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No offense was taken & I certainly did not feel you meant to do so either. I was just explaining that I have a hard time really nailing Buddhism down to one term or the other.
_/\_
metta
P.S.-I do like the work of Mr. Ekhart
great, fine You see I am struggling also to make sense out of some things i myself and others say, sometimes i bail out and ask for mercy
it is mentioned in the well known article about the pudgalavadins, last paragraph of the preface:
It seems, then, that they thought of some aspect or dimension of the self as transcending the aggregates and may have identified that aspect with Nirvana, which like most early Buddhists they regarded as an eternal reality.
I conclude that if "most early buddhists" regarded nirvana as eternal reality, they saw it as something apart from samsara, since eternal never applies to the latter one.
My memory, alas, fails me but I read somewhere, years ago, a discussion about nirvana and samsara being inter-dependent, both arising from sunyata, the one impossible without the other.
I agree in so far, that Nirvana would not be possible without samsara, since the elements of samsara are used to be denied when it comes to describe nirvana. though nirvana sometimes is described as greatest happyness and so forth, i currently hold the view that nirvana is a relative nothing (nihil privativum), if we speak of unborn, unconditioned and unending, it can not be anything fond in samsara, also not an emotion like happyness since emotions are never permanent, nor unconditioned.
PS: I forgot to give the source last the time, the article is here, http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pudgalav.htm, has already been posted here several times but since I used a quote from there I give it again.
Many of the Buddha's discourse might make more sense if we translated attâ, not as self or soul, but as referent. In this regard, the Buddha would be saying that the five khandhas are not the referent (anattâ).
Backing up a little, the Oxford English Dictionary defines "referent" as follows: 1. One who is referred to or consulted.
Also treating attâ as a frame of reference it makes more sense to understand the Buddha as saying that what is impermanent cannot be our frame of reference anymore than our suffering.
In the Pali canon I have found attâ to be used in several ways. Substituting referent for self or attâ, I found it used in the following ways: 1) The referent is itself and not other. This stands to reason for if the referent were other than itself it would not be a referent; 2) The referent as one's body (sakkaya); 3) The referent as transcendent to all sensory experience, e.g., this sensory determination is not the referent. By the way, most of the errors regarding self are called attagâbha, i.e., confusion regarding the self or referent.
That's interesting, but I don't think Mr. Perez-Ramon's conclusions are necessarily authoritative
& I'm not sure I fully understand some of his reasoning. In regards to the attasarana/dhammasarana comparison, it seems that the logical dilemma contingent upon how one translates them & I'm not so sure that the translations he chose are the best. If you translate attasarana as 'taking oneself as a refuge', then dhammasarana would translate as something like 'taking the dhamma as a refuge.'
Questions of "authority" properly aside, I must say I don't see your problem with any translation which would give dhammasarana as "taking the dhamma as refuge". Is that not the generally accepted meaning? Are you saying that "be a refuge unto dhamma" is actually a better way to put it?
Also, in my understanding, the attasarana is meant in the sense that one 'should not put anyone's head above his own.' After all, it is said that Awakening is simply awakening to the true nature of one's experience. It is a direct & proper knowing, rather than a confused, ignorant knowing. In this sense, I don't see this passage as creating too much of a problem for those who do not think we should imputing a higher Self. It seems we are back down to the same back & forth argument once again on whether & when atta is used in a conventional or transcendent sense. I'm really having difficulty in finding any concrete evidence for the latter & the former seems to be less exotic & dualistic.
This passage, I think we have covered very briefly back down the thread, and I find it regrettable that my arguments, which were quite convincing to me, were not apparently so to anybody else, especially to not1not2, who admits to being undecided. I think it does merit retouching on the point for some closer analysis, which I took the opportunity to go into some time ago on another website. I will repost it here, to hopefully clarify what I would call the apparent ambivalence of the passage and how closer analysis reveals its clear weightedness toward attasarana as self above and beyond "the world" and against the interepretation that attasarana here (and thus elsewhere) bears a merely conventional, worldly meaning (that atta is only that which we odinarily identify as the person: the five khandhas taken as a whole in the individual) in the sense of not relying on other people (a message, I hasten to note, which is much closer in meaning to that of the Kalamas sutta, where neither attasarana nor saranattano are found). The text of that post follows:
I am glad this passage finally came up. It represents the same concept of self as refuge as the phena sutta discussed above, but the context does lend slightly more weight to the "conventionalist" interpretation that it merely means one should rely on our own individual qualities rather than those of others for our salvation. This is a reasonable interpretation, and, I must say, not incompatible with a deeper reading which admits of attan for which there is liberation. In the phena sutta [I hasten to add], the context lends no weight to that interpretation, as has been shown. But here I can recognize that there is somewhat of an interpretive dilemma.
This passage occurs at Ananda's request for final instructions for the community. Ananda seems to express the general angst of the sangha, who must be wondering what they are going to do, who is going to lead them without their master. The Buddha's direct answer to Ananda is:
Whosoever may think that it is he who should lead the community of bhikkhus, or that the community depends upon him, it is such a one that would have to give last instructions respecting them. But, Ananda, the Tathagata has no such idea as that it is he who should lead the community of bhikkhus, or that the community depends upon him.
This is the answer to Ananda's question, and in a way it is like saying it was a stupid question. So the Buddha has already answered the question Ananda has put to him, it is now an opportunity for him to, in his classic way that we see many other times, to make the occasion into a teaching on Dhamma. All the foregoing, I understand, has been obvious. But instead of the Buddha making any further mention of relying on others, relying on teachers, he begins to talk about the decay of his body. He says:
It is, Ananda, only when the Tathagata, disregarding external objects, with the cessation of certain feelings, attains to and abides in the signless concentration of mind, 19 that his body is more comfortable.
33. "Therefore, Ananda, be islands unto yourselves, refuges unto yourselves, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as your island, the Dhamma as your refuge, seeking no other refuge.
I place particular emphasis here on the [parallel] relationship between "disregarding external objects" and "islands, refuges unto yourselves, seeking no external refuge;"
Such an emphasis is supported by what follows. Instead of elaborating by saying one is an island unto himself by relying on his own capacities, determination, personal qualities, etc, and not relying on the words, opinions, truths, etc of other people, he says of mindful contemplation of the five khandhas (which we know are not-self):
"earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; having the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge."
again, I have particular interest in "having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge". It says overcoming desire and sorrow in regard to the world (which is mindfully seen to be not-self), not overcoming reliance on other people, as an explanation of what is meant by the expressions "island, refuge" unto self (attan).
For me, if I pair this passage with the Phena sutta, [I came across saranattano in the Phena sutta quite by chance...if one were to do a search, it would not suprise me to find other similar examples of attasarana/saranattano] which totally lacks any reference to or concern with the question of reliance on other people, teachers, etc, the seamlessness of the concept is noticeable. Both here and in the Phena sutta, to be a refuge unto oneself is explained as meaning to overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world (in the Phena sutta, the five khandhas: synonymous in Buddhism to "the world" and sabbe dhamma), to seek no external refuge. So despite the slight interpretive dilemma we began with, I think there is, on more detailed consideration, a significant argument in favor of "self as refuge" above and beyond the world, as distinct though complementary to the reading which says the passage advocates a merely conventional self-reliance and nothing more.
just a question from my side to those who understand all references to self as mere conventional, never pointing to a transcendent self: Wouldn`t it be more straighforward to say: Let the 5 khandas be your refuge/Take refuge to the 5 khandas and so on? If we put it this way, there clearly we smell the stench of Mara instantly.
