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No control—the absence of choice in the present moment?
One of the names/titles attributed to the buddha is 'teacher of Gods & Humans'. There are many suttas/sutras where the buddha is doing just this. So I would guess that a human rebirth is not absolutely necessary for Awakening. However, I think what you may have been referring to the teaching that a human rebirth is fortunate because there is not too much pleasure & not too much pain. In both cases, the sensations overwhelm the individual & heedlessness ensues.
In the case of Devas, their experience is so rapturous (and they are so entangled in that sensation) that the fail to create the conditions for future Devahood & will often fall into a hell realm once their good karma expires. For hell beings, they are so consumed by suffering that they cannot even recognize this.
So, human rebirth is an excellent position for awakening as one can still effectively see the positive/negative results of good/bad actions without being too overwhelmed. However, as I said, there are Bodhisattvas & Devas who are capable of learning the Path.
Hope this answers your question. Back to the topic.
metta
_/\_
This is not what I have been taught. Human birth, my teachers told me, was not just "an excellent position for awakening" but the only birth that gives access to enlightenment, quite simply because it is the only birth which permits choice. Not having met any "devas" in my travels, I cannot speak to their existence or to their ability to awaken.
This is not what I have been taught. Human birth, my teachers told me, was not just "an excellent position for awakening" but the only birth that gives access to enlightenment, quite simply because it is the only birth which permits choice. Not having met any "devas" in my travels, I cannot speak to their existence or to their ability to awaken.
Well, you would have to take that issue up with your teacher. All that I can offer you is that the Buddha did teach about other realms of existence, and that according to the Pali Canon, it is possible to attain the cessation of suffering within them—if the prerequisite conditions are present. The example that I provided was concerning non-returners, which attain release after being reborn in one of the heavenly realms. This, however, is only possible if they have previously abandoned the first five fetters.
Please explain, Jason, to this slow person: the quoted text refers to "he", over and again. To my eye it suggests that this "he" has to "attain". Are you saying that this text, which seems to say it nowhere in your extract, sets out some sort of conditioned determinism? What does this do (and I know this is an old question) to personal responsibility?
Simon,
The complexities of conditionality...
In the beginning, "you" are responsible. As there is avijja (ignorance) present, there is also conditioned upon that a deluded view of reality, and of course, of a self, soul, agent, et cetera. With this sakkaya-ditthi (self-identification view), the only logical start is "I am the owner of my action, the heir of my actions." That is why the Buddha teaches this very formula as a subject for frequent contemplation (AN 5.57).
A person must first see that their actions do have effects—effects that may take them further along the Path, or effects which take them further away from the Path. However, after avijja has successfully been removed through the conditions of study and practice, there will no longer be any sense of self added to this equation. No "person" will be found as the mastermind behind all it all, but it will clearly be seen that it was ignorance that actually made this conditional process possible—it being the master link in the chain of paticca-samuppada (dependent co-arising).
The real problem is, if you start by telling people that "nobody" is actually responsible, the conditions might be present for them to think that as meaning they can do whatever they want consequence free—a doctrine of Purana-Kassapa, which was refuted by the Buddha. That would be a very stupid thing to do, in my opinion, because with ignorance still present, each intentional action produces more conditions for further becoming.
The Buddha has us begin with seeing ourselves as responsible for our actions. There are intentions behind them, and skillful intentions lead to skillful results (i.e. wisdom), while unskillful intentions lead to unskillful results (i.e. delusion). The trick is to understand that even though we are conditioned, we can utilize that conditionality to point us to that which is unconditioned. The Buddha does not have us confirm or deny a self — that is merely a form of self-view one way or the other — but he instead has us travel towards a direct realization of anatta itself.
As I see this, from my unenlightened POV, a conditional mind cannot grasp anatta simply as a concept, and therefore it can seem to make no sense logically, but it is still an integral part of the Path. Once anatta is clearly seen, however, all such questions dealing with "who" and "what" no longer apply. Moreover, as soon as the goal of release has been realized, there is nothing more to do, and "nobody" not to do it.
All the khandhas are said to be uncontrollable (MN 35).
Volition or will (cetana) falls under category of mental factors (cetasika), or as volitional actions (kamma), under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha)—both of which are conditioned (sankhata).
So, what does a haircutter do when I visit him. Or what do I do when I cut my nails. Or move my arm. Are you sure uncontrollable is the right rendering? Or would conditioned be more apropriate?
This topic is complex, as is paticca-samuppada itself.
Volition or will (cetana) falls under category of mental factors (cetasika), or as volitional actions (kamma), under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha)—both of which are conditioned (sankhata).
Everything that is conditioned has it requisite conditions.
Jason
conditons for kamma-formations, sankhāra, is ignorance or not knowing (avijja). What if I removed avijja to the extend I can see sankhara rise and cease? What if i can see if they merely are rooted in delusion or addiontanlly in hatred and greed? Is it still justified to tell me then I have no controll over them?
If we take the 50 cetasika of the sankhāra khandha listing in the Abhidhamma for granted, skip any subject possessing them and assuming for a moment that these are the properties of every mind, like the procedures of a computer program:
What causes them? I presume I am born with certain constelations due to my kamma I brought with me from my previous existence. But does my previous existence matter at all? What I want to say is that the current state matters, and there must be something to improve it or to worsen it. Ironically, ignorance then must be the cause (some form of sakyha dhitti) for me to pursue some practice, because I belief it benifits me and if I would come the conclusion of the Abhidhamma, was the supporting condition for coming there, although i might figure out I was wrong with my assumption. Only then we can explain away fatalism, if you want to explain no no controller hence no controll to people with sakyha-dhitti, it will make no sense imo. Stating no controll to anybody using conventional terms, speaking in subjects and objects must fail. Incidentally, Ignorance is also the condition for wholesome kamma-formations in paticca-samuppada
In the very first verse of the Dhammapada we learn that if a man speaks (bhâsati) or acts (karoti = the verb KAR, to do, to act, to perform) with an evil thought, dukkha follows him like the wheel the foot of the ox. Then in the next verse we also learn that if a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows him as a consequence. It almost goes without saying, there is a choice between going with an evil corrupt thought and a thought which is pure. And indeed there is because mind (mano) is the foremost (setthâ) and the artificer (mayâ).
The Buddha has said that phenomena (dhammâ) are mind-preceded (manopubbangamâ). Such phenomena are always changing as mind creates (maya) anew. In fact, we may say that as mind creates (manomaya) phenomena arises which can be either corrupt or pure. If corrupt, we speak and act corruptly. If good, we speak and act for the good.
Show me what a person mentally creates (manomaya) and I will tell you whether they are evil or good. If a person's mind is hate-filled; beset with fancies and foolish desires; that person will speak and act in evil ways. It is not as if these thoughts just happened to show up in that person's brain all of a sudden. They were made by him and acted upon. This person had the option to create beautiful thoughts; to think kindly of others; to do what is right and noble, and to build a legacy of good merit.
Indeed, there is a controller or if you prefer, a moral agent. There are evil and good thoughts that can be made. There is blame, too. There is the burden of guilt and a bad conscience for having created evil thoughts then speaking and acting on their behalf.
I remember when Jean-Paul Sartre took on his countrymen for their loathsome conduct during WWII. He despised the fact that many of his countrymen disclaimed responsibility for their cowardly and hypocritical roles during that war (and we Americans are no better for our cowardly response to this present war). One can only collaborate with evil because their thoughts sympathize with evil by making excuses for allowing evil to take root. For example, we are familiar with such excuses as, "I have to take care of my family first" or "I couldn't help it; I had no choice."
Like the Dhammapada suggests, we all get what we deserve. But this thought or belief that we are hopelessly conditioned and impotent is, itself, the result of mind's artifice (manomaya). We have also made a choice to attach to a world which is dependently originated (Skt., pratityasamutpada) wanting to take an endless ride on the wheel of samsara.
Those two lines from the Dhammapada illustrate the basic framework of conditionality themselves. The quality of an act is conditioned by the state of mind of the individual, and as you point out, the type of person (good, evil, et cetera) is conditioned upon the type of actions they perform. Moreover, mind as we have already covered, is as fleeting and impermanent as anything else is (SN 12.61). It's really not all that hard to understand.
