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The Buddha's Omniscience.
Jason
God EmperorArrakis Moderator
Omniscience seems to be a common theme throughout religion. Besides the most obvious case, the omniscience of God, various faiths have also claimed to have had earthly founders who were omniscient as well. The Jain founder, Mahavira, for example, is said to have been omniscient. The Buddha, a contemporary of Mahavira, is also said to have been omniscient, but is this a claim that holds any truth? Textually speaking, I think the evidence for the Buddha's omniscience, as it's generally understood by traditional Buddhists at least, is shaky at best, and there appears to be a fair amount of evidence suggesting that this was actually a later invention.
In SN 54.9, for example, the Buddha gives a talk to a group of monks praising foulness of the body meditation, a method in which one contemplates the body in a way that reduces attachment to the body and counteracts lust. After the talk, the Buddha goes into seclusion for half a month. While away, the monks practice meditating on the foulness of the body, but being repelled and disgusted with the body, many of them end up committing suicide or hiring assailants to kill them. Upon returning, the Buddha asks Ananda why the Sangha looks so diminished. Ananda explains the situation and then asks the Buddha to give them another meditation method, which ends up being mindfulness of breathing.
If the Buddha was indeed omniscient, it seems surprising that he'd have had to ask Ananda what happened. This is especially true considering that Mahavira, who's referred to as Nigantha Nataputta in the Pali Canon, is apparently ridiculed by Ananda in MN 76 for going to an empty house for alms, having to ask for directions, etc. In fact, it's surprising that the Buddha didn't simply give them a talk on mindfulness of breathing in the first place in order to avoid such a thing from even happening. The "orthodox" position that's supported by the commentaries, however, states that the Buddha already knew this was going to happen and basically played dumb.
The story given is that these monks were hunters in a past life that were reborn in hell, but due to some wholesome kamma, they eventually gained rebirth in the human realm and became renouncers under the Buddha. Knowing that a portion of their original unwholesome kamma was about to ripen, bringing about their deaths via homicide and suicide, and that there was nothing he could do to prevent this, the Buddha spoke of the foulness of the body in order to help remove their attachment to the body so that they would lose their fear of death. Sounds like bullshit to me. Bhikkhu Bodhi even admits that "... the idea of kammically predetermined suicide seems difficult to reconcile with the concept of suicide as a volitionally induced act" (1951-52).
Furthermore, in MN 71, the Buddha rejects the assertion that he claims to be "omniscient and all-seeing." He says, "... those who say thus do not say what has been said by me, but misrepresent me with what is untrue and contrary to fact" (Bodhi), but the commentary states that all knowable things are potentially accessible to him. The issue, of course, is whether the Buddha is rejecting the claim that he's omniscient in the sense that all things are knowable to him at all times without interruption (i.e., that he is omniscient in the sense that all knowable things are potentially accessible to him) or whether he is simply rejecting the claim altogether.
There are suttas that supposedly support the commentarial position regarding the Buddha's omniscience. As Bhikkhu Bodhi notes, "At MN 90.8, the Buddha says that it is possible to know and see all, though not simultaneously, and at AN 4:24/ii.24 he claims to know all that can be seen, heard, sensed, and cognized. This is understood by the Theravada commentators as an assertion of omniscience in the qualified sense" (1276). But, I fail to see how MN 90.8 affirms this possibility. The Buddha does state that it's not possible for a recluse or brahmin to know and see all simultaneously, but he never explicitly asserts his own omniscience, and I've since found that many modern scholars share this view.
One example, from Edward Thomas in History of Buddhist Thought, states:
Another example, from David Kalupahana in A History of Buddhist Philosophy, states:
In my opinion, the idea of the Buddha being an omniscient superman evolved over time, beginning not long after his death or possibly even while he was still alive, although Theravada was relatively conservative in this transformation. An examination of the textual evidence suggests that some later traditions attempted to transform the Buddha into a transcendent being, and eventually, an emanation of the supramundane Buddha.
This process can be traced, beginning with such works as the Mahavastu, and continuing on through works such as the Lalitavistara and the Saddharmapundarikasutra. Nevertheless, I believe that a similar scenario occurred in Theravada, albeit on a much smaller scale, and the Buddha was attributed with qualities that he himself rejected, or at the very least, qualities that were exaggerated. For what it's worth, I think it's possible the Buddha might have known all and saw all when it came to suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering and the path leading to the end of suffering (which is impressive enough); but, to be honest, I have a hard time believing that the Buddha knew all and saw all in the biblical sense, and I see little evidence to suggest that he did.
Any thoughts, comments, criticism?
In SN 54.9, for example, the Buddha gives a talk to a group of monks praising foulness of the body meditation, a method in which one contemplates the body in a way that reduces attachment to the body and counteracts lust. After the talk, the Buddha goes into seclusion for half a month. While away, the monks practice meditating on the foulness of the body, but being repelled and disgusted with the body, many of them end up committing suicide or hiring assailants to kill them. Upon returning, the Buddha asks Ananda why the Sangha looks so diminished. Ananda explains the situation and then asks the Buddha to give them another meditation method, which ends up being mindfulness of breathing.
If the Buddha was indeed omniscient, it seems surprising that he'd have had to ask Ananda what happened. This is especially true considering that Mahavira, who's referred to as Nigantha Nataputta in the Pali Canon, is apparently ridiculed by Ananda in MN 76 for going to an empty house for alms, having to ask for directions, etc. In fact, it's surprising that the Buddha didn't simply give them a talk on mindfulness of breathing in the first place in order to avoid such a thing from even happening. The "orthodox" position that's supported by the commentaries, however, states that the Buddha already knew this was going to happen and basically played dumb.
