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my commentary on the sutta ( I translated it on the fly) says:
"The expression lokāyata, which I translate as “sophism” can be compared with Rhys David, Dialogues 1.166ff., R.O. Franke, Dīgha trans. 19, note 3.) What`s meant by it is a school of philosophers, who concerned themselves particularly with nature-historical questions. The examples of the things treated by them are shown in the comments of Dīgha-Nikāya 1. 1. 25 (= I.11 (see. Sumangalavilāsinī OD. Rhys David and Carpenter 1. 90-91). For philosophers who tend to discuss metaphysical problems, the term lokāyata carries also the notion of materialism and triviality.
From the mentioned examples (“the crow is wise because its bones are white; the Crane is red, because its blood is red”) comes out however that at the same time that one makes the accusation that the lokāyatika tended to arrive at their resuls trhu the way of diaectics, not thru logical conclusion. They considered it as their duty to prove everything, even the most absurd. In addition, it is correct that the comment called in our Sutta (II 96,12) those are the people, which are familiar with vitandasattha, meaning the ones equipped with the art of dialectics that results in illusory reasons and fallacies."
Further the 5 of the 20 heresys in personality (sakkāya-ditthi) are denounced as materialst, namely the ones that proclaim annihliation of a self with death (uccheda-ditthi)
It is interesting that you bring this particular subject up, because I have always seen the five khandhas as the burden (as seen in SN 22.22) as well as the very same material we can use to construct the path (as seen in SN 22.79). The relationship between these two seemingly contradictory statements is not so hard to see when we take into consideration the role that intention plays in our overall experience, and how to use our experience of the five khandhas to observe and understand this process intimately. I could attempt to explain this relationship a bit further, but I fear that I would not do it just; therefore, I shall offer this essay by the Venerable Thanissaro in order to make this connection clearer: Five Piles of Bricks: The Khandhas as Burden & Path.
Respectfully,
Jason
After rereading your post Jason, I can understand your arguments better. Indeed volition plays a key role in the Buddhas teachings,I apologize i did not realize the similarity of the terms vilotion and intention.
Having said that, I think we should recall that kamma,or more precisly Sankhāra, is the place to start. While not having examined the pali terms, the first verse of the dhammapada says
Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox.
Mind is the forerunner of (all good) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, AFFECTION follows one, even as one's shadow that never leaves.
If we look at Pratitya-samutpada, Kamma formations (Sankhāra) are the first product. And what are they a result of? Ignorance. I am not a scholar and maybe my suggestion is wrong, but if i was to chose, i would have forumalted "kamma-formations" are the forerunner...", i hold that to be more precise. Or to be even more precise, "kusala- and akusala-cetanā shaping mano-kamma are the forerunners...". (which are followed by vacī-kamma & kāya-kamma )
The confusion imo comes now, when the conclusion is made that all kamma-formations are products of ignorance. But this does not deny imo that there are good ones, and bad ones (ones that root in greed, hatred and delusion and the opposites). It (endingof kamma) is maybe more sublte than I can currently grasp.
I agree that as long as we are not able to grasp nibbana, the kandhas can be rightly viewed at as tools that both can do harm and good, as the article you gave suggests. What makes them either a tool of mara or a tool of liberation is our will, intention, volition, kamma.
Nevertheless I can not think of any justification of taking refuge in them.
I must apologize, but I am unable to keep up with your posts because they are all over the place. They jump from topic to topic, and not only that, they are full of assumptions that I just do not have the time to straighten out.
Nevertheless, just to give you and example of what I mean, I have never said that the khandhas are a refuge in and of themselves nor have I presented an argument for anything of the sort. I simply offered my personal view that the process of release is only possible due to the five khandhas themselves, which was then supported by various sutta references.
Beyond that one point, you are implying an entire argument that is simply not there. That is why I made the statement that things would be clearer if the posts as well as the references were read a bit more thoroughly.
I am sorry if my posts are confusing for you, but since topics are interrelated, I dare to touch them if Ithink they belong to the whole. You for instance brought intention into the game, that to my understanding opens the direction towards kamma.
I never said you explcitly said one should take kandhas as a refuge. I say it follows if one rules out a transcendental self, since it must refer to the kandhas then. It does so by logic. No transcendental self, all self references must refer to the aggregates, I am not sure why someone would dispute that, if I am wrong, you maybe can explain me why.
If you were not directing your post towards me, then might I make a suggestion that you take the time to explicitly mention exactly who or what you are referencing in your posts because you begin post #453 with a quote from me, then move on to say that you understand my arguments better (whatever they may be), and then you conclude by saying that you still can not think of any justification for taking refuge in the khandhas.
Regardless if the topics are interrelated, you can still direct certain points to one or more of the parties involved so that those directly referenced are able to respond in an efficient manner. As for the rest of your question, I have long since taken myself out of the self versus no self debate, and I am only engaging those topics that I feel are directly beneficial to the practice itself. I consider the rest to fall under inappropriate attention.
Reason has a much easier time when it follows the idea that the referent or self is fundamentally detached from the five khandhas. Without such a referent, by default, the five khandhas become the sole frame of reference. Does our fate, therefore, rest entirely with the khandhas which are impermanent and painful?
It is hard to imagine that Gotama the Buddha taught that we have no choice but to accept that we are the five khandhas from which there is no escape. In light of this, was Gotama teaching a new species of annihilationism? It doesn't seem likely.
Returning to the idea of self as referent, the following passage seems very supportive. I can't imagine it is saying that we should accept the five khandhas as the "noble Witness" or our "master". Forgive me if I am wrong.
“The self (in thee), man, knows what is true or false.
Surely the noble Witness, sir, the Self,
You do misjudge, in that when sin is there
You do conceal the Self within the self...
Thus he who has the Self
As master, let him walk with heed, for whom
The world is master—shrewdly walk, for whom
Dhamma is master (as a) muser (let him walk).
Who lives as Dhamma bids him never fails"
(Anguttara 1.149, from I.B. Horner's Early Buddhist Theory of Man
Perfected, p. 145).
There is one more troubling aspect of Anattavada (the theory of no-self) I would like to touch on. While it may seem trivial to the learned among us, the question begs to be asked: "Who or what takes refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha?" Surely there is a refugee. If not, why even propose the triple refuge? On the same track, perhaps more importantly, who or what crosses the flood of samsara to reach the safe island of nirvana? Is there only a raft which crosses? It is almost laughable to imagine such.
That I.B. Horner Translation reads nothing like the translations I've found of this sutta. The style is completely different. I also cannot seem to locate any passages that correspond to this translation:
According to the numbering, it should correlate to this section of the Anguttara Nikaya:
11 Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the arising of non-arisen sensual desires and the development of arisen sensual desires as an agreeable object. Unwise reflection of an agreeable object
arouses non-arisen sensual desires and develops arisen sensual desires. This is the first.
12 Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the arising of non-arisen anger and the development of arisen anger as an angry object. Unwise reflection of an angry object
arouses non-arisen anger and develops arisen anger. This is the second
13.Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the arising of non-arisen sloth and torpor and the development of arisen sloth and torpor as discontent, weariness and sluggishness of mind after a heavy meal. Bhikkhus, the sluggish mind arouses non-arisen sloth and torpor and develops arisen sloth and torpor This is the third.
14.Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the arising of non-arisen restlessness and worry and the development of arisen restless and worry as an unappeased mind. The unappeased mind arouses non-arisen restlessness and worry and develops arisen restless and worry. This is the fourth.
15.Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the arising of non-arisen doubts and the development of arisen doubts as unwise reflection. Unwise reflection arouses non-arisen doubts and develops arisen doubts. This is the fifth.
16.Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the non arising of non-arisen sensual desires and the fading of arisen sensual desires as a loathsome object. Wise reflection of a loathsome object does not arouses non-arisen sensual desires and fades arisen sensual desires. This is the sixth.
17 Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the non arising of not arisen anger and the fading of arisen anger as the object, release in loving kindness. Wise reflection of the object release
in loving kindness does not arouse non-arisen anger and fades arisen anger. This is the seventh
18 .Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the not arising of non-arisen sloth and torpor and the fading of arisen sloth and torpor as getting started, setting out and putting forth effort.Bhikkhus, aroused effort does not arouse non-arisen sloth and torpor and fades arisen sloth and torpor This is the eighth..
19.Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the not arising of non-arisen restlessness and worry and the fading of arisen restless and worry as an appeased mind. The appeased mind does not arouse non-arisen restlessness and worry and fades arisen restless and worry. This is the nineth.
20.Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing more conducive to the not arising of non-arisen doubts and the fading of arisen doubts as wise reflection. Wise reflection does not arouse non-arisen doubts and fades arisen doubts. This is the tenth
If anyone could help, find where this passage comes from, that would be great. As far as I'm concerned, the Horner translations seems quite strange in it's style & wording.
Usually if you see a reference looking like A i 149 or Anguttara 1.149, or A I.149 it refers to the PTS Pali version page numbers, where the first number refers to the volume and the second to the page number (of the Pali, not the English text). These volumes and page numbers are totally independent of the organizational structure of the text itself (they do not refer to book, chapter, sutta).
Thus the passage that Bobby cited falls into the Book of the threes (Tika nipata), fourth chapter (Devaduta Vaggo), tenth and final sutta (10. Aadhipatteyyasuttaü Ý Authorities). Accesstoinsight doesn't have it, but the translation at metta.lk affords a somewhat different though clearly recognizable version:
There is no secrecy in the world, for one doing evil, you know the truth.
Friend, the good is the eyewitness, the self is slight,
When the self is appeased, evil has no place.
The Thus Gone Ones and the gods, see the foolish misbehaving.
Therefore becoming an authority to yourself be mindful.
Becoming an authority of the world, concentrate to be clever,
Be an authority of the Teaching, live according to the Teaching,
Do not give up the search, confronted by death realize,
The destruction of birth with effort
Such a knower of the worlds does not make anything his own.
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. Incidentally, most of the passages at the former www.attan.com were cited in this fashion, leading people unfamiliar with the system to embarrassingly to themselves, accuse him of just making up passages, which of course, disputed translations notwithstanding, he was not. I looked every one of them up.
p.p.s I forgot to thank Bobby for providing the additional affirmative example of self as authority/referent.
Anyone may find the passage which I cited from I.B. Horner's book at the Anguttara-Nikaya, Book of Threes at III, 4, paragraph 40 or in PTS, A.i.149. I have read it in the Pali. I don't see how the passage given in Horner's book is wildly off-track.
Again the context of this passage is in regard to a 'referent'. In the same section, "self-independece" (= PTS Pali-English Dic. attâdhipteyya) at A.i.147 is discussed by the Buddha.
Thus making the self predominant, he abandons evil, cultivates goodness, abandons things blameworthy, cultivates things blameless, and keeps himself in perfect purity. This, monks, is called "dominance of self" (atta-adhipteyya).