If one refutes the transcendend self, there is no point imo to put it otherwise. Since there is no room for a transcendend self then, all self references must point to the aggregates. One could also say then, take mara as a refuge.
I have decided to post more from Joaquin Perez-Remon's book, Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism. It is a labor of love that I do so because I have always been a struggling typist. Please disregard my typos, etc.
"The Buddha is about to die and reveals his inner disposition when about to attain parinibana. He does not say that he has left the self aside as if it were only a hindrance, he does not say either that he has waged war against the self and finally destroyed it. On the contrary he seems to give as an equivalent of his readiness to pass into utter nibbana the fact that he has made a refuge for the self. The ambivalence of the term atta becomes clear from the fact that in this sentence, me the active agent, and attano, the beneficiary of the action, are not two different entities but one and the same, that is, the Buddha who is about to attain utter nibbana. The reality of atta is linked here with the reality of nibanna" (p. 24).
* kata.m me sara.nam. attano
In the Phenapindupamasutta of the Khandhasamyutta the advice that the bhikkhu should make a refuge for the self (kareyya sara.namattano) is also connected with the obtention of nibbana, the accuta.m pada.m. The reality of atta is enhanced here by the illusory nature of the khandhas as opposed to it. Rupa is likened to foam, vedana is likened to a bubble, sanna is likened to a mirage, the sankhara is likened to a plantain-tree that has no pith, vinnana is likened to a juggler's creation. By seeing the kkhandhas in this light, the Aryan disciple grows disgusted at them, disgust produces repulsion, and repulsion lead to freedom. The metrical part of the sutta repeats the ideas of the prose part and ends up with the thought of ultimate liberation expressed in the following way:
Thus considering the khandhas [as pithless], the bhikkhu, displaying energy,
Day and night self-controlled, mindful,
Should cast off all fetters, should make a refuge for the self (kareyya saranattano),
Should behave like one whose head is ablaze, aspiring to the unfailing state (accuta.m pada.m).
'Making a refuge for the self' is here connected with 'casting off all fetters' (jaheyya sabbasa.myoga.m), which is mentioned before, and the 'aspiration for the unfailing state' (patthaya.m accuta.m pada.m), which comes soon after. All this, added to the consideration of the khandhas as something illusory is an implicit but definite assertion of the reality of atta" (p. 25).
"Even among the gods there is no other refuge for the self apart from the happiness of nibbâna" ( Devesupi attaa.na.m nibbaanasukhaa para.m natthi). --Therigatha 475 p. 24
Finally, to wind up this section on 'the self as refuge or island', we shall turn towards a stanza in the Suttanipata where those who have the self as island are said to be unattached, entirely free, i.e., aloof from whatever is samsaric which is utterly repugnant to the self:
The brahmana who intent on gaining merit would offer sacrifices,
Should bestow an offering, at the proper time,
On those who fare in the world with the self as island (ye attadipa vicaranti loke),
Possessing nothing, freed in every way (akincana sabbadhi vippamutta)" (p. 26).
I withdraw from the debate for some time, I realized I was ignorant of quite some things that have been said before already, hence I will head for meditation on the thread and return if I think I catched up with all important things that have been said by now here.
What leaves me still iritated is the argument that all talk of self is mere conventional, meaning the aggregates. We saw that the aggregates result out of interest/desire/will. Salvation is seen as losing interest for them, if they are all that is there, final salvation would mean total loss of every interest / total will denying.
fofoo, a total denial of the will (citta) was Schopenhauer's remedy for samsara. He was convinced that the will, which he considered to be ultimate reality, had no purpose or aim. It is just a blind striving.
Schopenhauer's fundamental error was his inability to understand the purpose of will's blind striving. From a Buddhist perspective, the purpose of will's striving is targeted towards self-comprehension rather than self-repulsion (duhkha).
Will is firstly a sheer immediacy which, because it is immediate with itself has no knowledge of itself (avidya). This is really its blind striving, in other words. As the will conjures up this world (which is other to itself) it begins to see traces of itself. Finally, it comes into samadhic relationship with itself which is nirvana. The will cools down in other words. There is no more striving insofar as it has found itself, purely (visuddhicitta). Everywhere the will sees itself manifested which is the vision described in the Avatamsaka Sutra. This reminds me somewhat of Zen's understanding of final enlightenment.
But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it’s just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and waters once again as waters. - Ch’ing-yüan [from the Ch’uan Teng Lu, 22]
Will is the very substance of all (substance is here not to be confused with essence). In the immediacy and ignorance of itself, there are mountains, and waters. But then will comes to realize that these are just empty manifestations. There are no real mountains and waters. Finally, by seeing that mountains and waters are creations of will, in which they are included in the will, itself, will comes to rest (nirvana). All is perfected (paramita). Mountains and waters are once again mountains and waters.
Schopenhauer was brilliant to a point. He just didn't grasp that the striving of will would stop when it comprehended itself. Heretofore, will's forms seemed blind and arbitrary which made it such. With will's actualization of itself all that changes. The world becomes beautiful. All things are manifestations of this Buddha-nature, i.e., the realized will.
Questions of "authority" properly aside, I must say I don't see your problem with any translation which would give dhammasarana as "taking the dhamma as refuge". Is that not the generally accepted meaning? Are you saying that "be a refuge unto dhamma" is actually a better way to put it?
That is not what I was saying at all. However, upon reviewing Bobby's post, I think that I may have misread what Perez-Ramon was saying the first time around, so my statement was misleading. I must have read the passage too quickly. Perhaps my coffee had not kicked in yet . I apologize for my error. I guess that point I was trying to make is now irrelevent.
Anyway, it seems that the passage referred to by Perez-Ramon supports the conventional interpretation of atta (in that instance) as the context of the passage was trying to determine who they should look to once the Buddha was gone. The Buddha responded that each individual should look to themselves & the dhamma as their guide & refuge, not on any other teacher. Taken in this context, I don't think there is any real conflict with the teaching that the khandas are anatta or mara. I imagine it would be highly difficult & arguably unnecessary for the Buddha to speak without personal pronouns & referring to the conventional self. I think that as long as one regards the conventional self in the proper manner (as an illusory perception created by the interaction of the khandas which is not self-existent & is in a constant state of flux), that there aren't any doctrinal problems with such statements. And in the instance referred to, I think it is quite clear that this is exactly what was meant by attasarana, though I can see how you might come to your conclusion. I guess we will have to agree to disagree in this instance. Now, in reference to the Phena Sutta & other suttas, I do not have a basis of knowledge, so I will refrain from commenting.
That said, my knowledge/mastery of the suttas/sutras & of the languages is quite lacking. For this reason I have decided to remain undecided (in any final sense) in regards to whether a transcendant atta/atman is being taught by means of via negativa. And while you all have made some good arguments, I prefer not to rely on the reasoning of others on such matters. Not that I think your reason is necessarily unsound, just that this is a difficult subject matter & I need a very high level of certainty which will require a lot more research on my part. Beyond that, I honestly don't find making such a decision to be of primary importance to my practice right now, and I'm not so sure when it will be.
Beyond that, I'm just going to stick to the statement that the 5 khandhas are anatta and the statement that 'conditioned phenomena are stressful (dukkha), conditioned phenomena are impermanent (anicca), and all phenomena are not-self (anatta). I will not venture any further than that. If you want to assume there is an Atta/Atman which is not conditioned, nor a phenomena, then that's fine (I guess). For me, I don't think it I need to do so, as far as my practice is concerned. And in regards to an Atta, which is not a phenomena & cannot be perceived (ineffible), can we really apply the ideas of existent/non-existent here in the same way which we apply them to perceptible phenomena. For example, space cannot be said to exist, but it cannot be said to not exist either. Same thing goes for mind. If you want to say something similar about Atta, then I can't really agree or disagree. In that sense, this conversation is moot (as far as I'm concerned).