The story given is that these monks were hunters in a past life that were reborn in hell, but due to some wholesome kamma, they eventually gained rebirth in the human realm and became renouncers under the Buddha. Knowing that a portion of their original unwholesome kamma was about to ripen, bringing about their deaths via homicide and suicide, and that there was nothing he could do to prevent this, the Buddha spoke of the foulness of the body in order to help remove their attachment to the body so that they would lose their fear of death. Sounds like bullshit to me. Bhikkhu Bodhi even admits that "... the idea of kammically predetermined suicide seems difficult to reconcile with the concept of suicide as a volitionally induced act" (1951-52).
Furthermore, in MN 71, the Buddha rejects the assertion that he claims to be "omniscient and all-seeing." He says, "... those who say thus do not say what has been said by me, but misrepresent me with what is untrue and contrary to fact" (Bodhi), but the commentary states that all knowable things are potentially accessible to him. The issue, of course, is whether the Buddha is rejecting the claim that he's omniscient in the sense that all things are knowable to him at all times without interruption (i.e., that he is omniscient in the sense that all knowable things are potentially accessible to him) or whether he is simply rejecting the claim altogether.
There are suttas that supposedly support the commentarial position regarding the Buddha's omniscience. As Bhikkhu Bodhi notes, "At MN 90.8, the Buddha says that it is possible to know and see all, though not simultaneously, and at AN 4:24/ii.24 he claims to know all that can be seen, heard, sensed, and cognized. This is understood by the Theravada commentators as an assertion of omniscience in the qualified sense" (1276). But, I fail to see how MN 90.8 affirms this possibility. The Buddha does state that it's not possible for a recluse or brahmin to know and see all simultaneously, but he never explicitly asserts his own omniscience, and I've since found that many modern scholars share this view.
One example, from Edward Thomas in History of Buddhist Thought, states:
Already the Jains claimed omniscience for their leader. They are said to have held that he was "omniscient, all-seeing, and possessed complete knowledge and insight; that whether walking or standing, asleep or awake, knowledge and insight were continually present". This claim is ridiculed by the Buddhists, and the omniscient teacher is described as so ignorant that he goes for alms to a house not knowing that it is empty, or as having to ask his way to a village. Buddha is represented as denying that he claims such omniscience. What he claims is the three knowledges, (1) that he remembers numberless past existences, as far back as he wishes, (2) that with his divine eye he can see beings passing away and being reborn according to their karma, (3) that with the destruction of the asavas he has of himself attained and realized release of mind and knowledge in this life and abides in it. (148)
Another example, from David Kalupahana in A History of Buddhist Philosophy, states:
The terms sabbannu, sabbavidu ("all-knowing") and sabbadassavi ("all-perceiving") occur in the early discourses. The general tendency among modern interpreters of Buddhism is to assume that this is a knowledge-claim comparable to the "omniscience" claimed by Mahavira or in the theistic tradition, where it is attributed to divinity. Although the Buddha disclaimed such knowledge in the Tevijja-Vacchagotta-sutta, insisting that he possessed only the threefold higher knowledge ... scholars are more inclined to interpret the last, namely, wisdom (panna), as "omniscience." It is true that some of the later Buddhist metaphysicians like the Sarvastivadins propounded ideas that can serve as a basis for such knowledge-claims. Modern interpreters therefore attempt to attribute these ideas to the Buddha himself despite a mass of evidence against doing so.
To understand what the Buddha meant by "all-knowing" or "all-perceiving," it is first necessary to analyze the use of the term "all" (sabbam) in the early discourses. Interestingly, an important discourse relating specially to this problem is attributed to the Buddha:
This discourse makes the Buddha's position abundantly clear. For the Buddha, "all" or "everything" represented the subject defined in terms of the six senses and the object explained in terms of the six sense objects. However, to be "omniscient" it is necessary that one knows everything, not only of the past and present but also of the future. It is possible to claim that the obvious past and future can be known directly if one can perceive the essence of everything. That essence being permanent and eternal, one glimpse of it at any point would mean knowledge of everything. This is certainly how the Buddhist school of Sarvastivadins attempted to justify omniscience, but such a view cannot be attributed to the Buddha. Not only did he refuse to recognize knowledge of such an essence or substance as exisiting in the future, he also claimed that he failed to perceive any such entity surviving in the immediate past or in the present.
This is the implication of a disciple's statement: Na tuyham adittham asutam amutam va ato avinnatam kincanam atthi loke. This statement is sometimes interpreted as "You are omniscient," that is, "There is nothing that you have not seen, heard or conceived." This is an extremely superficial and reckless rendering of an important statement. The statement is to be understood in light of the definition of an "enlightened one" in the early Buddhist context. In fact, the term akincana, "one who does not look for something" (kinci; other than what is given in sensory experience, a la discourse on "everything" quoted above), is used to refer to the enlightened one. Hence, the above statement in Pali is more appropriately rendered as: "You do not have (or recognize) something (na kincana) that is not seen, heard, conceived or cognized in this world," which would be a negation rather than an assertion of the very metaphysics that serve as the basis for "omniscience." This idea was highlighted centuries later by the famous Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (see Chapter XVI). (43-4)
To understand what the Buddha meant by "all-knowing" or "all-perceiving," it is first necessary to analyze the use of the term "all" (sabbam) in the early discourses. Interestingly, an important discourse relating specially to this problem is attributed to the Buddha:
Thus have I heard. Once the Fortunate One was living at Savatthi, in the monastery of Anathapindindika, [situated] in the Jeta's Grove. Then the Fortunate One addressed the monks: "O, monks!" They responded: "Yes, O Venerable One!" and the Fortunate One spoke thus: "Monks, I will preach to you 'everything.' Listen to it. Listen to it. What, monks, is 'everything'? Eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and odor, tongue and taste, body and touch, mind and concepts. These are called 'everything.' Monks, he who would say, 'I will reject this everything and proclaim another everything,' he may certainly have a theory [of his own]. But when questioned, he would not be able to answer and would, moreover, be subject to vexation. Why? Because it would not be within the range of experience."