In reading this section I see no case for the theory of no-self or Anattavada. Whether or not we meditate or live the pure life, we do so from the referent who transcends the five khandhas.
AN 3.40 Adhipateyya Sutta
Governing Principles
Translated from the Pali by
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
....
There is in the cosmos no secret place for one who has done an evil deed.
Your own self knows, my good man,whether you are true or false.
You underestimate the fine witnessthat is yourself, you with evil
in yourself that then you hide.
The devas & Tathagatas see the fool who goes about
out of tune with the cosmos.
Thus you should go about self-governed, mindful; governed by the cosmos,
masterful,absorbed in jhana;governed by the Dhamma, acting in line
with the Dhamma.
The sage who makes an effort in truth doesn't fall back.
Whoever through striving— overpowering Mara,
conquering the Ender — touches the stopping of birth,
is Such, a knower of the cosmos,wise,
a sage unfashioned by anything at all.
The construction visual of verse was a bit akward, so I put it in a prose format like the other 2 passages. So, I'd like to put all 3 here in this post for people to cross-reference.
Here's the I.B. Horner one:
“The self (in thee), man, knows what is true or false.
Surely the noble Witness, sir, the Self,
You do misjudge, in that when sin is there
You do conceal the Self within the self...
Thus he who has the Self
As master, let him walk with heed, for whom
The world is master—shrewdly walk, for whom
Dhamma is master (as a) muser (let him walk).
Who lives as Dhamma bids him never fails"
And finally, the one Vaccha posted from here, by Sister Upalavanna & A.D.Jayasundere.
There is no secrecy in the world, for one doing evil, you know the truth.
Friend, the good is the eyewitness, the self is slight,
When the self is appeased, evil has no place.
The Thus Gone Ones and the gods, see the foolish misbehaving.
Therefore becoming an authority to yourself be mindful.
Becoming an authority of the world, concentrate to be clever,
Be an authority of the Teaching, live according to the Teaching,
Do not give up the search, confronted by death realize,
The destruction of birth with effort
Such a knower of the worlds does not make anything his own.
thanks to all for providing the texts and the small lesson on how to decipher the references
not1not2: just a technicallity: Sister Upalavanna is presumably the only translator of the text vaccha posted (from metta.lk), A.D.Jayasundere`s translations are those when you click on (2). I am not sure if that changes anything, it just came to my attention when browsing the page of The great western vehicle while searching for additional translations, on metta.lk, it`s not that clear but I conclude that they have the same concept A.D.Jayasundere`s translations are solely found under (2)
I have the latest edition of the Anguttara Nikaya, translated by Nyanatiloka Mahathera, published by Nyanaponika Mahathera in German in a printed edition. I won`t bore you with a mediocre translation of mine from a pali text to german back to english, so i merely point out how he translated the important passages:
»In aller Welt gibt's kein Versteck
für den, der böse Tat verübt.
Dein Selbst sieht es, o Menschenkind,
was Wahrheit und was Lüge ist.
Ja, ein guter Zeuge ist es!"
There is no place to hide in the whole world
for him who does evil deeds.
Your Self sees it, o (child of an) human
what is truth and what is lie
Yes, a good witness it is!
I haven't really looked through them yet, so I don't quite understand the systems & how to cross-reference. Still, now I know there are resources. I just have to study them.
I currently read Erich Frauwallners "History of Indian Philosophy"(German edition, so I cannot provide you exact page numbers.
When turnning to the second volume, Chapter on materialism, there is a sutta mentioned that deals explcitly with a king that has a materialisitc world view. According to Frauwallner, both the Jains and the Buddhist have this sutta in common. For the Jains, it is the second Uvangam, the Rayapasenaijjam, the Buddhist text being Payasi Sutta (Digha Nikàya 23), the former one is believed to be the more original according to Frauwallner`s footnote. I did not find it on access2insight and on metta.lk, German version is available on palikanon.com, an english version can be found here: http://www.buddhistinformation.com/payasi_sutta.htm
forgive me if i distract again from the core topic, but I thought it might be useful to all of you who want an impression what materialism meant at the time of the early buddhists and the jainas, I hope it is useful for all of you.
fofoo, recently I found this. You might enjoy the reasoning behind it. It is without a doubt apophatic (the via negativa).
"He [the Buddha] does not say that we should know the true self, but that we must not regard as the self (âtmâ, p. attâ) that which is not the self. For otherwise craving clings to this false self, and thus brings about an entanglement in the cycle of beings. And salvation takes place not through our becoming consciousness of the true self, but through our recognizing as not-self all that is falsely regarded as the self, and so detaching desire therefrom" (Erich Frauwallner [Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, vol. I, 1953]).
It goes to the heart of what is to be regarded as the proper frame of reference for those of us who wish to end our suffering; wanting to detach from what is impermanent, suffering and not the self (anattâ). It may be the case that we are tossing out the baby while keeping the bath water with regard to the five khandhas which ordinary people believe to be the self or referent.
I completed the chapter on "The Buddha and the Jina" in Frauwallner`s History of Indian Philosophy". Indeed, his scholary assesment is that denying the self completely defenetly would go to far, and he suggests Buddha`s approach was apophatic in a very pragmatic way.
He even goes so far to suggest that the soul or self in Buddha`s view is the same as in Samkhya, that, according to him, is the passive observer, and the Buddha`s radically pragmatic way prevented him from both specuating about it as well as totally denying it, but rather divert the attention to an easily practicable way of self liberation . Indeed, concerning the Self as a passive observer, the quote we found lately in Anguttara-Nikaya (Devadåta vaggo) is a maybe rather lonely but a defenetive affirmation of exactly that assupmtion. The (true) Self, the noble witness, the unbiased judge.
I am refering to Anguttara-Nikaya, Book of the threes (Tika nipata), fourth chapter (Devaduta Vaggo), tenth and final sutta (10. Aadhipatteyyasuttaü Ý Authorities)., the sutta of which you posted 3 versions. The passages I mean (of all versions ) is this:
1.)(Thanissaro Bhikkhu)
Your own self knows, my good man,whether you are true or false.
2.)(I.B. Horner)
“The self (in thee), man, knows what is true or false.
Surely the noble Witness, sir, the Self,
3.)(Sister Upalavanna)
There is no secrecy in the world, for one doing evil, you know the truth.
Friend, the good is the eyewitness, the self is slight,
4.)(Nyanatiloka Mahathera, translated by me from German to English)
Your Self sees it, o (child of an) human
what is truth and what is lie
Yes, a good witness it is!
Thanks for the links, Jason. I believe I have read The Moral Life some time ago, but not yet read any of the other articles you posted. Thanks for contributing. If you wish to discuss any of these articles, we can take a look at them. I look forward to studying, in particular, the Buddhist Doctrine of Anicca, and The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-self, and the Problem of the Over-Self, to see what the author may substantially offer to this dialogue.
Yes, Jason. Thanks for the articles. I have only had time to read The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self, and the Problem of the Over-Self so far, but I plan on reading the others in the near future. While I doubt this article will convince everyone on this thread, it at very least, clarifies many things for me. I have found it very helpful & plan on re-reading it in the future. Anyway, I'd like to offer a few excerpts from the link that stood out to me. They are not necessarily in the order they were listed in the article.
...is there a permanent self over and above the changing aggregates?
Those who answer this question in the affirmative very often refer to the Sermon at Benares in support of their interpretation. The basic assumption behind this interpretation is that when the Buddha says that the five aggregates are not self (anatta), this does not amount to the denial of the Self. It only amounts to the fact that none of the five aggregates can be identified as our true Self, because they are subject to impermanence and also to what impermanence implies. The true Self is besides the five aggregates and could be discovered only by transcending them. For this purpose, the process of self-identification which manifests itself as: this is mine (etam mama), this I am (esoham asmi) and this is my self (eso me atta) should be replaced by the opposite process: this is not mine (netam mama), this I am not (nesoham asmi) and this is not my self (neso me atta). It is through this process of self-negation - so runs the argument - that one transcends the five aggregates and discovers his true Self. If the false self which is thus transcended, is subject to impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and characterised by non-substantiality (anatta), the true Self so discovered has the opposite three characteristics, namely, permanence (nicca), happiness (sukha) and the fact of being the true Self (atta). If man suffers it is because of his estrangement from his true Self. Therefore attainment of Nibbana means "a positive return of the self to itself".
If this interpretation is valid, it raises the very important question as to why the Buddha was silent on this matter. Why was the answer to it left to be implied or inferred? It also raises the equally important question why none, of the schools of Buddhist thought did not arrive at such a conclusion. Therefore it leads to the most improbable situation that they all misunderstood the original message of the Buddha. It is also worth mentioning here that among all the schools of Buddhist thought it was only the Vatisiputriyas, who believed in a puggala (person) which is supposed to be distinct from the sum total of the five aggregates. As claimed by the Vatisiputriyas, this did not amount to the belief in a soul as understood by many other Indian religions Yet for all, they came to be sarcastically referred to by other Buddhists as "heretics within our midst" (antascaratirthaka). Apart from these pieces of what may be called external evidence, there is internal evidence within the Pali texts which go against the theory of the Over-self.
In the Khemaka Sutta of the Samyuttanikaya," to which we referred above, it is recorded that a monk named Khemaka entertained the notion of "I am" (asmiti) in relation to the five aggregates. Then the other monks who were more knowledgeable put this question to him: "As to this notion of 'I am', friend Khemaka, of which you speak, what do you mean by this notion of 'I am'? Do you speak of 'I am' as body or as distinct from body, as feeling or as distinct from feeling, as perception or as distinct from perception, as mental formations or as distinct from mental formations, as consciousness or as distinct from consciousness?" From the context of the sutta, it is clear that these questions were put to Khemaka in order to show the correct view, namely that the notion of 'I am' cannot be applied either to the five aggregates or to 'something' distinct from them. This clearly establishes the fact that an independently existing self-entity cannot be discovered either within the five aggregates or besides them.
---
The next question that arises here is that if each of the aggregates cannot be so identified, does their combination provide a basis for such an identification. In fact, a very strong argument for the possibility of such a conclusion was developed by a Buddhist monk called Khemaka as recorded in the Khemaka Sutta of the Samyuttanikaya." As recorded here, this monk developed a proper insight into the nature of the five aggregates, so that he did not discern either a self (atta) or anything pertaining to a self (attaniya) in any of the five aggregates. However, he had a lurking tendency to believe that there is some kind of self in the combination of the five aggregates. This belief was based on the conviction that what was lacking in each aggregate can be found in their combination. The combination is endowed with what each constituent is devoid of. When we speak of the scent of a blue or white lotus - so runs the argument - we do not say that the scent belongs either to its petals, or to its colour, or to its fibres. The right answer is that the scent belongs to the flower as a whole. In the same way, when we speak of the self, we do not say that it can be discovered in the constituents of the human personality when they are taken severally. The self which eludes us when we seek it in each aggregate could certainly be discovered in their combination. This argument seems to be based on the observation that the whole is not the mere collection of its parts, but that it is obtained when these self-same parts are organized in a particular order, so that there is a qualitative difference between the parts taken severally and their organized collection which is the whole.
