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Of course, let's not forget that the Buddha rejects any feeling of "I am" as a conditioned, impermanent construction. And the feeling of "I am" is different than the realization of luminous mind. Also, I'm really not sure what Vedanta or Samkhya texts/philosophy have to do
with the buddhas teaching on anatta.
As a side note, on several occasions I have managed to maintain mindfulness while falling asleep, and have experience what looks/feels like a luminous flash which comes with a state of wakefulness. However, it was still a perception, and was impermanent. So I'm not sure whether there is any correspondence between this experience & what is being discussed right now.
Jason, I find the first note to be troubling. In addition, the conclusion seems awkward if not forced and unwarranted. Also I sense in the reasoning the fallacy of equivocation, that citta for a puthujjana is the same citta of an ariyasavaka or the Tathagata/Buddha. If this implication is true, it is patently false.
It is my impression that the author of the note, if he would permit himself to speak his mind boldly, is saying, in essence, that citta, defiled or luminous, is still finite. At the least he seems hesitant to acknowledge that citta or mind becomes transcendent when it is purified. The following passage is taken from the Samyukta-agama which, I think, clarifies the context of the mind in it transcendent form.
As to the Tathagata, his form is (Skt. releasednirvrta), his mind is well liberated (Skt. su-vimukta-citta). ‘He exists after death’ does not apply (Pali, na upeti) [and the three other positions]. As to the Tathagata, his form is released (Skt. nirvrta), his mind is well liberated (su-vimukta-citta). He is deep, great, not subject to determination, unreckonable, released (Skt. variant: a-prameyam a-sankhyeyam nirvrtam)” (SA,
905, 226b).
Also, in the Brahmayu Sutta of the Mijjhima-Nikaya (ii.144) it seems clear enough that a Buddha is one "who knows his mind is quite pure, freed from every attachment...who is master of all states of mind."
With regard to citta which is immaculate, others tend to agree that the mind when purified of its adventitious defilements attains liberation.
Of course, let's not forget that the Buddha rejects any feeling of "I am" as a conditioned, impermanent construction. And the feeling of "I am" is different than the realization of luminous mind. Also, I'm really not sure what Vedanta or Samkhya texts/philosophy have to do
with the buddhas teaching on anatta.
_/\_
metta
Simple: We were discussing Frauwallners assesment of anatta in early Buddhism. Frauwallner insists Buddha started form samkyha position and did not break with it totally, as there the self is transcendent, the ontological status of self then would be not "non existent" but "not a phenomena".
As a side note, on several occasions I have managed to maintain mindfulness while falling asleep, and have experience what looks/feels like a luminous flash which comes with a state of wakefulness. However, it was still a perception, and was impermanent. So I'm not sure whether there is any correspondence between this experience & what is being discussed right now.
_/\_
metta
That is an interesting sidenote I would say:) I managed to relize how I fell a sleep several times. It is like you realize that you will fall sleep now, fully aware of it. Of course this realizitation is not permament. You will sleep at some point simply. The interesting question is if that can be called a temporary insight or glimpse into something eternal, wether one calls it stream of conciuosness or illuminous mind. We all should not forget that introspection played abig role alwaysin indian religion and people tried to deduce universal principles from what they observerd on themselves.
Another interesting sidenote: I once dreamed I fell down the stairs. Now the funny thing: I was struggling with my feet but I was fully aware that I was only dreaming. I could not stop struggling until I fully woke up, although I realized it is only a dream while doing it. It lastest for a few seconds until I fully realized what was going on.
With regard to citta which is immaculate, others tend to agree that the mind when purified of its adventitious defilements attains liberation.
Bobby,
I agree with you that the mind, when purified of its defilements, attains liberation. That is, of course, the very definition of Nibbana—"Extinction of greed, extinction of hate, extinction of delusion: this is called Nibbāna" (S. XXXVIII. 1).
As for your assessment of the liberated mind, I have a feeling that this might take us even further off of the beaten path. This might be an entire topic in itself — worthy of its own thread — if anyone else is interested in pursuing it further.
Currently, this thread on anatta has become a hodge-podge of various doctrinal conversations, albeit interrelated one, and there is no reason that we cannot branch off separate discussions in order to focus on particular points of interest.
That's actually what happened in a nearby sycamore the other night when I read replies, hawks and owls feasting as squirels make ready for winter's onset.
ah, i was projecting :banghead:
I hope you could sleep well nevertheless. I will do that now. :doh:
I have never found any clinching evidence to the assertion that anatta was such a response. I have seen a few Buddhists make this claim, that is about all. Anatta, if anything reflective of the Buddha's genius, was a response to the belief that man is made up of skandha (which in the Jain religion meant moleculues). The Buddha named five holding aggregates or skandhas which people believed to be the attâ or the self. He corrected this view by saying the five skandhas are not the attâ which in Pali is anattâ. However, not all agreed. Eternalists contended that one or more of the five skandhas are the attâ and the rest are the loka or world. Annihilationists contended that the self is just a proxy for the aggregates that when they dissolve so does the self. The Buddha, of course, rejected both theories outright.
I must admit it was a poor shaman's attemt at hiaku. it usually sets in this time of year for me. If formatted properly it would have read:
bare branches of an autum harvest moon
owls' hoot and coo rustling the still night sky
dogs respond in protest
ah, first i was projecting, now I have bad taste too. Whats next?
regarding the other post, i think we agree at some level, mind( reasoning mind), is tool, not purpose. can be used or abused, labels applied to help or destroy, to pursue samsara or help ending suffering. I do think we just use other words for similar thoughts. We could open a new thread if you like, on compassion for instance. for me, true compassion is feeling what the other feels, what drives him, what does he need, fear love and so on. the insight to help him must come from your heart, recognizing yourself in him, destroying the concept of khandic individuality illusion.:)
ps: still this is just my view of compassion currently, i want to add.
See Allen Watts' extensive commentaries, as well as Krishnamurti. That'll keep you busy for a couple years. LOL.
Best Wishes
Do you think that J. Krishnamurti's protean term, "choiceless awareness", merely shifts the problematic of 'self' (attâ/atma) to that of a more immediate, undeveloped subject?
Choiceless awareness allows that I accept what is as it is presented, I don't need to choose anything, asumptions, no judgements, definitions, or comparissons.
This, I think, describes a mirror beautifully. The mirror has no choice; whatever we decide to place in front of it, it reflects (with the exception of tempretature). In this dipiciton, the self is limited to being passive. This reminds me somewhat of Locke's soul which was a contentless tabula rasa; which over time was filled with experiences. The problem with this, is one free who is a mirror or a being like Locke's tabula rasa? In fact, one may not be human at all who simply receives sensory data in a passive way. I must say this goes against the Buddha notion of attakara meaning self-agency or self-making.
Against the idea of passivity, in the Attakara Sutta in the book of sixes of the Anguttara-Nikaya (III, 337-8), the Buddha is in a discussion with a Brahman who is of the view that there is no 'self-agency' (attâkâra) or 'other agency' (parakara). To this view the Buddha said: "How could someone by himself approaching and receding say, `Nothing is done by the self, nothing is done by others." In other words, the Buddha denied the Brahman's view.
I can see a bit where UGs anger against J comes from. Not that I would be an UG fan (I admit that I find him sympathic, but I would not recommend him to anyone as guru except people who suffer Post Traumatic New Age disorder maybe). The choiceless awarness could in fact reflect the samkyha position we discussed earlier.
When we go a step further than J did; If there is no self at all, as UG claims, how is any breaking through thru conditioning possible? wouldnt we end in a sort of fatalism, that presents UGs position: "Nothing is self initiated, nothing changes absolutely, therefore all remains the same in essence, we only behave according to how we are contidioned and there is no escape at all"?
Absent a self is also absent a moral agent. What then is the purpose of liberation—and for whom? To try and eliminate the moral self which calls forth moral activity involving detachment and purification is problematic if not altogether paradoxical. We’re reminded of the problematic of ‘choiceless awareness’ which in this context slides towards moral indifference. In the Sandaka Sutta of the Mijjhima-Nikaya we learn about Buddhism’s negative reaction to the belief in no moral causation. Various teachers like Ajita Kesakambala, and Makkhali Gosala deny such. The Dhammapada seems deadset against it, too.
