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No control—the absence of choice in the present moment?
Jason
God EmperorArrakis Moderator
Everyone,
To begin with, there was a discussion about decision-making from the Abhidhamma standpoint on another forum, and someone said, “There is also no real control—you and your actions are all conditioned, the consequence of kammic accumulations ... i.e. the result of everything (all causes and conditions) which has come before."
I thought that perhaps I had simply misunderstood the wording here, but I did not think that it was correct to say that there is no control, or that our actions were solely the result of what has come before. When stated like this, it appeared to me to represent the Jain's doctrine of kamma in that it did not account for present intentions. If absolutely everything were the result of the past, liberation would not be possible.
As far as I understand this concept, the experience of the five aggregates is the result of past kamma, and whatever is done with body, speech, or mind is present kamma (SN 35.145). Even though the world of our experience is conditioned, the Buddha — as far as I understand him — taught that there is an element of control in the present moment.
Essentially, not only did the Buddha refute the Jain's idea of kamma (MN 101), which stated that whatever a person experiences — pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain — all is caused by what was done in the past, but he often stressed the importance of self-control due to the consequences of our actions (Dhp. 9-10) (MN 41) (MN 136) (SN 10.12).
While I was certainly not trying to suggest that there was a self somewhere in this equation, it begged to ask the question, if there were absolutely no element of control involved at all, what would be the purpose of such teachings? Logically speaking, if we were unable to exert any control in the present whatsoever, with our experiences being completely conditioned by past kamma alone, we would have to burn off our old kamma to escape samsara.
However, when I inquired as to what allows for the possibility of choice in the present moment, I was told by the Venerable Dhammanando that there was nothing. An example that I was given was a mosquito bites you on the nose, you feel annoyed and want to squash it, but then you recall that you're a precept-observing Buddhist and so restrain yourself. When this event is described in conventional terms, or according to the Sutta method, it might be said that you had a choice to kill the mosquito or to refrain, and that you chose the latter. But when it is described according to the Abhidhamma method, your abstention from killing was not due to choice but to the arising of kusala cetasikas (wholesome mental factors) such as moral shame and fear of wrong-doing (hiri & ottappa), and abstinence (virati).
There were many other examples that other people offered to me, including a passage from the Dhammasangani (pp. 7-8):
As well as from the Atthasalini, pp.147-148:
It was also mentioned that the Patthana goes into enormous detail about the 24 paccaya (conditions)—some of which are past and some present. Nevertheless, according to these people, even the present ones do not simply arise out of nothing. Nor do they arise because "I" want them to. The processes of mind are happening at enormous speed and there is no "person" who can do anything to stop them or change them. Even the cittas that are arising at this moment are conditioned by previous cittas as well as well as by other conditions that are present at the same time.
The basic gist of everything was apparently pointing towards the refutation that there is an agent that acts, that in the present moment, citta arises accompanied by cetasika. These arise together, each having its function. These fall away, conditioning the next complex, this arises immediately without a gap. With each having its own function, citta and the accompanying mental factors "perform" these functions. The consciousness of the moment has its own flavor, as it were, given the combination and nature of its constituents, which arise together with it by conditions.
In essence, what they were saying was that there is no khandha under our control (MN 35); therefore, there is no control. In addition, since this takes into account past kamma as well as present kamma, both being conditioned and further conditioning the present moment, it is not guilty of the Jain's wrong view of kamma. When put into those words, it does make sense to me, however, I still feel like something is missing here. To me, it sounds as if our development along the path would be coincidental at best. Since there is no element of control or choice involved, we would essentially have to be lucky enough to stumble onto the appropriate conditions for our spiritual advancement.
Even though this appears to fall under the dreaded conventional versus ultimate framework, and I understand that I am seeing these concepts through a fair amount of confusion, I wonder if I am missing something important here. I was hoping that some of you might be willing to share some of your thoughts on this with me.
Sincerely,
Jason
To begin with, there was a discussion about decision-making from the Abhidhamma standpoint on another forum, and someone said, “There is also no real control—you and your actions are all conditioned, the consequence of kammic accumulations ... i.e. the result of everything (all causes and conditions) which has come before."