So, what does a haircutter do when I visit him. Or what do I do when I cut my nails. Or move my arm. Are you sure uncontrollable is the right rendering? Or would conditioned be more apropriate?
fofoo,
There are countless conditions that go into any given moment. When a barber cuts your hair, there is a complex matrix of causes and conditions for them to do so. Maybe you are just confusing ultimate for conventional.
The aggregates are said to be uncontrollable in the sense of, "But precisely because form (feeling, perception, fabrications, consciousness) is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let my form be thus. Let my form not be thus" (SN 22.59).
The Buddha taught that volitional actions (kamma) fall under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha), which are conditioned (sankhata). This is quite standard in the Pali Canon. What more can I say?
Those two lines from the Dhammapada illustrate the basic framework of conditionality themselves. The quality of an act is conditioned by the state of mind of the individual, and as you point out, the type of person (good, evil, et cetera) is conditioned upon the type of actions they perform. Moreover, mind as we have already covered, is as fleeting and impermanent as anything else is (SN 12.61). It's really not all that hard to understand.
Jason
The most basic framework is mind's capacity for artifice (maya). We may all testify to this by introspection. 'Conditionality' is merely a description of the agential process which is self-conditioning and self-liberating.
The 'conditionality explanation' may satisfy those who are trying to scrub the Buddhist canon of any notion of self as, for example, in "having an emancipated self" (vimutt-attâ), by trying to appear consistent with the theory of no self. But this maneuver doesn't work—those who are having difficulty with understanding the place of self and attakara (self-doing) in the canon seem to be substituting the problem with the reification of an abstraction, viz., conditionality. Conditionality is supposed to do all the stuff an agent would normally do only now one can say, "Nope, there ain't any agential notion in Buddhism—conditions do it." This falls rather flat when we encounter passages like this:
"It is by the self that evil is done, it is by the self that one is impure,
It is by the self that one avoids evil, it is by the self (attanâ) that one is purified,
Purity and impurity depend on the self (paccattam), no one could purify another" (Dhammapada 165).
And a word about the last topic, if mind is so fleeting, why is it said to achieve liberation? Why then does the Buddha speak about mind being liberated (cittam vimuttam) from lust (raga), liberated from hatred, liberated from delusion (i.e., the three poisons)? Surely, in this context mind is more than a fleeting every day thought?
There are countless conditions that go into any given moment. When a barber cuts your hair, there is a complex matrix of causes and conditions for them to do so. Maybe you are just confusing ultimate for conventional.
The aggregates are said to be uncontrollable in the sense of, "But precisely because form (feeling, perception, fabrications, consciousness) is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let my form be thus. Let my form not be thus" (SN 22.59).
The Buddha taught that volitional actions (kamma) fall under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha), which are conditioned (sankhata). This is quite standard in the Pali Canon. What more can I say?
Jason
I know Jason, I argued the khandhas lack full controll myself in the Anatta Thread:)
I have problems with the term uncontrollable. We are said to verif the teachings by ourself. I, conventionally speaking, have of course controll over the kandhas allbeit limited. I can shape my body to some extend, i can suppress thought, cut my hair. On the long run however, they will do what they want without asking me. Hair will fall, body decay and so on. Without wanting to introduce more complex thoughts, my current understanding that kandhas lack full controll and at the long run willgo the way they are , e.g. genetically, conditioned. I think time might be important here, temporary controll vs ultimiate controll. just my thoughts.
And a word about the last topic, if mind is so fleeting, why is it said to achieve liberation?
Are you arguing with me or the Buddha?
"No other thing do I know, O monks, that changes so quickly as the mind. It is not easy to give a simile for how quicky the mind changes. (AN I.v.8)
"But as for what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness,' the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it. Why is that? For a long time this has been relished, appropriated, and grasped by the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person as, 'This is me, this is my self, this is what I am.' Thus the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it.
"It would be better for the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person to hold to the body composed of the four great elements, rather than the mind, as the self. Why is that? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for a year, two years, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years or more. But what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. Just as a monkey, swinging through a forest wilderness, grabs a branch. Letting go of it, it grabs another branch. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. In the same way, what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. (SN 12.61)
In the very first verse of the Dhammapada we learn that if a man speaks (bhâsati) or acts (karoti = the verb KAR, to do, to act, to perform) with an evil thought, dukkha follows him like the wheel the foot of the ox. Then in the next verse we also learn that if a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows him as a consequence. It almost goes without saying, there is a choice between going with an evil corrupt thought and a thought which is pure. And indeed there is because mind (mano) is the foremost (setthâ) and the artificer (mayâ).
The Buddha has said that phenomena (dhammâ) are mind-preceded (manopubbangamâ). Such phenomena are always changing as mind creates (maya) anew. In fact, we may say that as mind creates (manomaya) phenomena arises which can be either corrupt or pure. If corrupt, we speak and act corruptly. If good, we speak and act for the good.
Show me what a person mentally creates (manomaya) and I will tell you whether they are evil or good. If a person's mind is hate-filled; beset with fancies and foolish desires; that person will speak and act in evil ways. It is not as if these thoughts just happened to show up in that person's brain all of a sudden. They were made by him and acted upon. This person had the option to create beautiful thoughts; to think kindly of others; to do what is right and noble, and to build a legacy of good merit.
Indeed, there is a controller or if you prefer, a moral agent. There are evil and good thoughts that can be made. There is blame, too. There is the burden of guilt and a bad conscience for having created evil thoughts then speaking and acting on their behalf.
I remember when Jean-Paul Sartre took on his countrymen for their loathsome conduct during WWII. He despised the fact that many of his countrymen disclaimed responsibility for their cowardly and hypocritical roles during that war (and we Americans are no better for our cowardly response to this present war). One can only collaborate with evil because their thoughts sympathize with evil by making excuses for allowing evil to take root. For example, we are familiar with such excuses as, "I have to take care of my family first" or "I couldn't help it; I had no choice."
Like the Dhammapada suggests, we all get what we deserve. But this thought or belief that we are hopelessly conditioned and impotent is, itself, the result of mind's artifice (manomaya). We have also made a choice to attach to a world which is dependently originated (Skt., pratityasamutpada) wanting to take an endless ride on the wheel of samsara.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
All,
where does the debate leave us with the question if a controller is needed for controll? How do you all interpret the following:
"Mano-pubbangama dhamma, mano-settha, mano-maya."
Mind is chief, controller, agent, whateer name you give it here. I dare to say that the Dhammapada proclaims an agent, abeit not atman but namely mind, in contrast to the what we heard about the Abhidhamma.
Mind is chief, controller, agent, whateer name you give it here. I dare to say that the Dhammapada proclaims an agent, abeit not atman but namely mind, in contrast to the what we heard about the Abhidhamma.
Mind conditions, but mind is also conditioned. As the Buddha said, the mind is even more fleeting than the body. If you say that "mind" is this agent, which mind? The Buddha himself said that the mind changes so quickly that it is not easy to give a simile for how quickly it changes—that by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. None of this contradicts what is said in the Abhidhamma.
Jason, the quote you gave from (AN I.v.8) is a point of serious controversy. It cannot be meant that all characteristics of it change quickly, elsewise it cannot be cultivated, as it is stated in AN I.iv:
31. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as a not tamed mind. A not tamed mind is harmful. This is the first.
32. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is harmless, as a tamed mind. A tamed mind is harmless. This is the second.
33. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as an uncontrolled mind. An uncontrolled mind is harmful. This is the third.
34. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless, as a controlled mind. A controlled mind is harmless. This is the fourth.
35. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as an unprotected mind. An unprotected mind is harmful This is the fifth.
36. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless, as a protected mind. A protected mind is harmless. This is the sixth.
37. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so hàrmful as an unrestrained mind. An unrestrained mind is harmful. This is the seventh.
38. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless, as a restrained mind. A restrained mind
is harmless. This is the eighth.
39. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as a not tamed, not controlled, not protected and not restrained mind. A not tamed, not controlled, not protected and not restrained mind is harmful.
40. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless as a tamed, controlled, protected and restrained mind. A tamed, controlled, protected and restrained mind is harmless.