It is by the self that evil is done, it is by the self that one is impure,
It is by the self that one avoids evil, it is by the self (attanâ) that one is purified,
Purity and impurity depend on the very self (paccattam), no one could purify another (165)
The moral self if a given. Without the potential to act morality is impossible. Such potentiality doesn’t exist in itself—it belongs to the agential self. In this wise, the self has power over the choices it has to make. The Buddha describes such self-dominance (atta-adhipateyya) (or self-sovereignty) in the Adhipateyya Sutta of the Anguttara-Nikaya (i.147).
Herein, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu gone to the forest, to the root of a tree, to a lonely spot (suññagarato), reflect thus, ‘Not for the sake of robes did I leave home for the homeless life. Not for the sake alms, of residence, or for the sake of becoming or not becoming thus [in a future existence] did I leave home for a homeless life. But for the thought: here am I beset by birth, old age, death, sorrows, lamentation, pains, despair and tribulation, affected by pain, overcome by pain. If only I came to know the end of at least some of this mass of pain! And if having given up the pleasures of the sense I, who left home for the homeless life, were to look for similar or still worse pleasures of the sense, that would not benefit me.’ He reflects thus, ‘My unsluggish effort shall be put to action, my undisturbed mindfulness will be established, my body will be calm not turbulent, my mind will be composed, one-pointed (cittam ekagga).’ He, making the self the sole sovereign (attânamyeva adhipatim karitvâ), abandons what is evil, fosters what is good, abandons what is blameful, fosters what is blameless, he preserves the self pure (attânam suddham pariharati). This is called sovereignty of the self.
This is not outside of Nietzsche’s will-to-power. Here the true sovereign, as self, is imposing his will in order to overcome this mass of pain. It is difficult to believe that in this particular Sutta the self is just a conventional term which means nothing beyond its sound; being a signifier that points to clump of biological matter. Here we find that the self’s reality is much more, as a moral agent.
It`s just that I find what you said not convincing, I believe there is much real confusion out there and debates about anatta brings out the best of it. See, I have no problem with a samkhya view of a passive observer however I explored it and found it to be rejected by the Buddha. I find it dangerous that many Buddhists start with outright denying the self or soul, this really can lead to ways outside Buddhism, one might become an UG without realizing it, for instance. So, I do not agree that this is mental masturbation, it might have been in the time of the Buddha when we could have heard his words, without having to hear it thru millions of mind that rationalized it in some way and maybe at some point simply wrong.
I am just discussing here to learn and expanding my view. If it generates "hard" feeling in me, I try to stay away and resolve that first. I never thought of you trying to impose your ideas on others, I am not in conflict with you at all, I find you sympathic.
it`s a little off-topic now, but anyways I have some short words on that:
I resepct both, both were sincere seekers and put great effort in that, I believe. I think UG just freaked out at some point, but he has a good heart still. Wether both of them are closet Buddhists, I will not judge here, I believe one can learn from both if one sees what drives them to do what they do/did.
I will begin by saying that self has always been a problem. It was certainly a problem for the sramanas and the Buddha. The Buddha approached the problem understanding it is far easier to point to what the self is not rather than what it is. This might be put into a more definitive form. The Buddha understood that what is taken or assumed to be the self by ordinary people (puthujjana) is really not the self, hence anattâ. More importantly, self ( = the five khandhas) is not the true self because it (the khandha self) is conditioned. So what does it mean to be conditioned?
"Monks, there are these three condition-marks of that which is conditioned (sankhata). What three? Its genesis (uppada) is apparent, its passing away is apparent, its changeability while it persists is apparent. These are the three condition-marks (sankhatalakkhan)" (A.i.151, III, 5, § 47).
We may observe the five khandhas as being conditioned, which constitute the false self (anattâ)—but we can hardly observe the referent, so to speak, as being likewise conditioned, who makes the call.
The referent or attâ is untraceable by the khandhas. This, I underscore, is the problem with the self. It is real enough because we can observe that things are conditioned as if to say, "This is conditioned because it arises and passes away." By the same token, we can't plop the referent down and say, "Your conditioned, too." In other the words, the referent is here (paccatta) and not there as a thing (dhammâ).
Philosophers like UG and the heterodox sramanas during the time of the Buddha tried various schemes to repackage the problem of self with various makeshift schemes. Like UG, we may boldly declare there is no self or atman; then smuggle it back in as the 'natural state'. J. Krishnamurti can repackage it as "choiceless awareness". The self can become solipsism, the here & now, objectless consciousness and a host of other substitutions.
I see the problem as going much deeper; to an existential level. In a samsaric ocean of empty relativism; all of us treading water its seems, we are becoming exhausted. There is no yonder shore of nirvana in view—only a vast dark raging ocean meets us. If we are to escape from this nightmare we must awaken from the betwitchment (asava) of phenomena or fall into hopeless nihilism and go under. For nihilism arises when the ground of our existence called "self" become as problem for itself! The Buddha found a way out of the problem, escaping the nihilism of his time. We have not.
Iawa, Is this one of those topic stoppers? I am dutifully trying to keep this thread on topic. Other discussants have also contributed their time and energy trying to unpack this topic in coherent English. Pertinent atta/anatta comments, related to this topic, are always welcome.
I will begin by saying that self has always been a problem. It was certainly a problem for the sramanas and the Buddha. The Buddha approached the problem understanding it is far easier to point to what the self is not rather than what it is. This might be put into a more definitive form. The Buddha understood that what is taken or assumed to be the self by ordinary people (puthujjana) is really not the self, hence anattâ. More importantly, self ( = the five khandhas) is not the true self because it (the khandha self) is conditioned. So what does it mean to be conditioned?
We may observe the five khandhas as being conditioned, which constitute the false self (anattâ)—but we can hardly observe the referent, so to speak, as being likewise conditioned, who makes the call.
The referent or attâ is untraceable by the khandhas. This, I underscore, is the problem with the self. It is real enough because we can observe that things are conditioned as if to say, "This is conditioned because it arises and passes away." By the same token, we can't plop the referent down and say, "Your conditioned, too." In other the words, the referent is here (paccatta) and not there as a thing (dhammâ).
Philosophers like UG and the heterodox sramanas during the time of the Buddha tried various schemes to repackage the problem of self with various makeshift schemes. Like UG, we may boldly declare there is no self or atman; then smuggle it back in as the 'natural state'. J. Krishnamurti can repackage it as "choiceless awareness". The self can become solipsism, the here & now, objectless consciousness and a host of other substitutions.
I see the problem as going much deeper; to an existential level. In a samsaric ocean of empty relativism; all of us treading water its seems, we are becoming exhausted. There is no yonder shore of nirvana in view—only a vast dark raging ocean meets us. If we are to escape from this nightmare we must awaken from the betwitchment (asava) of phenomena or fall into hopeless nihilism and go under. For nihilism arises when the ground of our existence called "self" become as problem for itself! The Buddha found a way out of the problem, escaping the nihilism of his time. We have not.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
A useful relection, Bobby, thank you. The more this thread continues, the more I am reminded of the work of Roberto Assagioli and the psychosynthesis school, to say nothjing of Jung's remark that we have "fallen asleep to essence".
A useful relection, Bobby, thank you. The more this thread continues, the more I am reminded of the work of Roberto Assagioli and the psychosynthesis school, to say nothjing of Jung's remark that we have "fallen asleep to essence".
In agree with both of you. I believe the fallacy lies when using induction where it does not fit. Elaborating what all is not self is different from inducing nothing is self based on some observations. Anyone of you who might be interested can look up the terms Nihil privativum and Nihil negativum.
I am pretty much aware of which corner I am coming from
for me nihil privativum, the absence of something in respect to something other, is not an unbuddhist thought per se. I am more confortable to talk of nothing in terms of absence of craving, rather than some imaginary absolute nothingness. The latter is by no means nibbana, which is the mere absence of greed, hate and delusion in one of its oldest definitions.
I am pretty much aware of which corner I am coming from
for me nihil privativum, the absence of something in respect to something other, is not an unbuddhist thought per se. I am more confortable to talk of nothing in terms of absence of craving, rather than some imaginary absolute nothingness. The latter is by no means nibbana, which is the mere absence of greed, hate and delusion in one of its oldest definitions.
Regards
I think your focus on the negative is key to understanding anattâ. We moderns forget, as just one example, that the Latinate 'vacuus' meant at one time: "that the object qualified has often been, and will often be, in a state totally different from the present one" (this is from some ancient Latin book from the university library!). The example given (don't laugh) to illustrate this was: Ceyx was not at home to take part in making love with Halcyone, thus her bed was vacuus!
Believe it or not this ties in beautifully with the anattâ/attâ problematic. The average worlding (puthujjana) expects to find the attâ in what is conditioned—but the conditioned is an-attâ, that is, not the self.