I thought that perhaps I had simply misunderstood the wording here, but I did not think that it was correct to say that there is no control, or that our actions were solely the result of what has come before. When stated like this, it appeared to me to represent the Jain's doctrine of kamma in that it did not account for present intentions. If absolutely everything were the result of the past, liberation would not be possible.
As far as I understand this concept, the experience of the five aggregates is the result of past kamma, and whatever is done with body, speech, or mind is present kamma (SN 35.145). Even though the world of our experience is conditioned, the Buddha — as far as I understand him — taught that there is an element of control in the present moment.
Essentially, not only did the Buddha refute the Jain's idea of kamma (MN 101), which stated that whatever a person experiences — pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain — all is caused by what was done in the past, but he often stressed the importance of self-control due to the consequences of our actions (Dhp. 9-10) (MN 41) (MN 136) (SN 10.12).
While I was certainly not trying to suggest that there was a self somewhere in this equation, it begged to ask the question, if there were absolutely no element of control involved at all, what would be the purpose of such teachings? Logically speaking, if we were unable to exert any control in the present whatsoever, with our experiences being completely conditioned by past kamma alone, we would have to burn off our old kamma to escape samsara.
However, when I inquired as to what allows for the possibility of choice in the present moment, I was told by the Venerable Dhammanando that there was nothing. An example that I was given was a mosquito bites you on the nose, you feel annoyed and want to squash it, but then you recall that you're a precept-observing Buddhist and so restrain yourself. When this event is described in conventional terms, or according to the Sutta method, it might be said that you had a choice to kill the mosquito or to refrain, and that you chose the latter. But when it is described according to the Abhidhamma method, your abstention from killing was not due to choice but to the arising of kusala cetasikas (wholesome mental factors) such as moral shame and fear of wrong-doing (hiri & ottappa), and abstinence (virati).
There were many other examples that other people offered to me, including a passage from the Dhammasangani (pp. 7-8):
What on that occasion is volition (cetanaa)? The volition, purpose, purposefulness, which is born of contact with the appropriate element of representative intellection - that is the volition that there then is.
As well as from the Atthasalini, pp.147-148:
Volition is that which co-ordinates, that is, it binds closely (abhisandahati) to itself associated states as objects. This is its characteristic; its function is conation. There is no such thing as volition in the four planes of existence without the characteristic of co-ordinating; all volition has it. But the function of conation is only in moral and immoral states; as regards activity in moral and immoral acts, the remaining associated states play only a restricted part. But volition is exceedingly energetic. It makes double effort, double exertion. Hence the Ancients said: 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who, taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength, he doubled his effort, and said, "Take your sickles," and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' Volition is like the cultivator; the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, double effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts. Thus should conation as its function be understood.
It has directing as manifestation. It arises directing associated states, like the chief disciple, the chief carpenter, etc., who fulfil their own and others' duties...even so, when volition starts work on its object, it sets associated states to do each its own work. For when it puts forth energy, they also put forth energy...It is also evident that it arises by causing associated states to be energetic in such things as recollecting an urgent work and so forth.
It was also mentioned that the Patthana goes into enormous detail about the 24 paccaya (conditions)—some of which are past and some present. Nevertheless, according to these people, even the present ones do not simply arise out of nothing. Nor do they arise because "I" want them to. The processes of mind are happening at enormous speed and there is no "person" who can do anything to stop them or change them. Even the cittas that are arising at this moment are conditioned by previous cittas as well as well as by other conditions that are present at the same time.
The basic gist of everything was apparently pointing towards the refutation that there is an agent that acts, that in the present moment, citta arises accompanied by cetasika. These arise together, each having its function. These fall away, conditioning the next complex, this arises immediately without a gap. With each having its own function, citta and the accompanying mental factors "perform" these functions. The consciousness of the moment has its own flavor, as it were, given the combination and nature of its constituents, which arise together with it by conditions.
