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The question is, what has to be understood intellectually? Bodhi's extremely abstract characterization of not-self as "a lasting, simple ego-entity," or the simple and direct practice of stepping back to observe whatever clinging's arising in the present moment of practice and view the object of clinging as not me, not mine, not myself?
"@Florian, perhaps I'm misunderstanding you here, but to me monism and non-dualism are synonyms. Could you please elucidate your perceived distinction?"
@Bodhivaka - It does seem that sometimes monism is used as a synonym for nondualism. But if monism is the idea that everything is One (as opposed to two, many etc) then it is not the same as the idea that all distinctions are emergent. It assigns a numerical value to the ultimate, while nondualism would say that the universe is a unity, not a numerical value. Hence the Upanishadic view is characterised as advaita or 'not two' , a phrase that denies dualism but also carefully and deliberately avoids the suggestion of monism. Spencer Brown is careful in his book on Taoist cosmology to explain that a unity is not a numerical 'one', and Al-Halaj warns that it would be incorrect to say' God is One'. Etc.
So, the way I see it, the idea that by reduction the universe reduces to one thing is directly opposed to dualism, while nondualism would be opposed to all extreme views including monism and dualism.
I do not see nondualism as the denial of an upper-case 'Self', as you do, but the issue is so subtle that I'm not sure there's any point in debating it. I would argue against nihilism though. There has to be a grounding phenomenon, even it is not our 'Self'.
Just my view. Maybe there is another way of looking at it.
The question is, what has to be understood intellectually? Bodhi's extremely abstract characterization of not-self as "a lasting, simple ego-entity," or the simple and direct practice of stepping back to observe whatever clinging's arising in the present moment of practice and view the object of clinging as not me, not mine, not myself?
Intellectually both are not all that challenging I would say. It's mainly emotionally that the absence of an "ego-entity" is hard to accept. Because it seems so intuitive that we are in control of our body, that we have free will, that we are a sort of continuous central point in awareness, or any other way an "I"-ness feeling arises. And so therefore I agree just going at it intellectually won't do all that much. What really is needed is insights based upon a calmed mind, seeing it all disappear before one is able to accept, ow yes there really is no "me" in there.
@Bodhivaka - It does seem that sometimes monism is used as a synonym for nondualism. But if monism is the idea that everything is One (as opposed to two, many etc) then it is not the same as the idea that all distinctions are emergent. It assigns a numerical value to the ultimate, while nondualism would say that the universe is a unity, nota numerical value. Hence the Upanishadic view is characterised as advaita or 'not two' , a phrase that denies dualism but also carefully and deliberately avoids the suggestion of monism. Spencer Brown is careful in his book on Taoist cosmology to explain that a unity is not a numerical 'one', and Al-Halaj warns that it would be incorrect to say' God is One'. Etc.
So, the way I see it, the idea that by reduction the universe reduces to one thing is directly opposed to dualism, while nondualism would be opposed to all extreme views including monism and dualism.
I do not see nondualism as the denial of an upper-case 'Self', as you do, but the issue is so subtle that I'm not sure there's any point in debating it. I would argue against nihilism though. There has to be a grounding phenomenon, even it is not our 'Self'.
Just my view. Maybe there is another way of looking at it.
The view I've attempted to express within this thread can be condensed simply as "that which does not exist intrinsically is void of self." I've explained my reasoning behind this position numerous times, and seeing as how you've probably read through my comments I won't bore you with the details, but put quite simply, when it comes to reality, the universe and anatta, I take the view of Nagasena, who after demonstrating that a chariot is reducible, concluded that chariots do not exist.
As to nihilism, I do not deny the reality of a grounding phenomenon (such as fermions and bosons), I'm simply a mereological nihilist in as much as I assert that composite objects possess no intrinsic existence, and therefore, strictly speaking, don't exist at all.
I can agree with your first para. @Bodhivaka. It seems orthodox.
But I cannot agree with the second. Fermions and boson cannot be fundamental. A fundamental entity cannot require the pre-existence of space and time. Otherwise metaphysics would be a doddle, physics would be able to have a fundamental theory and Buddhism would be a mistake.
Would you not agree that whatever is fundamental must be independent of and prior to space and time?
A truly non-composite phenomenon would have no parts. This is one definitional property of a unity, that it has no parts.
Perhaps it would be correct to say that fermions and bosons are the most primitive physical entities. I wouldn't know. But to make a physical entity fundamental just does not work. Materialism would be a lot more popular if it actually worked.
It seems relevant to mention that someone just magaged to split an electron, which was thought to be non-composite.
The truth is moving and impermanent The truth is alive and sensitive so there can be love The truth is finely structured and not just a blob of emptiness The truth is both the manifest and non-manifest
I can agree with your first para. @Bodhivaka. It seems orthodox.
But I cannot agree with the second. Fermions and boson cannot be fundamental. A fundamental entity cannot require the pre-existence of space and time. Otherwise metaphysics would be a doddle, physics would be able to have a fundamental theory and Buddhism would be a mistake.
Would you not agree that whatever is fundamental must be independent of and prior to space and time?
A truly non-composite phenomenon would have no parts. This is one definitional property of a unity, that it has no parts.
Perhaps it would be correct to say that fermions and bosons are the most primitive physical entities. I wouldn't know. But to make a physical entity fundamental just does not work. Materialism would be a lot more popular if it actually worked.
It seems relevant to mention that someone just magaged to split an electron, which was thought to be non-composite.
I believe we need to consider the possibility that multiple fundamentals (such as space, time, matter, and energy) might exist as eternal, interdependent entities, rather than there being a single, independent fundamental phenomenon.
Matter and energy are no more dependent on space and time than space and time are dependent on matter and energy (or so I've read); however, despite the inter-dependency of these entities, each is individually irreducible and therefore intrinsically existent; as such, if we are to postulate a universe which exists as an eternally expanding and contracting entity composed of four interdependent fundamentals (space, time, matter, and energy) then I see no reason to assert the necessity of a single, independent fundamental phenomenon.
I know I'm stepping on shaky ground here, as to my knowledge most physicists are of the opinion that the universe is not, in fact, eternal; however, I don't believe asserting the possibility is entirely unreasonable.
Although I've researched this particular issue to some extent, I must admit that I haven't given it as much thought as other things, so perhaps you're aware of information that can establish the necessity of a single, independent fundamental phenomenon; I, however, am unaware of such information.