With that, I will bow out of the debate for now, as I've already said everything I have to say multiple times.
Right now I am going over the Khadhasamyutta section of the Samyutta-Nikaya. I found another similar passage at III.17. Bear in mind that an ariya-savaka is at least stream-entered who may eventually become an Arhat.
Peter Masefield, in his book, Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism, really opens a can of worms on the subject of ariya-savaka vs. ordinary followers (puthujjana) who are not yet stream-entered. Note, that just because one becomes a monk or a nun doesn't mean they are automatically ariya-savakas. I would also mention that one can become an ariya-savaka without being a monk or a nun.
Bobby
I`d like to let you know that your view is supported by Kathā Vatthu, IV,1 (Abhidhamma), which states that a housefather can als be a saint (i do not have the pali version but the word usually transated as saint is arhat). I recently read Seidenstücker`s comments on the buddhist differentations of the different "levels" (ordinary wordly person, stream entered, one time returner, never returner and arhat) and it came to my mind you mentioned the point here. Seidenstücker also lays down that a non-monk might even become an arhat, while being a monk is not even a "gurantee" for being stream-entered(sotapanna).
I know I said I was withdrawing from the discussion, but I was just reading the Cakkavatti Sutta, and I came accross the following passage which has an explicit explanation of what is meant by 'having yourself for a refuge':
..."Monks, live with yourself as your island, yourself as your refuge, with nothing else as your refuge. Live with the Dhamma as your island, the Dhamma as your refuge, with nothing else as your refuge. And how does a monk live with himself as his island, himself as his refuge, with nothing else as his refuge; with the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, with nothing else as his refuge? There is the case where a monk remains focused on the body in & of itself — ardent, alert, & mindful — putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. He remains focused on feelings in & of themselves... mind in & of itself... mental qualities in & of themselves — ardent, alert, & mindful — putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. This is how a monk lives with himself as his island, himself as his refuge, with nothing else as his refuge; with the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, with nothing else as his refuge.
Here it seems quite clear that the word 'yourself' is meant in the conventional sense. I really don't see some higher self being implied here, as the Buddha refuted any view of 'self' that associated it with the khandhas. but rather developing maintaining proper awareness in regard oneself. This proper awareness in regard to oneself is none other than the 'Four Foundations of Mindfulness' which can be considered essential to Right View. Anyway, while this doesn't necessarily refute the Upanishadic Atman, it seem pretty clear that, in these instances, self is not meant in that sense. Considering how many times people were admonished in the Suttas for declaring what the Buddha did not declare,
I think we need to be very careful & avoid drawing too many imputations into the suttas. The Buddha was usually quite explicit. And statements such as the following make me think that pursuing this line of thought are not as important as we may think:
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.
"The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones... discerns what ideas are fit for attention, and what ideas are unfit for attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas unfit for attention, and attends [instead] to ideas fit for attention... He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices."— MN 2
I know this has been posted before on this thread, but it has been quite a while. And, once again, this is all just my opinion based on what I've read & experienced, so take it for what it's worth.
I think that it is important to clarify what 'level' of investigation and for what outcome we are undertaking. If all I want is a car that runs well, I'll put in petrol and oil. I'll take it to the garage for servicing and follow the manufacturers' instructions.
When I was young, like so many of us, I tinkered with cars, dismantling and adjusting, etc. I knew about tappets and cylinder head bolt torques, e tutti quanti. Later, working for a connector manufacturer, I learned more about engine performance.
I have never been so fascinated that I have studied metallurgy in order to work for a new and better engine or body, but I am quite sure that there is much to learn about it.
Beyond that, there are the physics and chemistry of the components and fuel. And beyond even that, there is the mathematics of the universe!
I have no doubt at all that my search for 'essence' has distracted me from practice. Like Demeter seeking Persephone, there are fields lying fallow. At the same time, I remain convinced that there is something to investigate. And that it is important. Without comparing myself with such a genius, I am aware that Albert Einstein was in agony as he worked on his extraordinary discovery, as was Isaac Newton when he completely changed the understanding of the physics of light. Life would have been less painful (as would the lives of his family!) if AE had stuck to patents.
Whilst carrying on with my 'quest', I am also reminded, daily, that there is always a price to pay and that I shall go on being told, by many Buddhists, that I am looking for something that doesn't exist.
I thought about all the differentiations of higher self, merely conventional self, atta being merely used as reflexive andso on. Frankly, does it matter?
Wether self,myself or oneself etc, it refers to me. If we take for granted that we are merely an empircal person, the 5 aggregates are all we are, how could we be stable by any means?
"You are the 5 aggregates" does not make sense to me, really. They lack control, therefore are not the self, myself, oneself etc. even the convential use, atta as a reflexisve pronoun cannot refer to them. It refers to void at best, to myself which i have no idea of what it is except the things (aggreagets) which I am not. The viodness however does not rule out the existence, it just indicates the viodness of attributes of it.
I recently came across a sutta where the lack of control of the skandhas are given as reasons why they are not yourself. I think vaccha has adressed the control issue already, I will search for the sutta and give the reference here.
PS: Thanks for your open words Simon, I partly recognize myself in them
I know I said I was withdrawing from the discussion, but I was just reading the Cakkavatti Sutta, and I came accross the following passage which has an explicit explanation of what is meant by 'having yourself for a refuge':
Thanks for posting this reference (DN 26).
This definitive passage is identical to that we have discussed in the Mahaparinibbana sutta, so does not offer any information which I have not used to support my analysis. Here again, on the other hand, is another example (as in the Phena sutta, where it is even more explicit since the ostensible topic is the emptiness of the khandhas, a text we discussed down thread) where having self as refuge occurs definitively divorced from any context of a question as to the authority of another, reliance on teachers, refuge in ritual, etc., with no mention of reliance on other persons as the issue at hand. The "conventional self," I hasten to add once again, is itself no lasting refuge and island against the overpowering waves of birth and death. In fact, it may be argued, and is argued often by the same people who insist on the conventionalist view, that such a self, the conventional identity, what we often call "ego" ("me" as opposed to "you"), is indeed the source of the problem, hardly any refuge! It is a contradictory position, especially given contextual cues we have already discussed (in the Phena sutta, the emptiness and inconstancy of the five khandhas--hardly to be relied upon as refuge; in the Mahaparinibbana sutta, the decay of the body, the fleetingness of personal existence--again, hardly any refuge)
To take refuge in self here, as in the Mahaparinibbana sutta, is defined not in terms of not relying on others (a teaching which would find itself sounding quite similar in phrasing and meaning to theme as presented in the Kalamas sutta, which does not, curiously enough, contain any reference, definitive or passing, to self as refuge--I note that this is proof that the Buddha was capable of conceiving a teaching on a conventional self-reliance without being forced to use the word "self," even in its paradoxical conventional sense), but rather, quite notably, in terms of "putting aside greed and distress (desire and sorrow) with reference to the world." We take care to remember that "the world" is notably defined in the Buddha's teaching in quite personal terms, is synonymous and interchangeable with the five clinging aggregates; in short "the world" refers exactly to that which the "conventionalist" refers to as self, yet is ever and always insistently called NOT-self by the Buddha, shown not to be a refuge and why, and declared to be for putting down, setting aside, casting off like a suit of armor after victory in battle (Mahaparinibbana sutta).