I kick myself, fofoo, for not taking down the title of a book I was leafing through, a number of years ago, about Buddhism. What caught my attention was the author's observation that Buddhist scholars and clergy had made a monumental blunder in the use of the negative with regard to no-self; that it didn't mean there is categorically no-self, but that what is conditioned can never be the self.
The Buddha, in other words, was a thorough-going via negativa mystic. The self is not a kernel; it doesn't have magnitude or shape (rupa); it is not a determination for even consciousness (viññana). Yet we can attest to its presence when we take a stance with regard to the assertion or denial of a self. In this wise, the referent knows that the conditioned is not the self; and the self is not the conditioned (khandhas) (cf. M.iii.18).
Where the stance becomes paradoxical is when the conditioned becomes the referent which is little more than relativism. I think this is the modern view which is rooted in natural science; that this is the real world (a dogmatic assertion); there are no other worlds except what my senses are able to detect.
I admit it is difficult to get off the moonshine of our inborn attachment to sensory phenomena which are always conditioned. We are attached to our families, our homes, our reputations, nations, etc., all of which are conditioned phenomena, or the same nama-rupa (name and appearance). We would like to set these things aside—and we often try to do so with our imagination. Still, the depth of our attachment is betrayed when we tacitly affirm the five khandhas (the conditioned) by denying the unconditioned attâ.
IMO one can't be locked into a system of language basd on Aristolean principles when discussing Eastern philisophical topics that are merged with religio-spiritual implications.
First, let me say that the problem is not entirely about sematics, that if we are silent—sematic problems end—truth comes to us suddenly. What is more important is that when the Buddha used words as part of skillful means (upaya) he was pointing to what was meant as he understood it.
"Therefore, Mahâmati, let the Bodhisattva-Mahâsattva be in conformity with the meaning and not with the letter" (Lankavatara Sutra 194-195).
When we engage in disputes over meaning (or what is actually meant) this amounts to logomachy (meaning-war) which I hasten to add, was condemned by the Buddha. The meant, can only be verified by meditation—not by disputation. Disputation, however, can be useful as a means of providing information. And using the right rules, disputation can put to rest some very bad fallacies.
Incidentally, musing (dhyana) is a very important part of Buddhist practice. Tibetan Lamas I have known read the Buddhist canon on a daily basis, reflect upon it, and discuss it in formal ways.
Iawa, Buddhism is no easy subject because our attachments to the conditioned world are subtle. We are like spiders who spin webs, but get caught in our own webs.
When I first began to tackle Buddhism my arrogance thought this subject would be easy. Well, 40 years later, Buddhism isn't easy. And I can understand why the Buddha was, at first, unwilling to teach his awakening at all. To begin to even grasp a general knowledge of what the Buddha was teaching, one has to let go of all the human-all-too-human crap. It gets in the way. You can't see Buddhism through a glass darkly stained with crap!
Mind purification is, therefore, important—very important. In fact, it is the alpha & omega of Buddhism. And this means subjecting one's worldly concepts to the hammer of purification which amounts to a pyschological thrashing at times. But there is much, much more.
When one encounters pure mind, it is an unbelievable experience, one you'll never forget. All of a sudden that shelf of Sutras on the east wall makes perfect sense. You are overjoyed. You swear you can hear the old Buddha laugh.
We may observe the five khandhas as being conditioned, which constitute the false self (anattâ)—but we can hardly observe the referent, so to speak, as being likewise conditioned, who makes the call.
The referent or attâ is untraceable by the khandhas. This, I underscore, is the problem with the self. It is real enough because we can observe that things are conditioned as if to say, "This is conditioned because it arises and passes away." By the same token, we can't plop the referent down and say, "Your conditioned, too." In other the words, the referent is here (paccatta) and not there as a thing (dhammâ).
Philosophers like UG and the heterodox sramanas during the time of the Buddha tried various schemes to repackage the problem of self with various makeshift schemes. Like UG, we may boldly declare there is no self or atman; then smuggle it back in as the 'natural state'. J. Krishnamurti can repackage it as "choiceless awareness". The self can become solipsism, the here & now, objectless consciousness and a host of other substitutions.
I see the problem as going much deeper; to an existential level. In a samsaric ocean of empty relativism; all of us treading water its seems, we are becoming exhausted. There is no yonder shore of nirvana in view—only a vast dark raging ocean meets us. If we are to escape from this nightmare we must awaken from the betwitchment (asava) of phenomena or fall into hopeless nihilism and go under. For nihilism arises when the ground of our existence called "self" become as problem for itself! The Buddha found a way out of the problem, escaping the nihilism of his time. We have not.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I agree on the smuggeling attemps of the self as being repackaged in other phrases.
so what would be the argument against the self as "the knower of the fields", or as the samhkya pov often is put, "that which observes". Why is the Purusha not considered to be the self by the Buddha? The quote I provided earlier does not refer to sutta, but to some poetic literature of the buddhas life](BUDDHA-CARITA), but still if we consider it essentially reflecting the Buddha`s position, why did he insist to also give up "the knower of the fields"? Can we say the Buddha gave that up for something more subtle?
What I essentially want to say is: If the Buddha really was the one to perfect the apophatic tradition, wouldn`t every positive definition, regardless if called buddha nature or true self, let the doctrine become less subtle and less perfect? Nevertheless i consider it currently the lesser evil to "no self", since that might one fastly drown in crypto-nihilism.
fofoo, It is only a tentative hypothesis, but non-ariyans, which includes both puthujjana monks and puthujjana lay people, appear to be instructed along the lines of the via negative. Accordingly, they are instructed by the Buddha to differentiate between what is conditioned and what is unconditioned (e.g., khandhas/attâ).
As regards the puthujjana, it needs to be borne in mind, that they cannot tell who, so to speak, is an ariyan-savaka (noble disciple). They (puthujjana) are referred to as "ariyanam adassâvî" i.e., unable to discern who is ariyan. They are simply unskilled in the path (S.iii.108). Nor has the puthujjana realized the Dhamma which has an obvious mystical implication, referring here, not to texts, but, instead, to ultimate reality. As evidence I submit this which describes dhamma in mystical, transcendent terms.
"The Dhamma I have realized is deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond mere reasoning, subtle, and intelligible to the wise. But this generation delights, revels, and rejoices in sensual pleasures" (M.i.167–68).
According to the commentaries (Suttanipata A. 166) one is an ariya-savaka who has had revelation (sutatta) [of Dhamma] in the presence (santike) of aryians (ariyânam santike sutattâ ariyasâvako). Well, this strikes me as a positive experience, too. There is also the stock phrase "has seen Dhamma, reached Dhamma, found Dhamma and plunged into Dhamma" (M.i.380). This is also positive. A disciple (savaka) is one who also hears the Dhamma which in Pali is parato-ghosa (M.i.294), which can be rendered, transcendent-audition.
We have to keep in mind that ariya-savakas appear to be the only ones who may enter the authentic path (ariyamaggo) to liberation which means 'right view' is supramundane, going beyond the conditioned (there is a mundane right view. Cp. M.iii.72). Again, I see the positive here also.
You have raised some interesting issues and I have tried to give them flesh finding the proper citations. This is not as difficult as it appears except that we must keep in mind that we are chained to a conditioned totality which makes escape (i.e., nibbana) an exercise greater than any prison break in recent history! We haven't even touched on meditation and how it might figure in our getaway scheme.
Well yes, the discussion helped me to clarify some points and I thank you for your patience and effort. At the moment, I have nothing more of value to say on that matter, therefore I remain silent until I that changes.
Some great grist not1not2. Thanks! At any rate, Thanissaro Bhikkhu gives a brief but excellent analysis of this particular Sutta, covering the critical elements.
Potthapada 'assumes/believes/posits' ('passemi' from pacceti [pati-i]) a gross self, material, composed of the four elements, and feeding on solid food. Then he goes on to passemi a self made of mind (manomayam) and then passemi a self which is formless (arupa).
Naturally, the Buddha doesn't accept Potthapada's assumptions (pacceti) of self. He then says:
"I teach the Dhamma for the abandoning of the gross acquisition of a self (attapa.tilâbhâ), such that, when you practice it, defiling mental qualities will be abandoned, bright mental qualities will grow, and you will enter & remain in the culmination & abundance of discernment, having known & realized it for yourself in the here & now. If the thought should occur to you that, when defiling mental qualities are abandoned and bright mental qualities have grown, and one enters & remains in the culmination & abundance of discernment, having known & realized it for oneself in the here & now, one's abiding is stressful/painful, you should not see it in that way. When defiling mental qualities are abandoned and bright mental qualities have grown, and one enters & remains in the culmination & abundance of discernment, having known & realized it for oneself in the here & now, there is joy, rapture, serenity, mindfulness, alertness, and a pleasant/happy abiding.