Likewise it seems to me that energy/matter are dependent on spacetime. If matter is extended then space exists, and if it is extended for a duration then time exists. So energy implies spacetime. (Much as Kant argues).
For you, it seems, this suggests that all these things are fundamental. For me, however, (and Kant) it suggests that none of them are.
I'd say it is logic that establishes the necessity of a singular fundamental phenomenon. To have two such phenomenon could not be a result of any cause so it would have to be a complete coincidence that they both exist. And since one of them could have existed without the other then one of them must be contingent. If we think of this in terms of reductionism, then I'm suggesting that a theory with more than one purportedly original phenomenon is nonreductive. This is why mind-matter theories are always nonreductive, for these two phenomena would have to be reduced.
We find that if anything exists we cannot explain how it came into existence. Existence is an infinite regression once we assume that there is a fundamental entity that exists. There can be nothing before this fundamental entity so it must be eternal or have arisen from Nothing. But neither idea has ever worked. One way around this is to assume that what is fundamental is unified, unconditioned and unmanifest. Then spacetime and matter/energy would emerge as dependent phenomenon. We thus avoid the problem of explaining how this fundamental phenomenon exists. There would be a sense in which it doesn't.
In short, the moment we assume that there is a fundamental entity that exists (as opposed to not-existing), then we are in trouble. No philosopher has ever solved the problems associated with this assumption. We end up having to choose between ex nihilo creation or an infinite pile of turtles. The only solution would be to get rid of the problem by not making this assumption in the first place. That this is a solution does not make it true, of course, but it is highly suggestive. Tao makes a great deal of sense in logic.
If I had to make an argument against multiple fundamental entities I'd probably point to metaphysics and its failure to resolve the problems associated with this idea. A fundamental theory cannot just start with taking multiple entities as a given. They would have to be reduced.
Still, I must concede that we do not have to assume that logic is a good guide to these issues, and that in the end there is nothing to prevent us assuming multiple fundamental phenomena. Many philosophers conclude that the world is paradoxical, in which case any argument from reason will be inconclusive.
Likewise it seems to me that energy/matter are dependent on spacetime. If matter is extended then space exists, and if it is extended for a duration then time exists. So energy implies spacetime. (Much as Kant argues).
Agreed, just as spacetime is dependent on matter/energy.
For you, it seems, this suggests that all these things are fundamental. For me, however, (and Kant) it suggests that none of them are.
I would simply assert that space, time, matter, and energy are potential interdependent fundamentals; however, I simply accept such a notion as a possibility. I'm currently agnostic on the issue and am ultimately doing nothing more than dabbling in the realm of speculation, but the idea of eternally existing interdependent fundamentals does seem to make sense to me given my current understanding.
I'd say it is logic that establishes the necessity of a singular fundamental phenomenon. To have two such phenomenon could not be a result of any cause so it would have to be a complete coincidence that they both exist.
Seeing as how our potentially multiple fundamentals are all equally dependent on one another to exist, I'm not so sure we can call their shared existences a coincidence so much as a necessity.
Ultimately, we could claim the existence of anything (even a singular fundamental reality) is a coincidence; however, it makes more sense to me to say that reality has to be a certain way. Why? I haven't the slightest clue -- it just seems that way to me; therefore, given the inseparability of space, time, matter, and energy, I would submit that perhaps the shared existence of these potential fundamentals aren't a coincidence, but rather the nature of reality as it has to be.
And since one of them [the postulated multiple fundamentals] could have existed without the other then one of them must be contingent.
I wouldn't agree that one of the multiple fundamentals could exist without the other(s); rather, they would all be equally interdependent and contingent upon one another.
If we think of this in terms of reductionism, then I'm suggesting that a theory with more than one purportedly original phenomenon is nonreductive. This is why mind-matter theories are always nonreductive, for these two phenomena would have to be reduced.
I'm not quite sure I understand you here. Are you saying a theory which asserts the existence of multiple interdependent phenomena suggests that the phenomena can be reduced? If so, I disagree. The phenomena would be collectively interdependent by individually irreducible, and indeed, I believe something which can rightly be called fundamental must be irreducible.
We find that if anything exists we cannot explain how it came into existence.
Existence is an infinite regression once we assume that there is a fundamental entity that exists. There can be nothing before this fundamental entity so it must be eternal or have arisen from Nothing. But neither idea has ever worked. One way around this is to assume that what is fundamental is unified, unconditioned and unmanifest. Then spacetime and matter/energy would emerge as dependent phenomenon. We thus avoid the problem of explaining how this fundamental phenomenon exists. There would be a sense in which it doesn't.
In short, the moment we assume that there is a fundamental entity that exists (as opposed to not-existing), then we are in trouble. No philosopher has ever solved the problems associated with this assumption. We end up having to choose between ex nihilo creation or an infinite pile of turtles. The only solution would be to get rid of the problem by not making this assumption in the first place. That this is a solution does not make it true, of course, but it is highly suggestive. Tao makes a great deal of sense in logic.
Could you elaborate on this potential solution? I'm not really able to grasp it with what you've said, but it certainly sounds interesting.
If I had to make an argument against multiple fundamental entities I'd probably point to metaphysics and its failure to resolve the problems associated with this idea. A fundamental theory cannot just start with taking multiple entities as a given. They would have to be reduced.
Still, I must concede that we do not have to assume that logic is a good guide to these issues, and that in the end there is nothing to prevent us assuming multiple fundamental phenomena. Many philosophers conclude that the world is paradoxical, in which case any argument from reason will be inconclusive.
As I've said, due to the inseparable nature of these multiple fundamentals, I don't really find that taking them as a given is a problem. I know saying "the universe just has to be that way" may not sound the least bit satisfying, but I'm personally unable to postulate a more likely solution to the problems we're discussing here; but again, I'm interested in learning more about the potential solution you've mentioned.
I see what you mean about co-dependence implying necessity and not contingency. I would agree insofar as once one co-dependent phenomenon exists then so must the other. If they are co-dependent then they must come into existence together as a necessity. But if they come into existence then there would not have been Nothing beforehand, so they would both be contingent.
You say that you have no problem taking these multiple fundamentals as a given. But you also say that they are co-dependent. I'm not sure you can have it both ways. If they airise in co-dependence then they are not fundamental. Presumably you would reply to this objection by saying that they are eternal. But this is not a solution for any problems. Also, in case it matters, it would be in direct opposition to Big Bang theory.
