorough contemplation not to be. But, let me again try to make this clear, this is not a "finding" in an objective sense like finding a shell on the beach--or heartwood in a pine tree.
I do hope that clarifies the matter somewhat. I admit it would be difficult for me to reveal more thoroughly than that what was intended there.
in friendliness,
V.
In precisely what way am I making the simile say what it doesn't say? Are you trying to suggest that the heartwood in this simile does not stand for Self? If so what does it stand for? Or perhaps you are trying to say that a banana tree thus described does in fact have heartwood? That's interesting, because the sutta itself contains a description of the banana tree as lacking heartwood. Or maybe you are saying that a woodsman looking for heartwood in a banana tree thus described is not in fact looking unskillfully? If that were the case, we would not say he couldn't find it.
Please remember I'm not referring to the Culasaropama Sutta or the Phena sutta. Nevertheless, it should have been clear from my post that I understand the simile of the banana tree in this sutta is also about the emptiness of experience. That Self is not to be found in the eye and forms, etc, is a mainstay of the Buddha's teaching. We both know that.
I have stated my position clearly enough in the post. If you have missed it, then perhaps you simply need to reread it. Try to use your own discernment to figure it out. As I've said before, please continue this discussion without me.
J.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn-22-095-tb0.html#heartwood
This passage extends the metaphor on the emptiness of the khandhas/six sense spheres to include a clear-sighted man who stands for the monk who sees that the banana tree lacks heartwood. The sutta goes on quite beautifully, and I might say fortuitously to this discussion (this dialogue really has been enriching--I'm learning a lot), it contains that wonderful concept of self as refuge:
Again, I find it interesting that we have this reference to self in context of a teaching here on the emptiness of the khandhas (at Udayin on the anatta of the six senses). We here have it, unlike the Udayin sutta, in the form familiar to us in the Mahaparinibbanasutta, the concept of self as refuge, but here, as in the Udayin sutta, the reference to self is without the context that is touted in favor of a conventionalist interpretation of the Mahaparibbanasutta passage. This sutta is not at all about relying on one's own wisdom as opposed to that of others, and certainly not addressing the issue of a departing teacher. Instead, it is about the emptiness of the five khandhas. That one makes of self a refuge by abiding vigilantly with regard to what is not-self, free of all fetters (that tie one to what is not-self, empty), is pretty clearly the point here.
in friendliness,
V.
and
Good day all
_/\_
metta
I have taken the time to include Dr. Perez-Remon’s take on this subject. Please ignore my typing errors if you see any, for I am a struggling typist.
I hope this helps. At least it may show the beginner what he or she has to deal with when the canon is taken up as a whole. It may not be that self is denied but that the five khandhas are denied as being our self.
While some Buddhist schools wish to market the absence of self or sell it as illusory (I have never come across a passage which treats ‘self’ as illusory), in what Vac. and I have presented, another case can be made which, I believe, is more logical and systematic.
Love ya all,
Bobby
They both fell in love with each other, so the story goes. They delighted and enriched each other's company by composing poems, talking about Buddhism and maybe doing things lovers do.
Love ya all,
Bobby
Vaccha,
Then for the simple fact of clarification alone will I contribute one more post to this lengthy discussion. I hope this explanation will satisfy your curiosity as to why I found your use of this simile so misleading.
My major discontent concerning your usage of the heartwood simile in the Udayin Sutta was how you concluded your interpretation of it. While you held true to the basic premise of the simile as regarding the experience of the six sense bases and their objects as empty of self, you ended it by assuming that this is simply due to the wrong type of tree (that of the six sense spheres). It seemed to me that you implied that the absence of heartwood in this particular usage represented the not-self nature of the six sense spheres due to the wrong type of tree, and if one were to take apart the right type of tree they would discover the heartwood of self. To me, this was bordering on implying a doctrine of self.
The main problem I had was that neither the Venerable Ananada nor the Buddha ever said this. If Ananda did in fact want to show this to be so, he would have continued with the simile in such a way as to make that image perfectly clear. The simple fact of the matter is that he does not do this. What he does do is end the simile right there, and continues on with his explanation of the simile that "a monk assumes neither a self nor anything pertaining to a self in the six spheres of sensory contact". He never says in this simile that there is any other kind of tree one could search. In this way, I thought that you were drawing inferences from statements that shouldn't have inferences drawn from them. However, the problem I had mostly appears to be cleared up by your following post to not1not2 so, I offer you my sincerest apologies.
As for the rest of the points you and Mr. Lanier have raised, I will remain silent. I do not wish to be further baited by either of you into this endless cycle of debate. Through non-attachment I shall be liberated.
Farewell,
Jason