This discourse makes the Buddha's position abundantly clear. For the Buddha, "all" or "everything" represented the subject defined in terms of the six senses and the object explained in terms of the six sense objects. However, to be "omniscient" it is necessary that one knows everything, not only of the past and present but also of the future. It is possible to claim that the obvious past and future can be known directly if one can perceive the essence of everything. That essence being permanent and eternal, one glimpse of it at any point would mean knowledge of everything. This is certainly how the Buddhist school of Sarvastivadins attempted to justify omniscience, but such a view cannot be attributed to the Buddha. Not only did he refuse to recognize knowledge of such an essence or substance as exisiting in the future, he also claimed that he failed to perceive any such entity surviving in the immediate past or in the present.
This is the implication of a disciple's statement: Na tuyham adittham asutam amutam va ato avinnatam kincanam atthi loke. This statement is sometimes interpreted as "You are omniscient," that is, "There is nothing that you have not seen, heard or conceived." This is an extremely superficial and reckless rendering of an important statement. The statement is to be understood in light of the definition of an "enlightened one" in the early Buddhist context. In fact, the term akincana, "one who does not look for something" (kinci; other than what is given in sensory experience, a la discourse on "everything" quoted above), is used to refer to the enlightened one. Hence, the above statement in Pali is more appropriately rendered as: "You do not have (or recognize) something (na kincana) that is not seen, heard, conceived or cognized in this world," which would be a negation rather than an assertion of the very metaphysics that serve as the basis for "omniscience." This idea was highlighted centuries later by the famous Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (see Chapter XVI). (43-4)
In my opinion, the idea of the Buddha being an omniscient superman evolved over time, beginning not long after his death or possibly even while he was still alive, although Theravada was relatively conservative in this transformation. An examination of the textual evidence suggests that some later traditions attempted to transform the Buddha into a transcendent being, and eventually, an emanation of the supramundane Buddha.
This process can be traced, beginning with such works as the Mahavastu, and continuing on through works such as the Lalitavistara and the Saddharmapundarikasutra. Nevertheless, I believe that a similar scenario occurred in Theravada, albeit on a much smaller scale, and the Buddha was attributed with qualities that he himself rejected, or at the very least, qualities that were exaggerated. For what it's worth, I think it's possible the Buddha might have known all and saw all when it came to suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering and the path leading to the end of suffering (which is impressive enough); but, to be honest, I have a hard time believing that the Buddha knew all and saw all in the biblical sense, and I see little evidence to suggest that he did.
Any thoughts, comments, criticism?
0
Comments
What a superb thread and a wonderful opening post. My superficial acquaintance with the historical development of Buddhism has unearthed such nuggets as the debate surrounding the issue of whether an arhat can still experience nocturnal emissions.
It seems at some point during the development of Buddhism, the historical Buddha just wasn't enough of a super-hero to keep some people happy.
We now have the position where Mahayanists state that Gotama was not, in fact, omniscient as he was merely a liberated arhat, rather than a fully enlightened Buddha. But let's have a good look at two main elements which help to prop this idea up. Firstly, a fully enlightened being has compassion which matches a Boddhisattva. Secondly he has correct view regarding emptiness, the ultimate state.
In the first case, I don't see how it is possible to quantify compassion. There is no such thing as a compassion-ometer, with which we can measure relative amounts, so let's put that one down to opinion.
Secondly, "correct view". This is predicated on an analysis of reality which the Buddha refused to engage in. He consistently answers "does not apply" when given alternatives - and for a very good reason.
Unfortunately, some early Buddhist schools took it upon themselves to adopt theories regarding this. Proceeding from the notion that we somehow inhabit an illusory reality (Maya) they began to look for a basis which could be defined as true.
They started to cook up definitions of one kind or another - some coming to be known as Hinayana, some coming to be known as Mahayana - depending on the sophistication of the views they espoused. Neither of these developments are anything to do with the Theravadan school, which wrongly gets equated with the now-defunct Hinayana schools.
Both Hinayana and Mahayana proceed from the Hinduistic notion of Maya which teaches that we are ego-minds deluded and unable to grasp reality. The Hindus say it's God not recognizing himself, the Buddhist claim beings do not recognize the true basis 'emptiness'.
All of this is pure papañca (mental proliferation) and we can clearly see the whole thesis tearing apart when we investigate the teachings of highest yoga tantra. It is taught that the ultimate attainment is the union of bliss and emptiness.... but what emptiness I ask? Within the non-dual state of samhadi, there is no place for 'view' of any kind. No intellectual opinion, however refined can accompany you there, so we are looking at something more 'direct' and not any 'superior view'.
Again, another claim which does not bear scrutiny.
Somehow the Mahayana schools adopted, or maintained the system of tantra, whereas the Theravadans abandoned those teachings. I say abandoned, as there are accounts of the mind-made body in the Pali suttas which accord with tantric teachings on Powa, or consciousness transference.