But really it's the logic that falls down. Clearly there is something that is permanent and that prevents the universe from ever being Nothing. But if we say that this phenomenon exists eternally then we create the ancient dilemma of origins, the question of whether the universe begins with Something or Nothing. Both ideas are logically indefensible, which is why it is a dilemma. I could try to argue this point but I think it is easier to just recognise that most philosophers consider this to be a genuine dilemma. After all, if an eternally existing phenomenon made sense then it would certainly be the most popular view in the sciences. Yet physicists rarely choose it, and most prefer ex nihilo creation or agnosticism. Indeed, many dismiss metaphysics as useless precisely because it cannot resolve this dilemma and others like it. It cannot be resolved because both ideas are logically indefensible. (Nagarjuna et al). You might be interested to check out the physicist Paul Davies' Mind of God, since he discusses this topic at length. (He cannot solve the probem, and concludes that maybe there is something in the doctrine of mysticism).
There is a third option, as Davies notes, and this is to say, with Buddha and Lao Tsu, that Tao or Nibbana is original and all else is emergent and dependently arisen. Here there is no dilemma. We cannot ask why it exists because it doesn't. And we cannot ask why it doesn't exist because it does. This is Nagarjuna's 'two truths' or 'two worlds', the conventional and ultimate, the two ways we can conceive of the situation. 'Existence' is a slippery concept, and we rarely stop to ask exactly what we mean by it.
The problem of origins would arise from our mistaken concept of existence. We normally assume a fundamental distinction between Something and Nothing. But for (most?) Buddhists and (all?) Taoists there would be no such thing as a fundamental distinction.
Kant and Hegel arrive at the same solution in logic. Kant concludes that the ultimate or original phenomenon is not an instance of a category, (and proposes that this would be the proper subject for any rational psychology), and Hegel concludes that it is an undifferentiated 'spiritual unity'. They reach this conclusion because it does not make sense to them to suppose that a fundamental phenomenon is subject to the distinction between existence and non-existence. It leads to self-contradictions.
So we get to the idea of an 'unconditioned' phenomenon, and the philosophical problems are all solved. No need for ex nihilo creation or eternalism. Spacetime would be emergent, and all that it contains.
It is very well known that any other solution fails. What is less well known is that this solution succeeds.
I hope this is more helpful than argumentative. I do too much arguing.
@Florian, is it possible to explain how the fundamental phenomenon you've postulated could be both non-existent and existent at the same time? I'm having a difficult time wrapping my mind around that concept.
Taking into consideration what you've said, I must concede that both eternalism and creation ex nihilo seem to ultimately fail logically, which obviously raises serious doubts as to the validity and rationality of my ideas; therefore, I'm quite interested in gaining an adequate understanding of your view on the matter. If, however, it is too much to ask for you to try and explain the intricacies of your view, I would greatly appreciate your list of recommended readings.
I think you may really enjoy looking into this issue. It is a real brain-teaser. It is also completely crucial to an intellectual understanding of the 'mystical' cosmology.
The book that got me started on nondualism was Cultivating the Empty Field: The Silent Illumination of Zen Master Hongzhi, Ed. Taigen Dan Leighton. The preface and introduction are superb, and then there is the practice instructions and poetry.
But that was me. Given your angle of approach maybe Davies' Mind of God would be a good one. It is not about mysticism or religion, just lays out the philosophical problems that any cosmological theory would need to solve. Radhakrishnan's Philosophy of the Upanishads would take you straight to the heart of the issues.
I will also PM a link.
I did not mean to say that something could exist and not-exist at the same time, but that these are the two ways we can conceive of the ultimate, and therefore all phenomena. The truth would require that we transcend this distinction. This is the reason why Lao Tsu says that the Tao cannot be spoken and then goes on to say that the Tao must be spoken. It is not a paradox. We cannot speak of it for what it is, but we have to speak about it as best we can. We have to speak as if it is this or that, but in reality it is not this or that.
Just so there's something to read here...
In consciousness studies nondualism appears as 'relative phenomenalism'. Here is something relevant by Edward Barkin, from one of the best written essays I've ever read. The full text can probably be found on philpapers.com.
"The history of Western philosophy is filled with discussion, in one guise or another, of what is often called the ‘transcendental’ subject and object. The terms invoke the idea of a hidden self behind the phenomenal self and a hidden object behind the phenomenal object. Although Kant positioned the transcendental ‘things-in-themselves’ as methodological concepts rather than as metaphysical entities, the tendency since Kant has often been to reify them and then debate their objective existence. Idealists have typically wanted to exclude the transcendental object from philosophical discussion on the grounds of its alleged non-existence, while materialists have generally wanted to exclude the transcendental subject on the same grounds.
The idea behind modern phenomenalism would be that neither the transcendental object or subject exists in any concrete sense. Instead, one would postulate various possible combinations of phenomenal objects, the most coherent, complex and structured of which could be viewable as constituting emergent conceptual minds such as our own. In this case, the universe could be seen as fundamentally rooted in phenomena or mind.
As a result, there would be a tendency to reify mental phenomena, as in Berkeleian objective substance monism. However, I would argue that to do so would be as much of a mistake as to reify physical entities, since even the most basic mental properties can be shown to have a conceptual, and hence relative, non-objective aspect. In this idea’s original context, mainstream Buddhist philosophy, one would say that the reason to avoid endowing anything, including a qualitative state or a self, with the property of intrinsic, independent reality is that no object can be logically established without implicit or explicit reference to the causes and conditions which enable it to exist - including its parts and attributes and the very fact that a consciousness is required to mentally designate it a distinct entity in the first place. This principle is known as ‘dependent origination’ or ‘the interdependent nature of reality’. "
Edward Barkin ‘Relative Phenomenalism’ JCS Vol 10 No. 8 (2003)
@santhisouk, perhaps I'll come back a bit later and provide a more thorough explanation of my view on this matter, but in short, I wouldn't say it's a "who" that realizes a lack of self; rather, it's the aggregates (particularly mental formations and consciousness) which come to recognize the "self-made" illusion and transcend it.
Back to anatta, the Buddha only used it to qualify the five aggregates which, among other things are impermanent and suffering. He said of each aggregate not to regard it as the self - each aggregate is, he said, anatta (not-the-self). He said this because people believed their psycho-physical body is their self or atta. This belief sets us up for rebirth into another body of suffering. Most western Buddhists don't believe this. They believe that when a person dies, that's it. That is not Buddhism. That's is materialism.