I would be glad if we could explore (AN I.v.8) in more detail. We had it,I think already, Nyanatolika translates citta here as "conciousness" My commentary says that:
(*1) K: nach schnellem Entstehen ein schnelles Vergehen. K bemerkt ferner, dass dieser Text am Schluss einer Lehrunterweisung gesprochen wurde (die uns offenbar nicht erhalten ist). -
Bewusstsein = citta, welches aus stilistischen Gründen vorher mit Geist wiedergegeben wurde.
After fast originating comes a fast cessation. K remarks further that this text was spoken at the end of an instructive speech (which itself obviously is not any moreavailble to us)
conciousness = citta, which was rendered previously as mind/spirit previously.
Emphazis through bolds by me. We have to handle that part of this sutta (AN I.v.8) with extreme caution,since it lacks the context.
On the conventional level, you can say that all mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made—if one speaks or acts with an evil mind, suffering (dukkha) follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart, or if one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him.
On the ultimate level, however, what is "mind"? Is mind a permanent, stable, and unconditioned phenomenon that acts, but is not acted upon by conditionality? The answer, whether from the Suttas or the Abhidhamma, is no. Mind is indeed an impermanent, unstable, and conditioned phenomenon. The arising of mind has its own requisite conditions, just as its ceasing has its own requisite conditions.
I would be glad if we could explore (AN I.v.8) in more detail. We had it,I think already, Nyanatolika translates citta here as "conciousness" My commentary says that:
(*1) K: nach schnellem Entstehen ein schnelles Vergehen. K bemerkt ferner, dass dieser Text am Schluss einer Lehrunterweisung gesprochen wurde (die uns offenbar nicht erhalten ist). -
Bewusstsein = citta, welches aus stilistischen Gründen vorher mit Geist wiedergegeben wurde.
After fast originating comes a fast cessation. K remarks further that this text was spoken at the end of an instructive speech (which itself obviously is not any moreavailble to us)
conciousness = citta, which was rendered previously as mind/spirit previously.
Well, at least from the general Theravadin standpoint (which I am sure will be contended), citta (mind, consciousness, state of consciousness) is synonymous with mano (mind) and vinnana (consciousness).
Well, at least from the general Theravadin standpoint (which I am sure will be contended), citta (mind, consciousness, state of consciousness) is synonymous with mano (mind) and vinnana (consciousness).
Jason
It would be interesting to find out if they are similar or redundant. If the former is the case, this could be a worthwhile issue to pursue to understand mind and conciousness better. If they are redundant, I honestly must say I am confused.
Regarding to you question of the mind. I undeterstand that the syntetic activites called mind made can at least theoretically be analyzed into groups.
Now, if we look at table I, Impulsion (javana) can be associated with right or wrong view, for instance. The impuls must come from somewhere.
I think the problem of the debate is similar of that finding a first cause. One asks why and ends up seeing a conditioned chain. If one cuts of that chain, simply looking at the current state, the problem becomes rather theoretical, belongs to the realm of theorizers.
It would be interesting to find out if they are similar or redundant. If the former is the case, this could be worthwhile to pursue to unserstand mind and conciousness better. If they are redundant, I honestly must say I am confused.
As it were, there is an interesting discussion of this here.
fofoo, Moggallana seems to have some great spirit powers. Bhikkhus Bodhi translates at S.i.195:
Moggallana, great in spiritual power,
Encompassed their mind with his own,
And searching [he came to see] their minds:
Fully released (vippamutta), without acquisitions (nirupadhi)!
I would first argue that Moggallana's mind was powerful rather than passive. It's not the fickle mind of the typical worlding.
But getting back to the control issue, in the PTS Dic. reading about the various definitions of citta, I came across this:
"from the fetters of Mara those are released who control their heart" Dh 37. The word used here for control is "saṃyamissanti" (the verb YAM meaning to "restrain"); while heart is the familiar "citta". So back to the controller of the fickled mind or the mind released.
I was reading the Anguttara-Nikaya drinking some ginger-bread flavored coffee (decaf) and came across these passages of interest. Here is the citation for both: A.iii.387 VI, VI, § 58 (PTS). (Well, it is Celtic tree month and I have to celebrate!)
Herein, monks, the cankers to be got rid of by control by a monk are go rid of by control; to be rid of by use, endurance, avoidance, ejection, growth, are got rid of by [these qualities respectively].
Monks, consider the monk who with conscious purpose lives controlled by controlling the eye-faculties. Whereas, were he to live uncontrolled, the cankers, vexations, tormenting, would arise; since he lives controlled by controlling the eye faculties, the cankers are not. So, too, as to the faculties of the ear, nose tongue, body, mind. ... Whereas where he to live uncontrolled in control, the cankers, vexations, tormenting, would arise; since he lives controlled in control, the cankers are not.
I think earlier fofoo was thinking along the same lines. I don't think it will throw water on this fire, but who knows.
As we all must admit by know, we spend a lot of time going over Suttas, and that is a good thing. This is why I celebrate these discussions—they offer to fellow discussants a learing experience. In the Phagguna Sutta of the Anguttara-Nikaya the Buddha said that without the Tathagata or a disciple present if one "ever reflects in mind on Dhamma, as heard, as learnt, ponders on it, pores over it...his mind is wholly freed as to the complete destruction of the root of becoming" (A.iii.382, VI, VI, § 57).
Please explain, Jason, to this slow person: the quoted text refers to "he", over and again. To my eye it suggests that this "he" has to "attain". Are you saying that this text, which seems to say it nowhere in your extract, sets out some sort of conditioned determinism? What does this do (and I know this is an old question) to personal responsibility?
I have a problem with the concept personal responsiblity, because it's one of those qualities that if beyond the scope of the observers consciousness does not exist. Sad
I have a problem with the concept personal responsiblity, because it's one of those qualities that if beyond the scope of the observers consciousness does not exist. Sad
It`s a bit of a dilemma. Without personal responsibility, there is not need of forgivness. Without forgivness, one might become brutal. I believe this always has been a problem of human relationship. Metaphors like "looking into one`s heart" have always been important means to communicate understanding and compassion for others beyond mere logical battles of free will vs total determination. Sorry for going off-topic a bit
fofoo, Moggallana seems to have some great spirit powers. Bhikkhus Bodhi translates at S.i.195:
I would first argue that Moggallana's mind was powerful rather than passive. It's not the fickle mind of the typical worlding.
But getting back to the control issue, in the PTS Dic. reading about the various definitions of citta, I came across this:
"from the fetters of Mara those are released who control their heart" Dh 37. The word used here for control is "saṃyamissanti" (the verb YAM meaning to "restrain"); while heart is the familiar "citta". So back to the controller of the fickled mind or the mind released.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Bobby, from my personal limited studies on both western religon/philosophy and Buddhism, heart mostly points to volition. He died of a broken heart translates he lost the will to live. He has a heart of stone translates he ruthlessly goes after what he wants without regarding the wishes of others. His heart is bleeding translates to he loves something that is not any more available or does not give back love. I do not want to completely rationalize beautiful metaphors here, it is just my reading.:)
Reading a bit about Moggallana, his end seems to have been quite cruel. From my reading, he was equipped with supranatural powers, as he could change even his form. How litereal one might take the Jataka Story about him, he defenetly was an interesting fellow He seemed to have been creative, rather than passive, I agree, what`s noteworthy however is his end, as his powers could not prevent him to earn the fruits of his kamma from previous life. Linking it back to the topic here, I rather see Moggallana`s fate as a case for determination, namley by kammic law. However,it also indicates that since he was an arhant, Mara could not influence him any more, despite of its cruel appearance in form of thugs who beat him to death.
Bobby, from my personal limited studies on both western religon/philosophy and Buddhism, heart mostly points to volition. He died of a broken heart translates he lost the will to live. He has a heart of stone translates he ruthlessly goes after what he wants without regarding the wishes of others. His heart is bleeding translates to he loves something that is not any more available or does not give back love. I do not want to completely rationalize beautiful metaphors here, it is just my reading.:)
Your fondness for the philosophers of Will need not blind you to the fact that there are other possible deconstructions. Indeed, there are many of us who believe that Will is not the only driver.
Responsibility. Interestingly (or not), at the monastery I'm in at the moment, a teacher was talking yesterday about responsibility being simply the ability to respond appropriately in any given moment. It's not down to will I would say.