In essence, what they were saying was that there is no khandha under our control (MN 35); therefore, there is no control. In addition, since this takes into account past kamma as well as present kamma, both being conditioned and further conditioning the present moment, it is not guilty of the Jain's wrong view of kamma. When put into those words, it does make sense to me, however, I still feel like something is missing here. To me, it sounds as if our development along the path would be coincidental at best. Since there is no element of control or choice involved, we would essentially have to be lucky enough to stumble onto the appropriate conditions for our spiritual advancement.
Even though this appears to fall under the dreaded conventional versus ultimate framework, and I understand that I am seeing these concepts through a fair amount of confusion, I wonder if I am missing something important here. I was hoping that some of you might be willing to share some of your thoughts on this with me.
Sincerely,
Jason
0
Comments
About two years ago, when I was reading a lot of material on OBEs and trying to assess where the current trends in the study of the brain were going with regard to the mind/consciousness, it dawned on me (and rather humorously) that if the actor or the attakara (you may call it consciousness) were simply a passive epiphenomenon, we would have one heck of a problem. We would be living in an Alice in bizarre world.
Imagine as a young male you are walking down the street. Your body senses the body of a young female who is in estrus. Your body then lunges out for her body. As the passive, witness consciousness—which is just an epiphenomenon according to some of our great scientists—you passively watch as your body takes liberties with the young female's body. When it is all done, the consciousness excuses the body, then walks away. There is no arrest because the law states that the body is principle wherease consciousness, which the brain makes, can only manage to witness having no control over the body or the brain.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
23. 1. 7.
(7) Hetu Ý Reasons
1. I heard thus. At one time the Blessed One was living in the monastery offered by Anàthapiõóika in Jeta's grove in Sàvatthi.
2. The Blessed One addressed the monks from there: ßMonks, conscious of what, grasping and settling in what, arise the view, `There is no cause and reason for the defilement of beings. Beings are defiled without a reason. And without cause and reason beings are purified. There is no power, effort, manly stability, and manly achievement. All beings, living things, the born lively things are carried along to maturity together and experience pleasantness and unpleasantness in the six spheres of contact without help, power, or effort.
3. ßVenerable sir, the Blessed One is the leader for the Teaching, hearing it from the Blessed One the monks will bear it in mind.
4. ßMonks, conscious of matter, grasping and settling in matter, arises the view, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'.
5-7. ßMonks, conscious of feelings, perceptions, and intentions, grasping and settling in them arise the view, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'.
8. ßMonks, mindfully grasping and settling in consciousness arises the view, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'.
9. ßMonks, is matter permanent or impermanent?û
ßVenerable sir, it is impermanent.û
....
Adhering they are impermanent, unpleasant, changing would the view arise, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'?û
ßThat is not so, venerable sir.û
15. ßMonks, when the learned noble disciple has dispelled doubts in these six instances, his doubts about unpleasantness, its arising, ceasing, and the method for the ceasing of unpleasantness too are dispelled. Monks, to this is said the noble disciple has entered the stream of the Teaching. He would not fall from there and his single aim would be enlightenment.û
From SN 23.1" Diññhi Saüyutta (Beliefs and views)
Interestingly, "effort" is translated as willpower (Willenskraft) in my German version of the sutta. As far as I know, the above view( under 2, marked bold.) was the teaching of Makkhali Gosala, which was dismissed by the Buddha
Regards.
... lehrt der Buddha eine autonome Ethik der Selbstverantwortung und inneren Läuterung, die eine mitfühlende Verantwortung gegenüber dem Mitmenschen einschließt.
... the Buddha teaches an autonomous ethic of self responsibility and internal refinement which includes an compassionate responsibility for one`s fellows
Taken from the preface of Anguttara Nikāya , translated from the Pali to German by Nyanatiloka,published by Nyanaponika 3. Vorwort des Herausgebers zur 4. überarbeiteten Auflage
Regards
I admit that I still have problems thinking your post through, but it`s good you posted it, it gave me much to think. Nevertheless take the following with caution, I repeat I am an amateur concerning the Abhidhamma.