In brief, once again, the Buddha is given as defining "having self as refuge" as having put aside desire and sorrow with regard to that which is not-self! This, to my eye, all looks very plain, explicit, and up-front; it has nothing to do with imputation, inference, or trying to insert words and ideas into the Buddha's speech that are not explicitly there. It is based on what is there, which is what is so interesting about this issue, because those who would deny self or obscure its exalted usages in conventionalism, seem to think that this reading requires obscurantism and mystification, while in fact it is just out in the open in the Buddha's teaching, and the more familiar one is with these teachings the more insistent the theme begins to look.
Finally, I would like to note that I hesitate to call this "the Upanishadic Atman," for we require no reference to the Upanishads for support of the Buddha's advocacy for self; we need only look to the sutta pitaka as we have been doing.
Once again, we are at an impass. However, I would say that this statement is the one that we can all agree upon & is arguably the most important:
putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world
I also agree that the khandhas are anatta (devoid of eternal, unchanging, independent existence). I never said otherwise. But you seem to be denying that the Buddha used the term 'self' in it's conventional meaning, or that such an interpretation is appropriate. I disagree & do not feel there is any conflict in the teachings. Also, I do not agree that the Phena sutta gets more explicit about the phrases 'yourself as a refuge' & 'dhamma as a refuge' as it not discussing this specific phrase. I am well aware that the world refers to the 6 sense bases (& the khandhas), and I do not think that this refutes what I am saying.
That said, I don't think our philosophical disagreement will affect our practice, as developing the 4 foundations of mindulness will have the same function & effect regardless of whether or not there is an Atta outside the khandas.
The "conventional self," I hasten to add once again, is itself no lasting refuge and island against the overpowering waves of birth and death. In fact, it may be argued, and is argued often by the same people who insist on the conventionalist view, that such a self, the conventional identity, what we often call "ego" ("me" as opposed to "you"), is indeed the source of the problem, hardly any refuge! It is a contradictory position, especially given contextual cues we have already discussed (in the Phena sutta, the emptiness and inconstancy of the five khandhas--hardly to be relied upon as refuge; in the Mahaparinibbana sutta, the decay of the body, the fleetingness of personal existence--again, hardly any refuge)
Vacchagotta,
It is interesting that you bring this particular subject up, because I have always seen the five khandhas as the burden (as seen in SN 22.22) as well as the very same material we can use to construct the path (as seen in SN 22.79). The relationship between these two seemingly contradictory statements is not so hard to see when we take into consideration the role that intention plays in our overall experience, and how to use our experience of the five khandhas to observe and understand this process intimately. I could attempt to explain this relationship a bit further, but I fear that I would not do it just; therefore, I shall offer this essay by the Venerable Thanissaro in order to make this connection clearer: Five Piles of Bricks: The Khandhas as Burden & Path.
I recently came across a sutta where the lack of control of the skandhas are given as reasons why they are not yourself. I think vaccha has adressed the control issue already, I will search for the sutta and give the reference here.
I found it, it is Majjhima Nikaya 35
Aggivessana, you that say, matter is your self, do you wield power over that matter, as may my matter be thus, and not otherwise? .No, good Gotama. Attend carefully and reply Aggivessana. What you said earlier does not agree with what you say now.
Aggivessana, you that say, feelings are your self...
Aggivessana, you that say, determinations are your self....
Aggivessana, you that say, perceptions are your self...
Aggivessana, you that say, consciousness is your self....
What do you think, Aaggivessana, is matter permanent or impermanent? Impermanent good Gotama. That impermanent thing, is it unpleasant or pleasant? Unpleasant good Gotama. That impermanent, unpleasant, changing thing, is it suitable to be considered; that is mine, that I be, that is my self? No good Gotama.. Aggivessana, are feelings—are perceptions,--are determinations,--is consciousness permanent or impermanent? Impermanent good Gotama. That impermanent thing is it unpleasanat or pleasant? Unpleasant, good Gotama.That impermanent, unpleasant, changing thing, is it suitable to be considered, that is mine, that I be, that is my self? No, good Gotama..Aggivessana, a certain one clinging to unpleasantness, over powered by it, pressed down by it and reflecting it’s mine, would think it’s my self. Would he accurately understand unpleasaantness by himself or ward it off and abide? Good Gotama, how could it be. No, good Gotama, that would not happen.
It is interesting that you bring this particular subject up, because I have always seen the five khandhas as the burden (as seen in SN 22.22) as well as the very same material we can use to construct the path (as seen in SN 22.79). The relationship between these two seemingly contradictory statements is not so hard to see when we take into consideration the role that intention plays in our overall experience, and how to use our experience of the five khandhas to observe and understand this process intimately....
Thanks, Jason, for your contribution. I'm glad that this reiteration of our respective thoughts has offered the opportunity for the conversation to address fresh texts on the topic. I guess occasionally the outcome of repetitiveness can be fruitful. What you have cited as seemingly ambivalent I don't see as ambivalent at all. The Khajjaniya sutta is a very interesting one, and I dare say contrary to your interpretation of it, supportive of the case I am trying to make. I find your interpretation to be somewhat idiosyncratic, and quite unsupported by the text itself, as it has nothing constructive to say of the khandhas whatsoever, most especially not as a refuge. What it does say, not at all even on the surface of it seeming to contrast in approach to the Bhara sutta with respect to the khandhas, which shares its negativity in calling them a "burden" to be laid down, is this:
"This, monks, is called a disciple of the noble ones who tears down and does not build up; who abandons and does not cling; who discards and does not pull in; who scatters and does not pile up.
"And what does he tear down and not build up? He tears down form and does not build it up. He tears down feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness and does not build it up.
"And what does he abandon and not cling to? He abandons form and does not cling to it. He abandons feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness and does not cling to it.
"And what does he discard and not pull in? He discards form and does not pull it in. He discards feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness and does not pull it in.
"And what does he scatter and not pile up? He scatters form and does not pile it up. He scatters feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness and does not pile it up."
The explicit teaching of the sutta is in fact the opposite in meaning to taking refuge in the khandhas: to tear down, abandon, discard and scatter them! Regarding the Thanissaro article, I do not argue with the venerable in that he does not endeavor to reject the possibility of transcending the khandhas. In the article, interestingly enough, he writes in somewhat conservative fashion, of "As one of the discourses states, the freedom lying beyond the khandhas" and provides a list of descriptive indicators of this "total freedom", none of which is applicable to the khandhas, and which includes, notably: the island, shelter, harbor, refuge."
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. In reading this sutta, with appreciation for your having brought it to light, I was struck by How the Buddha defined "neither scattering nor piling up". Left unexplained, it could probably be interpreted as an expression of moderation, of tolerance, of leaving alone, or perhaps even as keeping the khandhas as the means and locus of liberation. Contrary to this, he defines it clearly as " stands having scattered it".
Perhaps I am mistaken; however, I do not understand how SN 22.79 is contrary to my interpretation because the sutta itself states that one reflects upon the various aspects of the five khandhas in such a way as to develop disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation with regard to the khandhas themselves. As the Venerable Thanissaro mentions, this suggests that there is the potential for each of the five khandhas to turn into discernible aggregates through the process of fabrication. This idea also is supported by the Buddha's statement:
"I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear. But at the same time, I tell you that there is no making an end of suffering & stress without reaching the end of the cosmos. Yet it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception & intellect, that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos." (AN 4.45)
In other words, an instructed disciple takes the five khandhas, which are inconstant, stressful, and not-self, and reflects upon them in such a way that they actively construct the path leading to disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation—one must first observe them, then discern them as they actually are, then abandon clinging for them, then grow disenchanted with them, then become dispassionate towards them, and finally, through dispassion, gain full release. This process of release is only possible due to the five khandhas themselves.