Buddha says he not only attained, but also taught monks how to do this.
There is stony silence within the Theravadan ranks on this issue. The general opinion being that, in any case, these teachings were unnecessary, as they were subsequently dropped. This is worrying as we have also seen a certain amount of antagonism towards Buddha's teachings on Jhana from within the Theravadan school. Whilst the man himself bangs on and on about it in sutta after sutta you would think (from the attitude of some teachers) that he never taught it.
Beyond the initial generation stage, tantra is in fact a meditation on the body - primarily the subtle body - the body of breath. It has little to do with any Mahayanist intellectual theories and is, like anapanasati a direct means, dealing only with the objects of the senses and not in speculation.
It's a tad off topic but I feel we can throw it into the hat, as there are numerous misconceptions regarding teachings within Buddhism, upon which many claims of superiority are based, and I think we need to honestly look at a broad picture to establish the validity of such claims.
I, personally, don't see any problem with a being (having attained nirvana) not knowing what Madonna's favourite food is, or what size shoes I wear.
I guess some people do, and for them there will always be super-duper mega-heroes and Gods of course.
namaste
Kris
I think that what we are looking at here is what results from the 'cult of personality'. More and more, I am convinced that the factual 'Historical Buddha', much like the 'historical Christ', has been almost totally effaced by mythogenesis (is there such a word?) Our historical characters become legends and then pass into myth. In the process, they have 'heroic' or 'diabolical' traits projected onto them. 'Omniscience' is one such archetypal characteristic.
There seem to be a number of fact6ors which drive this process, not least of which is the matter of control of the story. Thus, parents will tell 'legends' about their own parents and grandparents, and family stories take the place of history. We have a splendid example here in the UK where the legend of East End cheerfulness during the Blitz has almost completely eradicated the memory of looting, rape and murder going on amid the ruins.
When it comes to 'religious' icons, the process is even stronger. For me, any supra-human characteristic ascribed be it to a Gotama, a Jesus, or a Madame Blavatsky is suspect and, eventually, a hindrance. As i understand the Buddhist (and Abrahamic) view that only from a human life can we attain liberation, it points to the value of that life and that value is devalued by imputing elitist 'powers' to the Great Signposts.
Omniscience is a 'fairy godmother' wish which, if achieved, would, I am certain, be as overwhelming as the magical mill that would not stop grinding out porridge. It is like all other 'wishes' - glamourous but, ultimately, unsafe.
My question to myself is always the same: what difference does it make to the message if such spermundane characteristics were not historically factual? Can I escape from the cult of personality and grasp the message stripped of the baggage of myth, legend and, even, history?
Simon, that was very difficult for me to do. After an intense introduction to Tibetan Buddhism, with all its amazing and esoteric magic and mystery I finally fell away having made little headway. Floundering in a labyrinth of impossible expectations and high-fluted philosophy I kept wondering why this did not engage with my 'real' life.
It was not until I stumbled upon Theravadan teachings on Jhana that I finally found a path which used ONLY that which I could see, not that which I was 'supposed' to see. Used that which I was, not that which I first "should" be. Removed proliferation and expectations from my mind, rather than stuffing even more of them in than I already had.
You don't need to 'grasp' the message. Relax and imbibe it.
Jason, if there is anything I can help you with, just let me know.
namaste
I would be more sanguine about Theravada if I did not see 'Theravadans' as apt as 'Mahayanists' to splittism.
The personalities get in the way, even Gotama's, of the message. Perhaps this is why artists, musicians and architects have only claimed and signed their works for such a short period of time.
Well indeed. Splittists, personalities, opinions and counter-opinions. An endless strudel of stuff. What's to be made of it all?
That being said, I do have difficulty with any 'holier than thou'.
Palzang
I'm sure you are right, Palzang: we are back with the problem of translation. Perhaps that is why I am so fond of writers like Tom Paine or maths or, even, Spinoza: they wrote in a language where the meaning does not need to be translated.
The same problem exists in other disciplines too. Psychology/psychotherapy suffers from it as is witnessed by the way in which diagnostic terms with a very specific meaning pass into common speech: paranoia, neurosis, etc.
This then leads to an effect which winds up any debate, particularly in philosophical/religious debate. One person uses a particular word ('omniscience' in this thread). The next uses with a slightly different 'spin' or begins to quote dictionaries and debate becomes argument. Each person asserts that "words mean what I want them to mean", just like Humpty Dumpty, forgetting that language is a map of a map, all-too-far from the 'territory'. In terms of the wonderful Ox-Herding Pictures, language is a rough sketch of an account of a photograph of a footprint LOL
Palzang
At least with colours or sounds, we have some basic physics with which to work. But what is the wave length or decibel level of 'omniscience' or any other abstraction? And what instrument are we to use to measure it? As over-educated teenagers, I recall that a friend and I attempted to invent a "ruakhometer" which could measure the level of ruakh (Hebrew for breath and spirit). Not a success.
It is my hope that, one day soon, we shall have just such a unit of measurement on which all can agree. Of course, even with such a simple matter as measuring distance, one or two countries still cling to miles, feet and inches - indeed, I have difficulty with the SI units - but science has abandoned such human-based systems.
Likewise. People of that kind tend to be well versed in their tradition, with all the requisites deemed necessary by the followers but with little direct experience, otherwise genuine compassion and not vitriol would be their way.
So it is both total knowledge and total wisdom that marks the tathagatha. Nothing to do, really, with the ordinary meaning of omniscience. In fact, the knowledge of the law of karma is, as Jetsunma puts it, the only knowledge that is worth anything!