I think the fault lies in using the subject, such as we and I. If I am not mistaken, the Abhidhamma does not describe phenomena in relation to a subject such as a self. Hence, we neither have controll nor have no controll according to the Abhidhamma. Controll, if there, must be described and understood in unpersonal terms. When translated back to conventional speach, as said, never should deny free will. If not so, I do not see now how fatalism then could be explained away in conventional terms at all, all that was left then is that the fatalism has moral reasons (kamma), therefore, coming dangerously close .to the doctrine of Makkhali Gosala and even closer to the one of Mahavira, the Jain.
Regards
edit:you might be interested in wikipediaarticle on free will. while not deep it gives an outlook also for Buddhism.
Personal responsibility, ethics, and actions are what attracted me so greatly towards Buddhism. I sought to move away from fate and destiny as proposed by Western religions and it's faith based dogma. And instead move toward a philosophy or rather way of life revolving around action.
"Impell the self by means of the self (attanâ codayattâna.m)..."p., 98
"...control the self by means of the self (pa.tima.msettha attanâ)..."p., 98
"Being with guarded self (attagutto)..."p., 98
"...the wise bring the self under subjection (attâna.m damayanti)..."p., 99
"...mind shoud be exercised by the very self (attarûpena)...."p., 100
"...with mind turned to self (ajjhattacintî)..."p., 100
"Be a doer of what ought to be done for the self (attano kiccakârî'ssa)..."p., 100
"If he were to make his self (attâna.m)..."p., 100
"He is a brahmana who has ousted all evil dispositions, not rough (nihu.mhu.mko), free from impurity, with a self well controlled (yatatto)..."p., 101
"...but I exert my self (attâna.m padahanto)..."p., 103
The theory put forth by the Venerable Dhammanando "that there was nothing" is unconvincing given the above citations that control is clearly being indicated. The mosquito explantion, while certainly ingenious, is nevertheless unconvincing.
Coomaraswamy notes in his book, Metaphysics (page 271), "Attâ the charioteer (j vi.252), and the chariot conversely "enspirited" (attaniya, S v.6), all these are equivalent formulae: the Buddha is the Spirit, and it is only when He holds the reins, only when the Great Self (mahattâ, A 1.249), is in control [emphasis mine], that the contemplative therewith "drives off and away from this world: in what is called the Brahma-vehicle or Dhamma-vehicle (S v.6)."
Rather what is being exercised here is great control, enough to transcend this world and by implication, the five khandhas.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Anyway, as none of us are well versed in the subtleties of Abhidhamma, I'm not sure how productive this discussion is going to be.
_/\_
metta
Regards
The basic idea is that there is no one to control anything. The control that is perceived on the conventional level is itself conditioned, and therefore, there is no control when viewed form the ultimate level since the Abhidhamma refutes any agent that acts.
The Abhidhamma explains that there are simply mental states that arise and cease according to their supporting conditions. In other words, choice in the conventional sense is merely cetanaa cetasika in the ultimate sense as that is its specific function.
Jason
This way, you do not come in conflict with conventional speach at all. When you translate it back to convention, phrases with a subject, it should not contradict conventional truth of the Buddha. It is not higher truth falsifies conventional truth, rather it is the case it describes things more accurate, as far as I understood.
Not2, is this the passage you had in mind with regard to 'let my form be thus' which is from the Samyutta-Nikaya (S.iii.66)?
It seems clear enough to me that if any of the khandhas were actually the attâ or the self, and given that the attâ controls itself, it might be what it wishes. In other words, 'form' would not suffer.
This same idea is expressed in the Mahasaccaka Sutta (#35) of the Majjhima-Nikaya that if the body were the self it might do as it wanted as if to say, "Let my body be thus or not thus." (This would be great—one might never become sick.)
The real teaching of the Buddha insists that our true self does not consist of componets such as the five khandhas which we take to be our personality (sakkaya). The problem arises for us when we believe that the self is the khandhas or there is no self in which case, when the khandhas disintegrate, so does the self.