In other words, an instructed disciple takes the five khandhas, which are inconstant, stressful, and not-self, and reflects upon them in such a way that they actively construct the path leading to disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation—one must first observe them, then discern them as they actually are, then abandon clinging for them, then grow disenchanted with them, then become dispassionate towards them, and finally, through dispassion, gain full release. This process of release is only possible due to the five khandhas themselves.
Respectfully,
Jason
sorry to disturb you two, jason and vaccha,but...
from my understanding, detachment is the last step before full release. It is a result of disenchantement and dispassion, not vice versa. On what grounds could I gain detachment if I still am not disenchanted about the aggregates, and still am full of passion/desire for them? In other words, losing interest for them or detach from them is an act of dispassion, gained thru right (disenchanted) view towards the aggregates.
"Seeing thus, the instructed disciple of the noble ones grows disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with consciousness. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully released.' He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.' (SN 22.79)
from my understanding, detachment is the last step before full release. It is a result of disenchantement and dispassion, not vice versa. On what grounds could I gain detachment if I still am not disenchanted about the aggregates, and still am full of passion/desire for them? In other words, losing interest for them or detach from them is an act of dispassion, gained thru right (disenchanted) view towards the aggregates.
Thought I'd throw this in here since it applies to this point (the sequence of liberation):
Upanisa Sutta
While staying at Savatthi the Exalted One said:
"The destruction of the cankers, monks, is for one who knows and sees, I say, not for one who does not know and does not see. Knowing what, seeing what does the destruction of the cankers occur? 'Such is material form, such is the arising of material form, such is the passing away of material form. Such is feeling... perception... mental formations... consciousness; such is the arising of consciousness, such is the passing away of consciousness' — for one who knows and sees this, monks, the destruction of the cankers occurs.
"The knowledge of destruction with respect to destruction has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for the knowledge of destruction? 'Emancipation' should be the reply.
"Emancipation, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for emancipation? 'Dispassion' should be the reply.
"Dispassion, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for dispassion? 'Disenchantment' should be the reply.
"Disenchantment, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for disenchantment? 'The knowledge and vision of things as they really are' should be the reply.
"The knowledge and vision of things as they really are, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for the knowledge and vision of things as they really are? 'Concentration' should be the reply.
"Concentration, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for concentration? 'Happiness' should be the reply.
"Happiness, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for happiness? 'Tranquillity' should be the reply.
"Tranquillity, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for tranquillity? 'Rapture' should be the reply.
"Rapture, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for rapture? 'Joy' should be the reply.
"Joy, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for joy? 'Faith' should be the reply.
"Faith, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for faith? 'Suffering' should be the reply.
"Suffering, monks, also has a supporting condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for suffering? 'Birth' should be the reply.
"And what is the supporting condition for birth?. 'Existence' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for existence? 'Clinging' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for clinging? 'Craving' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for craving? 'Feeling' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for feeling? 'Contact' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for contact? 'The sixfold sense base' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for the sixfold sense base? 'Mentality-materiality' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for mentality-materiality? 'Consciousness' should be the reply.
"What is the supporting condition for consciousness? 'Kamma formations' should be the reply.
"Kamma formations, monks, also have a supporting condition, I say, they do not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition for kamma formations? 'Ignorance' should be the reply.
Anyway, the statement that 'the whole of the holy life can be found within this fathom long body' can be found in many places, such as the one provided by Jason. This indicates that we are not attempting to go outside the khandas, but rather come to know them as they really are, which leads to the subsequent disenchantment, dispassion, & emancipation. We are not cultivating a knowledge of an Atta outside the khandhas here at all, but rather a knowledge of the self & the world which leads to the end of the holy life. This statement seems to confirm my interpretion of 'yourself' which is found in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta & the Cakkavatti Sutta as a conventional rendering.
I agree that we talk on a rather generic level about the things, and detaching-> disenchentment-> dispassion or any other order might not neccessarily be a static recipe for gaining release, but in fact it might constantly affecting eacht other when we talk about overall or general progress, not about the process of detaching from a specific kandha, like a certain feeling, thought and so on.
From my personal understanding though, i feel that dispassion is needed for detachement, maybe I am wrong, but I think only when having reached dispassion towards any skandha or part of a skandha (a certain body e.g. a beloved one, a certain feeling and so on) releasing without suffering is possible, elsewise the passion/desire will cause suffering for the very try of detaching from things.
Am I right to assume that the Pali term translated as emancipation is the same that is sometimes translated as detachment? I admit I would have a encountered a serious probem in understanding the Dhamma if detaching comes before dispassion/loosing desire.
after googling a bit, it turned out that vimutti, the term translated as emancipation, sometimes is translated "objective detachment", while viraga, the term translated as dispassion, is sometimes translated as detachment.
Talking plain english now, using both my authentic, original confusion and wisdom, I`d say I have to lose passion/desire first before I can detach without suffering
Also, I do not agree that the Phena sutta gets more explicit about the phrases 'yourself as a refuge' & 'dhamma as a refuge' as it not discussing this specific phrase. I am well aware that the world refers to the 6 sense bases (& the khandhas), and I do not think that this refutes what I am saying.
not1not2,
Thanks for your considered reply. Allow me to clarify what I said. You appear to have read my statement as offering that the Phena sutta gives a more definitive analysis of the phrases in question. That was not really my intention, as the sutta is only a case where the concept of refuge for/as self is mentioned without elaboration, except to reinforce that mindfulness is the means of self-refuge. What is more explicitly apparent in the Phena sutta, however, is the context in which this mention occurs, which I note once again is explicitly devoid of any mention of, question about, or concern with the issue of reliance on other persons which is so much the focus of the conventional-only reading. Namely the discourse's topic is that the khandhas (which would be the referent for a conventional-only reading of sarann'attano) are empty and valueless in terms of the holy life, not reliable, not lasting, not solid. They are compared to some of the most insubstantial, fleeting things of this world. To me this quite simply defies any conception of them as being adequate to being called self or especially not refuge, an expression of safety and stability, and escape.
That's the way it goes:
it's a magic trick,
an idiot's babbling.
It's said to be
a murderer.1
No substance here
is found.
Thus a monk, persistence aroused,
should view the aggregates
by day & by night,
mindful,
alert;
should discard all fetters;
should make himself
his own refuge;
It just seems such a glaring contradiction not only to call what is called empty and non-self by very term you are denying of it (self) and take that "mere conventionalism" further by giving it a transcendent value, a value clearly above the value given to "the world", saying it is a refuge. That interpretation would be helped greatly by the existence of some passage which clearly sets out this ambivalence in a phraseology that clearly defines the identity rather than the difference of what is called self and what is called not-self, such as "and what monks, is self? self is just the five khandhas" or "what is called not-self is the self". In fact the prevailing structure is quite the opposite: there are clear listed criteria by which that which is not-self fails to live up to being called self by the Buddha; also what is called not-self is semantically elaborated as being "not my self" (na me so atta), widening the interpretive gap rather than closing it. It seems more natural to read it that self as refuge is that which what has just been called empty and is ever and insistently called not-self is not. Not-self is not-self. Self is self.
That said, I don't think our philosophical disagreement will affect our practice, as developing the 4 foundations of mindulness will have the same function & effect regardless of whether or not there is an Atta outside the khandas.