Back to anatta, the Buddha only used it to qualify the five aggregates which, among other things are impermanent and suffering. He said of each aggregate not to regard it as the self - each aggregate is, he said, anatta (not-the-self). He said this because people believed their psycho-physical body is their self or atta. This belief sets us up for rebirth into another body of suffering. Most western Buddhists don't believe this. They believe that when a person dies, that's it. That is not Buddhism. That's is materialism.
@Blondel, I have no problem admitting that I reject certain Buddhist teachings; for example, I don't believe in literal rebirth, psychic powers, or mythological creatures like naga, yet these are all things the Buddha taught.
As to anatta, however, the the view that there is no self at all is quite orthodox within Theravada Buddhism.
Back to anatta, the Buddha only used it to qualify the five aggregates which, among other things are impermanent and suffering. He said of each aggregate not to regard it as the self - each aggregate is, he said, anatta (not-the-self). He said this because people believed their psycho-physical body is their self or atta. This belief sets us up for rebirth into another body of suffering. Most western Buddhists don't believe this. They believe that when a person dies, that's it. That is not Buddhism. That's is materialism.
@Blondel, I have no problem admitting that I reject certain Buddhist teachings; for example, I don't believe in literal rebirth, psychic powers, or mythological creatures like naga, yet these are all things the Buddha taught.
As to anatta, however, the the view that there is no self at all is quite orthodox within Theravada Buddhism.
To teach there is fundamentally not a self is annihilationism. Not all Theravadins, of course, teach annihilationism, for example, the Dhammakaya Foundation teaches Nibbana is the Self or Attâ (the Prâkrta form of âtman is attâ, which is used in Pâli). It's worth keeping in mind that Theravada is a sect of Buddhism that came long after the Buddha's physical death with it's own spin on what the Buddha taught that is subject to a great deal of controversy. Most western Buddhists are clueless about this who pretty much accept that the Buddha was an annihilationist: there is no soul; when you're dead that's nirvana.
"This world is supported by (takes as its object) a polarity, that of self & no self."
There is a self, there is no self are just thoughts. Thinking gives rise to the thinker and his thoughts. They are dependently coarisen. Without the thinking there cannot be a thinker or thoughts.
Just like another thread on meaninglessness of live. By stating that life has no meaning, one is actually saying that life should have a meaning. Otherwise the question would not have arisen. There is that polarity.
"By & large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by (takes as its object) a polarity, that of existence & non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'non-existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html
In Buddhism, if nihilism is anything it is a problem of the self. Some during the Buddha's time claimed there was not, fundamentally, a self. The Buddha rejected this, nor did he teach that the self is an illusion. According to Nagarjuna, "People who do not understand the meaning of the Buddhist doctrine and do not know the designation (prajñapti) say that the âtman does not exist (Maha-prajnaparamita-shastra).
Back to anatta, the Buddha only used it to qualify the five aggregates which, among other things are impermanent and suffering. He said of each aggregate not to regard it as the self - each aggregate is, he said, anatta (not-the-self). He said this because people believed their psycho-physical body is their self or atta. This belief sets us up for rebirth into another body of suffering. Most western Buddhists don't believe this. They believe that when a person dies, that's it. That is not Buddhism. That's is materialism.
@Blondel, I have no problem admitting that I reject certain Buddhist teachings; for example, I don't believe in literal rebirth, psychic powers, or mythological creatures like naga, yet these are all things the Buddha taught.
As to anatta, however, the the view that there is no self at all is quite orthodox within Theravada Buddhism.
To teach there is fundamentally not a self is annihilationism. Not all Theravadins, of course, teach annihilationism, for example, the Dhammakaya Foundation teaches Nibbana is the Self or Attâ (the Prâkrta form of âtman is attâ, which is used in Pâli). It's worth keeping in mind that Theravada is a sect of Buddhism that came long after the Buddha's physical death with it's own spin on what the Buddha taught that is subject to a great deal of controversy. Most western Buddhists are clueless about this who pretty much accept that the Buddha was an annihilationist: there is no soul; when you're dead that's nirvana.
Annihilationism teaches the destruction of the self; however, if the self does not exist, there is no self to be destroyed, and thus annihilationism is irrelevant. The words "annihilationism" and "nihilism" are often carelessly thrown about interchangeably as if they mean the same thing, but they don't. In my opinion, nihilism (non-existent self) is the Middle Way between eternalism (indestructible self) and annihilationism (destructible self).
Moreover, teaching the non-existence of the self is not necessarily equivalent to teaching that death = nirvana. Many Buddhists who reject the notion of a self also believe in rebirth by means of a stream of consciousness that passes on from one body to the next.
Whether or not the Theravada school of thought is in perfect harmony with the Buddha's original teachings is subject to debate. I personally tend to trust Theravadin views more than others, given the conservative and orthodox nature of the sect, but ultimately I rely on my own logic, understanding, and experience above all.
All names of philosophies (nihilism, materialism etc) are just labels; the actual views are a different thing and will differ from person to person. But what I would label nihilism is not the Buddha's view, but views like "nothing exists" or "the world doesn't exist".
In Buddhism, if nihilism is anything it is a problem of the self. Some during the Buddha's time claimed there was not, fundamentally, a self. The Buddha rejected this, nor did he teach that the self is an illusion.
Could you please source a passage from the Pali canon where the Buddha directly rejects the claim that there is no self?
According to Nagarjuna, "People who do not understand the meaning of the Buddhist doctrine and do not know the designation (prajñapti) say that the âtman does not exist (Maha-prajnaparamita-shastra).
I looked up your quote and could only find it on zennist.typepad.com; on the same website, however, Nagarjuna is quoted as saying that “the true nature (tathatâ), the nature of phenomena (dharmatâ), the summit of existence (bhûtakoti), do not exist from the mundane point of view, but they do exist from the absolute point of view. In the same way, individuals exist from the mundane point of view, but do not exist from the absolute point of view.”
However, we could throw opposing quotes from different scholars at each other all day. Using the words of Nagasena, for example, I could easily build up a case for the non-existence of a self; however, I think this discussion would be more productive if we stuck to quoting the original words of the Buddha as found within the Pali canon.
The source for the Nagar. passage, is online: THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM OF NĀGĀRJUNA (MAHĀPRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀŚĀSTRA) ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE VOL. III CHAPTERS XXXI-XLII, 253c.