"I also teach the Dhamma for the abandoning of the mind-made acquisition of a self... for the abandoning of the formless acquisition of a self, such that, when you practice it, defiling mental qualities will be abandoned, bright mental qualities will grow, and you will enter & remain in the culmination & abundance of discernment, having known & realized it for yourself in the here & now... When defiling mental qualities are abandoned and bright mental qualities have grown, and one enters & remains in the culmination & abundance of discernment, having known & realized it for oneself in the here & now, there is joy, rapture, serenity, mindfulness, alertness, and a pleasant/happy abiding" (D.i.195–198). [Trans., Thanissaro Bhikkhu]
From what I can determine from the text, the Buddha's logic run thus: The attâ or self is itself and never other (than itself). Logically speaking, if the self were other than itself it would not be itself it would be anattâ. The five khandhas are essentially anattâ because they are, for the self, something other or alien to it.
This is born out when the Buddha says to Potthapada, "perception would be one thing, and the self another" (Aññâva saññâ bhavissati añño attâ) (D.i.186). In sum, the self as no determinate existence as being either gross, psychical, or formless.
This may also help to get a handle on the matter. It is from the Dhammapada.
“There, the wise man, should seek enjoyment, having slain (hitva) the passions (kame) having no part (akiñcano) [in them]; having thoroughly purified (pariyodapeyya) the self (attânam) from thought-defilements (cittakilesehi)” (88).
When what is 'other' to the self is thoroughly removed, the self, now being the very content of pure mind, we can be said to have reached the other shore, in a manner of speaking. Heretofore, we acquired what was not truly the self assuming or believing (pacceti) it to be the self. This kind of acquiring produced citakilesehi, or mind-defilements. We believed that these defilements were the self until we saw otherwise.
I'm wondering how the Palace analogy would apply to the idea of an 'Atta' outside the khandas?
"Potthapada, it's as if a man at a crossroads were to build a staircase for ascending to a palace, and other people were to say to him, 'Well, my good man, this palace for which you are building a staircase: do you know whether it's east, west, north, or south of here? Whether it's high, low, or in between?' and, when asked this, he would say, 'No.' Then they would say to him, 'So you don't know or see the palace for which you are building a staircase?' When asked this, he would say, 'Yes.'
"So what do you think, Potthapada — when this is the case, don't the words of that man turn out to be unconvincing?"
Now, the here's what the Buddha had to say about his own teaching, in regard to this analogy:
"Potthapada, it's as if a man at a crossroads were to build a staircase for ascending to a palace, and other people were to say to him, 'Well, my good man, this palace for which you are building a staircase: do you know whether it's east, west, north, or south of here? Whether it's high, low, or in between?' He would say, 'This, friends, is the palace to which I am building a staircase. The staircase is right under the palace.'
"So what do you think, Potthapada — when this is the case, don't the words of that man turn out to be convincing?"
"Yes, lord..."
"In the same way, in the past I have been asked, 'What, friend, is the gross acquisition of a self... the mind-made acquisition of a self... the formless acquisition of a self for whose abandoning you teach the Dhamma...?' When asked this, I would answer, 'This, friend, is that gross acquisition of a self for whose abandoning I teach the Dhamma...'
"What do you think, Potthapada. When this is the case, don't those words turn out to be convincing?"
"Yes, lord. When this is the case, those words turn out to be convincing."
So, while I respect your point of view, Bobby, & don't consider it to be completely out of line, I am simply not convinced.
maybe we understand the whole debate better if we start to understand what transcendent means. It surely means not an empirical pehnomena to be found "outside" the khandhas, i.e. an "extra" khandha that is permanent nd to be found in the forest one day if one is lucky. It more designates something beyond empircal recognition and demonstrability.
Imo, the debate often breaks down to that. Majority of Buddhist interpretors do not seem to accept self as transcendet, while they acknolwedge trancendental ideality in Buddhism, shifting it to Nibbana for instance. A minority claims the self is transcendental in Buddhism (not in Abhidhamma of course).
Deniers of transcendental self like to ask why no sect supposedly came up with such a self. Affirmers claim wether or not they came up with it, it is blatantly obvious when reding the nikayas. What we have is a classical dispute between tradionalists and a as heterodox perceived minority that implicitly questions the understanding of Buddhism of whole tradiotions with their ideas.
I'm just wondering how this is so blatantly obvious to them.
metta
_/\_
Well, this we try to figure out here:) I can try to summarize the position of one german scholar whose name i forgot in the next days (need time, have few )
Personally, I must say I am a little of a conflict shy person and I do not like disputes at all, prefer discussions or soft debates, I am somehow forced to seek for harmony. So, when things get too hot, I stay out and wait a bit (no kitchen for me).
However, I play with open cards all the time, and I must admit that I am someone who rather likes a private region, be it as tiny as possible, not expressable at all, instead of being told i am just the aggregates, that`s all, opening me to vivisection without any shelter. Note this is how I feel, I am not to say it is fully justified within the nikayas.
Imo, the debate often breaks down to that. Majority of Buddhist interpretors do not seem to accept self as transcendet, while they acknolwedge trancendental ideality in Buddhism, shifting it to Nibbana for instance.
What is astonishing in this, is that while the majority are shifting that transcendent over to nibbana, they've created a broad ugly ditch between the being (satta/sattva) and nibbana, itself, insofar as it is tacitly maintained that nobody realizes nibbana. Rahula, for example, goes so far as to adduce that the 'being' composed of the Five Aggregates realizes nirvana. This is to say, in other words, the Five Aggregates realize nirvana! But this idea is not to be found or even hinted at in the Pali canon. If we were to disambiguate most of what the majority has said about who or what realizes nirvana, the following might be said: nirvana is final non-rebirth death. But this is just annihilationism, that is, uccheda-vada.
Which system of logic are you using?[/COLOR][/SIZE]
When I went to school we learned that logic concerned problems of validity—not truth. One, for example, can make a statement that is perfectly logical but untrue.
The question of anatta seems to be heading towards asking whom or what realizes Nibbana. Perhaps what should also be remembered here is that the Buddha said that any sense of self, any self-identification view, any process of I-making and my-making, is based on either one or all of the five khandhas (MN 44, Mn 109, SN 22.1). When speaking about a self, agent, referent, et cetera, you must do so in reference to something that cannot be touched, felt, perceived, thought about, or cognized in any way whatsoever.
Please correct me if I am wrong, but effectively, you are speaking about something that, as far as experience goes, cannot be said to exist because if it cannot be experienced, how can it be said to exist. That is why, when it comes to Nibbana, such a thing is beyond words, beyond concepts, beyond existing or even not existing, as it is the final end of phenomena (AN 10.58). Logically speaking, what could be said to observe this final end of phenomena? How could it observe this? Where is it? The questions are endless.
The question of anatta seems to be heading towards asking whom or what realizes Nibbana.
This is from the Samyutta-Nkkaya, III, 53-54:
When consciousness is unestablished (tadappatittathitam vinnanam), not coming to growth, nongenerative, it is liberated (vimuttam). The self liberated (vimutt-attâ), it is immovable (thitam), the self immovable (thita-attâ), it is content, whose self is content (santusit-attâ), is not agitated. Unagitated, the very self (pacc-attam) surely attains complete nibbana.
I have used hyphens to set off "the self" (attâ) in the compounds so the discussants can see it who are without any knowledge of Pali. Attâ is here, with one exception, used in the nominative singular. You may, of course, disagree with this rendering. But from what I can see it is an uphill battle to disprove the essential message that the Buddhist votary attains nibbana.
Well, this we try to figure out here:) I can try to summarize the position of one german scholar whose name i forgot in the next days (need time, have few )
Regards
The man is called Georg Grimm
just joking. Although the following interpretation of Anatta is in line with the former one`s, as far as I can see it.(However, he himself claims Grimm departet from the "original" view of the Buddha by stating his "Great Syllogism")
I translate the following from the German. It is from his book "empty is the world"(Leer ist die Welt)
The Buddha defenetly rejected to claim that there is no self, however he avioded to speak about it.