This I can tentatively agree with. For me, suttas like this go a long way in giving us a fuller picture that the practice of mindfulness entails not only merely paying attention to the khandhas as ordinarily experienced (you find this taught in so many Zen centers), but rather to remember (Sati also carries a strong aroma of remembrance/recollection, as it also means "recollect"--in other words to keep in mind what we tend to forget) these deeper properties (anicca, dukkha, anatta) of the khandhas which make them inappropriate as safe harbor in the storm of birth and death. It is thereby, through constant remembrance of these truths, that one cultivates dispassion and detachment, abandoning joy and sorrow with regard to them.
Thanks for your clarification of your Phena Sutta reference. I still don't fully agree with the way you are analyzing, but I can see what you are saying.
It just seems such a glaring contradiction not only to call what is called empty and non-self by very term you are denying of it (self) and take that "mere conventionalism" further by giving it a transcendent value, a value clearly above the value given to "the world", saying it is a refuge.
I don't think I'm giving it a transcendent value here at all. What else than one's own experience (& the Dhamma) do we have to realize the fruition of the holy path? My interpretation of dual phrases of taking oneself as a refuge & the dhamma as a refuge does not conflict with the passages & analysis you have provided, IMO. And I really don't think that we can say that the conventional rendering places it above the value given to "the world." Once again, the buddha (in these passages) does not say to put aside the world, but rather our passion & distress in regard to it. And there is certainly no reference to a higher Atta in the buddhas explanation of what these statements mean. Otherwise, he would have launched into a discourse of the khandhas being anatta, rather than the 4 foundations of mindfulness which do not involve throwing away the khandas at all. The sutta indicates that we are to reflect on nothing but our own experience in the light of the Dhamma. Once again, this interpretation is supported by the statement that "the whole of the holy life is found within this fathom long body." Now, are you going to suggest that the Atta can be found within the body? :tongue2:
Anyway, I am getting tired of repeating myself, so I'm going to refrain from further discussion if all it is going to involve is rehashing the same arguments we have been posting for the past 20+ pages.
sorry to point out the obvious, but does anyone realize that it is about volition, kamma?
throwing away the kanddhas is nonsense imo. it translates to suicide, plain and simple.
It´s obvious to me that suffering is the result of the desire for the kandhas. They are, as Vaccha as pointed out correctly, impermanet, stressful and not yours, not yourself. They have to be looked at as something alien. What else should the not-self of the kandhas imply? Any attempt of creating an artifical identity based on them is wrong view, leads to suffering, distracts from the path.
As long as we are in samsara, we have the kandhas. Nibbana is desribed as loss of passion and detachment from the kandhas. If one of us achieves paranibbana, they will be gone. that is my understanding. since all phenomena will be gone then, nothing is left that can be described.throwing away the kandhas is no active process, like throwing away a body, e.g.jumping from a bridge, it rather results from will acting, whenthere is no more kamma left, no ground, no new fuel for the kandhas is there.
there are some symbols that desribe it, like a fire gone out but the place were it where is still warm (nibbana), while paranibbana being the fire out and the place being cold. I don`t know how to express it better, throwing away the kandhas is not actively destryoing them, but it rather results from having no desire for them. When no kamma is left, their birth has ended, they have not been killed, they rather find nonew ground after the death of the individual person.
The relationship between these two seemingly contradictory statements is not so hard to see when we take into consideration the role that intention plays in our overall experience, and how to use our experience of the five khandhas to observe and understand this process intimately.
Based on the Ariyamaggasutta what you said rings very true in light that the Buddha said his way was a kamma for the cessation of kamma. It's not about literally opposing the existence of the khandhas by simply destroying them as in suicide, it's about discarding them in the sense of no longer grasping them and thereby abandoning them as their natural term of existence expires; as you phrased it looking at them, identifying them as something alien (para). It is all said nicely in the sutta which was recently brought up, SN22.79 Khajjaniyasutta (S iii . 86), where the khandhas are for abandoning, not for holding.
It strikes me that in saying the khandhas may be our refuge that we could be mixing our metaphors, mistaking the path and the means of the path for that which the path aims for (refuge). If we say that the path which is enacted in life (in this fathom long body) is like a raft or a chariot, we say so in distinction to the refuge, the home, the goal which we aim them towards. That is why the Buddha spoke of relay chariots which are successively abandoned and also of leaving the raft behind. The raft is not our refuge. The other shore is.
This talk of the fathom-long body sutta strikes me as somewhat taken out of context. The sutta in which this passage occurs voices no question regarding self and non-self, nor does it say that the fathom-long body is itself any kind of refuge or can be made into any kind of refuge. It is just that freedom from suffering is neither gained by travelling nor by changing form of existence. Pretty plain, it seems to me. Regarding the question of self "in the body," or the idea that the khandhas are the sum total of the person, the Yamaka sutta should be studied carefully.
I really cannot understand why anyone would consider any kandha as a refuge. We repeatedly showed it lackes controll, it is not yours, it is impermanent, it is stressfull.
Such a refuge will fall victim to random change since it is conditioned. We can not form any kandha according to our wishes. What we can form however, are the wishes themselves, having no desire or wish in reagrds to the kandhas i consider to be the fruit of the path, as the sutta you provided says, the eightfold path results in kamma that will end all kamma.
In other words, the kandhas are the results of our kamma, but we have nomeans of directly manipulating them. Elsewise we could say, let form be thus, let feeling be thus and so on. They are not under our direct control. Our means are looking after our kamma-formations since this is what we create and are able to control and change. That`s my understanding I drew from the debate until now.
I would simply say that in these to instances (the Mahaparinibbana & Cakkavatti) the term oneself/yourself does not mean taking a khanda stance, but simply means that we, the practitioner, take our experience & the dhamma to be our only basis of practice (not the experience of another or a teaching that is not the Dhamma). It is only in that sense that we take refuge in ourselves, because anything beyond that falls into the problems that Vaccha has been mentioning.
_/\_
metta
P.S.-I do understand the essential role that volitional action plays in this
Perhaps things would be clearer if the posts as well as the references were read a bit more thoroughly. I would just hope that someone takes the time to carefully sift through all this information and seriously contemplate their profundity before they merely take a position and argue it endlessly. The Dhamma is more than an intellectual's game of debate; it is a path of practice to be implemented for the one's own long term welfare and happiness.
I really cannot understand why you chose to make that statement. Interestingly, you take a postion yourself at the end of your post, I wonder where you got it from, I always thought the Dhamma is about the ending of suffering which is not the same as happiness.
Anyways, since I feel adressed by your critique and I admit I tend to answer selectivly and do not study all given references before posting, I will bail out again of the debate for a while and observe it.
I apologize if you are unhappy with my statement; nevertheless, I made that statement because I felt that it was worth mentioning. If you disagree with my assessment, that is fine; however, I have seen people simply continue their arguments without actually addressing the posts and/or references that they are apparently arguing against. It makes this entire dialogue counterproductive. Concerning one's long term welfare and happiness, perhaps reading AN 3.65, DN 16, MN 21, and MN 135 will help to answer your questions about where I got it from.
I can understand your concerns and as I already said, I admit to not read every information given completely or with equal effort. Nevertheless I wouldn`t argue if things were just my personal conjecture without having any base within the tipitika,
I find it important to note that the fetters/chains are destroyed, not the kandhas, birth is prevented, not the kandhas literally murdered. It`s obvious that elsewise, the prejudice that Buddhism is hostile towards life that some circles have would be falsely given new fuel.
I still find it problematic to speak of happyness as a summary of the dhamma though, if you read the sources you gave earlier and the one not1not2 gave, cessation of suffering (dukkha) is more safe to say imo, the 3th noble truth is also about the ending of suffering/stress/dissatisfaction...(dukkha), not the creation of happyness. I do not hold this to be merely a word game, but an important and maybe very subtle difference.