You must not like Kant whose Critique paved the way for faith! LOL
Again it's nihilism in which there is a problem with the self. Even saying that the self is a fiction or an illusion is nihilism because fundamentally there is complete rejection of the self as real on shaky empirical grounds as in, I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist.
On the other hand, the Buddha said nonself or anattâ (Sank., anâtman) is suffering (SN 22:46). He also told Radha to abandon desire for whatever is nonself or in Sanskrit anâtman (SN 35:78). The Buddha even rejected the five khandhas as being his self. He said of each aggregate that it is na meso attâ (not my self) which, in effect is saying, this psycho-physical person is not my âtman.
The Buddha's ministry was not to annihilate the âtman or in Pali, attâ but teach people that they must not regard as their self that which is not the self or anattâ. Otherwise, the consequence is rebirth.
The only Theravadins worth their salt and weight in gold belong to the Dhammakaya Foundation.
The source for the Nagar. passage, is online: THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM OF NĀGĀRJUNA (MAHĀPRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀŚĀSTRA) ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE VOL. III CHAPTERS XXXI-XLII, 253c.
You must not like Kant whose Critique paved the way for faith! LOL
Respectfully, I was asking you to source a passage in the Pali canon where the Buddha directly rejects the notion that a self does not exist, not your Nagarjuna quote.
Again it's nihilism in which there is a problem with the self. Even saying that the self is a fiction or an illusion is nihilism because fundamentally there is complete rejection of the self as real on shaky empirical grounds as in, I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist.
I think you may not fully understand my position. I'm not denying that I'm a nihilist -- I am; what I am not is an annihilationist. I agree that the Buddha rejected annihilationism, but nihilism (which I would assert is in line with the Buddha's teachings) is something entirely different.
By now I must have written entire pages on the philosophical and scientific reasons I reject the existence of a self and why I believe such a position is consistent with the Buddha's teaching, so I won't waste time repeating myself; but needless to say, my reasons for rejecting a self are much more complex than "I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist."
On the other hand, the Buddha said nonself or anattâ (Sank., anâtman) is suffering (SN 22:46). He also told Radha to abandon desire for whatever is nonself or in Sanskrit anâtman (SN 35:78). The Buddha even rejected the five khandhas as being his self. He said of each aggregate that it is na meso attâ (not my self) which, in effect is saying, this psycho-physical person is not my âtman.
Could you quote the passage you're referring to in SN 22:46? I don't have access to it.
The passage you're referring to in SN 35:78 is consistent with my view. I also believe a desire for all things which are not the self should be abandoned, which is everyth
The source for the Nagar. passage, is online: THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM OF NĀGĀRJUNA (MAHĀPRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀŚĀSTRA) ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE VOL. III CHAPTERS XXXI-XLII, 253c.
You must not like Kant whose Critique paved the way for faith! LOL
Respectfully, I was asking you to source a passage in the Pali canon where the Buddha directly rejects the notion that a self does not exist, not your Nagarjuna quote.
Again it's nihilism in which there is a problem with the self. Even saying that the self is a fiction or an illusion is nihilism because fundamentally there is complete rejection of the self as real on shaky empirical grounds as in, I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist.
I think you may not fully understand my position. I'm not denying that I'm a nihilist -- I am; what I am not is an annihilationist. I agree that the Buddha rejected annihilationism, but nihilism (which I would assert is in line with the Buddha's teachings) is something entirely different.
By now I must have written entire pages on the philosophical and scientific reasons I reject the existence of a self and why I believe such a position is consistent with the Buddha's teaching, so I won't waste time repeating myself; but needless to say, my reasons for rejecting a self are much more complex than "I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist."
On the other hand, the Buddha said nonself or anattâ (Sank., anâtman) is suffering (SN 22:46). He also told Radha to abandon desire for whatever is nonself or in Sanskrit anâtman (SN 35:78). The Buddha even rejected the five khandhas as being his self. He said of each aggregate that it is na meso attâ (not my self) which, in effect is saying, this psycho-physical person is not my âtman.
Could you quote the passage you're referring to in SN 22:46? I don't have access to it.
The passage you're referring to in SN 35:78 is consistent with my view, as I also believe a desire for all things which are not the self should be abandoned (which is everything, seeing as how there is no self). I also agree that the five aggregates are not the self, seeing as how (again) there is no self.
The Buddha's ministry was not to annihilate the âtman or in Pali, attâ but teach people that they must not regard as their self that which is not the self or anattâ. Otherwise, the consequence is rebirth.
I agree that the Buddha didn't intend to annihilate the self (simply because there is no self to annihilate), but I disagree with your assertion that the Buddha taught of a "true self."
At Sāvatthī. “Bhikkhus, form is impermanent…. Feeling is impermanent…. Perception is impermanent…. Volitional formations are impermanent…. Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’
Which says nothing about a true self. It just says, whatever is suffering, that is not self - something stated in various ways throughout the canon.
I think, however, that a more on topic statement is in the sutta directly after that one - SN 22.47:
At Sāvatthī. “Bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who regard [anything as] self in various ways all regard [as self] the five aggregates subject to clinging, or a certain one among them.
In other words, any self view is in the aggregates (which are not self).
Either way, whether quoting later teachers, or the suttas, at a certain point in a persons practice, it doesn't really get them to more understanding. Instead, it is more likely to cause fixed views. So now this thread has looked at non self from a scientific point of view, a sutta point of view, a logical point of view, I think it's time to look at it from an internal point of view. Aka meditation, where the aggregates can slow down and even disappear.. and what'll be left then? If you start to see that you see more than any sutta can provide.
Bodhivaka: "What is suffereing is nonself." SN 22:45. I think the difference between nihilism and the doctrine of uccheda-vâda amounts to a quibble. The O.E.D. says of nihilism: The belief or theory that the world has no real existence; the rejection of all notions of reality.
Bodhi, the Dhammakaya Foundation is Theravadin - it just doesn't buy the nihilistic reading of some monks. Nibbana is the attâ or the self. That is where they stand.
At Sāvatthī. “Bhikkhus, form is impermanent…. Feeling is impermanent…. Perception is impermanent…. Volitional formations are impermanent…. Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’
Which says nothing about a true self. It just says, whatever is suffering, that is not self - something stated in various ways throughout the canon.