However, this conclusion, on the part of Ven. Khemaka, though based on strong arguments, did not qualify him for final emancipation. This shows that, from the Buddhist point of view, his conclusion was wrong. Why is it so? In this connection we would like to make the following observations: it is, of course, true that Buddhism analyses the empiric individuality into five aggregates in order to show that none of them could be identified as a self-subsisting self-entity. However, it is not asserted that the individual is a mere collection of the five aggregates, just as much as a wall is not a mere collection of bricks. What is asserted is that the individual is the sum total of the five aggregates when they are organized together according to the principles of dependent origination (pancakkhandha paticcasamuppanna). What is denied in Buddhism is not the concept of person which is called puggala, but a self-subsisting entity within the puggala, which answers to the definition of atta. Therefore, Buddhism has no objection to the concept of puggala, if by puggala is understood, not an entity distinct from the sum total of the properly organized five aggregates, nor a substance enduring in time, nor an agent within the five aggregates. The puggala (person) is the sum total of the five aggregates combined according to the principles of dependent origination and which are constantly in a state of flux.
---
Let us now consider the problem of the Over-Self in the light of the Buddhist observations pertaining to epistemology. In this connection it must be stated here that Buddhism recognizes not only different means of knowledge but also different levels of knowledge. Besides the ordinary sensory knowledge indicated by such cognitive terms as vinnana (bare awareness) and sanna (sensory perception), it speaks of a higher non-sensuous knowledge indicated by such cognitive terms as abhinna (higher knowledge), parinna (comprehensive knowledge), anna (gnosis), and panna (wisdom). If the first level of knowledge is circumscribed and influenced by our own subjective dispositions, the second level of knowledge is free from such limiting and conditioning factors. It is through this second kind of knowledge that one is said to be able to see things as they truly are (yathabhutam pajanati). As to means of knowledge, Buddhism recognizes not only sensory perception but also extra-sensory perception. This latter means of knowledge is said to enable one to cognize things which do not come within the ken or ordinary sensory knowledge. For our present purpose we need not go into their details. What matters here is the fact that, although Buddhism recognizes different means and levels of knowledge, it is never claimed that a permanent Over-self (the true self) transcending the empirical self (the false self) becomes an object of such knowledge. If anything becomes the object of higher knowledge, which provides a true vision and insight into the nature of reality (yathabhutananadassana), it is the five aggregates (the empiric individuality), and not an elusive Self which transcends them. In point of fact, one theme that runs throughout the Buddhist discourses is that it is the five aggregates that become an object of higher knowledge (Pancakkhandha abhinneyya parinneyya). Hence it is that to a question raised by the Buddha himself, namely: "What, monks, are the things that should be thoroughly comprehended through higher knowledge?" The Buddha himself provides the answer: "It is the five aggregates of grasping (= the empiric individuality) - so should it be answered". It is clear, therefore, that, according to Buddhism, the object of higher knowledge is not a higher reality, but the phenomenal world. This excludes the possibility of any metaphysical reality which serves as the ultimate ground of existence, no matter under what name it is introduced: the macrocosmic Soul, the First Cause, or the Transcendental Over-Self.
Another aspect that may be considered here is the experience gained through the higher stages of mind's concentration. We refer here to the Buddhist teaching on jhana, which recognizes eight (or nine) levels of mental concentration where each succeeding one represents a higher stage of the mind's unification. It is a process through which the differentiated mind gets gradually unified until it reaches a sublime level of mental refinement. The question that arises here is whether one who attains jhanic experience gets a glimpse of his true Self which was hidden to him during normal times. Can the jhanic experience be interpreted as communion of absorption with a metaphysical reality? In this connection we would like to quote here an observation made by the German Buddhist monk, Ven. Gnanaponika: "A fertile soil for the origin and persistence of beliefs and ideas about a self, soul, god or any other form of an absolute entity is misinterpreted meditative experience occurring in devotional rapture or mystical trance. Such experience is generally interpreted by the mystic or theologian as revelation of, or union with, a godhead; or it is taken for a manifestation of man's true and eternal Self."
That Buddhism does not interpret the content of jhanic experience in a mystic or metaphysical is clearly suggested by the Anupada Sutta in the Majjhimanikaya. Here we find an analysis, made by Sariputta, of the nature and content of the experience obtained through jhana, What is interesting to note here is the fact that the content of each jhana is fully itemized, without leaving any residue for any kind of mystic interpretation. Thus from the Buddhist point of view, it can be psychologically analysed like any other mundane experience. What is more significant is the observation made that the mental constituents of each jhana are said to arise in full awareness of the meditator: "He is fully aware of their arising (vidita uppajjanti), their persistence (vidita upattanhanti) and their passing away (vidita abbhattham gacchanti). Then he comes to the conclusion that these mental factors, having not been, come to be (ahutva sambhonti), and, having been, they pass away (hutva pativenti). It is further observed that, since Sariputta fully comprehends the constituents of jhanic experience, he does not get attracted by them (anupaya) nor does he get repelled by them (anapaya), nor does he get attached to them (anissita) or infatuated by them (appatibaddha) Without getting overwhelmed by them he thus comes to the conclusion that there is an emancipation higher than that (atthi uttarim nissarananti pajanati).
Thus this account on the nature of jhanic experience establishes three facts: one is that its content could be fully analysed without leaving any residue. The second is that its constituents arise and vanish in full knowledge of the meditator. The third is the fact that it does not in itself constitute final emancipation. For, according to Buddhism, the jhanic experience, too, is impermanent (anicca), unsatisfactory (dukkha), and devoid of a self (anatta), conditioned (sankhata) and is of dependent origination (paticcasamuppanna). These observations on the nature and content of jhanic experience clearly show that it cannot be interpreted in terms of mysticism or metaphysics, i.e., as providing proof for the existence of the Over-Self. In point of fact, Buddhism seems to be fully aware of the possibility of misinterpreting it on the basis of theological or metaphysical theories. This seems to explain why the meditator is advised to review the content of jhanic experience in the light of the three marks of phenomenal existence (tilakkhana), i.e., as impermanent (anicca), unsatisfactory (dukkha) and as devoid of a self-subsisting entity (anatta).
The next aspect that must be taken into consideration for a final solution to the problem of the Over-Self is the Nibbanic experience. This is an aspect which we propose to take up in our lecture on Nibbana. However, for our present purpose, it is necessary to refer here to one important aspect of the Nibbanic experience. This refers to the position of the Tathagata, i.e. one who has attained Nibbana, in relation to the five aggregates (khandhas). In the Buddhist texts, it is claimed that the Tathagata cannot be comprehended either with reference to the five aggregates or without reference to them. The first suggests that the Tathagata does not identify himself with any of the aggregates or the personality-factors. The second suggests that he does not identify himself with anything outside the aggregates, i.e., something than transcends them, as for example the Over-Self. Both means that the Tathagata is free from all forms of self identification. From this it must not be concluded that one who has attained Nibbana identifies himself with Nibbana, as is clearly shown in the first sutta of the Majjhimanikaya. Such an identification according to Buddhism amounts to a serious form of spiritual bondage. In the context of the Buddhist teaching on anatta, the Upanisadic statement, namely "I am Brahman" or "Thou art That" is a form of asmimana, self-identification. According to the Buddhist view of emancipation, there is no emancipation as long as asimana persists. This is clear from the story of the Buddhist monk called Khemaka to which we referred in the course of this lecture.
From what we have observed so far it should become clear that the Nibbanic experience, too, does not provide evidence for the theory of the Over-Self, a self that transcends the empirical self. That the ideal of emancipation as conceived by early Buddhism has no parallel to that of the Upanishads is a subject that has been studied by a number of modem scholars. In the context of these studies, Radhakrishnan's conclusion that early Buddhism is only a restatement of the thought of the Upanishads from a new standpoint needs revision. As Helmuth Von Glasenapp observes it is of course true that early Buddhism and the Upanishads share many doctrines in common, such as Karma, rebirth and deliverance through insight. However, as he further observes, since these ideas were commonly held by a number of contemporary religions, such as Jainism, it is not possible to determine which influenced Buddhism. The fact that the Upanishads preceded early Buddhism does not necessarily mean that the latter was a linear development of the former. For it is a well-known fact that in the history of thought new ideas could emerge not only as a further refinement of earlier ideas but also as a reaction against them, i.e. in dialectical opposition to them. In both cases the influence of what precedes for the emergence of what succeeds is undeniable. However, the difference in the two kinds of influence is also unmistakable. As we observed in our first lecture, Buddhism emerged, not as a linear development of either sassatavada or ucchedavada, but as a critical response to their mutual opposition.
Anyway, like I said, I imagine this won't be entirely convincing, but it does bring up strong analysis.
The piece entitled The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self, and the Problem of the Over-Self at http://www.thebuddhistsociety.org/middleway/Content.jsp raises and summarises the question and a range of answers. Most useful, I found. Thanks for the link.
Clearly this is a very long-standing debate within Buddhism and this I found particularly illuminating. For some reason, probably arising from Euro-centric, imperialist arrogance, I had assumed that the debate about "Overself" or "Soul" or whatever name we care to give it had arsien from the interface with the monotheisms and that, recently. Whatever was the actual form of Vedantic belief in 6th century northern India, the notion of atta was clearly an issue.
I found this comment interesting:
In point of fact it is th(e) fourth meaning of anatta which, from the soteriological point of view, is the most important. However, it does not appear to have got due attention in the later schools of Buddhist thought as well as in modern writings on Buddhism. Perhaps this may indicate a shift of emphasis from Buddhism as a religion to Buddhism as a philosophy. (my emphasis)
Are we are only replaying and rehearsing old debates? Or have we, from new contexts and cultures contribute anything new to the old, tired arguments?
Arrogance again suggest that we have, and the clue lies in the same article. Reference is made, almost casually, to a perennial philosophy, to those who practise eclecticism. Light can be shed on the debate from a new direction. This is a process for which Buddhism has always been in training, as it were, moving into diverse culrural contexts and, like a benign virus, adapting and indigenising. To use a metaphor from the old British Empire, Buddhism 'goes native' wherever it goes.
And history seems to suggest that Buddhism will address the deepest questions troubling the culture into which it arrives. We may regret that we have no King Trisong Deutsen to send for a Padma Sambhava but that is the state we are in. It is up to us and to the teachers we can find to find out what, precisely, it is that is so deeply troubling our culture. At present, it appears to me that the nature of consciousness, the notion of a self, an Over-Self, whatever, is pretty much at the heart of our malaise. How can we, from a Buddhist standpoint, address the systematic commodification of human beings, of turning the workforce into 'human resources'? The Christian concept of the immortal soul, as per their definition, is no longer enough to attract automatic reverence. What does the Buddhist say about the question that is asked, over and over: who am I?