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federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
Responsibility. Interestingly (or not), at the monastery I'm in at the moment, a teacher was talking yesterday about responsibility being simply the ability to respond appropriately in any given moment. It's not down to will I would say.
Only insofar as you may choose to "respond appropriately" - or inappropriately - in one way or another. Responsibility is not judgemental. Will is.
"The source of self-consciousness is will ( 1797)...There is finally and preëminently no other Being but will. The will is primary Being and to it alone are applicable all its predicates: groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-assertion ( 1809)." — Schelling
"That in general anything comes to pass, that the effect follows, depends on the Will; that the effect, if it follows, follows with necessity as this and no other, depends on the Logical. . . . That things be, is determined by the alogical Will; what things are, is determined by the logical Idea." — Eduard v. Hartmann
The above follows very much the Mind-only school of Buddhism; that determinate reality is supported by Mind or Wille, which Kant described a the formative principle.
Turning to Schopenhauer, Buddhism differs from his philosophy in this regard: the will does not need to be subjugated; but when it comprehends itself (svacittdristamatra) the fiery thirst of desire ends. For all along desire was just the incompleteness (avidya) of the will with itself. This lack or want of itself spurred it on to create all things (sarvadharma).
From the side of the practitioner both classical Ch'an (J., Zen) and Tibetan Dzogchen teach the apperception of the pure will which is usually translated as 'Mind'. Dzogchen is remarkable in that the adept sees things as harmless natural will-formations. It is not an intellectual apperception either. It is perfected power (siddha). He generates a field of energy about him which may explain why Buddhist art employs the halo. He transmits this power to the disciple who then prefects it by a life time of practice.
Much of this is not taught Westerners because it is too difficult to deal with their monophasic cultural upbrining (Asian cultures are polyphasic). So they essentially get the short shrift. Lamas are quite content to lest Western scholars translate the esoteric stuff. They can't employ it anyway.
With regard to will in Judaism and Christianity it all begins with Genesis and how we might read it.
Beraeshith bara Aelohim aeth-ha-shamaim w'aeth-ha-âretz.
You could read it as follows: It [Wille] created Aelohim (being of beings); the implicate of heaven and earth. In this pericope we see that Wille pluralizes itself becoming (Aelohim), thus becoming many; which is undeveloped. In my opinion, and that doesn't count much, the Old Testament is really an elaborate meditation on mind and body; working back to the realization of the unconditioned. I think to some extent the Torah Jews understand this.
Responsibility. Interestingly (or not), at the monastery I'm in at the moment, a teacher was talking yesterday about responsibility being simply the ability to respond appropriately in any given moment. It's not down to will I would say.
It`s certainly a nice way to put it without getting involved in long lasting disputes (I recall having read often that the issue was transfered from the realm of "dry" philosophers to the domain of neuro-scientists).
Only insofar as you may choose to "respond appropriately" - or inappropriately - in one way or another. Responsibility is not judgemental. Will is.
Generally, I am not opposed to judging, very least regarding myself, as long as the emphazis is not on blame but compassion and improving.
Regularily looking if one is tormented by the three poisons i consider to be an important element of the path, and even if free will is postulated, I propose that everyone should keep in mind that choice is limited by people`s skills, and emphazis should be on stressing the potential of becoming better, not lamenting on what went wrong.
Your fondness for the philosophers of Will need not blind you to the fact that there are other possible deconstructions. Indeed, there are many of us who believe that Will is not the only driver.
Simon,
you hit the nail on the head we are all deconstructions/reconstructionists from the the path of light, to the path of vibrations traveling the ear which we percieve in an auditory manner.
Seems there's losts of variables to confuse that complex onboard plasma mircoprocessor into a state of delusion, eh, not to mention that damn looping recording/reinforcing/rejecting mechanistic feature that is all to difficult to reprogram, let alone bypass.;)
In essence, what they were saying was that there is no khandha under our control (MN 35); therefore, there is no control. In addition, since this takes into account past kamma as well as present kamma, both being conditioned and further conditioning the present moment, it is not guilty of the Jain's wrong view of kamma.
Jason
Jason,
Firstly, I still have problems seeing above view not guilty as falling under the Jain's view of Karma. I do not want to go on your nerves with my German translations, but the rendering in my suttas is pre-determined (vorhergewirkt), rather than " result of past". While similar terms, the subtle difference comes when arguing that the Jains point that was refuted merely was that all is fully conditioned by past, arguing that presence also fully condiondend might not help against the case of pre-determination. Maybe we can look at the Pali terms in near future.
Secondly, I still have problems not seeing the no-controll claim as not falling under the view of Gosala. I provide following from DN2:
"When this was said, Makkhali Gosala said to me, 'Great king, there is no cause, no requisite condition, for the defilement of beings. Beings are defiled without cause, without requisite condition. There is no cause, no requisite condition, for the purification of beings. Beings are purified without cause, without requisite condition. There is nothing self-caused, nothing other-caused, nothing human-caused. There is no strength, no effort, no human energy, no human endeavor. All living beings, all life, all beings, all souls are powerless, devoid of strength, devoid of effort. Subject to the changes of fate, serendipity, and nature, they are sensitive to pleasure and pain in the six great classes of birth. "
While one can probably refute most points of Gosalla by still holding to a concept of moral retribution, can one say if there is no controll, there still is a requisite condition for purification? Strictly speaking, if everything is conditioned, all conditions are requisite, because they cannot be other than they are. In other words, pointing to a requisite condition for purification is pointless, because conditioning will bring us there or not anyways. Even in saying it is pointless, I would be making no point at all, I just would exactly say what I had to.
While one can probably refute most points of Gosalla by still holding to a concept of moral retribution, can one say if there is no controll, there still is a requisite condition for purification? Strictly speaking, if everything is conditioned, all conditions are requisite, because they cannot be other than they are. In other words, pointing to a requisite condition for purification is pointless, because conditioning will bring us there or not anyways. Even in saying it is pointless, I would be making no point at all, I just would exactly say what I had to.
Yes, I think we can say there are still requsite conditions without control. In the ultimate sense, control as we understand it is not needed in a conditional world. The purification of beings has its requsite conditions, as well as being a requsite condition itself. One cannot say, for example, let my Nibbana be thus, let my Nibbana not be thus, et cetera, nor can one say let me achieve Nibbana right now.
My understanding of this topic is impermanent; and as such, it changes depending upon the various circumstances surrounding it. Perhaps we can rid some of the confusion by removing the idea that cetanaa cetasika has choice as its function, and replacing it with the idea that it is just another action of mind.
There are many different ways in which we can look at this subject. One is to look at it from the conventional level of beings (satta). On that level, we (as in Jason, fofoo, et cetera) can make decisons, we can make chocies, et cetera. I walk into a store and I decide to buy tofu instead of beef for my curry dish.
On the ultimate level, who makes decisions, who makes choices? Did the Buddha teach of an unconditioned agent which chooses, decides, or controls? On the ultimate level, do we (as in Jason, fofoo, et cetera) exist? Can we be found? Is there something that we can point to and say this is me?
From my limited understanding, the answer in Theravada is no. The choice to walk into a store and the decision to purchase tofu instead of beef is not a choice that was made free from causes or conditions. There are causes and conditions for the particular store I chose, as well as for not buying the beef.
In the ultimate sense, how can there be choices, decisions, or control without a chooser, decider, or controller? To be honest, there might be, but I do not know what allows for this possibility in Abhidhamma since there is no agent or self by which a choice is made. There are only actions (kamma) born out of avijja.
Essentially, if the appropriate conditions for touching the Deathless are present, then one is able to transcend suffering; if the appropriate conditions are not present for touching the Deathless, then one is unable to transcend suffering. Pointing to the requsite conditions for purification is not pointless as that in itself may be a requsite needed for the arising of the factors for awakening (bojjhanga).
I am sure we do, but how does this relate to what the Abhidhamma has to say (which is the context of this topic)?