When the Buddha, with regard to an aggregate, said na meso attâ, he was attâ. That is about as simple as it gets. Keep in mind that you can't put attâ under an electron microscope. Because you can't it doesn't mean it is not a reality. To deny, completely, attâ as a reality is nihilism.
No, he didn't say that he was atta. There is no reference to himself. When saying na meso attâ it means `this is not a self´. A self in general. This may be a bit clearer when reading the below:
23. "You may well accept, monks, the assumption of a self-theory[27] from the acceptance of which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. (But) do you see, monks, any such assumption of a self-theory?" — "No, Lord." — "Well, monks, I, too, do not see any such assumption of a self-theory from the acceptance of which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair."
.. 25. "If there were a self, monks, would there be my self's property?" — "So it is, Lord." — "Or if there is a self's property, would there by my self?" — "So it is, Lord." — "Since in truth and in fact, self and self's property do not obtain, O monks, then this ground for views, 'The universe is the Self. That I shall be after death; permanent, stable, eternal, immutable; eternally the same shall I abide, in that very condition' — is it not, monks, an entirely and perfectly foolish idea?" — "What else should it be, Lord? It is an entirely and perfectly foolish idea."[30]
You call it nihilism. That's fine, as I said before, such things are just labels we put on things. For me it is not nihilism, because it only denies the existence a self/soul/me-entity, but does not deny everything else.
The Buddha has no need to posit a self theory as if there were no self to begin with, then decided to make one up! Self is intrinsic. He had to first know attâ before he could say of an aggregate that it is na m'eso attâ. The Buddha speaks of the self when he says that it is our refuge along with dharma (SN 22:43). What else would be a refuge, the "murderous" five aggregates (SN 22:85)?
@Blondel, I look at the information Sabre has provided, as well as the information I've learned elsewhere, and I see a strong refutation of the notion of self; you, however, do not. I don't think that's going to change.
We both interpret the Dharma differently and that's perfectly fine; to each their own. I've studied the Buddha's teachings and reached one conclusion, you've done the same and reached another. I think it's time we just agree to disagree and get back to practicing Buddhism instead of arguing about it.
Comments
@Bodhivaka - It does seem that sometimes monism is used as a synonym for nondualism. But if monism is the idea that everything is One (as opposed to two, many etc) then it is not the same as the idea that all distinctions are emergent. It assigns a numerical value to the ultimate, while nondualism would say that the universe is a unity, not a numerical value. Hence the Upanishadic view is characterised as advaita or 'not two' , a phrase that denies dualism but also carefully and deliberately avoids the suggestion of monism. Spencer Brown is careful in his book on Taoist cosmology to explain that a unity is not a numerical 'one', and Al-Halaj warns that it would be incorrect to say' God is One'. Etc.
So, the way I see it, the idea that by reduction the universe reduces to one thing is directly opposed to dualism, while nondualism would be opposed to all extreme views including monism and dualism.
I do not see nondualism as the denial of an upper-case 'Self', as you do, but the issue is so subtle that I'm not sure there's any point in debating it. I would argue against nihilism though. There has to be a grounding phenomenon, even it is not our 'Self'.
Just my view. Maybe there is another way of looking at it.
As to nihilism, I do not deny the reality of a grounding phenomenon (such as fermions and bosons), I'm simply a mereological nihilist in as much as I assert that composite objects possess no intrinsic existence, and therefore, strictly speaking, don't exist at all.
But I cannot agree with the second. Fermions and boson cannot be fundamental. A fundamental entity cannot require the pre-existence of space and time. Otherwise metaphysics would be a doddle, physics would be able to have a fundamental theory and Buddhism would be a mistake.
Would you not agree that whatever is fundamental must be independent of and prior to space and time?
A truly non-composite phenomenon would have no parts. This is one definitional property of a unity, that it has no parts.
Perhaps it would be correct to say that fermions and bosons are the most primitive physical entities. I wouldn't know. But to make a physical entity fundamental just does not work. Materialism would be a lot more popular if it actually worked.
It seems relevant to mention that someone just magaged to split an electron, which was thought to be non-composite.
The truth is alive and sensitive so there can be love
The truth is finely structured and not just a blob of emptiness
The truth is both the manifest and non-manifest
Matter and energy are no more dependent on space and time than space and time are dependent on matter and energy (or so I've read); however, despite the inter-dependency of these entities, each is individually irreducible and therefore intrinsically existent; as such, if we are to postulate a universe which exists as an eternally expanding and contracting entity composed of four interdependent fundamentals (space, time, matter, and energy) then I see no reason to assert the necessity of a single, independent fundamental phenomenon.
I know I'm stepping on shaky ground here, as to my knowledge most physicists are of the opinion that the universe is not, in fact, eternal; however, I don't believe asserting the possibility is entirely unreasonable.
Although I've researched this particular issue to some extent, I must admit that I haven't given it as much thought as other things, so perhaps you're aware of information that can establish the necessity of a single, independent fundamental phenomenon; I, however, am unaware of such information.
For you, it seems, this suggests that all these things are fundamental. For me, however, (and Kant) it suggests that none of them are.
I'd say it is logic that establishes the necessity of a singular fundamental phenomenon. To have two such phenomenon could not be a result of any cause so it would have to be a complete coincidence that they both exist. And since one of them could have existed without the other then one of them must be contingent. If we think of this in terms of reductionism, then I'm suggesting that a theory with more than one purportedly original phenomenon is nonreductive. This is why mind-matter theories are always nonreductive, for these two phenomena would have to be reduced.
We find that if anything exists we cannot explain how it came into existence. Existence is an infinite regression once we assume that there is a fundamental entity that exists. There can be nothing before this fundamental entity so it must be eternal or have arisen from Nothing. But neither idea has ever worked. One way around this is to assume that what is fundamental is unified, unconditioned and unmanifest. Then spacetime and matter/energy would emerge as dependent phenomenon. We thus avoid the problem of explaining how this fundamental phenomenon exists. There would be a sense in which it doesn't.
In short, the moment we assume that there is a fundamental entity that exists (as opposed to not-existing), then we are in trouble. No philosopher has ever solved the problems associated with this assumption. We end up having to choose between ex nihilo creation or an infinite pile of turtles. The only solution would be to get rid of the problem by not making this assumption in the first place. That this is a solution does not make it true, of course, but it is highly suggestive. Tao makes a great deal of sense in logic.