Palzang
Knowledge and Truth in Early Buddhism: An examination of the Kaalaama Sutta and related Paali Canonical texts By Dharmacari Nagapriya
http://www.westernbuddhistreview.com/vol3/Knowledge.htm
In the context of this thread on omniscience, this section, just before the conclusions, seems germane:
Hi Simon,
Good question and a good quote. I think 'testing' is much easier than most people think. Generally, when we are confronted with a system like Buddhism we employ all our intellect and prior knowledge of other faiths and philosophies in order to contextualise what we encounter.
But just take a second to consider this. What if the "truth" of Buddhism isn't to be found there? What if it is to be found in that most overlooked and often despised piece of garbage - the physical body. Yes, your eating, sleeping, excreting, dumb slab of meat - the bit that drags you to the computer, so that you can consider the lofty implications of Buddhism.
How can anything 'spiritual' be found there, amongst this problematic fertiliser-in-waiting?
In my experience it's ALL there. The partnership of body and mind is not a partnership at all when we remain entranced by the voice in our heads. When we drop it, there is only our body, its senses and nothing else. Mindfulness immersed in body (yes that dungheap) via the gateway of the breath is all the truth there is - stress and its release.
Body / mind are dependent arisen events. The inner dialogue cuts you off from this experience. When you abandon the dialogue you enter into a new reality. It's very simple, clean and beautiful and not as difficult as some would have us imagine. It is, in any case, our base condition. We only need to recognize it - we don't need to DO anything about it, or have an opinion on it.
namaste
This is what we have, in the sutta, to reflect on and understand:
I think this leaves questions unanswered - which is just what we need, is it not? Challenges rather than answers!
Indeed. A few practical tips can help too IMHO.
Your post is an expression of your experience & the spiritual beings you have or have not associated with.
Respectfully, this is mere opinion. If you accept that buddhavacana is a valid means of knowledge, then the whole idea that these later texts invent something that was not there earlier might be archeology but it is not epistemologically sound within a buddhist philosophical framework. You are essentially relying on discursive mind to determine what is valid and what is not based on your own preconceptions. It is of course your choice which tradition you choose to follow. I personally choose to delight in the rich variety of points of view that tend to all the mother sentient beings with their various needs, desires and contexts without having to denigrate the tenets or the credulity of the followers of any particular path.
In the Tibetan Mahayana tradition, Shakyamuni is always considered 'samyaksambuddha'-- i.e. fully enlightened. What is your source for this claim?
View is not a matter of prapanca for Vajrayanists. It is jnana or prajna, dependending on context and tradition. Certainly one could not fault the Madhyamikas for positing a priori absolutes. Their entire project was to undermine the positions of those that they engaged with through aporia and reductio ad absurdum.
This was most certainly not what the Mahayanists did. They were not looking for first principles. They did not arrive at the unreal and then deduce the real from it. The sum total of the Second and Third turning teachings on prajnaparamita and tathagathagarbha respectively were a cleaning away of the dross from cognition and uncovering its inseparable qualities. They are, though you may not accept it, equally the words of the Buddha to those of us that have taken refuge in Mahayana Dharma.
Your chronology is flawed. In fact, the mayavadin approach codified most famously by Adi Shankara was profoundly influenced by buddhist epistemology and not the other way around. There is also great subtlety within the Vedantic approaches-- many of which are nothing like you are describing. The parinamavada and abhasavada did not accept that the phenomenal world is unreal but ultimately they thought it was the unrolling of the potency of existence-consciousness-bliss. Hindus do not speak of God, they speak of Brahman, and amongst advaitins it is understood that one is talking about boundless awareness and not some sort of ultimately existing ens. Also, just saying that something "sounds Hindu" does not magically refute it.
That is a bold claim to make. You are in essence saying that for the last two thousand odd years, countless practitioners that spent their lives in meditation were not able to recognize what was prapanca and what was samadhi. What is it that you are translating as "view"? In tantra, it certainly does not mean "intellectual viewpoint" or theory. I sense a little irony here, because if you were as experienced in samadhi as you are implicitly claiming and if you had studied the actual texts with a master you would not make such a claim. Mystical religion is always in some respects a closed system, in that one needs to participate in the linguistic community to truly understand the web of meaning conveyed by the various jargon terms employed. Our post-Gutenberg notions of the sole sufficiency of textual sources is completely alien to Vajrayana in particular.
The objects of the senses are hardly direct, being known through the agency of the senses and interpretation by mind consciousness. Tantra in all its modes is primarily concerned with the development of both jnana and skillful means to aid the countless suffering beings, not speculation. However, I don't understand disdain for philosophy. My mind has been tremendously clarified, even by reading the works of those I vociferously disagree with. There *are* healthy prapanca that actually serve to reveal the dharmakaya. If not, what was the point of the Buddha teaching?
Nonceptually,
Namgyal
Many thanks for taking the time to read my post and provide a well-considered reply. Yes, I have pushed the envelope a bit in one or two places but I'll try to explain a little more of where I'm coming from on this stuff so with any luck I won't appear too unreasonable.
I agree here. I hope my POV isn't denigration of any path - it's not intended to be. We make our choices from what we encounter and experience but on many things I prefer to keep an open mind.
This is one of those 'have your cake & eat it scenarios'. I have read that Shakyamuni (although in truth fully enlightened) was a 'limited' manifestation which did not deliver the full package - ie Mahayana & tantra. I have read countless threads on E-Sangha posted by knowledgeable Mahayanists to this effect. I also learned it myself from my teachers. At the end of the day, this kind of speculation is harmful and only breeds conflict IMHO.