Jason
Though as Buddhists we are taught that there is no"self"(spirit) and also no"Self" (Atman)this still does not negate the fact that eventhough the core being of ALL "reality"is emptiness - there is still the illusory "dream state" which we (the dreamers dreaming ourselves & our environment AS the dream) DO partake in on a level of perception which does in "fact" constitute what we collectively refer to as "controlled reality". Basically we are the lie telling the lie. Since "we"are the ones telling the lie / and yet "we" do not exist--does'nt it make sense that "we" are the ultimate "controllers of our own "reality.
it seems we are stuck with the infamous conventional vs ultimate debate. Currently, I must say I am at the end of my knowledge and I cannot say now if I want to examine the Abhidhamma aproach deeper.
However, I want to make one remark. Even if we are totally conditioned, our responsiblity lies in using our skills, i.e., the ammount of ignorance we have removed. In simple terms, there is a difference between a blind man falling into a trap and a seeing man delibratly trapping into it.
Essentially, if the appropriate conditions for touching the Deathless are present, then one is able to transcend suffering; if the appropriate conditions are not present for touching the Deathless, then one is unable to transcend suffering. Pointing to the requsite conditions for purification is not pointless as that in itself may be a requsite needed for the arising of the factors for awakening (bojjhanga).
Jason
It is pointless if we make conditionality absolute, because there is no place where a decision is actually made. It seems that what we are missing is that though I can't just say "let me achieve Nibbana immediately," I can say "let me achieve Nibbana." This is one of the most basic conflicts of Abhidhamma with the discourses of the Buddha. Abhidhammically, we are speaking as if the conditions for achieving Nibbana are outside of ourselves and entirely beyond our control--because absolutely all is outside ourselves, even ourselves--: as is obvious, we deny agency altogether. This is opposite--literally opposite!-- to the teachings of the Buddha we find exhorting disciples to arouse themselves, to make effort, to take refuge in themselves and no other (no other refers not only to other people but also to anything outside themselves), to exert themselves, to make effort, to be resolute. In the discourses themselves the Buddha declares "there is self-agency"!
You can say many things, but without the appropriate conditions present, such things will not come to pass—whether those conditions are internal (i.e. mental states) or external (i.e. hearing the Dhamma). Nothing I have said has contradicted the Buddha as far as I am aware. In fact, understanding this process of conditionality is the key to understanding the way to liberation. Just taking a look at suttas such as AN 10.92, SN 6.1, SN 12.20, SN 12.23, et cetera illustrates this point. In the Buddha's own words, these things do not lack supporting conditions.
Furthermore, the Buddha defines the all (sabba) as the eye and forms, ear and sounds, nose and aromas, tongue and flavors, body and tactile sensations, intellect and ideas, or in other words, the six sense media (salayatana). In the formula of dependent co-arising (paticca-samuppada), it states, "Nama-rupa-paccaya salayatanam: "Through the mental and physical phenomena are conditioned the six bases,"" i.e. the five physical sense-organs, and consciousness as the sixth. As such, in this sense, all is conditioned and therefore subject to conditionality.
When we say causality or conditionality, we do so because we want to emphasize a picture of paticca-samuppada that is entirely impersonal, and we want to de-emphasize the Nikayan role of agency in the wayfaring or liberation of beings. In fact, impersonal is the favorite word when paticca-samuppada is mentioned, is it not? This is an issue that I have come lately to believe is a broad misconception. The way I have come to see it, in light of this and other discussions, paticca-samuppada is not impersonal at all. Its factors are all personal factors, experienced by individuals. Indeed, its perpetuation is accomplished by the individual, so is its cessation.
A mechanisitic interpretation of paticca-samuppada either precludes the possibility of liberation, since there is nothing among its factors that we can find doing anything other than perpetuating it, or guarantees it universally. Along the latter line, we might say that since "suffering" is the supporting condition for "joy" and the rest of the chain through to destruction of the poisons, that liberation is guaranteed for all, being only the natural conclusion in causal chain of events. I don't believe either of these views is to the point. Do you see my point?
Maybe at this point we get a feeling why the Pudgalavadins insisted on the Pudgala, that afaik, was not considered a Dhamma. They presumably failed to explain what the Pudgala then is, if not a Dhamma, but they could stomach the Nikayas presumably without a two truths doctrine. Just my thoughts.
I am afraid that I do not see your point. Who is this we? Refresh my memory as to where I said the word impersonal, or where I have de-emphasized the Nikayas in any way. I am not aware of anyone who has quoted them on this site as much as I.
It is also interesting that you say we attempt to make this impersonal, de-emphasizing the Nikayan role of agency in the wayfaring or liberation of beings. However, there are places where the Buddha himself uses this method such as in SN 12.12.
At any rate, we are speaking about choice from the Abhidhamma perspective. As such, those views are relevent to this discussion. If you wish to refute the Abhidhamma method, there is a thread already prepared for critical discussions of such [url=url=http://www.newbuddhist.com/forum/showthread.php?t=2186]here[/url].
I am afraid that I do not see your point. Who is this we? Refresh my memory as to where I said the word impersonal, or where I have de-emphasized the Nikayas in any way. I am not aware of anyone who has quoted them on this site as much as I.
I do not say you say the word impersonal, but it seems clear to me that rather than de-emphasizing the Nikayas, you de-emphasize self-agency.
At any rate, we are speaking about choice from the Abhidhamma perspective. As such, those views are relevent to this discussion. If you wish to refute the Abhidhamma method, there is a thread already prepared for critical discussions of such here.
Jason
If my comments have been off-topic here, you have my apologies. Please have your thread, and enjoy it.
Dwelling at Savatthi. "Monks, there are these four nutriments for the maintenance of beings who have come into being or for the support of those in search of a place to be born. Which four? Physical food, gross or refined; contact as the second; intellectual intention the third; and consciousness the fourth. These are the four nutriments for the maintenance of beings who have come into being or for the support of those in search of a place to be born.
When this was said, Ven.-Moliya-Phagguna said to the Blessed One, "Lord, who feeds on the consciousness-nutriment?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'feeds.' If I were to say 'feeds,' then 'Who feeds on the consciousness-nutriment?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'Consciousness-nutriment for what?' And the valid answer is, 'Consciousness-nutriment for the production of future coming-into-being. When that has come into being and exists, then the six sense media. From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact.'"
"Lord, who makes contact?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'makes contact.' If I were to say 'makes contact,' then 'Who makes contact?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes contact?' And the valid answer is, 'From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling.'"
"Lord, who feels?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'feels.' If I were to say 'feels,' then 'Who feels?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes feeling?' And the valid answer is, 'From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving.'"
"Lord, who craves?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'craves.' If I were to say 'craves,' then 'Who craves?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes craving?' And the valid answer is, 'From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance.'"
"Lord, who clings?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'clings.' If I were to say 'clings,' then 'Who clings?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes clinging?' And the valid answer is, 'From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering.
"Now from the remainderless fading & cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of contact. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling. From the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving. From the cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the cessation of birth, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair all cease. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of stress & suffering."
Please point out to me the self-agency in this sutta.
This is a huge mistake. I did not say that self-agency is affirmed in this particular sutta, and it is only convenient to the point you are trying to put across that you ask me this question about this sutta. Such a thing is also known as a straw man.
Though I realize, as you have pointed out before, it is off-topic, I mention only to clarify for you so that there is no continued mistake: the sutta I had in mind when I said the Buddha affirms self-agency (I also believe it is expressed in many ways consistently throughout the suttas--the path is a robotic absurdity, a divine lottery, without it) occurs at A iii 337 (AN 6.1.4.8 {38} Attakāra suttaṃ):
"Never, brahman, have I seen or heard of such an avowal, such a view. Pray, how can one step onwards, how can one step back, yet say: There is no self-agency; there is no other-agency? What think you, brahman, is there such a thing as initiative?
'Yes, sir'
That being so, are beings known to initiate?
'Yes, sir'
'Well, brahman, since there is initiative and beings are known to initiate, this is among beings the self-agency, is the other-agency."
How am I misrepresenting your position? Perhaps we need to review the discussion. First, you said that we, whoever we may be, want to emphasize a picture of paticca-samuppada that is entirely impersonal, and we want to de-emphasize the Nikayan role of agency in the wayfaring or liberation of beings. You also said that it is clear to you that rather than de-emphasizing the Nikayas, I de-emphasize self-agency. Now, prior to this statement, I gave a reference to a sutta in the Nikayas that demonstrates the Buddha's use of what you term to be an impersonal picture of conditionality (SN 12.12).