In regard to intention or cetana, at A.ii.230-231, the Buddha speaks about the "the deed that is dark with dark result"; "the bright deed with the bright result"; "the deed that is both dark and bright, with a result that is both dark and bright" and the intention (cetana) that is the deed that conduces to the waning of deeds (kammakkhaya).
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I wonder could the atta or self — if there were such a thing — say, “I wish not to be obscured by the khandhas?”
Jason
If I may, I would like to see if I could clarify this.
Perhaps the question we are asking could be better put if we start out with the observation that, as far as we know, we exist. Whether this is true in the ultimate sense, and regardless of the fact that such an existence is impermanent and transitory, we have the convention of a person. As far as I concerned, this topic is not about refuting what exists and what does not exist.
As the Suttas have stated (SN 22.22), there is the carrier (puggala) of the burden (upadana-khandha). The person, who in this case is named Jason, is the carrier of the burden. What I think the question we are asking comes down to is whether there is any choice or control that the person (puggala) can exert in the present moment in order to become a Noble One (ariya-puggala).
According to the Abhidhamma, the answer is no.
Furthermore, the reason that the answer is no is twofold. The first reason is that according to the Abhidhamma, there is no agent that acts; therefore, there is no one who can be said to be in control, or that can effectively make decisions. The conventional person (puggala) has no control over the burden (upadana-khandha), even of the aggregate responsible for volition or intention (cetana).
This coincides with reason number two in that such illusions of choice or control are in their ultimate sense conditioned phenomena. The Abhidhamma explains that there are simply mental states that arise and cease according to their supporting conditions, no chooser. In other words, choice in the conventional sense is merely cetanaa cetasika in the ultimate sense as that is its specific function.
The key to this concept is that since there is no agent that acts, there cannot be a specific place where we can point to and say this is responsible for decision-making—decisions are actions conditioned upon arising mental states, which in turn have their supporting conditions, etc. As dead of a horse as anatta might be, the Abhidhamma viewpoint is built entirely upon this one single concept.
Does anybody wish to add their thoughts to this?
Curiously,
Jason
is the Abhidhamma merely saying that the puggala has no control over the burden? Does it accept the notion of being the carrier of the burden at all?
Wether it is the puggala or a mental phenomenon, the problem is merely shifted to another level. You may laugh, but I could ask if a mental phenomena has free will.Or if a mind has free will. Meaning, is everywhere total determination or not?
If all is subject to determination, there is no room for any effort born out of free choice. You must do what you do and cannot do otherwise. Or the mental phenomenas. Or the mind. I want to emphazize that determination does not neccessarily imply predictability.
Can you explain in conventional terms why "no controller/chooser", merely cetanaa cetasikais not fatalism?
Regards
This is probably way off but, the easiest way for me to understand what is being said is if I look at it as the conventional viewpoint explains things through subject, verb, and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint explains things through verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes—i.e. no chooser, only choices being made.
This, I think, is incredibly difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once sakkaya-ditthi is removed, the duality of subject and object is also removed thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena. Nibbana would then be regarded as the end of this conditional phenomena, or in other words, the cessation of the activity of samsara (perpetual wandering).
Jason
Elohim, what is the meaning of reason in the above context? I am not sure I am following you. It seems like you are saying, in this context, a reason is synonymous with a claim. But this is not the meaning of reason which has to do with providing a sufficient basis or ground for an assertion or a belief. In court you would be required to give evidence for your claim. This would be the same as giving reasons.
Here, I find little or no reason. Abhidhamma you say is asserting there is no acting agent because there is no one who is in control. But this is saying the same thing twice as you must be aware. It is like saying, Abhidhamma says there are bachelors in the Sangha who are monks because (i.e., the reason) there are unmarried men present who have taken vows of celibacy!
As for the second reason it is murky at best. Are you saying there is no controller because "such illusion of choice or control are in their ultimate sense conditioned phenomena"? There is a difference between the chooser and the choice; or the controller and the controlled. A controller might be able to control his head, arms, and legs. But just because a controller controls the temporal body we shouldn't draw the hasty conclusion that the controller is also temporal like the body. Logically, it doesn't follow. Are we now to conclude from this that the Buddha, since he used the temporal to explain his enlightenment to those with little dust in their eyes, was also temporal; subject to death (then why did he speak of the deathless realm [amatadhatu]?