I agree, they had very good reasons for creating a powerful philosophical system. Amongst other things to help refute Hinayanists who were positing partless particles as a findable basis and so on. The only problem is in believing and teaching that any 'constructed' philosophical system is an actual basis for meditative experience, or reality for that matter.
True indeed. There are very profound teachings within some schools of Hinduism which I value. Anything sounding Hindu, would not be refuted by myself on that basis alone.
No, clearly not.
Yes, some irony indeed. It is the dogged insistence that emptiness = prasangika view, ie philosophical construct, that I find hard to swallow. Not saying that you have advocated this view, merely that I have frequently encountered it within Tibetan Buddhism.
A direct experience can never be a 'construct' of any kind otherwise it is a delusion. So my point is, why present it thus? This particular gripe is more aimed at the Gelugpa school rather than your Kagu school which has some excellent Mahamudra and Dzogchen teachings.
But then what is direct? I don't buy into teachings on 'two truths'. Rejecting one whilst seeking another is a false division IMHO. I accept the teachings on nama rupa ie. name and form, as we can experience ourselves 'doing' this, or relinquishing it - but any claims beyond that can't be substantiated, as they are necessarily mere construct and do not accord with the passage into Jhana - the act of relinquishment itself.
My point is that many people over-rely upon it. It is a useful tool but just as the menu is not the same as eating the meal, philosophy is not the same as experience. Some would take issue with that POV though.
Agree. We all need healthy papanca - I owe a debt to it but was personally ensnared in it for too long. My post was aimed at addressing what lies beyond it and perhaps looking at the issue from another angle.
I hope this makes a few 'contentious' points a little clearer.
Namaste
Kris
Palzang
Hi Palzang,
That surprises me. I thought it was a 'given' in Mahayana schools - evidently not.
The position, as I understand it (roughly), was that although Shakyamuni was completely one with the Dharmakaya, his manifestation was merely in order to bring sutra teachings to the world. People who follow these teachings can, at best gain liberation but not full enlightenment.
Those who attain nirvana are subsequently gathered up by fully enlightened Buddhas and somehow put on the final bit of the path to full enlightenment - which is said to be beyond both samsara and nirvana.
Vajrayana teachings were never taught by him but subsequently delivered by Vajradhara.
I thought that the above was general knowledge. At least I've heard it spouted more often than I care to remember. I have no specific source for it, rather it's what I've soaked up over twenty years of involvement from all kinds of people. If you are of the opinion that it is mistaken, then that pleases me greatly. I don't care for the theory, as I've only ever seen it used by some to puff up their egos and /or belittle others.
Namaste
Palzang
So do you differentiate between Nirvana and Enlightenment?
What you describe sounds a little like the theosophical teachings or the Alice Bailey channellings. I can imagine that it would appear unacceptable for those to whom the Shakyamuni Buddha attained perfect awakening.
That's kind of how I see it too. The old koan of "If you see the Buddha on the road, kill him." runs through my head occasionally.
I don't know if it's wrong or not - but my Buddha doesn't wear spandex or a cape and can't fly or blast lasers from his eyes. At least not all the time.
But, whatever "enlightenment" is and having finally achieved that state and all the unfetteredness (?) it brings - that is something I can wrap my brain around.
I think Gotama went to great lengths trying to dis-spell the desire ignorant sentient beings have for something to deify and worship - but for some reason, we just don't get it. And in thinking this - I don't believe it detracts anything from the gifts of the Buddha's enlightenment or the gift of the Dharma.
-bf
This idea originate from certain Mahayana texts such as the Threefold Lotus Sutra. In the Threefold Lotus Sutra, the arahant is said to have not yet reached final nirvana. Essentially, they are seen as being intoxicated with the samadhi of cessation, not the nirvana that is attained by a fully enlightened Buddha.
Moreover, it is said that Buddhas are then able to awaken these individuals from their temporary cessation in order for them to continue towards complete Buddhahood, which is characterized by omniscience. This is said to be due to Buddhahood being the result of wisdom and merit accumulation, and not just the eradication of afflictions.
The nature of Shakyamuni in Mahayana is a bit more complicated as well. For one thing, Mahayana is not homogeneous in a number of areas; but in general, the Buddha is seen to be a nirmanakaya, i.e., a manifestation of the Dharmakaya who appears for the benefit of sentient beings.
Jason
Thanks for that. I knew I must have had it from somewhere.
That's the one. It brings us neatly to the question of how we define the final state. Which kind is it?
Perhaps it would be interesting to take a look at that.
Namaste
Palzang
No spandex? Seriously? Dang, that's what I was looking forward to!
Palzang
A very nice way of looking at it Pally.
I've found an article which pretty much sums up the philosophy I've encountered:
http://www.urbandharma.org/udharma6/enlightnirvana.html
Some quotes:
Also from Wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana
Also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kulayarāja_Tantra
This contrasts with the description of Nirvana we have in the Theravadan tradition
Just a few thoughts.
Namaste
I think that this extends to other traditions, though perhaps without such a long and vehemently argued history that also intertwined with Tibetan politics and distribution of wealth.
The way I see it, these are two pedagogical approaches to the same reality. One can take the approach of emptiness as a non-affirming negation to overcome attachment to objects as inherently existing. The affirming negation can then be used to overcome a subtle tendency to negate even that which remains when all other discursiveness is ended.
This is of course a contentious issue, with some claiming that an affirming negation is reifying an Absolute and others claiming that the non-affirming negation is simply nihilism. Personally, I am content now to practice within the tradition I have been instructed without getting involved in the debate, but there were some real donnybrooks over this issue on the Buddha-L listserv back in the 90s.