Now, I would like to ask you once again, where is self-agency in this sutta? I, for one, do not see anything that resembles a reference to self-agency in this particular sutta. In fact, it mirrors precisely what I have been trying to say in regards to conditionality. What this proves to me is that your assumption that we want to emphasize a picture of paticca-samuppada that is entirely impersonal, wanting to de-emphasize the Nikayan role of agency in the wayfaring or liberation of beings, and contradicting the Buddha is simply false as the Buddha himself uses this method when describing conditionality.
Comments
This is not what I have been taught. Human birth, my teachers told me, was not just "an excellent position for awakening" but the only birth that gives access to enlightenment, quite simply because it is the only birth which permits choice. Not having met any "devas" in my travels, I cannot speak to their existence or to their ability to awaken.
Well, you would have to take that issue up with your teacher. All that I can offer you is that the Buddha did teach about other realms of existence, and that according to the Pali Canon, it is possible to attain the cessation of suffering within them—if the prerequisite conditions are present. The example that I provided was concerning non-returners, which attain release after being reborn in one of the heavenly realms. This, however, is only possible if they have previously abandoned the first five fetters.
Jason
Simon,
The complexities of conditionality...
In the beginning, "you" are responsible. As there is avijja (ignorance) present, there is also conditioned upon that a deluded view of reality, and of course, of a self, soul, agent, et cetera. With this sakkaya-ditthi (self-identification view), the only logical start is "I am the owner of my action, the heir of my actions." That is why the Buddha teaches this very formula as a subject for frequent contemplation (AN 5.57).
A person must first see that their actions do have effects—effects that may take them further along the Path, or effects which take them further away from the Path. However, after avijja has successfully been removed through the conditions of study and practice, there will no longer be any sense of self added to this equation. No "person" will be found as the mastermind behind all it all, but it will clearly be seen that it was ignorance that actually made this conditional process possible—it being the master link in the chain of paticca-samuppada (dependent co-arising).
The real problem is, if you start by telling people that "nobody" is actually responsible, the conditions might be present for them to think that as meaning they can do whatever they want consequence free—a doctrine of Purana-Kassapa, which was refuted by the Buddha. That would be a very stupid thing to do, in my opinion, because with ignorance still present, each intentional action produces more conditions for further becoming.
The Buddha has us begin with seeing ourselves as responsible for our actions. There are intentions behind them, and skillful intentions lead to skillful results (i.e. wisdom), while unskillful intentions lead to unskillful results (i.e. delusion). The trick is to understand that even though we are conditioned, we can utilize that conditionality to point us to that which is unconditioned. The Buddha does not have us confirm or deny a self — that is merely a form of self-view one way or the other — but he instead has us travel towards a direct realization of anatta itself.
As I see this, from my unenlightened POV, a conditional mind cannot grasp anatta simply as a concept, and therefore it can seem to make no sense logically, but it is still an integral part of the Path. Once anatta is clearly seen, however, all such questions dealing with "who" and "what" no longer apply. Moreover, as soon as the goal of release has been realized, there is nothing more to do, and "nobody" not to do it.
Hence the conventional vs. ultimate.
Jason
So, what does a haircutter do when I visit him. Or what do I do when I cut my nails. Or move my arm. Are you sure uncontrollable is the right rendering? Or would conditioned be more apropriate?
conditons for kamma-formations, sankhāra, is ignorance or not knowing (avijja). What if I removed avijja to the extend I can see sankhara rise and cease? What if i can see if they merely are rooted in delusion or addiontanlly in hatred and greed? Is it still justified to tell me then I have no controll over them?
Regards
What causes them? I presume I am born with certain constelations due to my kamma I brought with me from my previous existence. But does my previous existence matter at all? What I want to say is that the current state matters, and there must be something to improve it or to worsen it. Ironically, ignorance then must be the cause (some form of sakyha dhitti) for me to pursue some practice, because I belief it benifits me and if I would come the conclusion of the Abhidhamma, was the supporting condition for coming there, although i might figure out I was wrong with my assumption. Only then we can explain away fatalism, if you want to explain no no controller hence no controll to people with sakyha-dhitti, it will make no sense imo. Stating no controll to anybody using conventional terms, speaking in subjects and objects must fail. Incidentally, Ignorance is also the condition for wholesome kamma-formations in paticca-samuppada
The Buddha has said that phenomena (dhammâ) are mind-preceded (manopubbangamâ). Such phenomena are always changing as mind creates (maya) anew. In fact, we may say that as mind creates (manomaya) phenomena arises which can be either corrupt or pure. If corrupt, we speak and act corruptly. If good, we speak and act for the good.
Show me what a person mentally creates (manomaya) and I will tell you whether they are evil or good. If a person's mind is hate-filled; beset with fancies and foolish desires; that person will speak and act in evil ways. It is not as if these thoughts just happened to show up in that person's brain all of a sudden. They were made by him and acted upon. This person had the option to create beautiful thoughts; to think kindly of others; to do what is right and noble, and to build a legacy of good merit.
Indeed, there is a controller or if you prefer, a moral agent. There are evil and good thoughts that can be made. There is blame, too. There is the burden of guilt and a bad conscience for having created evil thoughts then speaking and acting on their behalf.
I remember when Jean-Paul Sartre took on his countrymen for their loathsome conduct during WWII. He despised the fact that many of his countrymen disclaimed responsibility for their cowardly and hypocritical roles during that war (and we Americans are no better for our cowardly response to this present war). One can only collaborate with evil because their thoughts sympathize with evil by making excuses for allowing evil to take root. For example, we are familiar with such excuses as, "I have to take care of my family first" or "I couldn't help it; I had no choice."
Like the Dhammapada suggests, we all get what we deserve. But this thought or belief that we are hopelessly conditioned and impotent is, itself, the result of mind's artifice (manomaya). We have also made a choice to attach to a world which is dependently originated (Skt., pratityasamutpada) wanting to take an endless ride on the wheel of samsara.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Those two lines from the Dhammapada illustrate the basic framework of conditionality themselves. The quality of an act is conditioned by the state of mind of the individual, and as you point out, the type of person (good, evil, et cetera) is conditioned upon the type of actions they perform. Moreover, mind as we have already covered, is as fleeting and impermanent as anything else is (SN 12.61). It's really not all that hard to understand.
Jason
fofoo,
There are countless conditions that go into any given moment. When a barber cuts your hair, there is a complex matrix of causes and conditions for them to do so. Maybe you are just confusing ultimate for conventional.
The aggregates are said to be uncontrollable in the sense of, "But precisely because form (feeling, perception, fabrications, consciousness) is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let my form be thus. Let my form not be thus" (SN 22.59).
The Buddha taught that volitional actions (kamma) fall under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha), which are conditioned (sankhata). This is quite standard in the Pali Canon. What more can I say?
Jason
The most basic framework is mind's capacity for artifice (maya). We may all testify to this by introspection. 'Conditionality' is merely a description of the agential process which is self-conditioning and self-liberating.
The 'conditionality explanation' may satisfy those who are trying to scrub the Buddhist canon of any notion of self as, for example, in "having an emancipated self" (vimutt-attâ), by trying to appear consistent with the theory of no self. But this maneuver doesn't work—those who are having difficulty with understanding the place of self and attakara (self-doing) in the canon seem to be substituting the problem with the reification of an abstraction, viz., conditionality. Conditionality is supposed to do all the stuff an agent would normally do only now one can say, "Nope, there ain't any agential notion in Buddhism—conditions do it." This falls rather flat when we encounter passages like this:
And a word about the last topic, if mind is so fleeting, why is it said to achieve liberation? Why then does the Buddha speak about mind being liberated (cittam vimuttam) from lust (raga), liberated from hatred, liberated from delusion (i.e., the three poisons)? Surely, in this context mind is more than a fleeting every day thought?
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I know Jason, I argued the khandhas lack full controll myself in the Anatta Thread:)
I have problems with the term uncontrollable. We are said to verif the teachings by ourself. I, conventionally speaking, have of course controll over the kandhas allbeit limited. I can shape my body to some extend, i can suppress thought, cut my hair. On the long run however, they will do what they want without asking me. Hair will fall, body decay and so on. Without wanting to introduce more complex thoughts, my current understanding that kandhas lack full controll and at the long run willgo the way they are , e.g. genetically, conditioned. I think time might be important here, temporary controll vs ultimiate controll. just my thoughts.