Simply to answer, "there is no I" denies the instinctive, if inchoate, experience of many, if not most, people. The Buddha, as quoted, gave us a different example of reaction in the Khemaka Sutta of the Samyuttanikaya: he said nothing. I am reminded of the reaction of Jesus to Pilate's question about truth. The fact that the teacher does not answer cannot, I suggest, be taken to mean that there is no answer. It may, and probably is, that the question is not the right one. And, indeed, that the answer challenges human-to-human communication skills, not mention traditional logic, to breaking point.
**********************
"Hence one who had attained Nibbana is called ohita-bhara, i.e. one who had laid down the burden. The fact that there is a reference here to a burden as well as to its bearer has given rise to the speculation that there is a person or a self-entity besides the five aggregates."
fofoo, I dusted off my old xerox copies form Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's study of Samkaya because of your mention of Frauwallner with regard to the self. Bhattacharyya writes:
Samkaya admits a metaphysical dualism of subject and object, the existence of each being conceived as independent of the existence of the other. At the same time, the nature of the object is understood in necessary reference to the self, while the self is taken to be intelligible by itself.
The rest of Bhattacharyya's analysis is quite heady. I have provided you with another quote to see what I mean by the term 'heady'!
The essential character of the object—viz., its manifestness is understood to be at once a being and a process. The object, in fact, is known as getting manifested. To get manifested is for the object to be defined out of its own unmanifest condition, to be in this sense distinct from itself; and to get unmanifested is for this outward distinction to lapse or become retracted into itself. Either process is explicitly for the self and is intelligible only in reference to the self....The conscious evanescence of the manifestness of the object means a perception of its reality being independent of or distinct from the self and of the manifestness, therefore, having being conditioned by the non-distinction of the object from the self. Thus the manifesting process of the object, which is its defining from itself, implies its non-distinction from the self and the lapsing of this definition implies a distinguishing of the object from the self. The object defines itself when it does not distinguihs itself from the self and it gets undefined in character when it distinguishes itself as an existent from the self.
And if your grey matter hasn't exploded here is still another quote.
The non-distinction of the object from the self is the fact corresponding to the illusory identification of the self with the object. The self is identified with the object in the consciousness of being embodied. The body is itself a real but terminable organisation of the object, the unity of which consists entirely in its not distinguishing itself from the self. Distinguishing, as has been indicated, is a contingent but real function of the object itself, implying the termination of the equally real predicament of not distinguishing. The body as not-distinct from the self is the conscious body (and not embodied self), with consciousness not as a quality but as an associated thing. The oneness with the self from the side of the object means only undistinguishedness, but from the side of the self it means the embodiment of the self in the object. The body is thus an objective fact known as such when it has begun to be distinguished from the self (and thus disolved) in reflection, or, in other words, when the embodiment of the self has begun to be realised as an unreal modification for the self.
There are several points here which I find engaging; which correspond with the khandhas as not being the self as they become more objective for us. (The contrary also holds true, that as khandhas become undistinguished, we tend to 'self them'.) Suffice it to say, there is a lot here to mine. There seems to be a connection between Samkhya and Buddhism which is not for historians to prove or disprove but is a matter for philosophy.
A coda to this, one might argue there are subjects in Buddhism which are not entirely those of the founder. It has not gone unnonticed that the khandha theory itself may not be original but reflects the work of latter-day revisionists. According to Pande, Mrs. Rhy Davids has argued convincingly that it should not be regarded as early. In fact, the khandha theory he remarks "failed to appear in almost the whole of the Digha-Nikaya till the very end, in the first nine suttas of the Mijjhima-Nikaya, in the first three Samyuttas of the Samyutta-Nikayas" not to mention the entire Sutta-Nipata. In the Khandhasamyutta section of the Samyutta-Nikaya the discourses are not delivered by the Buddha but are in fact delivered by Sariputta and Mahakaccana!
To reference your concluding remarks, Simon, I would like to post the following, from the article we are discussing, by itself. It was amidst the previous excerpts I quoted, but I think it may have got lost there:
However, this conclusion, on the part of Ven. Khemaka, though based on strong arguments, did not qualify him for final emancipation. This shows that, from the Buddhist point of view, his conclusion was wrong. Why is it so? In this connection we would like to make the following observations: it is, of course, true that Buddhism analyses the empiric individuality into five aggregates in order to show that none of them could be identified as a self-subsisting self-entity. However, it is not asserted that the individual is a mere collection of the five aggregates, just as much as a wall is not a mere collection of bricks. What is asserted is that the individual is the sum total of the five aggregates when they are organized together according to the principles of dependent origination (pancakkhandha paticcasamuppanna). What is denied in Buddhism is not the concept of person which is called puggala, but a self-subsisting entity within the puggala, which answers to the definition of atta. Therefore, Buddhism has no objection to the concept of puggala, if by puggala is understood, not an entity distinct from the sum total of the properly organized five aggregates, nor a substance enduring in time, nor an agent within the five aggregates. The puggala (person) is the sum total of the five aggregates combined according to the principles of dependent origination and which are constantly in a state of flux.
I am not sure if it is entirely correct to say that the Buddha said absolutely nothing in response to the question, "Who am I?" In the Pali Canon, the evidence suggests that he said "Who am I?" was a question not worth asking, that it fell under what he termed ayoniso manasikara (inappropriate attention), and that it ultimately lead to "a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion, a writhing, a fetter of views" (MN 2).
Nevertheless, as you have said, it is not the right question. From what I understand, the right question to begin with is, "What when I do it will be for my long-term welfare and happiness?" which will eventual lead one to the subjects of yoniso manasikara (appropriate attention) such as, "This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress..."
Thanks all for participating.Given the vivid responses and the much material given lately by all of you,I will have to study some things first.
Concerning if the question "Is there a self?" should be set aside or not, I think it is safe to say that the Buddha gave not much attention to it, refrained from too much theory, when prompted for a yes or no remained silent and rather was into showing actually how to remove suffering pragmatically.
Nevertheless this is an open discussion of anatta, some of his disciples always have philosophised and I guess always will, and everyone is free to pay no attention at all to the debate and rather can resort to secterian doctrines or even private beliefs.
I am not sure if it is entirely correct to say that the Buddha said absolutely nothing in response to the question, "Who am I?" In the Pali Canon, the evidence suggests that he said "Who am I?" was a question not worth asking, that it fell under what he termed ayoniso manasikara (inappropriate attention), and that it ultimately lead to "a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion, a writhing, a fetter of views" (MN 2).
Nevertheless, as you have said, it is not the right question. From what I understand, the right question to begin with is, "What when I do it will be for my long-term welfare and happiness?" which will eventual lead one to the subjects of yoniso manasikara (appropriate attention) such as, "This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress..."
Regards,
Jason
........and what could more accurately and pointedly address the pain inherent in a market-economy culture?
I think it is worth to mention that the Buddha`s doctrine is often considered to be timeless, therfore adressing the nature of existence, rather than the malaises of the zeitgeist.
I think it is worth to mention that the Buddha`s doctrine is often considered to be timeless, therfore adressing the nature of existence, rather than the malaises of the zeitgeist.
regards
For me, the former implies the latter. They are recursive and any teaching that aspires to be timeless must also address the pain of the individual condemned to action.
naturaly, but the doctrine is for salvation of beings, regardless what market form the society they live in has. It can maybe argued that the turnings of the wheel are the adoption to zeitgeist, preventing Buddhism from becoming dogmatic and rather continiously observing how suffering can be reduced or even eliminated.
In the discourse in which the wanderer Vacchagotta opens up a dialogue with the Buddha in which the Buddha's silence plays a major role, Perez-Remon writes:
"For a balanced evaluation of this passage, we have to remind ourselves of the principle established above. Vacchagotta did not profess the Buddhist faith, therefore he subscribed single-mindedly to the belief that the self is identified with the khandhas. The Buddha, on the other hand, wholeheartedly rejected such identification, and as we have often said this was a pivotal point in his teaching. In these circumstances, the dialogue between Vacchagotta and the Buddha was impossible, the term 'self' hand an entirely different meaning for both of the parties concerned. This gives us the meaning of the Buddha's silence. If the Buddha had answered in the affirmative, Vacchagotta would have wrongly interpreted the answer as conforming to the doctrine of the eternalists, who attribute perpetuity to the self of the sakkayaditthi, the only one of which Vacchagotta had any knowledge. If the Buddha had answered in the negative, Vacchagotta would have been misled to think that the Buddha was siding with the annihilationists, or better, perhaps, nihilists. If again, the Buddha had answered in the affirmative, he would have appeared to favor Vacchagotta's idea of the self as identified with the khandhas. This would have made impossible the arisal in Vacchagotta's mind of the knowledge that all those empirical factors are non-self, sabbe dhammâ anattâ. Finally, if the Buddha had answered in the negative, then, Vacchagotta's confusion, a result of his adherence to the sakkayaditthi, would have increased enormously. He would have thought, 'First I was sure I had a self, and now I have to think I have none'....All this shows that in this dialogue the reality of the true self is not brought into question, on the contrary, it is asserted as it constitutes the implicit solution to all the difficulties emanating form Vacchagotta's belief in the self of the skkayaditthi....If the teaching of the Buddha had as its central dogma the doctrine of absolute anattâ the only answer available to him would have been the negative one, n'atth'attâ (i.e., there is not a self)" (Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, 258).
Briefly taking up The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self, and the Problem of the Over-Self, I find that, in the main, that the author is shadow boxing or, better yet, making a straw-man. The straw-man lies in shifting the attâ position to that of sakkayaditthi, i.e., the view that the khandhas are attâ. If anything could be more clear, scholars like Joaquin Perez-Remon are saying the exact opposite, viz., the self is not any of the five khandhas! This, its seems, falls into middle-way thinking. The self is neither connected with the five khandhas nor is it naught.
I am preparing a hopefully short post critiquing the Karunadasa article on several points (as I have done with some other articles offered down the thread). Hopefully that will be forthcoming in the next couple of days. Bobby, you have touched on one of the points I wanted to address.
I mined this out of The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies which is a presigious Buddhist journal although I have nothing against ordinary quiet little journals that sit, unread, in the theology library.:) I was impressed with it. It cuts to the chase.