I will take your advice now and study the sources given by you and others lately more deeply and eventually return when I have something new and worthwhile to say.
Finally, I would like to note that I hesitate to call this "the Upanishadic Atman," for we require no reference to the Upanishads for support of the Buddha's advocacy for self; we need only look to the sutta pitaka as we have been doing.
in friendliness,
V.
Short Note before I have my break:
I finished "The Buddha Nature: Death and Eternal Soul in Buddhism", the Dalai Lama argues in there that the Buddha merely argued against against an upanishadic self,outside of body and mind, not against a self per se. What case the Dalai wants to make, what kind ofself he advoctes remained unlcear to me after finishing the book.
I have earlier made the point that we may treat attâ or self as the referent or, alternatively, as the frame of reference. This helps to clear up some of the confusion about the five khandhas/anatta when it comes to properly understanding what is to be rejected as mere phenomenality and what is not to be rejected. Perhaps Pande says it better that I.
“The doctrine [of an-attâ = not the self] denies that there is in the physical or mental realms anything which may properly be called one’s “self” since everywhere within them impermanence and dependence rule. This of itself does not mean the denial of all “self” whatever, but only of the phenomenality of the “self”. What is usually denied is that any of the khandhas may be the Attâ, not the existence of the Attâ as such. Even in the more positive later literature, the Attâ that is denied is often conceived purely phenomenally" (Origins of Buddhism, 499).
If we accept his reasoning then we may conclude that one of the main goals of the Buddha's mission was to get people to stop treating the self or attâ as if it were a phenomenon. Indeed, the Buddha's smilies are to the point, that the khandhas cannot be the referent. While seeming to be real for the ordinary person, they are, nevertheless, ephemeral. Form, for example, is said to be like a lump of foam. Feeling is like a water bubble and so on to the last khandha in which the Buddha says that consciousness in but an illusion (S.iii.142). In no discourse of which I am aware does the Buddha unambiguously say or suggest that the attâ or self is ephemeral.
It is my opinion that people who find it difficult to accept that the Buddha taught the ephemerality of the five khandhas and not the self are confused about the Buddhist religion is general. They have mistaken Buddhism for an ancient version of materialism in which the nonmaterial is denied. Fundamentally, they believe in what their senses perceive which adds up, also, to the philosophy of naive realism. There is, however, little or no evidence for such a position in Buddhism. One of the major themes of Buddhism is that all things (thing is the sense of a quality or attribute) are impermanent, suffering and are without a self (anattâ). Nowhere does the Buddha indicate that the self is included in phrase "all things". In particular, what comprises the "all" (sabbe) are the six senses (S.iv.15). The referent we can judge is beyond the range of the six senses. It is the one who knows that it is not, itself, in pain but that its fixation on the ephemeral entity is pain-causing.
I think any credible scholar worth their salt would agree that all the passages relating to attâ or aelf must be counted and weighted by a variety of means (e.g., hemeneutics) avoiding the doctrinaire. This is the way evidence works. We have to become convinced by the mix of quantity and quality. On the other hand, deploying ingeniousness without evidence; trying to prove the assertion that the Buddha denied the self is little more than putting the conclusion ahead of the evidence. This is the a priori fallacy.
The habit of selecting passages from the Buddhist canon then twisting them into proofs of a so-called no-self doctrine is also the habit of ignoring numerous other passages in which the no-self doctrine is inapplicable as Joaquin Perez-Remon shows in his work, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. The earlier parts of the canon, including the commentaries, it should be underscored, makes no clear establishment of a no-self doctrine anymore than say the Christian Gospels explicitly formulate a Trinitarian doctrine. The no-self doctrine is the handiwork of post-parinirvana Buddhist monks in which the Buddha is but a passing memory. Their added basket, the Abhidhamma, doesn't stand the evidentiary test of being part of the founder's original teaching. If anything, it is a taxonomy of error in which any vestige of the ephemeral we might cherish as the self is negated. Our present body, in this context, is precisely what we are not. And any reason to cling to it only invites more suffering for the referent.
Thank you Bobby for bringing your point up again that has virtually been ignored by the rest of us. From my current understanding, I wholeheartedly agree with your assessment, espacially this I find important to highlight:
They have mistaken Buddhism for an ancient version of materialism in which the nonmaterial is denied.Fundamentally, they believe in what their senses perceive which adds up, also, to the philosophy of naive realism
Do you have references to suttas where the materialists (Cārvāka/Lokyāta) are explicitly addressed?
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I do it on the daily,
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They buy me all these ices.
Dolce & Gabbana,
Fendi and Donna
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All their money got me wearin' fly
brother I ain't askin,
They say they love my ass ‘n,
Seven Jeans, True Religion's,
I say no, but they keep givin'
So I keep on takin'
And no I ain't taken
We can keep on datin'
I keep on demonstrating.
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You love my lady lumps,
My hump, my hump, my hump,
My humps they got u,
She's got me spending.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me and spending time on me.
She's got me spendin'.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me, up on me, on me
What you gon' do with all that junk?
All that junk inside that trunk?
I'ma get, get, get, get, you drunk,
Get you love drunk off my hump.
What u gon' do with all that ass?
All that ass inside them jeans?
I'm a make, make, make, make you scream
Make u scream, make you scream.
Cos of my hump, my hump, my hump, my hump.
My hump, my hump, my hump, my lovely lady lumps. (Check it out)
I met a girl down at the disco.
She said hey, hey, hey yea let's go.
I could be your baby, you can be my honey
Let's spend time not money.
mix your milk wit my cocoa puff,
Milky, milky cocoa,
Mix your milk with my cocoa puff, milky, milky riiiiiiight.
They say I'm really sexy,
The boys they wanna sex me.
They always standing next to me,
Always dancing next to me,
Tryin' a feel my hump, hump.
Lookin' at my lump, lump.
U can look but you can't touch it,
If you touch it I'ma start some drama,
You don't want no drama,
No, no drama, no, no, no, no drama
So don't pull on my hand boy,
You ain't my man, boy,
I'm just tryn'a dance boy,
And move my hump.
My hump, my hump, my hump, my hump,
My hump, my hump, my hump, my hump, my hump, my hump.
My lovely lady lumps (lumps)
My lovely lady lumps (lumps)
My lovely lady lumps (lumps)
In the back and in the front (lumps)
My lovin' got u,
She's got me spendin'.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me and spending time on me.
She's got me spendin'.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me, up on me, on me.
What you gon' do wit all that junk?
All that junk inside that trunk?
I'ma get get get get you drunk
Get you love drunk off my hump.
What you gon' do wit all the ass
All that ass inside those jeans.
I'ma make make make make you scream
Make you scream, make you scream.
What you gon' do wit all that junk
All that junk inside that trunk
I'ma get get get get you drunk
Get you love drunk off this hump.
What you gon' do wit all that breast?
Sh'all that breast inside that shirt?
I'ma make, make, make, make you work
Make you work, work, make you work.
She's got me spendin'.
Spendin all your money on me and spendin' time on me
She's got me spendin'.
Spendin' all your money on me, up on me, on me.
Thanks for the rather funny text, but I`d prefer a sutta.
I could dedcuce critique of the Cārvāka/Lokyāta, but I would be interested if there are some Suttas where they are explicitly adressed, meaning the term appears, or a philospher of them. I know one where Makkhali Gosala is adressed and dismissed but he wasn`t a materialist, he affirmed kamma and rebirth but denied free will, hence he was a determinist/fatalist.