Regards
Except that the Buddha never said this.
A poor translation doesn't persuade me.
Are you arguing with me or the Buddha?
Jason
All,
where does the debate leave us with the question if a controller is needed for controll? How do you all interpret the following:
"Mano-pubbangama dhamma, mano-settha, mano-maya."
Mind is chief, controller, agent, whateer name you give it here. I dare to say that the Dhammapada proclaims an agent, abeit not atman but namely mind, in contrast to the what we heard about the Abhidhamma.
Mind conditions, but mind is also conditioned. As the Buddha said, the mind is even more fleeting than the body. If you say that "mind" is this agent, which mind? The Buddha himself said that the mind changes so quickly that it is not easy to give a simile for how quickly it changes—that by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. None of this contradicts what is said in the Abhidhamma.
Jason
I would be glad if we could explore (AN I.v.8) in more detail. We had it,I think already, Nyanatolika translates citta here as "conciousness" My commentary says that:
(*1) K: nach schnellem Entstehen ein schnelles Vergehen. K bemerkt ferner, dass dieser Text am Schluss einer Lehrunterweisung gesprochen wurde (die uns offenbar nicht erhalten ist). -
Bewusstsein = citta, welches aus stilistischen Gründen vorher mit Geist wiedergegeben wurde.
After fast originating comes a fast cessation. K remarks further that this text was spoken at the end of an instructive speech (which itself obviously is not any moreavailble to us)
conciousness = citta, which was rendered previously as mind/spirit previously.
Emphazis through bolds by me. We have to handle that part of this sutta (AN I.v.8) with extreme caution,since it lacks the context.
Regards
On the conventional level, you can say that all mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made—if one speaks or acts with an evil mind, suffering (dukkha) follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart, or if one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him.
On the ultimate level, however, what is "mind"? Is mind a permanent, stable, and unconditioned phenomenon that acts, but is not acted upon by conditionality? The answer, whether from the Suttas or the Abhidhamma, is no. Mind is indeed an impermanent, unstable, and conditioned phenomenon. The arising of mind has its own requisite conditions, just as its ceasing has its own requisite conditions.
Jason
Well, at least from the general Theravadin standpoint (which I am sure will be contended), citta (mind, consciousness, state of consciousness) is synonymous with mano (mind) and vinnana (consciousness).
Jason
It would be interesting to find out if they are similar or redundant. If the former is the case, this could be a worthwhile issue to pursue to understand mind and conciousness better. If they are redundant, I honestly must say I am confused.
Regarding to you question of the mind. I undeterstand that the syntetic activites called mind made can at least theoretically be analyzed into groups.
when we go to ultimate level and look at Consciousness-States (viññāna kkhandha) and Mental-States (sankhāra kkhandha), there we have it.
Now, if we look at table I, Impulsion (javana) can be associated with right or wrong view, for instance. The impuls must come from somewhere.
I think the problem of the debate is similar of that finding a first cause. One asks why and ends up seeing a conditioned chain. If one cuts of that chain, simply looking at the current state, the problem becomes rather theoretical, belongs to the realm of theorizers.
Regards
As it were, there is an interesting discussion of this here.
Jason
I would first argue that Moggallana's mind was powerful rather than passive. It's not the fickle mind of the typical worlding.
But getting back to the control issue, in the PTS Dic. reading about the various definitions of citta, I came across this:
"from the fetters of Mara those are released who control their heart" Dh 37. The word used here for control is "saṃyamissanti" (the verb YAM meaning to "restrain"); while heart is the familiar "citta". So back to the controller of the fickled mind or the mind released.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I think earlier fofoo was thinking along the same lines. I don't think it will throw water on this fire, but who knows.
As we all must admit by know, we spend a lot of time going over Suttas, and that is a good thing. This is why I celebrate these discussions—they offer to fellow discussants a learing experience. In the Phagguna Sutta of the Anguttara-Nikaya the Buddha said that without the Tathagata or a disciple present if one "ever reflects in mind on Dhamma, as heard, as learnt, ponders on it, pores over it...his mind is wholly freed as to the complete destruction of the root of becoming" (A.iii.382, VI, VI, § 57).
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I have a problem with the concept personal responsiblity, because it's one of those qualities that if beyond the scope of the observers consciousness does not exist. Sad
It`s a bit of a dilemma. Without personal responsibility, there is not need of forgivness. Without forgivness, one might become brutal. I believe this always has been a problem of human relationship. Metaphors like "looking into one`s heart" have always been important means to communicate understanding and compassion for others beyond mere logical battles of free will vs total determination. Sorry for going off-topic a bit
Bobby, from my personal limited studies on both western religon/philosophy and Buddhism, heart mostly points to volition. He died of a broken heart translates he lost the will to live. He has a heart of stone translates he ruthlessly goes after what he wants without regarding the wishes of others. His heart is bleeding translates to he loves something that is not any more available or does not give back love. I do not want to completely rationalize beautiful metaphors here, it is just my reading.:)
Reading a bit about Moggallana, his end seems to have been quite cruel. From my reading, he was equipped with supranatural powers, as he could change even his form. How litereal one might take the Jataka Story about him, he defenetly was an interesting fellow
Regards
Your fondness for the philosophers of Will need not blind you to the fact that there are other possible deconstructions. Indeed, there are many of us who believe that Will is not the only driver.
Only insofar as you may choose to "respond appropriately" - or inappropriately - in one way or another. Responsibility is not judgemental. Will is.
The above follows very much the Mind-only school of Buddhism; that determinate reality is supported by Mind or Wille, which Kant described a the formative principle.
Turning to Schopenhauer, Buddhism differs from his philosophy in this regard: the will does not need to be subjugated; but when it comprehends itself (svacittdristamatra) the fiery thirst of desire ends. For all along desire was just the incompleteness (avidya) of the will with itself. This lack or want of itself spurred it on to create all things (sarvadharma).
From the side of the practitioner both classical Ch'an (J., Zen) and Tibetan Dzogchen teach the apperception of the pure will which is usually translated as 'Mind'. Dzogchen is remarkable in that the adept sees things as harmless natural will-formations. It is not an intellectual apperception either. It is perfected power (siddha). He generates a field of energy about him which may explain why Buddhist art employs the halo. He transmits this power to the disciple who then prefects it by a life time of practice.
Much of this is not taught Westerners because it is too difficult to deal with their monophasic cultural upbrining (Asian cultures are polyphasic). So they essentially get the short shrift. Lamas are quite content to lest Western scholars translate the esoteric stuff. They can't employ it anyway.
With regard to will in Judaism and Christianity it all begins with Genesis and how we might read it.
Beraeshith bara Aelohim aeth-ha-shamaim w'aeth-ha-âretz.
You could read it as follows: It [Wille] created Aelohim (being of beings); the implicate of heaven and earth. In this pericope we see that Wille pluralizes itself becoming (Aelohim), thus becoming many; which is undeveloped. In my opinion, and that doesn't count much, the Old Testament is really an elaborate meditation on mind and body; working back to the realization of the unconditioned. I think to some extent the Torah Jews understand this.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
It`s certainly a nice way to put it without getting involved in long lasting disputes (I recall having read often that the issue was transfered from the realm of "dry" philosophers to the domain of neuro-scientists).
Generally, I am not opposed to judging, very least regarding myself, as long as the emphazis is not on blame but compassion and improving.
Regularily looking if one is tormented by the three poisons i consider to be an important element of the path, and even if free will is postulated, I propose that everyone should keep in mind that choice is limited by people`s skills, and emphazis should be on stressing the potential of becoming better, not lamenting on what went wrong.
Regards
Simon,
you hit the nail on the head we are all deconstructions/reconstructionists from the the path of light, to the path of vibrations traveling the ear which we percieve in an auditory manner.
Seems there's losts of variables to confuse that complex onboard plasma mircoprocessor into a state of delusion, eh, not to mention that damn looping recording/reinforcing/rejecting mechanistic feature that is all to difficult to reprogram, let alone bypass.;)
In Gassho
Jason,
Firstly, I still have problems seeing above view not guilty as falling under the Jain's view of Karma. I do not want to go on your nerves with my German translations, but the rendering in my suttas is pre-determined (vorhergewirkt), rather than " result of past". While similar terms, the subtle difference comes when arguing that the Jains point that was refuted merely was that all is fully conditioned by past, arguing that presence also fully condiondend might not help against the case of pre-determination. Maybe we can look at the Pali terms in near future.