Abhidhamma seems to believe that the controller which is engaged with the temporal body (a body which is partite, conditioned and subject to death) must also be conditioned and likewise subject to death.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
This rings true in Schopenhauer´s interpretation of Nibbana and "Pradschna-Paramita", putting aside the equation with his system for a second:
This might be nitpicking now, but I might ask if we eliminate objects and subjects, are adverbs still allowed?
Regards.
Bobby,
No, because The Abhidhamma does not posit a controller at all. Nevertheless, this is not the anatta thread, and it will not be turned into one. According to the Abhidhamma, there is no self, no controller, no doer, no sufferer, no traveller, et cetera.
As for the deathless state or realm, whatever that might be, where is that deathless state? Does it exist outside of the individual free of greed, hatred, and delusion? If so, how? If it is the unconditioned, how is it that we conditioned beings can realize it?
Jason
To return to this question, I thought that I would offer what the Venerable Dhammanando had to say about this:
From the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, I understand this concept as there being no chooser only the activity or process of choosing. However, when looking at the activities and processes of choosing, can it really be called choice or control without a chooser or controller? I think that the words choice and control are lacking on the conventional level because of the complex process of conditionality that goes into the decision-making process itself. That is how I understand the Venerable Dhammanando's comment about causal determinism, but I could be completely wrong for all I know.
Regards,
Jason
That's interesting J. Krishnamurti throws those ideas around in his discussions of "choiceless awareness."
We are all responsible for our own deeds and let us not forget that we can someday become Buddha on the same token if we so choose the right method of practice and right faith.
This is what makes Buddhism a religion of 'mature' minds in that we are all accountable. No fancy god would fly down from the sky to save us. Now if one graduates from learning the Abhidhamma then time to move to higher ground, like studying the Lankavatara and begin that all is the manifestation of Mind itself.
Any Zen folks here, join in!
Paladin
Is there a doer when all observable phenomenon are merely symptoms of the cosmos.
Apple trees apple, and the earth peoples.
You forget yourself. Introspection is something different than watching apples fall.You can observe volition on yourself, not on the apple, other people or anything else. That`s why meditation is part of the path instead of merely watching apples and trees. :vimp:
Regards
Only if you attribute self-awareness to the cosmos. Another act of faith, I trow.
The Abhidhamma trains the person to abandon the belief in a self, period.
That is simple, this/that conditionality (SN 12.20), or as its also known, dependent co-arising (DN 15) explains all of this. In addition, in the Pali Nikayas, the mind is as fleeting and impermanent as anything else is.
From the standpoint of the Abhidhamma itself, there is nothing higher.
Regards,
Jason
Who then makes the decision to abandon the belief in self and then carries out the order?
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Conventionally speaking, you do. In Abhidhamma, this 'you' can be broken down into its constituent parts (ie- cetasikas). Additionally, let's not forget that the very feeling of 'selfness' or 'me-ness' of 'you' is a conditioned phenomena in & of itself.
_/\_
metta
According to this/that conditionality (idappaccayata), when this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that. Therefore, when the conditions for a self-identification view are no longer present, there will no longer be a self-identification view.
As far as I have seen, within the context of Abhidhamma, the idea of a stable, permanent, or otherwise unconditioned decision-maker, or agent, or self of any kind cannot be found; therefore, from the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, this is a non-issue. The real issues here are the mechanisms of these conditional processes themselves.
Jason
Jason,
at least one of the article provided concerning the Stoa makes the case against the Abhidhamma and for an agent. The stoa placed the agent in the role of decision making. thru reason, he ought to realize the consequneces of his acts. He must see that things are conditioned in this and that way, from there the self-responsability comes.
Victory over drives and suffering (stoics saw passion as suffering) is the Agent`s effort thru reason.