Why?..."because nothing can be said about the self or "I" and whenver it is talked of a self or I there arises the danger that someone start to think of the self or I as something. Self or "I" however is a completely empty term which nothing can be thought of. The one who recognized this will stop to try to think something at all when hearing "self" or "I". For the thought, the self or I is the same as nothing. Instead of that, one can also say : The self ist transcendend, it is beyond every possibility to be recognized, but that does not mean it does not exist."
From Leer ist die Welt,chapter "Atta und Anatta", Heading "ANATTA- ZWEIERLEI DEUTUNG"
From what 'I can see, they are pretty similar. Their take on the self can be found in FAQ Nr23
I wonder if they get along with Grimm`s Great Syllogism. Assuming a transcendental self is no gurantee for that, as Mr Schmid showed.
This sentence might settle it:
Nirvana, Perfect Wisdom, the Deathless, the Unborn, the Uncreated, the Real, the Permanent, Absolute Changeless Permanent Reality, and Self are all the same, that which is unfathomable, inconceivable, immutable, inscrutable, deep, boundless, unmeasurable, markless, signless, undefinable, incomprehensible.
Whatever the transcended object is labeld, both Grimm and them take it as a permanent reality minus all other samsaric attributes.
fofoo, this Buddhist fundamentalist guy lives close to my town. I have concluded over the years that his stuff comes mainly from Grimm. Oh, and be careful never to cite this URL on E-sangha. It is instant excommunication!
Oh, don't post this one either.
Man should not give up the self (attânam no dade poso), he should never surrender the self (attânam no pariccaje). — S.i.44
I thinkthe wording you gave from S.i.44 cannot be really disputed except you go for sectarian views. The self is appearent in all translations I read. Geiger notes in the German translation, that he wanted to give a "philogoical precise as possible" translation. The self is also in there.
The legitimate dispute would begin, I imagine, if you look for the commentary of Buddhagosa. It is included in the Geiger translation as footnotes. It says
- attânam no dade poso means one will not make himself a slave of others
- attânam no pariccaje means he will not surrender his life to lions, tigers etc
I defenetly have problems agreeing on Buddhgossa`s commentary on attânam no pariccaje, it seems it is far too narrow and reduces the freedom of the self just to no be eaten by wild animals. My reading is more that it also points to spiritual freedom.
I defenetly have problems agreeing on Buddhgossa`s commentary on attânam no pariccaje, it seems it is far too narrow and reduces the freedom of the self just to no be eaten by wild animals. My reading is more that it also points to spiritual freedom.
We are to gather, I assume, that attâ is like a clown's wax nose inasmuch as we can make it into any shape we wish. In Buddhaghosa's treatment of self, as you have shown, the self is made into a temporal self: one which resists being a slave and being eaten.
My favorite example of the use of the clown's wax nose is this passage from the DighaN. at II, 120:
"Now I go from you, having made my refuge of self" (kata me saranam attano).
Even with Walshe's wax nose translation, "having made myself my refuge", nevertheless, it is hard to understand why the dying Buddha, who understood a refuge to be like an island which is safe from the flood of samsara, would now choose to make his refuge himself if, as some latter-day Buddhists allege, he taught anattâ.
If this refuge is only temporary, then why bother saying this? On the other hand, if the self of the Buddha is more than the sum of his temporal body, which will die shortly, then it is fitting that he should say I've made my refuge of self.
A thorough going apophatic, the Buddha, of course, has always forsaken everything that is conditioned. Now he is about to forsake his conditioned carnal body; being in his refuge—which is death free.
This is an interesting topic, thank you all for your participation. As the discussion has windened down, I like to add some enthusiasm to the thread. This is what I found on that Nirvana Sutra link:
"According to the Buddha, the monks have grasped merely the outer letters of his doctrine, but not its essential meaning. They have fallen victim to an extreme and inverted form of meditative practice in which they view that which is truly Eternal as something impermanent, that which is truly the Self as what is non-Self, that which is truly Blissful as suffering, and that which is truly Pure as something impure. They have failed to distinguish between what is of Samsara and what is of Great Nirvāṇa (mahā-nirvāṇa or mahā-parinirvāṇa). Saṃsāra is non-Self – thus far the monks are correct. But they have committed a serious metaphysical miscalculation – the Buddha indicates - by ascribing samsaric qualities and characteristics to the non-samsaric, to Nirvana, indeed to the Buddha himself. For while everything that is samsaric is rightly labelled as non-Self, the Buddha reveals in the course of the sūtra that he, as the Dharmakāya, is nothing less than the eternal Self (atman) itself."
I certainly believe this because it makes sense to my dull mind. Thank to the thread, it open my eye that there is the Buddha-self. In my practice, I now know where to look for.
Thanks Vacchagotta, Bobby Lanier, Fofoo for the great insights!
For those who propound the theory of anatta, the problem of self-identity, as we realize it from our birth to the present, is difficult to ignore and set aside. The matter of self-identity is accepted in the Jakatas (Birth Stories) where the Bodhisat remains self-identical despite rebirth into different forms. How, therefore, is it possible to have anatta and self-identity at the same time, in one being?
That is a very interesting observation. From my limited understanding, I think it is true to say that there is a sense of self-identity involved in our experience. However, in the Pali Canon, the Buddha said that this sense of self-identity comes about when one assumes one or more of the aggregates to be the self, or the self as possessing one or more of the aggregates, or one or more of the aggregates as in the self, or the self as in one or more of the aggregates (MN 109).
He also said, interestingly enough, that one should attend to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self (SN 22.122). Nevertheless, I do not think that the Buddha was concerned with questions regarding a self either positively or negatively. I think that what he was really concerned with was stress and the cessation of stress (SN 22.86). Those are just my thoughts anyway.
Elohim, by self-identity I meant identity in change (Grk., metabole). I have read a great deal of the Pali canon and the notion of self-identity through or in change is not argued against. In fact, it is the whole essence of the Bodhisat, that in his passage from one state of being to another, he remains self-identical with his bodhi quest.
I think what you are referring to is sakkaya which is not at all the same as self-identity. The problematic of sakkaya is not unlike Ovid's story of Echo and Narcissus in the Metamorphoses.
As his punishment, after his hunt, Narcissus, in order to quench his thirst, sees an image in the pool of pure water and falls in love "with unbounded hope", believing to have found substance (i.e., his true self) in mere shadow (khandhas). Somewhat akin to the Buddhist asavas, Narcissus then becomes spell-bound (asava) with the sakkaya. Under this metamorphoses, clinging to shadow, i.e., the sakkaya, he wastes away, never overcoming this metamorphoses (Skt., pratityasamutpada).
Although I have condensed the story in the Metamorphoses, it is quite Buddhist in a number of respects which serves to illustrate, adequately I think, the difference between the sakkaya and self-identity in change as personified by the Bodhisat in the Jatakas.
Sorry, but I am not following you here. I am not familiar with Greek literature, so your parallel is lost on me. Perhaps you can try to explain your point to me another way, because I still do not quite understand what you mean by self-identity or identity in change. As far as I understand what you are saying, kamma can account for the continuity between lives. Past actions themselves do not have any identity (although we may easily think they are products of one), and yet they are capable of ripening as future results. After all, the five clinging-aggregates are said to be old kamma (SN 35.145). Once kamma is ended, such questions of identity longer apply as birth is ended, and there is no further becoming. However, that might not even be your point, so I apologize if I am going in the wrong direction here. But just on a side not, the Jataka stories are not canonical, only the Jataka verses are.
Comments
with the buddhas teaching on anatta.
As a side note, on several occasions I have managed to maintain mindfulness while falling asleep, and have experience what looks/feels like a luminous flash which comes with a state of wakefulness. However, it was still a perception, and was impermanent. So I'm not sure whether there is any correspondence between this experience & what is being discussed right now.
_/\_
metta
It is my impression that the author of the note, if he would permit himself to speak his mind boldly, is saying, in essence, that citta, defiled or luminous, is still finite. At the least he seems hesitant to acknowledge that citta or mind becomes transcendent when it is purified. The following passage is taken from the Samyukta-agama which, I think, clarifies the context of the mind in it transcendent form.
Also, in the Brahmayu Sutta of the Mijjhima-Nikaya (ii.144) it seems clear enough that a Buddha is one "who knows his mind is quite pure, freed from every attachment...who is master of all states of mind."
With regard to citta which is immaculate, others tend to agree that the mind when purified of its adventitious defilements attains liberation.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Simple: We were discussing Frauwallners assesment of anatta in early Buddhism. Frauwallner insists Buddha started form samkyha position and did not break with it totally, as there the self is transcendent, the ontological status of self then would be not "non existent" but "not a phenomena".