The Mahavagga (I. 2. 3) of the Vinayapitaka says that the supreme happiness is attainable by eliminating or driving out (vinayo) the concept or notion (mâna) “I am” (asmi): the ego, or ahamkâra. The Alagaddûpamasutta of the Majjhimanikâya (I. 22) (P.T. Society text, p. 139) says that a bhiksu is emancipated when he abandons (pahîno) the concept of ego (asmi mâno). The context leaves no room for doubt that in this sutta (text, p. 135) the Buddha is speaking of the individual self when he describes the six wrong views (ditthitthânâni) concerning rûpa, vedanâ, etc., thus: etam mama, eso’ham asmi, eso me attâ (“this is mine,” “I am this,” “this is my self.”) Thus the emphasis is on the ego or the individual self as distinct from the impersonal, universal self. This is further clear from the same sutta (text, p. 138): Attani vâ bhikkhave sati/attaniyam-m ti assâsati: “If there is recollection of a self, this is: ‘the self is myself.’” Notice that the emphasis is on the self of mine and not the self which could mean both the great, impersonal, universal self, the paramâtman, and the individual self, âtman or âtma. The Chachakka sutta of the Majjhimanikâya (III. 148) (text, p. 284) make it clear that the rise or origination of the individual self (sakkâyasamudaya) leads to consciousness of individuality: etam mam, eso ‘ham asmi, eso me attâ. It is reiterated in the same sutta that the absence of the sense of selfhood n’etam man, etc., suppresses the individual self (svskâyanirodhagâmini).
The Dhammapada draws a distinction between the great self and a self. Dhammapada 160 and 380 says that the self is the lord of the self (attâ hiattâno nâtho) and the self is the bourn of the self (âtta hi attâno gati). Dhammanadai]sic[/i 379 avers that the self stimulates and controls the self (attanâ codayattânam pativâse attamattanâ). What does not exist eternally is an individual self. As the Samyuttanikâya (III. 130) says, “There is nowhere to be found in the Khandhas, ‘I am.’” (The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 7 No. 2, 127–128).
For me, the above serves to caution us not to cling to the five khandhas by relying on them, for they are impermanent and fraught with potential suffering. On the same track, if I begin to define my self in terms of the five khandhas I am manifesting and objectifying a false sense of self. In proportion, the self which is distinct from the khandhas seems to be almost naught. I suffer, therefore, not because of self—I suffer because I thirst for the five khandhas, denying what transcends them.
Bobby: I believe the excerpt from the Buddhist journal you gave goes in the right direction, and I agree that the thirst for the aggregates are the reason for suffering. This can be easily verified by anyone by reading the 1st Noble Truth: "Now this, O monks, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, old age is suffering, death is suffering, sorrow, grieving, dejection, and despair are suffering. Contact with unpleasant things is suffering, not getting what you want is also suffering. In short, the five aggregates of grasping are suffering."
However,I want to note that the translation "the self is the lord of the self" is disputed by some, at least I read this. They would argue that atta here merely would mean oneself with no hint to a self or soul. I read the version "the self is the lord of the self" however in Radhakrishnan`S "Sourcebook in Indian philosophy". Here I found a site that deals with that sentence: http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/DBLM/olcourse/pali/reading/gatha160.htm
Nevertheless I have not enough knowledge to argue about what might be the most apropriate translation, I merely wanted to bring it to your attention.
Alas, I am finding that the length of my point-by-point discussion of Karunadasa's article is becoming overly long for posting to the forum, so I'm going to renege on my intention to post it. About every point he raises contains, to my way of thinking, some fundamental errors, which to discuss in detail on every point is becoming exhausting even for me--I am finding that given my writing style the response is at least as long as the article! I believe Bobby hinted at the gist of the source of many of the errors in his recent post about the article. I guess I will post the first two paragraphs with the intention of discussing it generally. If anybody would like to discuss any one of the points individually, we could get into them in that way.
To begin with, Karunadasa characterizes the dilemma at hand in a somewhat prejudicial way, offering the reader a false dilemma in the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. Fairly enough, he sets up on the one hand what he calls “the mainstream view,” describing it as the universal rejection of a permanent self-entity. Against this, however, he contrasts the interpretation of the “overself,” which he introduces as "Vedantic," interpreting Buddhism as systematically "Upanishadic," and as, curiously, a theory advancing the "transcendental unity" of all religions (this latter seems directed especially at CAF Rhys Davids; the now-familiar “she became a theosophist” accusation). The reader seems to be offered a choice, before discussion is even under way, between what is to be seen as orthodox Buddhism and what is overtly characterized as Hindu-oriented non-Buddhism, perhaps even Theosophy! The problem with this, especially in our own context here, I maintain, is that it is entirely possible to find fault with what is referred to here as the “mainstream view,” and arrive at an affirmation of Self as distinct from what is non-self within the Buddhist teaching without any reliance on the Vedas or the Upanishads whatsoever, with total faithfulness to the teachings of the Buddha in their discourse form as we have them, and especially without reliance on the premise that all religions are one--any characterization to the opposite is obviously prejudicial.
We move on to the substance of the lecture. Very early in the article, in the first sense of anatta which karunadasa discusses, we find a typical example of question-begging, which I find to be all too common, where the author states: “Since the constituents that make up the human personality are described as dependently arisen (paticcasamuppanna pancakkhandha), it follows that within it there is no self-enduring substance or a self-entity existing by its own power.” When we identify the premises of the argument, we find it to be circular, for among the premises that the khandhas are not-self and that they are dependently arisen, we discover the premise that the khandhas comprise the whole of the human personality, the positive way of saying that there is no self together with them. The argument could be restated: there is no self within the khandhas, therefore there is no self within the khandhas. What is at issue is basically whether the khandhas comprise the "self" (the human personality) entirely or whether there is an enduring self that may be man's refuge against the tides of the birth and death of the khandhas, and this issue cannot be settled by presumption.
It seems to me this problem plagues the rest of the article, where the predominant basis for the author's discussion seems to rest on the validity of this circularism. There are several other issues, but this is the primary one.
It is also worth noting that to bring up nitattha and neyyattha ("drawn out" and "to be drawn out") is only to highlight the interpretive dilemma at hand, rather than to convincingly argue that one's own interpretation is correct. The teaching on nitattha and neyyattha doesn't give us a passage-by-passage guide to which teachings are explicit and which are not; it is up to each to discern the explicit and implicit meaning, and obviously either side of this debate regarding atta and anatta is going to believe they have done so correctly.
I have nothing to add to your profound critique, Vaccha, except that I am getting tired of reading the phrase "constant state of flux", which the author of the text you address uses. As Nanavira Thera rightly pointed out, this is a disastrous oversimplification of Aniccata. If nothing is permament it does not follow everything is constantly changing all the time. It just will be changed when the conditions are there. If I am wrong, please show me a sutta where it is stated that everything is constantly fluxing. And when this is stated, you can neither agree or disagree with me, I am in flux and just changed my view.
fofoo, I dusted off my old xerox copies form Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's study of Samkaya because of your mention of Frauwallner with regard to the self.
There are several points here which I find engaging; which correspond with the khandhas as not being the self as they become more objective for us. (The contrary also holds true, that as khandhas become undistinguished, we tend to 'self them'.) Suffice it to say, there is a lot here to mine. There seems to be a connection between Samkhya and Buddhism which is not for historians to prove or disprove but is a matter for philosophy.
I agree that especially in Indian philosophy, this is an important approach, since the Indians are said to have "no sense for history". The idea that by pedantically write down events in chronological order offers any insight to ideas seems alien to indian culture, which unlike the west, never subscribed to a historicism as we know it from some of our philosophers and ideologues
Therefore, most of the academic research, at least initially,had been done by Europeans and Frauwallner is said to be the first one who tried an historic approach of ideas (Ideengeschichte), that is, a mixture between pedantic history writing and showing which ideas are successors of formers, regardless if they embrace or oposse them. I understand that he cannot be taken as the last word in that respect, but I trust his judgement more than anyone`s who has either religious or even political interests. To date, I think it is best that we treat every historic approach on that matter with caution, and rather concentrate on if different epistemological approaches can be justified within Buddhism without needing to know for sure where the ideas originated, or what they were a response to. I wonder if we will ever be able to get a true idea of the original teachings, since we all come from a certain epistemological position, many people seem not to be comfortable with the idea that Buddhism was a kind of Idealism from the beginning on.
A coda to this, one might argue there are subjects in Buddhism which are not entirely those of the founder. It has not gone unnonticed that the khandha theory itself may not be original but reflects the work of latter-day revisionists. According to Pande, Mrs. Rhy Davids has argued convincingly that it should not be regarded as early. In fact, the khandha theory he remarks "failed to appear in almost the whole of the Digha-Nikaya till the very end, in the first nine suttas of the Mijjhima-Nikaya, in the first three Samyuttas of the Samyutta-Nikayas" not to mention the entire Sutta-Nipata. In the Khandhasamyutta section of the Samyutta-Nikaya the discourses are not delivered by the Buddha but are in fact delivered by Sariputta and Mahakaccana!
Love ya'all,
Bobby
I have not done any reading on that matter but thanks for bringing it to my attention.
The rest of Bhattacharyya's analysis is quite heady. I have provided you with another quote to see what I mean by the term 'heady'!
Quote:
The essential character of the object—viz., its manifestness is understood to be at once a being and a process. The object, in fact, is known as getting manifested. To get manifested is for the object to be defined out of its own unmanifest condition, to be in this sense distinct from itself; and to get unmanifested is for this outward distinction to lapse or become retracted into itself. Either process is explicitly for the self and is intelligible only in reference to the self....The conscious evanescence of the manifestness of the object means a perception of its reality being independent of or distinct from the self and of the manifestness, therefore, having being conditioned by the non-distinction of the object from the self. Thus the manifesting process of the object, which is its defining from itself, implies its non-distinction from the self and the lapsing of this definition implies a distinguishing of the object from the self. The object defines itself when it does not distinguihs itself from the self and it gets undefined in character when it distinguishes itself as an existent from the self.
I think it is true that as soon as we start to talk of a self, we spererate or isolate a certain thing we label self from the rest. The same is true for every word, however, if I am not mistaken, as soon as we use a term for a preceived object, we cut off certain qualities of it. e.g. the term tree, if we use it to describe a fir, it is so inaccurate that noone has a certain idea how it looks like, without seeing of what we are talking about, the other easily could imagine we are talking about an oak. still if we use oak and fir, it is nothing said about how tall or small, of the oak has leaves or not and so on. still, we can go on and on and are exactly able do describe all qualities at a certain point for a certin object at a certain time at a certain position in space. We are not to ignore the linguisitc turn in Western philosophy that took place last century, and indeed many philosophical problems seem to oroginate from the improper use of language (not that i would be a master of it). Hence, all we describe are the representation of objects as the appear to us, putting them into our categories and build a reality on them, that is why we in contrast to other animals could advance, however, if we start to question our reality, we it might get shaked and wecould realize things arenot as we thought they were. In other words, since Kant we know that objects conform to our knowledge,rather that our knowledge conforms to the object that we know as such and such. To put with the word of a Zen Master whose name I forgot:"Words cannot express the highest truth, but if there were no words, how was it possible to hint to it at all?