Secondly, I still have problems not seeing the no-controll claim as not falling under the view of Gosala. I provide following from DN2:
While one can probably refute most points of Gosalla by still holding to a concept of moral retribution, can one say if there is no controll, there still is a requisite condition for purification? Strictly speaking, if everything is conditioned, all conditions are requisite, because they cannot be other than they are. In other words, pointing to a requisite condition for purification is pointless, because conditioning will bring us there or not anyways. Even in saying it is pointless, I would be making no point at all, I just would exactly say what I had to.
Regards
Yes, I think we can say there are still requsite conditions without control. In the ultimate sense, control as we understand it is not needed in a conditional world. The purification of beings has its requsite conditions, as well as being a requsite condition itself. One cannot say, for example, let my Nibbana be thus, let my Nibbana not be thus, et cetera, nor can one say let me achieve Nibbana right now.
My understanding of this topic is impermanent; and as such, it changes depending upon the various circumstances surrounding it. Perhaps we can rid some of the confusion by removing the idea that cetanaa cetasika has choice as its function, and replacing it with the idea that it is just another action of mind.
There are many different ways in which we can look at this subject. One is to look at it from the conventional level of beings (satta). On that level, we (as in Jason, fofoo, et cetera) can make decisons, we can make chocies, et cetera. I walk into a store and I decide to buy tofu instead of beef for my curry dish.
On the ultimate level, who makes decisions, who makes choices? Did the Buddha teach of an unconditioned agent which chooses, decides, or controls? On the ultimate level, do we (as in Jason, fofoo, et cetera) exist? Can we be found? Is there something that we can point to and say this is me?
From my limited understanding, the answer in Theravada is no. The choice to walk into a store and the decision to purchase tofu instead of beef is not a choice that was made free from causes or conditions. There are causes and conditions for the particular store I chose, as well as for not buying the beef.
In the ultimate sense, how can there be choices, decisions, or control without a chooser, decider, or controller? To be honest, there might be, but I do not know what allows for this possibility in Abhidhamma since there is no agent or self by which a choice is made. There are only actions (kamma) born out of avijja.
Essentially, if the appropriate conditions for touching the Deathless are present, then one is able to transcend suffering; if the appropriate conditions are not present for touching the Deathless, then one is unable to transcend suffering. Pointing to the requsite conditions for purification is not pointless as that in itself may be a requsite needed for the arising of the factors for awakening (bojjhanga).
Jason
I am sure we do, but how does this relate to what the Abhidhamma has to say (which is the context of this topic)?
Jason
it seems we are stuck with the infamous conventional vs ultimate debate. Currently, I must say I am at the end of my knowledge and I cannot say now if I want to examine the Abhidhamma aproach deeper.
However, I want to make one remark. Even if we are totally conditioned, our responsiblity lies in using our skills, i.e., the ammount of ignorance we have removed. In simple terms, there is a difference between a blind man falling into a trap and a seeing man delibratly trapping into it.
I want to give the following for consideration:
Free Will - Even forRobots
Regards
It is pointless if we make conditionality absolute, because there is no place where a decision is actually made. It seems that what we are missing is that though I can't just say "let me achieve Nibbana immediately," I can say "let me achieve Nibbana." This is one of the most basic conflicts of Abhidhamma with the discourses of the Buddha. Abhidhammically, we are speaking as if the conditions for achieving Nibbana are outside of ourselves and entirely beyond our control--because absolutely all is outside ourselves, even ourselves--: as is obvious, we deny agency altogether. This is opposite--literally opposite!-- to the teachings of the Buddha we find exhorting disciples to arouse themselves, to make effort, to take refuge in themselves and no other (no other refers not only to other people but also to anything outside themselves), to exert themselves, to make effort, to be resolute. In the discourses themselves the Buddha declares "there is self-agency"!
Why are we saying there is not?
Why?
in friendliness,
V.
Getting to the easy questions now, V.?
You can say many things, but without the appropriate conditions present, such things will not come to pass—whether those conditions are internal (i.e. mental states) or external (i.e. hearing the Dhamma). Nothing I have said has contradicted the Buddha as far as I am aware. In fact, understanding this process of conditionality is the key to understanding the way to liberation. Just taking a look at suttas such as AN 10.92, SN 6.1, SN 12.20, SN 12.23, et cetera illustrates this point. In the Buddha's own words, these things do not lack supporting conditions.
Furthermore, the Buddha defines the all (sabba) as the eye and forms, ear and sounds, nose and aromas, tongue and flavors, body and tactile sensations, intellect and ideas, or in other words, the six sense media (salayatana). In the formula of dependent co-arising (paticca-samuppada), it states, "Nama-rupa-paccaya salayatanam: "Through the mental and physical phenomena are conditioned the six bases,"" i.e. the five physical sense-organs, and consciousness as the sixth. As such, in this sense, all is conditioned and therefore subject to conditionality.
Jason
A mechanisitic interpretation of paticca-samuppada either precludes the possibility of liberation, since there is nothing among its factors that we can find doing anything other than perpetuating it, or guarantees it universally. Along the latter line, we might say that since "suffering" is the supporting condition for "joy" and the rest of the chain through to destruction of the poisons, that liberation is guaranteed for all, being only the natural conclusion in causal chain of events. I don't believe either of these views is to the point. Do you see my point?
in friendliness,
V.
Regards
I am afraid that I do not see your point. Who is this we? Refresh my memory as to where I said the word impersonal, or where I have de-emphasized the Nikayas in any way. I am not aware of anyone who has quoted them on this site as much as I.
It is also interesting that you say we attempt to make this impersonal, de-emphasizing the Nikayan role of agency in the wayfaring or liberation of beings. However, there are places where the Buddha himself uses this method such as in SN 12.12.
At any rate, we are speaking about choice from the Abhidhamma perspective. As such, those views are relevent to this discussion. If you wish to refute the Abhidhamma method, there is a thread already prepared for critical discussions of such [url=url=http://www.newbuddhist.com/forum/showthread.php?t=2186]here[/url].
Jason
I do not say you say the word impersonal, but it seems clear to me that rather than de-emphasizing the Nikayas, you de-emphasize self-agency.
If my comments have been off-topic here, you have my apologies. Please have your thread, and enjoy it.
in friendliness,
V.
As I have said, the Buddha also uses this method.
Please point out to me the self-agency in this sutta.
Jason
This is a huge mistake. I did not say that self-agency is affirmed in this particular sutta, and it is only convenient to the point you are trying to put across that you ask me this question about this sutta. Such a thing is also known as a straw man.
Though I realize, as you have pointed out before, it is off-topic, I mention only to clarify for you so that there is no continued mistake: the sutta I had in mind when I said the Buddha affirms self-agency (I also believe it is expressed in many ways consistently throughout the suttas--the path is a robotic absurdity, a divine lottery, without it) occurs at A iii 337 (AN 6.1.4.8 {38} Attakāra suttaṃ):
Regards
How am I misrepresenting your position? Perhaps we need to review the discussion. First, you said that we, whoever we may be, want to emphasize a picture of paticca-samuppada that is entirely impersonal, and we want to de-emphasize the Nikayan role of agency in the wayfaring or liberation of beings. You also said that it is clear to you that rather than de-emphasizing the Nikayas, I de-emphasize self-agency. Now, prior to this statement, I gave a reference to a sutta in the Nikayas that demonstrates the Buddha's use of what you term to be an impersonal picture of conditionality (SN 12.12).
Now, I would like to ask you once again, where is self-agency in this sutta? I, for one, do not see anything that resembles a reference to self-agency in this particular sutta. In fact, it mirrors precisely what I have been trying to say in regards to conditionality. What this proves to me is that your assumption that we want to emphasize a picture of paticca-samuppada that is entirely impersonal, wanting to de-emphasize the Nikayan role of agency in the wayfaring or liberation of beings, and contradicting the Buddha is simply false as the Buddha himself uses this method when describing conditionality.
Jason