Regards
That is an interesting sidenote I would say:) I managed to relize how I fell a sleep several times. It is like you realize that you will fall sleep now, fully aware of it. Of course this realizitation is not permament. You will sleep at some point simply. The interesting question is if that can be called a temporary insight or glimpse into something eternal, wether one calls it stream of conciuosness or illuminous mind. We all should not forget that introspection played abig role alwaysin indian religion and people tried to deduce universal principles from what they observerd on themselves.
Another interesting sidenote: I once dreamed I fell down the stairs. Now the funny thing: I was struggling with my feet but I was fully aware that I was only dreaming. I could not stop struggling until I fully woke up, although I realized it is only a dream while doing it. It lastest for a few seconds until I fully realized what was going on.
Regards
Bobby,
I agree with you that the mind, when purified of its defilements, attains liberation. That is, of course, the very definition of Nibbana—"Extinction of greed, extinction of hate, extinction of delusion: this is called Nibbāna" (S. XXXVIII. 1).
As for your assessment of the liberated mind, I have a feeling that this might take us even further off of the beaten path. This might be an entire topic in itself — worthy of its own thread — if anyone else is interested in pursuing it further.
Currently, this thread on anatta has become a hodge-podge of various doctrinal conversations, albeit interrelated one, and there is no reason that we cannot branch off separate discussions in order to focus on particular points of interest.
Jason
ah, i was projecting :banghead:
I hope you could sleep well nevertheless. I will do that now. :doh:
I have never found any clinching evidence to the assertion that anatta was such a response. I have seen a few Buddhists make this claim, that is about all. Anatta, if anything reflective of the Buddha's genius, was a response to the belief that man is made up of skandha (which in the Jain religion meant moleculues). The Buddha named five holding aggregates or skandhas which people believed to be the attâ or the self. He corrected this view by saying the five skandhas are not the attâ which in Pali is anattâ. However, not all agreed. Eternalists contended that one or more of the five skandhas are the attâ and the rest are the loka or world. Annihilationists contended that the self is just a proxy for the aggregates that when they dissolve so does the self. The Buddha, of course, rejected both theories outright.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
ah, first i was projecting, now I have bad taste too. Whats next?
regarding the other post, i think we agree at some level, mind( reasoning mind), is tool, not purpose. can be used or abused, labels applied to help or destroy, to pursue samsara or help ending suffering. I do think we just use other words for similar thoughts. We could open a new thread if you like, on compassion for instance. for me, true compassion is feeling what the other feels, what drives him, what does he need, fear love and so on. the insight to help him must come from your heart, recognizing yourself in him, destroying the concept of khandic individuality illusion.:)
ps: still this is just my view of compassion currently, i want to add.
I suppose you mean J. Krishnamurti, not UG? It would be helpful if you could provide references that we can examine together here.
Do you think that J. Krishnamurti's protean term, "choiceless awareness", merely shifts the problematic of 'self' (attâ/atma) to that of a more immediate, undeveloped subject?
Love ya'll,
Bobby
This, I think, describes a mirror beautifully. The mirror has no choice; whatever we decide to place in front of it, it reflects (with the exception of tempretature). In this dipiciton, the self is limited to being passive. This reminds me somewhat of Locke's soul which was a contentless tabula rasa; which over time was filled with experiences. The problem with this, is one free who is a mirror or a being like Locke's tabula rasa? In fact, one may not be human at all who simply receives sensory data in a passive way. I must say this goes against the Buddha notion of attakara meaning self-agency or self-making.
Against the idea of passivity, in the Attakara Sutta in the book of sixes of the Anguttara-Nikaya (III, 337-8), the Buddha is in a discussion with a Brahman who is of the view that there is no 'self-agency' (attâkâra) or 'other agency' (parakara). To this view the Buddha said: "How could someone by himself approaching and receding say, `Nothing is done by the self, nothing is done by others." In other words, the Buddha denied the Brahman's view.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
When we go a step further than J did; If there is no self at all, as UG claims, how is any breaking through thru conditioning possible? wouldnt we end in a sort of fatalism, that presents UGs position: "Nothing is self initiated, nothing changes absolutely, therefore all remains the same in essence, we only behave according to how we are contidioned and there is no escape at all"?
The moral self if a given. Without the potential to act morality is impossible. Such potentiality doesn’t exist in itself—it belongs to the agential self. In this wise, the self has power over the choices it has to make. The Buddha describes such self-dominance (atta-adhipateyya) (or self-sovereignty) in the Adhipateyya Sutta of the Anguttara-Nikaya (i.147).
This is not outside of Nietzsche’s will-to-power. Here the true sovereign, as self, is imposing his will in order to overcome this mass of pain. It is difficult to believe that in this particular Sutta the self is just a conventional term which means nothing beyond its sound; being a signifier that points to clump of biological matter. Here we find that the self’s reality is much more, as a moral agent.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
It`s just that I find what you said not convincing, I believe there is much real confusion out there and debates about anatta brings out the best of it. See, I have no problem with a samkhya view of a passive observer however I explored it and found it to be rejected by the Buddha. I find it dangerous that many Buddhists start with outright denying the self or soul, this really can lead to ways outside Buddhism, one might become an UG without realizing it, for instance. So, I do not agree that this is mental masturbation, it might have been in the time of the Buddha when we could have heard his words, without having to hear it thru millions of mind that rationalized it in some way and maybe at some point simply wrong.
Regards
I am just discussing here to learn and expanding my view. If it generates "hard" feeling in me, I try to stay away and resolve that first. I never thought of you trying to impose your ideas on others, I am not in conflict with you at all, I find you sympathic.
Regards
I resepct both, both were sincere seekers and put great effort in that, I believe. I think UG just freaked out at some point, but he has a good heart still. Wether both of them are closet Buddhists, I will not judge here, I believe one can learn from both if one sees what drives them to do what they do/did.
Regards
We may observe the five khandhas as being conditioned, which constitute the false self (anattâ)—but we can hardly observe the referent, so to speak, as being likewise conditioned, who makes the call.
The referent or attâ is untraceable by the khandhas. This, I underscore, is the problem with the self. It is real enough because we can observe that things are conditioned as if to say, "This is conditioned because it arises and passes away." By the same token, we can't plop the referent down and say, "Your conditioned, too." In other the words, the referent is here (paccatta) and not there as a thing (dhammâ).
Philosophers like UG and the heterodox sramanas during the time of the Buddha tried various schemes to repackage the problem of self with various makeshift schemes. Like UG, we may boldly declare there is no self or atman; then smuggle it back in as the 'natural state'. J. Krishnamurti can repackage it as "choiceless awareness". The self can become solipsism, the here & now, objectless consciousness and a host of other substitutions.
I see the problem as going much deeper; to an existential level. In a samsaric ocean of empty relativism; all of us treading water its seems, we are becoming exhausted. There is no yonder shore of nirvana in view—only a vast dark raging ocean meets us. If we are to escape from this nightmare we must awaken from the betwitchment (asava) of phenomena or fall into hopeless nihilism and go under. For nihilism arises when the ground of our existence called "self" become as problem for itself! The Buddha found a way out of the problem, escaping the nihilism of his time. We have not.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Love ya'll,
Bobby
A useful relection, Bobby, thank you. The more this thread continues, the more I am reminded of the work of Roberto Assagioli and the psychosynthesis school, to say nothjing of Jung's remark that we have "fallen asleep to essence".
In agree with both of you. I believe the fallacy lies when using induction where it does not fit. Elaborating what all is not self is different from inducing nothing is self based on some observations. Anyone of you who might be interested can look up the terms Nihil privativum and Nihil negativum.
I am pretty much aware of which corner I am coming from
for me nihil privativum, the absence of something in respect to something other, is not an unbuddhist thought per se. I am more confortable to talk of nothing in terms of absence of craving, rather than some imaginary absolute nothingness. The latter is by no means nibbana, which is the mere absence of greed, hate and delusion in one of its oldest definitions.
Regards
I think your focus on the negative is key to understanding anattâ. We moderns forget, as just one example, that the Latinate 'vacuus' meant at one time: "that the object qualified has often been, and will often be, in a state totally different from the present one" (this is from some ancient Latin book from the university library!). The example given (don't laugh) to illustrate this was: Ceyx was not at home to take part in making love with Halcyone, thus her bed was vacuus!