In that context (and only in that context), the quote I recently found from another Zen Master in a Brevier makes sense to me:
"One and the same moon reflects in all waters
All moons in the water, are one with the one moon
The eye sees it, but no hand can grasp it
The moon in the water
That`s my schools`s secret"
Has anyone read digha nikaya 23 where the materialist`s view is debunked? If so, can anyone say what term is translated as soul from pali and if it is apropriate to do so? Obviously, the passage clearly suggests that the non-phenomenality of the soul is no indication for its non-existance, and to think such would be unjustified:
"Venerable Kumara, once a man was brought to me, a thief, caught in the act, and needing to be punished. When it came time to sentence him, I said, "Take this man and put him into a large pot, bound and gagged. Then, seal over the top of the pot with damp skin and then cover it with unheated clay. Then place the pot in an oven, and light a large fire." So they did. Once he was dead, the pot was removed and opened. Then, removing the gag, we looked to see if his spirit, his soul, his essence - would come out and finally escape. But it did not, there was no soul, no spirit, no essence. This is why I think there is no other world."
"Charming. Well, Prince, when you are taking a nap, or sleeping, do you admit to seeing other places? Ponds and beautiful forests, or perhaps castles in the clouds? Or perhaps deep caverns?"
"Something like that, but yes, I have dreams, Reverend Kumara."
"And are you not watched over and attended by servants and concubines?"
"Yes, I am."
"And have they ever seen your soul coming or going while you slept?"
"Erm… no."
"Well, prince, if they cannot see your soul while you are alive, how can you expect to see a man’s soul after he is dead."
"Whatever. I still hold firm that other worlds do not, nay, cannot exist."."
A brief synopsis: The Pāyāsi Sutta explores the arguments of Prince Payasi, who is said to deny after death states. The counter arguments directed to him are those of the Buddhist monk, Kumara Kassapa, who argues that even though Payasi found no sensory evidence of an after state such as a jiva or soul, his materialistic theory does not imply the falsity of the belief in after death states of being.
fofoo, the soul here is the jiva instead of attâ. In this Sutta, Kassapa is debating with Prince Payasi who is trying to empirically determine the jiva (soul) by performing a series of ghastly experiments. As we learn, materialists like Payasi are only satisfied by the evidence of the senses. The materialist argument is as follows: 'I do not know this, I do not see this; therefore (tasmā) it does not exist' (Aham etam na jānāmi, aham etam na passāmi, tasmā tam natthī ti). This would be countered with it is wrong to infer from 'I do not see X' that 'X does not exist'. In the Sutta, an example is given of a man born blind (jaccandho puriso) who can't see colors forms, the stars, etc. Prince Payasi, by Kassapa, is made to concede that such things exist even though a man who is blind from birth cannot see them.
One of the interesting questions is the extent to which jivan and attan may or may not be considered synonymous in the discourses of the Buddha. This becomes a key question when the familiar "imponderables" come into play, where the familiar "is the soul (jivan) one thing and the body another?" is so often cited as evidentiary to the Buddha's teaching on the self (attan).
On this point I must admit some degree of puzzlement. My first instinct is that the Buddha's discourses do not assume identity between the jivan and attan, though there is to my knowledge no definitive passage distinguishing the two. Maybe you could shed some light on it, Bobby?
In the Pali-English dictionary under attan, I found this:
Meanings. 1. The soul as postulated in the animistic theories held in N India in the 6th and 7th cent. B. C. It is described in the Upanishads as a small creature, in shape like a man, dwelling in ordinary times in the heart. It escapes from the body in sleep or trance; when it returns to the body life and motion reappear. It escapes from the body at death, then continues to carry on an everlasting life of its own. For numerous other details see Rh. D. Theory of Soul in the Upanishads J R A S 1899. Bt. India 251 -- 255. Buddhism repudiated all such theories, thus differing from other religions. Sixteen such theories about the soul D i.31. Seven other theories D i.34. Three others D i.186/7. A ʻ soul ʼ according to general belief was some thing permanent, unchangeable, not affected by sorrow S iv.54 = Kvu 67; Vin i.14; M i.138. See also M i.233; iii.265, 271; S ii.17, 109; iii.135; A i.284; ii.164, 171; v.188; S iv.400. Cp. ātuman, tuma, puggala, jīva, satta, pāṇa and nāma -- rūpa.
It is suggested that jiva is to be compared with Attan. Now, What I find important to mention is the claim that Buddhism repudiated all such theories. I find it important to mention it repudiated the theories, not the possibility of a jiva, as dn 23 suggest, and I consider that by no means nit picking.
From that sutta, we get a an impression how subtle the notion of not-self or not-the-soul in early Buddhism was. If we were to say that Buddhism denied outright a soul from the beginning on, the sutta would make no sense and monk Kumara Kassapa would have sided with the great experimenter Prince Payasi.
I find it odd, at least from the pov of contemporary Buddhism which supports anatta, that Kumara Kassapa seems to be on the side of the jivam (soul) in this one. The stance, at least for Kumara Kassapa, is that the jivam cannot be perceived by the senses. The Prince, on the other hand, wants to deny the jivam, completely, since he cannot see it after trying his ghastly experiement.
I think that if one were to read DN 23 very carefully, one would see that Kumara Kassapa only refuted the corrupted views of Prince Payasi—namely the views that there was no world other than this, no fruit of actions, and no rebirth. Kumara Kassapa used the concept of a soul in order to illustrate his points due to the Prince's own reasoning for holding such wrong views.
The Prince had a thief put into a large pot, and had him boiled alive until he was dead. When the Prince removed the lid to see if any soul or spirit tried to escape, he saw that there was none so he concluded that there was no other world. Kumara Kassapa merely used the Prince's own words against him in order to illustrate the absurd nature of his conclusions—nothing more.
I think that if one were to read DN 23 very carefully, one would see that Kumara Kassapa only refuted the corrupted views of Prince Payasi—namely the views that there was no world other than this, no fruit of actions, and no rebirth. Kumara Kassapa used the concept of a soul in order to illustrate his points due to the Prince's own reasoning for holding such wrong views.
The Prince had a thief put into a large pot, and had him boiled alive until he was dead. When the Prince removed the lid to see if any soul or spirit tried to escape, he saw that there was none so he concluded that there was no other world. Kumara Kassapa merely used the Prince's own words against him in order to illustrate the absurd nature of his conclusions—nothing more.
Sincerely,
Jason
Granted, on the other side it is also true that exactly the view that the jiva is a seperate physical entity than the body is refuted. Nowhere is the conclusion held as correct by the monk that, if one cannot see the jiva coming out of one`s body, wether it`s after death or in sleep, it does not exist at all. The sutta is in line with anyone refusing to accept the non-existance of a jiva on empirical grounds.
Comments
Lokayatika Sutta
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.048.than.html
my commentary on the sutta ( I translated it on the fly) says:
"The expression lokāyata, which I translate as “sophism” can be compared with Rhys David, Dialogues 1.166ff., R.O. Franke, Dīgha trans. 19, note 3.) What`s meant by it is a school of philosophers, who concerned themselves particularly with nature-historical questions. The examples of the things treated by them are shown in the comments of Dīgha-Nikāya 1. 1. 25 (= I.11 (see. Sumangalavilāsinī OD. Rhys David and Carpenter 1. 90-91). For philosophers who tend to discuss metaphysical problems, the term lokāyata carries also the notion of materialism and triviality.
From the mentioned examples (“the crow is wise because its bones are white; the Crane is red, because its blood is red”) comes out however that at the same time that one makes the accusation that the lokāyatika tended to arrive at their resuls trhu the way of diaectics, not thru logical conclusion. They considered it as their duty to prove everything, even the most absurd. In addition, it is correct that the comment called in our Sutta (II 96,12) those are the people, which are familiar with vitandasattha, meaning the ones equipped with the art of dialectics that results in illusory reasons and fallacies."
Further the 5 of the 20 heresys in personality (sakkāya-ditthi) are denounced as materialst, namely the ones that proclaim annihliation of a self with death (uccheda-ditthi)
After rereading your post Jason, I can understand your arguments better. Indeed volition plays a key role in the Buddhas teachings,I apologize i did not realize the similarity of the terms vilotion and intention.
Having said that, I think we should recall that kamma,or more precisly Sankhāra, is the place to start. While not having examined the pali terms, the first verse of the dhammapada says
Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox.
Mind is the forerunner of (all good) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, AFFECTION follows one, even as one's shadow that never leaves.
If we look at Pratitya-samutpada, Kamma formations (Sankhāra) are the first product. And what are they a result of? Ignorance. I am not a scholar and maybe my suggestion is wrong, but if i was to chose, i would have forumalted "kamma-formations" are the forerunner...", i hold that to be more precise. Or to be even more precise, "kusala- and akusala-cetanā shaping mano-kamma are the forerunners...". (which are followed by vacī-kamma & kāya-kamma )
The confusion imo comes now, when the conclusion is made that all kamma-formations are products of ignorance. But this does not deny imo that there are good ones, and bad ones (ones that root in greed, hatred and delusion and the opposites). It (endingof kamma) is maybe more sublte than I can currently grasp.
I agree that as long as we are not able to grasp nibbana, the kandhas can be rightly viewed at as tools that both can do harm and good, as the article you gave suggests. What makes them either a tool of mara or a tool of liberation is our will, intention, volition, kamma.
Nevertheless I can not think of any justification of taking refuge in them.
Regards.
I must apologize, but I am unable to keep up with your posts because they are all over the place. They jump from topic to topic, and not only that, they are full of assumptions that I just do not have the time to straighten out.
Nevertheless, just to give you and example of what I mean, I have never said that the khandhas are a refuge in and of themselves nor have I presented an argument for anything of the sort. I simply offered my personal view that the process of release is only possible due to the five khandhas themselves, which was then supported by various sutta references.
Beyond that one point, you are implying an entire argument that is simply not there. That is why I made the statement that things would be clearer if the posts as well as the references were read a bit more thoroughly.
Regards,
Jason
I never said you explcitly said one should take kandhas as a refuge. I say it follows if one rules out a transcendental self, since it must refer to the kandhas then. It does so by logic. No transcendental self, all self references must refer to the aggregates, I am not sure why someone would dispute that, if I am wrong, you maybe can explain me why.
If you were not directing your post towards me, then might I make a suggestion that you take the time to explicitly mention exactly who or what you are referencing in your posts because you begin post #453 with a quote from me, then move on to say that you understand my arguments better (whatever they may be), and then you conclude by saying that you still can not think of any justification for taking refuge in the khandhas.
Regardless if the topics are interrelated, you can still direct certain points to one or more of the parties involved so that those directly referenced are able to respond in an efficient manner. As for the rest of your question, I have long since taken myself out of the self versus no self debate, and I am only engaging those topics that I feel are directly beneficial to the practice itself. I consider the rest to fall under inappropriate attention.
Regards,
Jason
Regards
It is hard to imagine that Gotama the Buddha taught that we have no choice but to accept that we are the five khandhas from which there is no escape. In light of this, was Gotama teaching a new species of annihilationism? It doesn't seem likely.
Returning to the idea of self as referent, the following passage seems very supportive. I can't imagine it is saying that we should accept the five khandhas as the "noble Witness" or our "master". Forgive me if I am wrong.