To venture into dangerous territory for the sake of conversation, I think that people who take the exclusively rangtongpa approach have one experience when in meditation and then a different understanding when they arise from the meditation. If one accepts as I do the Tathagathagarbha sutras as being definitive, it is a given that alongside the dharmakaya realization of emptiness are the boundless compassionate activities of the inseparable sambhoga- and nirmanakaya and these form the basis of vajrayana meditation so it is not mere conjecture.
But then, I have no problem with being called a crypto-Hindu, having been an actual Hindu for many years without any conflict. :-)
Ecumenically,
Namgyal
Hi Namgyal,
A very good post which touches on some important topics. My crypto-Hindu bent is in the area of Kashmiri Shaivism and in particular the teachings on Spanda, which I find compelling, especially when placed alonside Buddhist teachings on Jhana and cessation.
I studied the tenets years ago but never found the concept of a non-affirming negation to be anything other than a concept. On the other hand - movement and stillness can be realised experientially.
What I'm coming to see is that the movement aspect is stress or dukka and the stillness is calm and liberating, thus my interest in the Spanda teachings which propose a state of movement beyond cessation that is nevertheless outside of dukka (or Mara's reach).
Mara taunts Buddha in one sutta, claiming he is not free from realms 'human and celestial'. Buddha replies that Mara will never find him - trackless, like a bird in the sky.
Buddha taught "stress and it's release" - unbinding into the attribute-less. Can there ever be dukka-free movement which does not gain nutriment from the bonds of sensual pleasure?
Namaste
There was no second turning of the wheel. First, as reported in the Theravada suttas, the Buddha taught the teaching of emptiness. There are numerous discourses on sunnata in the Theravada suttas.
Second, the Buddha also exhorted compassion. If the arahants had no compassion, why did they spend their lives walking around India teaching the Dhamma?
Third, as regards to the notion of inseparable qualities, the Buddha-To-Be rejected this as enlightenment. All of the states of infinite mind were rejected by the Buddha-To-Be as Nibbana. The Theravada suttas have few teachings on 'non-duality' because 'non-duality' is 'white-darkness'. It is not enlightenment. It is mere concentration. It is Hindu Advaita. Buddhist enlightenment results in dispassion rather than 'oneness'.
Oneness or non-duality is the reflection of the universe in a single due drop. Dispassion arises from the realisation that due drop will burst, sooner or later.
Fourth, from a sectarian Theravada perspective, what is considered to be a second turning is actually a regression into regarding the immaterial jhanas as enlightenment.
Fifth, my impression of your beliefs about the 2nd turning of the wheel is they are mere unverified blind faith, a kind of 'football hooliganism', where one barracks for the team with the most supporters. Conforming with the crowd is certainly not the way of enlightenment.
If you had investigated these matters factually, you would come to the same opinion as myself. Buddha said:
Interesting thoughts, moving from the 'nothingness' of Narajuna to the 'Great Self' of Samantabhadra.
A Buddha is beyond both becoming & non-becoming. A Buddha manifests great personality. However, that 'personality' is understood to be empty. It is merely mental formations.
If we read the Theravada suttas, Buddha exhibited a unique & strong character and interacted with personable qualities with people. Buddha said of the final goal:
The Buddha said of the conventionality of 'self':
Just out of curiosity, you use the word 'sectarian' a lot in reference to your Theravaden understanding of the Dhamma. I was just wondering if you understand that the word 'sectarian' means factional, separatist, partisan,
doctrinaire, dogmatic, extreme, fanatical, rigid, inflexible, bigoted, hidebound, or narrow-minded. If you do understand the meaning of the word, are you saying that you do agree with the 'sectarian' view or you don't? I just want to make sure I'm understanding you correctly.
Dudjom Rinpoche: The Shortcomings of refutation and proof
The Shortcomings of refutation and proof: from the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism by Dudjom Rinpoche.
Page, 929 - ….. If all the doctrines refuted by learned and accomplished Tibetans were false, no authentic doctrine at all would be found. For instance in his treatise which analyzes the three vows, Sakya Pandita refuted a great many of the Takpo Kagyu teachings, such as Six Doctrines and the Great Seal (Mahamudra). In his Answers to the Questions of the Kadampa Spiritual Benefactor Namkabum severely refutes the Kagyu adherents saying: “The doctrinal tradition of Mahamudra according to Drigungpa and Taklungpa does not agree with any of the tantrapitaka. I think that it is not a genuine path. But do not repeat this to others!”
The Kadampa were themselves refuted by Phadampa and others and the venerable Milarepa criticized Takpo Lharje for adhering to the career of a Kadampa. The esoteric instructions of Phadampa’s Pacification were said by Zhikpo Nyiseng, Co-se Temdrel and others to be fanciful doctrines. They also said that Chod practice was a doctrine “leaked out by a mad nun”. Some sad that even the Five Golden Doctrines of the Shangpas had been composed by Kungpo Tshultrim Gonpo, and so would not include them in the Tangyur. The Sakyapa duo, Yakde Pancen and Rongton Sheja Kunzi, and the trio Sonam Snege, Sakya Chokden and Taklung Lotsawa severely refuted the view and philosophy of the venerable Tsongkapa and maintained even his visions of Manjughosa were not genuine. The supremely learned Rikpei Reldri said that Kalachakra was not genuine tantra …………..