Chrysippos of Soli put it this way:
"If someone throws a barrel onto an inclined plane, he gives indeed the outer reason for the beginning of the movement. The intrinsic reason that the barrel rolls downwards however lies in its shape, therefore in its whole nature" (trans. by me from German)
Regards
„
You would have to take that issue up with the Venerable Dhammanando, as he is the one who provided the article in his post—albeit, on another forum. I simply provided his response in regards to the question of casual determinism versus fatalism.
Jason
Not2, Why the don't you provide a citation from the Abhidhamma itself. It would help all of the discussants. I have access to the PTS Abhidhamma over at the theology library, but rather than spend my time with students reeking of bubble gum
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Elohim, Mutatis mutandis, taking the agent as a wave-phenomenon, I can see your point. But my position is that the agent is a wave-maker, who is waveless. Moreover, it is my tentative opinion that Abhidhamma deals almost exclusively with wave-phenomena. It is particularly for those beleaguered souls (satta) who are confused as to the difference between waves and waveless nibbana.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Most likely puggala. Sorry, but no citations here.
Do you have any citations on this waves v. waveless nibbana? They would be helpful. More importantly, are you saying that the Abhidhamma is for confused souls who don't understand the buddhadharma on the level you do? That's what it sounds like. If I recall correctly, didn't you say you weren't qualified to speak as an expert on Buddhism (but as a theologian), back in one of your first posts?
http://www.newbuddhist.com/forum/showpost.php?p=24648&postcount=48
thanks,
Confused soul (satta)
_/\_
_/\_
metta
On paticca-samuppada, Nyanatiloka Mahathera had this to say:
Perhaps this will help to shed some new light on this question.
Jason
Ah, the brave pioneer Nyanatiloka Mahathera.
I think here lies the source of much confusion. Western Systems often distinguish between causality of external reality and causality in thinking, latter one being basically nothing more than logic. If one wants make sense, one usually has to follow those laws. Will write more when I have come a bit further in my understanding.
Regards
It seems to me that in the passage quoted the Ven. Nyanatiloka Mahathera wants to have his cake and eat it too. He says that the questions "Has man a free will" and "Is will free?" are unanswerable because of being wrongly put, but we must remember that he himself has put them this way (I presume in order to set himself up to be able to say they were wrongly put, and to expound on why). More importantly, perhaps, his discussion is an answer to the "unanswerable because wrongly put" questions, though thinly disguised as the reasons the question is ostensibly "unanswerable". The reasons thus given are in fact indistinguishable from the simple answer: "no, will is not free."
Given the definition of fatalism (niyata) how is it not a fatalist doctrine (niyativada) to aver that one is constrained or bound (niyata) by conditions (sankhara)? The only possible way I might free myself from such bondage (niyata) is to be potentially independent of sankhara and, therefore, be free of conditions. But then this would not be fatalism insofar as I am able to find a path out of these conditions (sankhara).
I think it is fair to say that the Bhante's grasp of Buddhism is suggestive of a fatalistic position with the belief that all is conditioned. In this respect, it follows that we are automatons who have no means by which to conquer the illusory world into which we have fallen (nidana). Were it otherwise, we would have control—enough to escape (nirvana).
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Suggestive, yes, but I think that's why he made the statement you quoted:
While I can see how his explanation still seems fatalistic, what is being questioned here (in my understanding) is not 'free will', but the idea of an agent that somehow acts from outside of the aggregates. And the effect is that when this 'agency' is rejected, the term 'free will' does not philosophically fit anymore. So, it is in that sense that 'free will' is negated. I don't have any citations here, as I am not versed in Abhidhamma, but that is my understanding of their position.
I do have a few questions for you, though. Do the terms 'volition' & 'will' differ in your understanding? How can 'an agency' influence volition if it is outside it's sphere? Does 'waveless Nibbana' influence the 'waves' in your understanding & how? How does the Abhidhamma explanation clash with the conventional explanation to you (aside from its philsophical/terminological breakdown)?
Metta
_/\_
For me, volition and will is the same but since I am a native German speaker I might project some notions into the english Will from German "Wille" (whatever they might be)
Esentially it is the idea behind it. without volition, nothing is ugly and nothing is beautiful for instance. Things become so the moment you want or do not want them in my eyes.