If I had to make an argument against multiple fundamental entities I'd probably point to metaphysics and its failure to resolve the problems associated with this idea. A fundamental theory cannot just start with taking multiple entities as a given. They would have to be reduced.
Still, I must concede that we do not have to assume that logic is a good guide to these issues, and that in the end there is nothing to prevent us assuming multiple fundamental phenomena. Many philosophers conclude that the world is paradoxical, in which case any argument from reason will be inconclusive.
Ultimately, we could claim the existence of anything (even a singular fundamental reality) is a coincidence; however, it makes more sense to me to say that reality has to be a certain way. Why? I haven't the slightest clue -- it just seems that way to me; therefore, given the inseparability of space, time, matter, and energy, I would submit that perhaps the shared existence of these potential fundamentals aren't a coincidence, but rather the nature of reality as it has to be. I wouldn't agree that one of the multiple fundamentals could exist without the other(s); rather, they would all be equally interdependent and contingent upon one another. I'm not quite sure I understand you here. Are you saying a theory which asserts the existence of multiple interdependent phenomena suggests that the phenomena can be reduced? If so, I disagree. The phenomena would be collectively interdependent by individually irreducible, and indeed, I believe something which can rightly be called fundamental must be irreducible. Could you elaborate on this potential solution? I'm not really able to grasp it with what you've said, but it certainly sounds interesting. As I've said, due to the inseparable nature of these multiple fundamentals, I don't really find that taking them as a given is a problem. I know saying "the universe just has to be that way" may not sound the least bit satisfying, but I'm personally unable to postulate a more likely solution to the problems we're discussing here; but again, I'm interested in learning more about the potential solution you've mentioned.
I see what you mean about co-dependence implying necessity and not contingency. I would agree insofar as once one co-dependent phenomenon exists then so must the other. If they are co-dependent then they must come into existence together as a necessity. But if they come into existence then there would not have been Nothing beforehand, so they would both be contingent.
You say that you have no problem taking these multiple fundamentals as a given. But you also say that they are co-dependent. I'm not sure you can have it both ways. If they airise in co-dependence then they are not fundamental. Presumably you would reply to this objection by saying that they are eternal. But this is not a solution for any problems. Also, in case it matters, it would be in direct opposition to Big Bang theory.
But really it's the logic that falls down. Clearly there is something that is permanent and that prevents the universe from ever being Nothing. But if we say that this phenomenon exists eternally then we create the ancient dilemma of origins, the question of whether the universe begins with Something or Nothing. Both ideas are logically indefensible, which is why it is a dilemma. I could try to argue this point but I think it is easier to just recognise that most philosophers consider this to be a genuine dilemma. After all, if an eternally existing phenomenon made sense then it would certainly be the most popular view in the sciences. Yet physicists rarely choose it, and most prefer ex nihilo creation or agnosticism. Indeed, many dismiss metaphysics as useless precisely because it cannot resolve this dilemma and others like it. It cannot be resolved because both ideas are logically indefensible. (Nagarjuna et al). You might be interested to check out the physicist Paul Davies' Mind of God, since he discusses this topic at length. (He cannot solve the probem, and concludes that maybe there is something in the doctrine of mysticism).
There is a third option, as Davies notes, and this is to say, with Buddha and Lao Tsu, that Tao or Nibbana is original and all else is emergent and dependently arisen. Here there is no dilemma. We cannot ask why it exists because it doesn't. And we cannot ask why it doesn't exist because it does. This is Nagarjuna's 'two truths' or 'two worlds', the conventional and ultimate, the two ways we can conceive of the situation. 'Existence' is a slippery concept, and we rarely stop to ask exactly what we mean by it.
The problem of origins would arise from our mistaken concept of existence. We normally assume a fundamental distinction between Something and Nothing. But for (most?) Buddhists and (all?) Taoists there would be no such thing as a fundamental distinction.
Kant and Hegel arrive at the same solution in logic. Kant concludes that the ultimate or original phenomenon is not an instance of a category, (and proposes that this would be the proper subject for any rational psychology), and Hegel concludes that it is an undifferentiated 'spiritual unity'. They reach this conclusion because it does not make sense to them to suppose that a fundamental phenomenon is subject to the distinction between existence and non-existence. It leads to self-contradictions.
So we get to the idea of an 'unconditioned' phenomenon, and the philosophical problems are all solved. No need for ex nihilo creation or eternalism. Spacetime would be emergent, and all that it contains.
It is very well known that any other solution fails. What is less well known is that this solution succeeds.
I hope this is more helpful than argumentative. I do too much arguing.
Taking into consideration what you've said, I must concede that both eternalism and creation ex nihilo seem to ultimately fail logically, which obviously raises serious doubts as to the validity and rationality of my ideas; therefore, I'm quite interested in gaining an adequate understanding of your view on the matter. If, however, it is too much to ask for you to try and explain the intricacies of your view, I would greatly appreciate your list of recommended readings.
The book that got me started on nondualism was Cultivating the Empty Field: The Silent Illumination of Zen Master Hongzhi, Ed. Taigen Dan Leighton. The preface and introduction are superb, and then there is the practice instructions and poetry.
But that was me. Given your angle of approach maybe Davies' Mind of God would be a good one. It is not about mysticism or religion, just lays out the philosophical problems that any cosmological theory would need to solve. Radhakrishnan's Philosophy of the Upanishads would take you straight to the heart of the issues.
I will also PM a link.
I did not mean to say that something could exist and not-exist at the same time, but that these are the two ways we can conceive of the ultimate, and therefore all phenomena. The truth would require that we transcend this distinction. This is the reason why Lao Tsu says that the Tao cannot be spoken and then goes on to say that the Tao must be spoken. It is not a paradox. We cannot speak of it for what it is, but we have to speak about it as best we can. We have to speak as if it is this or that, but in reality it is not this or that.
Just so there's something to read here...
In consciousness studies nondualism appears as 'relative phenomenalism'. Here is something relevant by Edward Barkin, from one of the best written essays I've ever read. The full text can probably be found on philpapers.com.
"The history of Western philosophy is filled with discussion, in one guise or another, of what is often called the ‘transcendental’ subject and object. The terms invoke the idea of a hidden self behind the phenomenal self and a hidden object behind the phenomenal object. Although Kant positioned the transcendental ‘things-in-themselves’ as methodological concepts rather than as metaphysical entities, the tendency since Kant has often been to reify them and then debate their objective existence. Idealists have typically wanted to exclude the transcendental object from philosophical discussion on the grounds of its alleged non-existence, while materialists have generally wanted to exclude the transcendental subject on the same grounds.