Believe it or not this ties in beautifully with the anattâ/attâ problematic. The average worlding (puthujjana) expects to find the attâ in what is conditioned—but the conditioned is an-attâ, that is, not the self.
I kick myself, fofoo, for not taking down the title of a book I was leafing through, a number of years ago, about Buddhism. What caught my attention was the author's observation that Buddhist scholars and clergy had made a monumental blunder in the use of the negative with regard to no-self; that it didn't mean there is categorically no-self, but that what is conditioned can never be the self.
The Buddha, in other words, was a thorough-going via negativa mystic. The self is not a kernel; it doesn't have magnitude or shape (rupa); it is not a determination for even consciousness (viññana). Yet we can attest to its presence when we take a stance with regard to the assertion or denial of a self. In this wise, the referent knows that the conditioned is not the self; and the self is not the conditioned (khandhas) (cf. M.iii.18).
Where the stance becomes paradoxical is when the conditioned becomes the referent which is little more than relativism. I think this is the modern view which is rooted in natural science; that this is the real world (a dogmatic assertion); there are no other worlds except what my senses are able to detect.
I admit it is difficult to get off the moonshine of our inborn attachment to sensory phenomena which are always conditioned. We are attached to our families, our homes, our reputations, nations, etc., all of which are conditioned phenomena, or the same nama-rupa (name and appearance). We would like to set these things aside—and we often try to do so with our imagination. Still, the depth of our attachment is betrayed when we tacitly affirm the five khandhas (the conditioned) by denying the unconditioned attâ.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
First, let me say that the problem is not entirely about sematics, that if we are silent—sematic problems end—truth comes to us suddenly. What is more important is that when the Buddha used words as part of skillful means (upaya) he was pointing to what was meant as he understood it.
"Therefore, Mahâmati, let the Bodhisattva-Mahâsattva be in conformity with the meaning and not with the letter" (Lankavatara Sutra 194-195).
When we engage in disputes over meaning (or what is actually meant) this amounts to logomachy (meaning-war) which I hasten to add, was condemned by the Buddha. The meant, can only be verified by meditation—not by disputation. Disputation, however, can be useful as a means of providing information. And using the right rules, disputation can put to rest some very bad fallacies.
Incidentally, musing (dhyana) is a very important part of Buddhist practice. Tibetan Lamas I have known read the Buddhist canon on a daily basis, reflect upon it, and discuss it in formal ways.
Iawa, Buddhism is no easy subject because our attachments to the conditioned world are subtle. We are like spiders who spin webs, but get caught in our own webs.
When I first began to tackle Buddhism my arrogance thought this subject would be easy. Well, 40 years later, Buddhism isn't easy. And I can understand why the Buddha was, at first, unwilling to teach his awakening at all. To begin to even grasp a general knowledge of what the Buddha was teaching, one has to let go of all the human-all-too-human crap. It gets in the way. You can't see Buddhism through a glass darkly stained with crap!
Mind purification is, therefore, important—very important. In fact, it is the alpha & omega of Buddhism. And this means subjecting one's worldly concepts to the hammer of purification which amounts to a pyschological thrashing at times. But there is much, much more.
When one encounters pure mind, it is an unbelievable experience, one you'll never forget. All of a sudden that shelf of Sutras on the east wall makes perfect sense. You are overjoyed. You swear you can hear the old Buddha laugh.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I agree on the smuggeling attemps of the self as being repackaged in other phrases.
so what would be the argument against the self as "the knower of the fields", or as the samhkya pov often is put, "that which observes". Why is the Purusha not considered to be the self by the Buddha? The quote I provided earlier does not refer to sutta, but to some poetic literature of the buddhas life](BUDDHA-CARITA), but still if we consider it essentially reflecting the Buddha`s position, why did he insist to also give up "the knower of the fields"? Can we say the Buddha gave that up for something more subtle?
What I essentially want to say is: If the Buddha really was the one to perfect the apophatic tradition, wouldn`t every positive definition, regardless if called buddha nature or true self, let the doctrine become less subtle and less perfect? Nevertheless i consider it currently the lesser evil to "no self", since that might one fastly drown in crypto-nihilism.
Regards
As regards the puthujjana, it needs to be borne in mind, that they cannot tell who, so to speak, is an ariyan-savaka (noble disciple). They (puthujjana) are referred to as "ariyanam adassâvî" i.e., unable to discern who is ariyan. They are simply unskilled in the path (S.iii.108). Nor has the puthujjana realized the Dhamma which has an obvious mystical implication, referring here, not to texts, but, instead, to ultimate reality. As evidence I submit this which describes dhamma in mystical, transcendent terms.
According to the commentaries (Suttanipata A. 166) one is an ariya-savaka who has had revelation (sutatta) [of Dhamma] in the presence (santike) of aryians (ariyânam santike sutattâ ariyasâvako). Well, this strikes me as a positive experience, too. There is also the stock phrase "has seen Dhamma, reached Dhamma, found Dhamma and plunged into Dhamma" (M.i.380). This is also positive. A disciple (savaka) is one who also hears the Dhamma which in Pali is parato-ghosa (M.i.294), which can be rendered, transcendent-audition.
We have to keep in mind that ariya-savakas appear to be the only ones who may enter the authentic path (ariyamaggo) to liberation which means 'right view' is supramundane, going beyond the conditioned (there is a mundane right view. Cp. M.iii.72). Again, I see the positive here also.
You have raised some interesting issues and I have tried to give them flesh finding the proper citations. This is not as difficult as it appears except that we must keep in mind that we are chained to a conditioned totality which makes escape (i.e., nibbana) an exercise greater than any prison break in recent history! We haven't even touched on meditation and how it might figure in our getaway scheme.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Regards
_/\_
metta
Potthapada 'assumes/believes/posits' ('passemi' from pacceti [pati-i]) a gross self, material, composed of the four elements, and feeding on solid food. Then he goes on to passemi a self made of mind (manomayam) and then passemi a self which is formless (arupa).
Naturally, the Buddha doesn't accept Potthapada's assumptions (pacceti) of self. He then says:
From what I can determine from the text, the Buddha's logic run thus: The attâ or self is itself and never other (than itself). Logically speaking, if the self were other than itself it would not be itself it would be anattâ. The five khandhas are essentially anattâ because they are, for the self, something other or alien to it.
This is born out when the Buddha says to Potthapada, "perception would be one thing, and the self another" (Aññâva saññâ bhavissati añño attâ) (D.i.186). In sum, the self as no determinate existence as being either gross, psychical, or formless.
This may also help to get a handle on the matter. It is from the Dhammapada.
When what is 'other' to the self is thoroughly removed, the self, now being the very content of pure mind, we can be said to have reached the other shore, in a manner of speaking. Heretofore, we acquired what was not truly the self assuming or believing (pacceti) it to be the self. This kind of acquiring produced citakilesehi, or mind-defilements. We believed that these defilements were the self until we saw otherwise.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Now, the here's what the Buddha had to say about his own teaching, in regard to this analogy:
So, while I respect your point of view, Bobby, & don't consider it to be completely out of line, I am simply not convinced.
_/\_
Imo, the debate often breaks down to that. Majority of Buddhist interpretors do not seem to accept self as transcendet, while they acknolwedge trancendental ideality in Buddhism, shifting it to Nibbana for instance. A minority claims the self is transcendental in Buddhism (not in Abhidhamma of course).
Deniers of transcendental self like to ask why no sect supposedly came up with such a self. Affirmers claim wether or not they came up with it, it is blatantly obvious when reding the nikayas. What we have is a classical dispute between tradionalists and a as heterodox perceived minority that implicitly questions the understanding of Buddhism of whole tradiotions with their ideas.
Regards
I'm just wondering how this is so blatantly obvious to them.
metta
_/\_
Well, this we try to figure out here:) I can try to summarize the position of one german scholar whose name i forgot in the next days (need time, have few
Personally, I must say I am a little of a conflict shy person and I do not like disputes at all, prefer discussions or soft debates, I am somehow forced to seek for harmony. So, when things get too hot, I stay out and wait a bit (no kitchen for me).
However, I play with open cards all the time, and I must admit that I am someone who rather likes a private region, be it as tiny as possible, not expressable at all, instead of being told i am just the aggregates, that`s all, opening me to vivisection without any shelter. Note this is how I feel, I am not to say it is fully justified within the nikayas.