For all these arguments there was certainly the basic intention and special need; but for example, on the other hand, the peerless Takpo Kagyu tradition did produce a host of accomplished masters, and it is well established that Jamgon Tsongkapa’a enlightened activity on behalf of the Buddhist teaching was like that of a “Second Teacher”. If the doctrines, which were well expounded by such persons as these, who were praised in the indestructible prophecies of the Buddha himself and those of the great master Padmasambhava, and which explicitly abide in what is meaningful, are impure, it would seem that most Tibetans ought to be excommunicated from the teachings of the Buddha…………………
We should reflect upon the meaning of such words, which the Buddha expressed in many ways. As long as we have not acquired the pure eye of the doctrine whereby the truth about doctrines and individuals is seen, it is unbearably terrible to analyze things through exaggeration and depreciation, saying this is perverse, this impure, and that artificial.”
As for your claim that there was no second turning of the wheel, DD, I would simply reiterate that using sectarianism to justify your own beliefs and discredit others is not the way to practice Buddhadharma.
Palzang
By sectarian, I also imply: "Hey! This may not be for you so please do not take what I say so seriously! Be light. Be happy!"
It is all very subjective. Saying there was a 2nd turning is sectarianism. It is saying the 1st turning was deficient and inferior.
Saying there was no 2nd turning is non-sectarian. It incorporates all schools of Buddhism into one.
That said, my impression is the Sri Lankan Mahavihara Theravadans forgot about emptiness over time. Rather than a 2nd turning, there was probably a 'rebirth' of sunnata in the Mahayana.
But I could be wrong. I was not there!
The geniune thinking offered by most with such humour and good intentions is nice, but the dismal dogma really has to go. It's disingenuous to be so dismally dogmatic and then all flippant about some kind of get-over-my-in-your-face-ness with a happy smiley ness mess.
I'll take the genuine, original, constructive and engaging contributions of warm human beings over the dry recapitulations of extant dreary doctrine of an over-earnest Islamicist/Buddhist anytime.
I don't mean to say this in an unfriendly way. I realize it is not a sweet sentiment, but I'm just weary of interesting people being driven off this site by people who just parrot some nice-sounding sophistry and forget about charity and the spirit of dialogue.
It is entirely your prerogative what you accept as the genuine teachings of the Buddha. If you choose to exclude the Prajnaparamita teachings of the second turning and the Tathagathagarbha teachings of the third turning as being inauthentic, there is little basis for discourse as our premises are entirely different. Given your unpleasantness, that is not an entirely unwelcome conclusion.
There is nothing in the entire corpus of Buddhism that moves beyond understanding sunyata and karuna/upaya. That does not mean that one teaching invalidates another. Who here has said that the arhats lack compassion? You are responding to an argument that has not been made. The arhats are universally held to be holy beings. In the Tibetan tradition, we uphold pratimoksha alongside the bodhisattva and vidyadhara trainings. We certainly do not denigrate any teachings of the Buddha.
Who is talking about infinite mind? What are you even translating as "mind"? If you are talking about the buddhagunas being based on the catuskoti, the buddha qualities neither exist, do not exist, neither or both. Even the Pali sources have references to buddhahood as infinite, eternal, etc. as this is an important pedagogical position to take to relax the tendency to cut at what appears with analysis.
However, if you are merely going to insist on making specious arguments, please at least quote the actual texts rather than saying "Buddha says..."
You really should try to limit your ignorance to a single philosophical system at a time. It is apparent that you are neither acquainted with the actual texts of Vedanta nor the Buddhist teachings on advaita or you wouldn't say something as patently absurd as that realization of non-duality is some form of dhyana. You make a strong claim of what "buddhist enlightenment" is-- on what basis do you make this claim? Have you achieved the result of practice? Have you even attained the levels of dhyana?
Non-duality is not a conceptual activity, it is nisprapanca. There is nothing to burst, nor is there anyone to observe it. I think you must have read polemics without actually reading what you claim to refute. You have decided a priori on your given system rather than on whatever reality may be. Let me tell you that if reality trumps my understanding, it is my understanding that changes to fit.
Dispassion (I will assume you mean vairagya) is very much a conceptual activity dependent on a subject, object and action.
Please, at least roam further afield in your theft of metaphors than our thread on the merits of chastity. What amazes me is that without any actual contact with me nor any profound discourse you feel entitled to hold forth on my convictions. That to me is a fatal leap into the abyss of your own opinions.
Ah, the folly of youth. If I had inescapably arrived at the same conclusions as you, I would have shot myself in the head a long time ago.
Dispassion is like 'vomitting'. Vomitting is not a conceptual activity. :cool:
Who mentioned chastity?
To sum my points:
1) There is no point in dismissing the textual supports of another's tradition if you care to have a reasoned discourse.
2) There is no point in dismissing the soteriology of another unless you have fully understood the terms that they use. The great pandits of yore engaged the philosophers they disagreed with in vigorous debate, having first truly understood what the opponent's position actually is.
3) So-called dispassion is usually just a masquerade for anger and it manifests quite clearly in puritanical attitudes towards women that we are well-advised to leave in the medieval Asian cultures they originated in.
4) If one is inescapably compelled by one's standards of facticity to become a nihilist, you are probably better off dead.
Of course all of these points ignore the wisdom of the Internets: Don't feed the trolls.
Well said Sir.
It is said:
Or more precisely, dispassion leads to liberation (SN 12.23).
Is this the same as the impartiality we speak of when we say 'may all beings be free from attachment and aversion' in the prayer of the four immeasurables? Fellow Tibetan Buddhist practitioners might help me out here please.:D
Kind wishes,
Dazzle