There is one more troubling aspect of Anattavada (the theory of no-self) I would like to touch on. While it may seem trivial to the learned among us, the question begs to be asked: "Who or what takes refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha?" Surely there is a refugee. If not, why even propose the triple refuge? On the same track, perhaps more importantly, who or what crosses the flood of samsara to reach the safe island of nirvana? Is there only a raft which crosses? It is almost laughable to imagine such.
Love ya'll
Bobby
According to the numbering, it should correlate to this section of the Anguttara Nikaya: Nãvaraõappahàõavaggo
If not, it would have to be in the previous one, Cittapariyàdànavaggo
If anyone could help, find where this passage comes from, that would be great. As far as I'm concerned, the Horner translations seems quite strange in it's style & wording.
thanks
_/\_
metta
Thus the passage that Bobby cited falls into the Book of the threes (Tika nipata), fourth chapter (Devaduta Vaggo), tenth and final sutta (10. Aadhipatteyyasuttaü Ý Authorities). Accesstoinsight doesn't have it, but the translation at metta.lk affords a somewhat different though clearly recognizable version:
http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/4Anguttara-Nikaya/Anguttara1/3-tikanipata/004-devadutavaggo-e.html
And the Pali,
http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/4Anguttara-Nikaya/Anguttara1/3-tikanipata/004-devadutavaggo-p.html
Hope that helps you now and in the future!
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. Incidentally, most of the passages at the former www.attan.com were cited in this fashion, leading people unfamiliar with the system to embarrassingly to themselves, accuse him of just making up passages, which of course, disputed translations notwithstanding, he was not. I looked every one of them up.
p.p.s I forgot to thank Bobby for providing the additional affirmative example of self as authority/referent.
Again the context of this passage is in regard to a 'referent'. In the same section, "self-independece" (= PTS Pali-English Dic. attâdhipteyya) at A.i.147 is discussed by the Buddha.
In reading this section I see no case for the theory of no-self or Anattavada. Whether or not we meditate or live the pure life, we do so from the referent who transcends the five khandhas.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
The construction visual of verse was a bit akward, so I put it in a prose format like the other 2 passages. So, I'd like to put all 3 here in this post for people to cross-reference.
Here's the I.B. Horner one:
And finally, the one Vaccha posted from here, by Sister Upalavanna & A.D.Jayasundere.
_/\_
metta
not1not2: just a technicallity: Sister Upalavanna is presumably the only translator of the text vaccha posted (from metta.lk), A.D.Jayasundere`s translations are those when you click on (2). I am not sure if that changes anything, it just came to my attention when browsing the page of The great western vehicle while searching for additional translations, on metta.lk, it`s not that clear but I conclude that they have the same concept A.D.Jayasundere`s translations are solely found under (2)
Regards
in friendliness,
V.
»In aller Welt gibt's kein Versteck
für den, der böse Tat verübt.
Dein Selbst sieht es, o Menschenkind,
was Wahrheit und was Lüge ist.
Ja, ein guter Zeuge ist es!"
There is no place to hide in the whole world
for him who does evil deeds.
Your Self sees it, o (child of an) human
what is truth and what is lie
Yes, a good witness it is!
http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/4Anguttara-Nikaya/Anguttara1/3-tikanipata/004-devadutavaggo-e.html
http://www.sunderland.ac.uk/~os0dwe/bs12.html
I haven't really looked through them yet, so I don't quite understand the systems & how to cross-reference. Still, now I know there are resources. I just have to study them.
_/\_
metta
I currently read Erich Frauwallners "History of Indian Philosophy"(German edition, so I cannot provide you exact page numbers.
When turnning to the second volume, Chapter on materialism, there is a sutta mentioned that deals explcitly with a king that has a materialisitc world view. According to Frauwallner, both the Jains and the Buddhist have this sutta in common. For the Jains, it is the second Uvangam, the Rayapasenaijjam, the Buddhist text being Payasi Sutta (Digha Nikàya 23), the former one is believed to be the more original according to Frauwallner`s footnote. I did not find it on access2insight and on metta.lk, German version is available on palikanon.com, an english version can be found here: http://www.buddhistinformation.com/payasi_sutta.htm
forgive me if i distract again from the core topic, but I thought it might be useful to all of you who want an impression what materialism meant at the time of the early buddhists and the jainas, I hope it is useful for all of you.
Regards
Since everyone else is offering links and references that touch upon various aspects related to this topic, I am curious as to whether anyone has come across the works of Y. Karunadasa such as The Moral Life: Both as a Means and an End, The Buddhist Critique of Sassatavada and Ucchedavada, The Buddhist Doctrine of Anicca (Impermanence), The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self, and the Problem of the Over-Self, and Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma; and if so, what did you think about them?
Curiously,
Jason
It goes to the heart of what is to be regarded as the proper frame of reference for those of us who wish to end our suffering; wanting to detach from what is impermanent, suffering and not the self (anattâ). It may be the case that we are tossing out the baby while keeping the bath water with regard to the five khandhas which ordinary people believe to be the self or referent.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
He even goes so far to suggest that the soul or self in Buddha`s view is the same as in Samkhya, that, according to him, is the passive observer, and the Buddha`s radically pragmatic way prevented him from both specuating about it as well as totally denying it, but rather divert the attention to an easily practicable way of self liberation . Indeed, concerning the Self as a passive observer, the quote we found lately in Anguttara-Nikaya (Devadåta vaggo) is a maybe rather lonely but a defenetive affirmation of exactly that assupmtion. The (true) Self, the noble witness, the unbiased judge.
Regards
thanks
_/\_
metta
1.)(Thanissaro Bhikkhu)
Your own self knows, my good man,whether you are true or false.
2.)(I.B. Horner)
“The self (in thee), man, knows what is true or false.
Surely the noble Witness, sir, the Self,
3.)(Sister Upalavanna)
There is no secrecy in the world, for one doing evil, you know the truth.
Friend, the good is the eyewitness, the self is slight,
4.)(Nyanatiloka Mahathera, translated by me from German to English)
Your Self sees it, o (child of an) human
what is truth and what is lie
Yes, a good witness it is!
thanks
_/\_
Thanks for the links, Jason. I believe I have read The Moral Life some time ago, but not yet read any of the other articles you posted. Thanks for contributing. If you wish to discuss any of these articles, we can take a look at them. I look forward to studying, in particular, the Buddhist Doctrine of Anicca, and The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-self, and the Problem of the Over-Self, to see what the author may substantially offer to this dialogue.
in friendliness,
V.
Anyway, like I said, I imagine this won't be entirely convincing, but it does bring up strong analysis.
_/\_
metta
Clearly this is a very long-standing debate within Buddhism and this I found particularly illuminating. For some reason, probably arising from Euro-centric, imperialist arrogance, I had assumed that the debate about "Overself" or "Soul" or whatever name we care to give it had arsien from the interface with the monotheisms and that, recently. Whatever was the actual form of Vedantic belief in 6th century northern India, the notion of atta was clearly an issue.
I found this comment interesting: Are we are only replaying and rehearsing old debates? Or have we, from new contexts and cultures contribute anything new to the old, tired arguments?
Arrogance again suggest that we have, and the clue lies in the same article. Reference is made, almost casually, to a perennial philosophy, to those who practise eclecticism. Light can be shed on the debate from a new direction. This is a process for which Buddhism has always been in training, as it were, moving into diverse culrural contexts and, like a benign virus, adapting and indigenising. To use a metaphor from the old British Empire, Buddhism 'goes native' wherever it goes.
And history seems to suggest that Buddhism will address the deepest questions troubling the culture into which it arrives. We may regret that we have no King Trisong Deutsen to send for a Padma Sambhava but that is the state we are in. It is up to us and to the teachers we can find to find out what, precisely, it is that is so deeply troubling our culture. At present, it appears to me that the nature of consciousness, the notion of a self, an Over-Self, whatever, is pretty much at the heart of our malaise. How can we, from a Buddhist standpoint, address the systematic commodification of human beings, of turning the workforce into 'human resources'? The Christian concept of the immortal soul, as per their definition, is no longer enough to attract automatic reverence. What does the Buddhist say about the question that is asked, over and over: who am I?
Simply to answer, "there is no I" denies the instinctive, if inchoate, experience of many, if not most, people. The Buddha, as quoted, gave us a different example of reaction in the Khemaka Sutta of the Samyuttanikaya: he said nothing. I am reminded of the reaction of Jesus to Pilate's question about truth. The fact that the teacher does not answer cannot, I suggest, be taken to mean that there is no answer. It may, and probably is, that the question is not the right one. And, indeed, that the answer challenges human-to-human communication skills, not mention traditional logic, to breaking point.
**********************
"Hence one who had attained Nibbana is called ohita-bhara, i.e. one who had laid down the burden. The fact that there is a reference here to a burden as well as to its bearer has given rise to the speculation that there is a person or a self-entity besides the five aggregates."
*****************************
The rest of Bhattacharyya's analysis is quite heady. I have provided you with another quote to see what I mean by the term 'heady'!
And if your grey matter hasn't exploded here is still another quote.
There are several points here which I find engaging; which correspond with the khandhas as not being the self as they become more objective for us. (The contrary also holds true, that as khandhas become undistinguished, we tend to 'self them'.) Suffice it to say, there is a lot here to mine. There seems to be a connection between Samkhya and Buddhism which is not for historians to prove or disprove but is a matter for philosophy.
A coda to this, one might argue there are subjects in Buddhism which are not entirely those of the founder. It has not gone unnonticed that the khandha theory itself may not be original but reflects the work of latter-day revisionists. According to Pande, Mrs. Rhy Davids has argued convincingly that it should not be regarded as early. In fact, the khandha theory he remarks "failed to appear in almost the whole of the Digha-Nikaya till the very end, in the first nine suttas of the Mijjhima-Nikaya, in the first three Samyuttas of the Samyutta-Nikayas" not to mention the entire Sutta-Nipata. In the Khandhasamyutta section of the Samyutta-Nikaya the discourses are not delivered by the Buddha but are in fact delivered by Sariputta and Mahakaccana!
Love ya'all,
Bobby
_/\_
metta
I am not sure if it is entirely correct to say that the Buddha said absolutely nothing in response to the question, "Who am I?" In the Pali Canon, the evidence suggests that he said "Who am I?" was a question not worth asking, that it fell under what he termed ayoniso manasikara (inappropriate attention), and that it ultimately lead to "a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion, a writhing, a fetter of views" (MN 2).
Nevertheless, as you have said, it is not the right question. From what I understand, the right question to begin with is, "What when I do it will be for my long-term welfare and happiness?" which will eventual lead one to the subjects of yoniso manasikara (appropriate attention) such as, "This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress..."
Regards,
Jason
Concerning if the question "Is there a self?" should be set aside or not, I think it is safe to say that the Buddha gave not much attention to it, refrained from too much theory, when prompted for a yes or no remained silent and rather was into showing actually how to remove suffering pragmatically.