Regards
What is astonishing in this, is that while the majority are shifting that transcendent over to nibbana, they've created a broad ugly ditch between the being (satta/sattva) and nibbana, itself, insofar as it is tacitly maintained that nobody realizes nibbana. Rahula, for example, goes so far as to adduce that the 'being' composed of the Five Aggregates realizes nirvana. This is to say, in other words, the Five Aggregates realize nirvana! But this idea is not to be found or even hinted at in the Pali canon. If we were to disambiguate most of what the majority has said about who or what realizes nirvana, the following might be said: nirvana is final non-rebirth death. But this is just annihilationism, that is, uccheda-vada.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
When I went to school we learned that logic concerned problems of validity—not truth. One, for example, can make a statement that is perfectly logical but untrue.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
The question of anatta seems to be heading towards asking whom or what realizes Nibbana. Perhaps what should also be remembered here is that the Buddha said that any sense of self, any self-identification view, any process of I-making and my-making, is based on either one or all of the five khandhas (MN 44, Mn 109, SN 22.1). When speaking about a self, agent, referent, et cetera, you must do so in reference to something that cannot be touched, felt, perceived, thought about, or cognized in any way whatsoever.
Please correct me if I am wrong, but effectively, you are speaking about something that, as far as experience goes, cannot be said to exist because if it cannot be experienced, how can it be said to exist. That is why, when it comes to Nibbana, such a thing is beyond words, beyond concepts, beyond existing or even not existing, as it is the final end of phenomena (AN 10.58). Logically speaking, what could be said to observe this final end of phenomena? How could it observe this? Where is it? The questions are endless.
Sincerely,
Jason
This is from the Samyutta-Nkkaya, III, 53-54:
I have used hyphens to set off "the self" (attâ) in the compounds so the discussants can see it who are without any knowledge of Pali. Attâ is here, with one exception, used in the nominative singular. You may, of course, disagree with this rendering. But from what I can see it is an uphill battle to disprove the essential message that the Buddhist votary attains nibbana.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
In gassho
Steve
The man is called Georg Grimm
just joking. Although the following interpretation of Anatta is in line with the former one`s, as far as I can see it.(However, he himself claims Grimm departet from the "original" view of the Buddha by stating his "Great Syllogism")
the guy I had in mind is calledKurt Schmid
I translate the following from the German. It is from his book "empty is the world"(Leer ist die Welt)
The Buddha defenetly rejected to claim that there is no self, however he avioded to speak about it.
Why?..."because nothing can be said about the self or "I" and whenver it is talked of a self or I there arises the danger that someone start to think of the self or I as something. Self or "I" however is a completely empty term which nothing can be thought of. The one who recognized this will stop to try to think something at all when hearing "self" or "I". For the thought, the self or I is the same as nothing. Instead of that, one can also say : The self ist transcendend, it is beyond every possibility to be recognized, but that does not mean it does not exist."
From Leer ist die Welt,chapter "Atta und Anatta", Heading "ANATTA- ZWEIERLEI DEUTUNG"
Regards
http://www.fundamentalbuddhism.com/german.htm
It seems pretty close to Grimm's Eld-Buddhist Community.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I wonder if they get along with Grimm`s Great Syllogism. Assuming a transcendental self is no gurantee for that, as Mr Schmid showed.
This sentence might settle it:
Nirvana, Perfect Wisdom, the Deathless, the Unborn, the Uncreated, the Real, the Permanent, Absolute Changeless Permanent Reality, and Self are all the same, that which is unfathomable, inconceivable, immutable, inscrutable, deep, boundless, unmeasurable, markless, signless, undefinable, incomprehensible.
Whatever the transcended object is labeld, both Grimm and them take it as a permanent reality minus all other samsaric attributes.
Regards
Oh, don't post this one either.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I thinkthe wording you gave from S.i.44 cannot be really disputed except you go for sectarian views. The self is appearent in all translations I read. Geiger notes in the German translation, that he wanted to give a "philogoical precise as possible" translation. The self is also in there.
The legitimate dispute would begin, I imagine, if you look for the commentary of Buddhagosa. It is included in the Geiger translation as footnotes. It says
- attânam no dade poso means one will not make himself a slave of others
- attânam no pariccaje means he will not surrender his life to lions, tigers etc
I defenetly have problems agreeing on Buddhgossa`s commentary on attânam no pariccaje, it seems it is far too narrow and reduces the freedom of the self just to no be eaten by wild animals. My reading is more that it also points to spiritual freedom.
We are to gather, I assume, that attâ is like a clown's wax nose inasmuch as we can make it into any shape we wish. In Buddhaghosa's treatment of self, as you have shown, the self is made into a temporal self: one which resists being a slave and being eaten.
My favorite example of the use of the clown's wax nose is this passage from the DighaN. at II, 120:
Even with Walshe's wax nose translation, "having made myself my refuge", nevertheless, it is hard to understand why the dying Buddha, who understood a refuge to be like an island which is safe from the flood of samsara, would now choose to make his refuge himself if, as some latter-day Buddhists allege, he taught anattâ.
If this refuge is only temporary, then why bother saying this? On the other hand, if the self of the Buddha is more than the sum of his temporal body, which will die shortly, then it is fitting that he should say I've made my refuge of self.
A thorough going apophatic, the Buddha, of course, has always forsaken everything that is conditioned. Now he is about to forsake his conditioned carnal body; being in his refuge—which is death free.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
"According to the Buddha, the monks have grasped merely the outer letters of his doctrine, but not its essential meaning. They have fallen victim to an extreme and inverted form of meditative practice in which they view that which is truly Eternal as something impermanent, that which is truly the Self as what is non-Self, that which is truly Blissful as suffering, and that which is truly Pure as something impure. They have failed to distinguish between what is of Samsara and what is of Great Nirvāṇa (mahā-nirvāṇa or mahā-parinirvāṇa). Saṃsāra is non-Self – thus far the monks are correct. But they have committed a serious metaphysical miscalculation – the Buddha indicates - by ascribing samsaric qualities and characteristics to the non-samsaric, to Nirvana, indeed to the Buddha himself. For while everything that is samsaric is rightly labelled as non-Self, the Buddha reveals in the course of the sūtra that he, as the Dharmakāya, is nothing less than the eternal Self (atman) itself."
I certainly believe this because it makes sense to my dull mind. Thank to the thread, it open my eye that there is the Buddha-self. In my practice, I now know where to look for.
Thanks Vacchagotta, Bobby Lanier, Fofoo for the great insights!
SG
Love ya'll,
Bobby
That is a very interesting observation. From my limited understanding, I think it is true to say that there is a sense of self-identity involved in our experience. However, in the Pali Canon, the Buddha said that this sense of self-identity comes about when one assumes one or more of the aggregates to be the self, or the self as possessing one or more of the aggregates, or one or more of the aggregates as in the self, or the self as in one or more of the aggregates (MN 109).
He also said, interestingly enough, that one should attend to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self (SN 22.122). Nevertheless, I do not think that the Buddha was concerned with questions regarding a self either positively or negatively. I think that what he was really concerned with was stress and the cessation of stress (SN 22.86). Those are just my thoughts anyway.
Jason
I think what you are referring to is sakkaya which is not at all the same as self-identity. The problematic of sakkaya is not unlike Ovid's story of Echo and Narcissus in the Metamorphoses.
As his punishment, after his hunt, Narcissus, in order to quench his thirst, sees an image in the pool of pure water and falls in love "with unbounded hope", believing to have found substance (i.e., his true self) in mere shadow (khandhas). Somewhat akin to the Buddhist asavas, Narcissus then becomes spell-bound (asava) with the sakkaya. Under this metamorphoses, clinging to shadow, i.e., the sakkaya, he wastes away, never overcoming this metamorphoses (Skt., pratityasamutpada).
Although I have condensed the story in the Metamorphoses, it is quite Buddhist in a number of respects which serves to illustrate, adequately I think, the difference between the sakkaya and self-identity in change as personified by the Bodhisat in the Jatakas.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Sorry, but I am not following you here. I am not familiar with Greek literature, so your parallel is lost on me. Perhaps you can try to explain your point to me another way, because I still do not quite understand what you mean by self-identity or identity in change. As far as I understand what you are saying, kamma can account for the continuity between lives. Past actions themselves do not have any identity (although we may easily think they are products of one), and yet they are capable of ripening as future results. After all, the five clinging-aggregates are said to be old kamma (SN 35.145). Once kamma is ended, such questions of identity longer apply as birth is ended, and there is no further becoming. However, that might not even be your point, so I apologize if I am going in the wrong direction here. But just on a side not, the Jataka stories are not canonical, only the Jataka verses are.
Jason
Can you explain the difference, Jason? And the authority, please?
Many thanks