The idea behind modern phenomenalism would be that neither the transcendental object or subject exists in any concrete sense. Instead, one would postulate various possible combinations of phenomenal objects, the most coherent, complex and structured of which could be viewable as constituting emergent conceptual minds such as our own. In this case, the universe could be seen as fundamentally rooted in phenomena or mind.
As a result, there would be a tendency to reify mental phenomena, as in Berkeleian objective substance monism. However, I would argue that to do so would be as much of a mistake as to reify physical entities, since even the most basic mental properties can be shown to have a conceptual, and hence relative, non-objective aspect. In this idea’s original context, mainstream Buddhist philosophy, one would say that the reason to avoid endowing anything, including a qualitative state or a self, with the property of intrinsic, independent reality is that no object can be logically established without implicit or explicit reference to the causes and conditions which enable it to exist - including its parts and attributes and the very fact that a consciousness is required to mentally designate it a distinct entity in the first place. This principle is known as ‘dependent origination’ or ‘the interdependent nature of reality’. "
Edward Barkin
‘Relative Phenomenalism’
JCS Vol 10 No. 8 (2003)
As to anatta, however, the the view that there is no self at all is quite orthodox within Theravada Buddhism.
There is a self, there is no self are just thoughts. Thinking gives rise to the thinker and his thoughts. They are dependently coarisen. Without the thinking there cannot be a thinker or thoughts.
Just like another thread on meaninglessness of live. By stating that life has no meaning, one is actually saying that life should have a meaning. Otherwise the question would not have arisen. There is that polarity.
Moreover, teaching the non-existence of the self is not necessarily equivalent to teaching that death = nirvana. Many Buddhists who reject the notion of a self also believe in rebirth by means of a stream of consciousness that passes on from one body to the next.
Whether or not the Theravada school of thought is in perfect harmony with the Buddha's original teachings is subject to debate. I personally tend to trust Theravadin views more than others, given the conservative and orthodox nature of the sect, but ultimately I rely on my own logic, understanding, and experience above all.
However, we could throw opposing quotes from different scholars at each other all day. Using the words of Nagasena, for example, I could easily build up a case for the non-existence of a self; however, I think this discussion would be more productive if we stuck to quoting the original words of the Buddha as found within the Pali canon.
The source for the Nagar. passage, is online: THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM OF NĀGĀRJUNA (MAHĀPRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀŚĀSTRA) ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE
VOL. III CHAPTERS XXXI-XLII, 253c.
You must not like Kant whose Critique paved the way for faith! LOL
Again it's nihilism in which there is a problem with the self. Even saying that the self is a fiction or an illusion is nihilism because fundamentally there is complete rejection of the self as real on shaky empirical grounds as in, I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist.
On the other hand, the Buddha said nonself or anattâ (Sank., anâtman) is suffering (SN 22:46). He also told Radha to abandon desire for whatever is nonself or in Sanskrit anâtman (SN 35:78). The Buddha even rejected the five khandhas as being his self. He said of each aggregate that it is na meso attâ (not my self) which, in effect is saying, this psycho-physical person is not my âtman.
The Buddha's ministry was not to annihilate the âtman or in Pali, attâ but teach people that they must not regard as their self that which is not the self or anattâ. Otherwise, the consequence is rebirth.
The only Theravadins worth their salt and weight in gold belong to the Dhammakaya Foundation.
By now I must have written entire pages on the philosophical and scientific reasons I reject the existence of a self and why I believe such a position is consistent with the Buddha's teaching, so I won't waste time repeating myself; but needless to say, my reasons for rejecting a self are much more complex than "I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist." Could you quote the passage you're referring to in SN 22:46? I don't have access to it.
The passage you're referring to in SN 35:78 is consistent with my view. I also believe a desire for all things which are not the self should be abandoned, which is everyth
By now I must have written entire pages on the philosophical and scientific reasons I reject the existence of a self and why I believe such a position is consistent with the Buddha's teaching, so I won't waste time repeating myself; but needless to say, my reasons for rejecting a self are much more complex than "I can't sense a soul with my sensory apparatus, ergo, it doesn't exist." Could you quote the passage you're referring to in SN 22:46? I don't have access to it.
The passage you're referring to in SN 35:78 is consistent with my view, as I also believe a desire for all things which are not the self should be abandoned (which is everything, seeing as how there is no self). I also agree that the five aggregates are not the self, seeing as how (again) there is no self. I agree that the Buddha didn't intend to annihilate the self (simply because there is no self to annihilate), but I disagree with your assertion that the Buddha taught of a "true self." I disagree. Some of the most respected and knowledgable Buddhist scholars in the world have been Theravadins that rejected the existence of a self.
I think, however, that a more on topic statement is in the sutta directly after that one - SN 22.47: In other words, any self view is in the aggregates (which are not self).
Either way, whether quoting later teachers, or the suttas, at a certain point in a persons practice, it doesn't really get them to more understanding. Instead, it is more likely to cause fixed views. So now this thread has looked at non self from a scientific point of view, a sutta point of view, a logical point of view, I think it's time to look at it from an internal point of view. Aka meditation, where the aggregates can slow down and even disappear.. and what'll be left then? If you start to see that you see more than any sutta can provide.
Bodhi, the Dhammakaya Foundation is Theravadin - it just doesn't buy the nihilistic reading of some monks. Nibbana is the attâ or the self. That is where they stand.
When the Buddha, with regard to an aggregate, said na meso attâ, he was attâ. That is about as simple as it gets. Keep in mind that you can't put attâ under an electron microscope. Because you can't it doesn't mean it is not a reality. To deny, completely, attâ as a reality is nihilism.
"this is not my self" is the stock translation.
The Buddha has no need to posit a self theory as if there were no self to begin with, then decided to make one up! Self is intrinsic. He had to first know attâ before he could say of an aggregate that it is na m'eso attâ. The Buddha speaks of the self when he says that it is our refuge along with dharma (SN 22:43). What else would be a refuge, the "murderous" five aggregates (SN 22:85)?
We both interpret the Dharma differently and that's perfectly fine; to each their own. I've studied the Buddha's teachings and reached one conclusion, you've done the same and reached another. I think it's time we just agree to disagree and get back to practicing Buddhism instead of arguing about it.