Nevertheless this is an open discussion of anatta, some of his disciples always have philosophised and I guess always will, and everyone is free to pay no attention at all to the debate and rather can resort to secterian doctrines or even private beliefs.
regards
........and what could more accurately and pointedly address the pain inherent in a market-economy culture?
regards
For me, the former implies the latter. They are recursive and any teaching that aspires to be timeless must also address the pain of the individual condemned to action.
Regards
Briefly taking up The Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self, and the Problem of the Over-Self, I find that, in the main, that the author is shadow boxing or, better yet, making a straw-man. The straw-man lies in shifting the attâ position to that of sakkayaditthi, i.e., the view that the khandhas are attâ. If anything could be more clear, scholars like Joaquin Perez-Remon are saying the exact opposite, viz., the self is not any of the five khandhas! This, its seems, falls into middle-way thinking. The self is neither connected with the five khandhas nor is it naught.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
in friendliness,
V.
For me, the above serves to caution us not to cling to the five khandhas by relying on them, for they are impermanent and fraught with potential suffering. On the same track, if I begin to define my self in terms of the five khandhas I am manifesting and objectifying a false sense of self. In proportion, the self which is distinct from the khandhas seems to be almost naught. I suffer, therefore, not because of self—I suffer because I thirst for the five khandhas, denying what transcends them.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
However,I want to note that the translation "the self is the lord of the self" is disputed by some, at least I read this. They would argue that atta here merely would mean oneself with no hint to a self or soul. I read the version "the self is the lord of the self" however in Radhakrishnan`S "Sourcebook in Indian philosophy". Here I found a site that deals with that sentence: http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/DBLM/olcourse/pali/reading/gatha160.htm
Nevertheless I have not enough knowledge to argue about what might be the most apropriate translation, I merely wanted to bring it to your attention.
Regards
To begin with, Karunadasa characterizes the dilemma at hand in a somewhat prejudicial way, offering the reader a false dilemma in the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. Fairly enough, he sets up on the one hand what he calls “the mainstream view,” describing it as the universal rejection of a permanent self-entity. Against this, however, he contrasts the interpretation of the “overself,” which he introduces as "Vedantic," interpreting Buddhism as systematically "Upanishadic," and as, curiously, a theory advancing the "transcendental unity" of all religions (this latter seems directed especially at CAF Rhys Davids; the now-familiar “she became a theosophist” accusation). The reader seems to be offered a choice, before discussion is even under way, between what is to be seen as orthodox Buddhism and what is overtly characterized as Hindu-oriented non-Buddhism, perhaps even Theosophy! The problem with this, especially in our own context here, I maintain, is that it is entirely possible to find fault with what is referred to here as the “mainstream view,” and arrive at an affirmation of Self as distinct from what is non-self within the Buddhist teaching without any reliance on the Vedas or the Upanishads whatsoever, with total faithfulness to the teachings of the Buddha in their discourse form as we have them, and especially without reliance on the premise that all religions are one--any characterization to the opposite is obviously prejudicial.
We move on to the substance of the lecture. Very early in the article, in the first sense of anatta which karunadasa discusses, we find a typical example of question-begging, which I find to be all too common, where the author states: “Since the constituents that make up the human personality are described as dependently arisen (paticcasamuppanna pancakkhandha), it follows that within it there is no self-enduring substance or a self-entity existing by its own power.” When we identify the premises of the argument, we find it to be circular, for among the premises that the khandhas are not-self and that they are dependently arisen, we discover the premise that the khandhas comprise the whole of the human personality, the positive way of saying that there is no self together with them. The argument could be restated: there is no self within the khandhas, therefore there is no self within the khandhas. What is at issue is basically whether the khandhas comprise the "self" (the human personality) entirely or whether there is an enduring self that may be man's refuge against the tides of the birth and death of the khandhas, and this issue cannot be settled by presumption.
It seems to me this problem plagues the rest of the article, where the predominant basis for the author's discussion seems to rest on the validity of this circularism. There are several other issues, but this is the primary one.
It is also worth noting that to bring up nitattha and neyyattha ("drawn out" and "to be drawn out") is only to highlight the interpretive dilemma at hand, rather than to convincingly argue that one's own interpretation is correct. The teaching on nitattha and neyyattha doesn't give us a passage-by-passage guide to which teachings are explicit and which are not; it is up to each to discern the explicit and implicit meaning, and obviously either side of this debate regarding atta and anatta is going to believe they have done so correctly.
in friendliness,
V.
Regards.
I agree that especially in Indian philosophy, this is an important approach, since the Indians are said to have "no sense for history". The idea that by pedantically write down events in chronological order offers any insight to ideas seems alien to indian culture, which unlike the west, never subscribed to a historicism as we know it from some of our philosophers and ideologues
Therefore, most of the academic research, at least initially,had been done by Europeans and Frauwallner is said to be the first one who tried an historic approach of ideas (Ideengeschichte), that is, a mixture between pedantic history writing and showing which ideas are successors of formers, regardless if they embrace or oposse them. I understand that he cannot be taken as the last word in that respect, but I trust his judgement more than anyone`s who has either religious or even political interests. To date, I think it is best that we treat every historic approach on that matter with caution, and rather concentrate on if different epistemological approaches can be justified within Buddhism without needing to know for sure where the ideas originated, or what they were a response to. I wonder if we will ever be able to get a true idea of the original teachings, since we all come from a certain epistemological position, many people seem not to be comfortable with the idea that Buddhism was a kind of Idealism from the beginning on.
I have not done any reading on that matter but thanks for bringing it to my attention.
Regards
In that context (and only in that context), the quote I recently found from another Zen Master in a Brevier makes sense to me:
"One and the same moon reflects in all waters
All moons in the water, are one with the one moon
The eye sees it, but no hand can grasp it
The moon in the water
That`s my schools`s secret"
Don`tworry, it`s just some grey matter,not my self
Regards
Has anyone read digha nikaya 23 where the materialist`s view is debunked? If so, can anyone say what term is translated as soul from pali and if it is apropriate to do so? Obviously, the passage clearly suggests that the non-phenomenality of the soul is no indication for its non-existance, and to think such would be unjustified:
"Venerable Kumara, once a man was brought to me, a thief, caught in the act, and needing to be punished. When it came time to sentence him, I said, "Take this man and put him into a large pot, bound and gagged. Then, seal over the top of the pot with damp skin and then cover it with unheated clay. Then place the pot in an oven, and light a large fire." So they did. Once he was dead, the pot was removed and opened. Then, removing the gag, we looked to see if his spirit, his soul, his essence - would come out and finally escape. But it did not, there was no soul, no spirit, no essence. This is why I think there is no other world."
"Charming. Well, Prince, when you are taking a nap, or sleeping, do you admit to seeing other places? Ponds and beautiful forests, or perhaps castles in the clouds? Or perhaps deep caverns?"
"Something like that, but yes, I have dreams, Reverend Kumara."
"And are you not watched over and attended by servants and concubines?"
"Yes, I am."
"And have they ever seen your soul coming or going while you slept?"
"Erm… no."
"Well, prince, if they cannot see your soul while you are alive, how can you expect to see a man’s soul after he is dead."
"Whatever. I still hold firm that other worlds do not, nay, cannot exist."."
Regards
fofoo, the soul here is the jiva instead of attâ. In this Sutta, Kassapa is debating with Prince Payasi who is trying to empirically determine the jiva (soul) by performing a series of ghastly experiments. As we learn, materialists like Payasi are only satisfied by the evidence of the senses. The materialist argument is as follows: 'I do not know this, I do not see this; therefore (tasmā) it does not exist' (Aham etam na jānāmi, aham etam na passāmi, tasmā tam natthī ti). This would be countered with it is wrong to infer from 'I do not see X' that 'X does not exist'. In the Sutta, an example is given of a man born blind (jaccandho puriso) who can't see colors forms, the stars, etc. Prince Payasi, by Kassapa, is made to concede that such things exist even though a man who is blind from birth cannot see them.
Love ya'll
Bobby
On this point I must admit some degree of puzzlement. My first instinct is that the Buddha's discourses do not assume identity between the jivan and attan, though there is to my knowledge no definitive passage distinguishing the two. Maybe you could shed some light on it, Bobby?
In the Pali-English dictionary under attan, I found this:
Meanings. 1. The soul as postulated in the animistic theories held in N India in the 6th and 7th cent. B. C. It is described in the Upanishads as a small creature, in shape like a man, dwelling in ordinary times in the heart. It escapes from the body in sleep or trance; when it returns to the body life and motion reappear. It escapes from the body at death, then continues to carry on an everlasting life of its own. For numerous other details see Rh. D. Theory of Soul in the Upanishads J R A S 1899. Bt. India 251 -- 255. Buddhism repudiated all such theories, thus differing from other religions. Sixteen such theories about the soul D i.31. Seven other theories D i.34. Three others D i.186/7. A ʻ soul ʼ according to general belief was some thing permanent, unchangeable, not affected by sorrow S iv.54 = Kvu 67; Vin i.14; M i.138. See also M i.233; iii.265, 271; S ii.17, 109; iii.135; A i.284; ii.164, 171; v.188; S iv.400. Cp. ātuman, tuma, puggala, jīva, satta, pāṇa and nāma -- rūpa.
It is suggested that jiva is to be compared with Attan. Now, What I find important to mention is the claim that Buddhism repudiated all such theories. I find it important to mention it repudiated the theories, not the possibility of a jiva, as dn 23 suggest, and I consider that by no means nit picking.
From that sutta, we get a an impression how subtle the notion of not-self or not-the-soul in early Buddhism was. If we were to say that Buddhism denied outright a soul from the beginning on, the sutta would make no sense and monk Kumara Kassapa would have sided with the great experimenter Prince Payasi.
Regards
Love ya'll,
Bobby
_/\_
metta
I think that if one were to read DN 23 very carefully, one would see that Kumara Kassapa only refuted the corrupted views of Prince Payasi—namely the views that there was no world other than this, no fruit of actions, and no rebirth. Kumara Kassapa used the concept of a soul in order to illustrate his points due to the Prince's own reasoning for holding such wrong views.
The Prince had a thief put into a large pot, and had him boiled alive until he was dead. When the Prince removed the lid to see if any soul or spirit tried to escape, he saw that there was none so he concluded that there was no other world. Kumara Kassapa merely used the Prince's own words against him in order to illustrate the absurd nature of his conclusions—nothing more.
Sincerely,
Jason
Granted, on the other side it is also true that exactly the view that the jiva is a seperate physical entity than the body is refuted. Nowhere is the conclusion held as correct by the monk that, if one cannot see the jiva coming out of one`s body, wether it`s after death or in sleep, it does not exist at all. The sutta is in line with anyone refusing to accept the non-existance of a jiva on empirical grounds.
Regards.