Regarding your question of the agent. all explanations I read remain crude. In the west the answer points to logos.Since men has not only volotion but also reason, he can presumably controll it. That`s what behind the quote "man can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants" imo. Volition might come without our controll, but we can realize what kind of volotion it is (wholesome unwholesome) and then either execute or reject it. In that case, we would be agents of volition equipped with reason that can influence volition indirectly.
In Sutta, we have hints that the wise supresses negative volition, stops negative kamma in growing, turning one`s attention away from them and instead focus on the good. Can look up the sutta if you want.
Thus, it must surely follow that there is some aspect of the human condition which permits escape from the conditioned state. Is that what we are talking about when we speak about the will being free?
That is not correct.
Hence Purelanders.
Jason
This topic is complex, as is paticca-samuppada itself.
Conventionally, we might be able to say that we have an indirect influence over volition, but from the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, we cannot say that. We will only see a complex process of conditionality.
All the khandhas are said to be uncontrollable (MN 35).
Volition or will (cetana) falls under category of mental factors (cetasika), or as volitional actions (kamma), under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha)—both of which are conditioned (sankhata).
Everything that is conditioned has it requisite conditions.
Yes, you could find references to monks practicing appropriate attention, but you would also find references that there are conditions leading up to such actions, which consequently, condition further actions.
Jason
Escape from the conditioned world, that is, the conjured up world we are thrown into at birth, which surrounds us as the flesh, is no easy matter. The best a non-ariyan might hope for is a nice Vimana! There is a collection of stories in the Pali canon called Vimânavatthu, that is, the Stories of the Mansions. They prove that merit-making pays off in the next birth in which the departed being (satta) receives a huge mansion (vimana)—which to this gaffer sounds like the equivalent of a celestial Southern mansion sans slaves.
To receive such a mansion, however, we need merit. Merit-making could be accomplished by almost anything living, if they listen to the Dhamma being preached with an open heart. One such story that comes to mind is that of a frog. Yep, you heard it right, a frog. I will briefly describe the good fortune of this little hopper which is found in the Mandukadevaputtavimana (V. The Fifth Division: Great Chariot, 1 (51). The first: Frog-Deva Mansion).
One day the Lord was with some great compassion. However, he knew that on that day, by the evening, when he was teaching Dhamma, a frog hearing his voice and being attracted to it, would be killed, "suffering violence at someone's hand". Yet, because of his merit, the frog would be reborn in a deva-world (it seems a cowherd leaning on his crook, listening to the Lord, crushed the poor little fellow).
At any rate, after being crushed to death the frog got a beautiful mansion and was attended by nymphs.
So there is some hope even for those who are not yet ariyans. If we listen to the Lord's Dhamma with an open heart like the little frog we too will attain "the unmoving place" and will "grieve not".
Love ya'll,
Bobby
"Violence ends when awareness sees awareness, rather than other."
Please explain, Jason, to this slow person: the quoted text refers to "he", over and again. To my eye it suggests that this "he" has to "attain". Are you saying that this text, which seems to say it nowhere in your extract, sets out some sort of conditioned determinism? What does this do (and I know this is an old question) to personal responsibility?
One of the names/titles attributed to the buddha is 'teacher of Gods & Humans'. There are many suttas/sutras where the buddha is doing just this. So I would guess that a human rebirth is not absolutely necessary for Awakening. However, I think what you may have been referring to the teaching that a human rebirth is fortunate because there is not too much pleasure & not too much pain. In both cases, the sensations overwhelm the individual & heedlessness ensues.
In the case of Devas, their experience is so rapturous (and they are so entangled in that sensation) that the fail to create the conditions for future Devahood & will often fall into a hell realm once their good karma expires. For hell beings, they are so consumed by suffering that they cannot even recognize this.
So, human rebirth is an excellent position for awakening as one can still effectively see the positive/negative results of good/bad actions without being too overwhelmed. However, as I said, there are Bodhisattvas & Devas who are capable of learning the Path.
Hope this answers your question. Back to the topic.
metta
_/\_