If I understood correctly, "consuming junkies" are merely a part of the materialists that are dismissed by the buddha. Socialists, followers of scientism and all other groups that deny all spiritual concepts like kamma and rebirth fall into that category too.
Now I will keep my promise and reflect on other things that have been said first
Sorry, but I'm really getting tired of the Theravada slams. Anyone who looks into Abhidhamma will realize it is far from 'naive' & that it certainly is not a materialistic view.
BTW, you still never answered my question as to why you signed your name as A.E. (post #333) a ways back. I am honestly very suspicious of your agenda here, considering the constistent attacks on the Theravada tradition you keep posting.
fofoo: Do you have references to suttas where the materialists (Cārvāka/Lokyāta) are explicitly addressed?
K.N. Jayatilleke's book, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge is a must read if you wish to immerse yourself in the almost ignominious details of the materialists.
These might give you some direction as least from the Indian side:
“Another synonym of Chrvaka [a materialist] is Lokayata which means a commoner and therefore, by implication, a man of low and unrefined taste” (Indian Philosophy: A Critical Survey, by Chandradhar Sharma; Rider, 1960, 41).
"According to the Cârvâka (materialist), consciousness is not a separate Reality. He holds that Reality consist of the objective world only which is constituted by the four Mahabhutas (Primary Elements), viz., earth, water, fire, and air" (Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta).
Related to this and hopefully helpful for you, Jayatilleke points out that some of the Upanisadic conceptions of the atman are notably materialistic insofar as the atman is conceived of as being 'the size of a thumb' or as being 'smaller than a grain of rice'.
not1not2: "naive realism" is a fixed philosophical term that indicates a certain epistemological position. You can look it up. Although it might be not a nice expression, it certainly does not hold the every day meaning of naivity that is often equated with stupidity. As to the Abbidhamma, i must say I am still critical of it but i have no indepth knowledge of it, that`s why I always emphazise my judgements are made from my current understanding when such is the case.
bobby: thanks for recommendations! I surely will have a look. In western Philosophy, outside of the traditional idealistic philosphers, Kant is important to that, his thing in itself that designates pure objectivity is not to be recognized. Schopenhauer also wrote that "...materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself." In his "fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason", he argued that the battle between realists and nominalists were to break out again,he`d rather side with the nominalists (since it reflects the position that objects only can be known in relation to a subject I guess). I`ll end the excourse on that at this point, should i find suttas were materialists are explicitly adressed, I will give you all the references.
Comments
great, fine
It seems, then, that they thought of some aspect or dimension of the self as transcending the aggregates and may have identified that aspect with Nirvana, which like most early Buddhists they regarded as an eternal reality.
I conclude that if "most early buddhists" regarded nirvana as eternal reality, they saw it as something apart from samsara, since eternal never applies to the latter one.
PS: I forgot to give the source last the time, the article is here, http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pudgalav.htm, has already been posted here several times but since I used a quote from there I give it again.
http://www.nirvanasutra.org.uk/buddhanaturenotupaya.htm
Love ya'll
Bobby
Backing up a little, the Oxford English Dictionary defines "referent" as follows: 1. One who is referred to or consulted.
Also treating attâ as a frame of reference it makes more sense to understand the Buddha as saying that what is impermanent cannot be our frame of reference anymore than our suffering.
In the Pali canon I have found attâ to be used in several ways. Substituting referent for self or attâ, I found it used in the following ways: 1) The referent is itself and not other. This stands to reason for if the referent were other than itself it would not be a referent; 2) The referent as one's body (sakkaya); 3) The referent as transcendent to all sensory experience, e.g., this sensory determination is not the referent. By the way, most of the errors regarding self are called attagâbha, i.e., confusion regarding the self or referent.
Love ya'all,
Bobby
This passage, I think we have covered very briefly back down the thread, and I find it regrettable that my arguments, which were quite convincing to me, were not apparently so to anybody else, especially to not1not2, who admits to being undecided. I think it does merit retouching on the point for some closer analysis, which I took the opportunity to go into some time ago on another website. I will repost it here, to hopefully clarify what I would call the apparent ambivalence of the passage and how closer analysis reveals its clear weightedness toward attasarana as self above and beyond "the world" and against the interepretation that attasarana here (and thus elsewhere) bears a merely conventional, worldly meaning (that atta is only that which we odinarily identify as the person: the five khandhas taken as a whole in the individual) in the sense of not relying on other people (a message, I hasten to note, which is much closer in meaning to that of the Kalamas sutta, where neither attasarana nor saranattano are found). The text of that post follows:
I am glad this passage finally came up. It represents the same concept of self as refuge as the phena sutta discussed above, but the context does lend slightly more weight to the "conventionalist" interpretation that it merely means one should rely on our own individual qualities rather than those of others for our salvation. This is a reasonable interpretation, and, I must say, not incompatible with a deeper reading which admits of attan for which there is liberation. In the phena sutta [I hasten to add], the context lends no weight to that interpretation, as has been shown. But here I can recognize that there is somewhat of an interpretive dilemma.
This passage occurs at Ananda's request for final instructions for the community. Ananda seems to express the general angst of the sangha, who must be wondering what they are going to do, who is going to lead them without their master. The Buddha's direct answer to Ananda is: This is the answer to Ananda's question, and in a way it is like saying it was a stupid question. So the Buddha has already answered the question Ananda has put to him, it is now an opportunity for him to, in his classic way that we see many other times, to make the occasion into a teaching on Dhamma. All the foregoing, I understand, has been obvious. But instead of the Buddha making any further mention of relying on others, relying on teachers, he begins to talk about the decay of his body. He says: I place particular emphasis here on the [parallel] relationship between "disregarding external objects" and "islands, refuges unto yourselves, seeking no external refuge;"
Such an emphasis is supported by what follows. Instead of elaborating by saying one is an island unto himself by relying on his own capacities, determination, personal qualities, etc, and not relying on the words, opinions, truths, etc of other people, he says of mindful contemplation of the five khandhas (which we know are not-self):
again, I have particular interest in "having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge". It says overcoming desire and sorrow in regard to the world (which is mindfully seen to be not-self), not overcoming reliance on other people, as an explanation of what is meant by the expressions "island, refuge" unto self (attan).
For me, if I pair this passage with the Phena sutta, [I came across saranattano in the Phena sutta quite by chance...if one were to do a search, it would not suprise me to find other similar examples of attasarana/saranattano] which totally lacks any reference to or concern with the question of reliance on other people, teachers, etc, the seamlessness of the concept is noticeable. Both here and in the Phena sutta, to be a refuge unto oneself is explained as meaning to overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world (in the Phena sutta, the five khandhas: synonymous in Buddhism to "the world" and sabbe dhamma), to seek no external refuge. So despite the slight interpretive dilemma we began with, I think there is, on more detailed consideration, a significant argument in favor of "self as refuge" above and beyond the world, as distinct though complementary to the reading which says the passage advocates a merely conventional self-reliance and nothing more.
in friendliness,
V.
If one refutes the transcendend self, there is no point imo to put it otherwise. Since there is no room for a transcendend self then, all self references must point to the aggregates. One could also say then, take mara as a refuge.
Love ya'll
Bobby
I withdraw from the debate for some time, I realized I was ignorant of quite some things that have been said before already, hence I will head for meditation on the thread and return if I think I catched up with all important things that have been said by now here.
What leaves me still iritated is the argument that all talk of self is mere conventional, meaning the aggregates. We saw that the aggregates result out of interest/desire/will. Salvation is seen as losing interest for them, if they are all that is there, final salvation would mean total loss of every interest / total will denying.
Schopenhauer's fundamental error was his inability to understand the purpose of will's blind striving. From a Buddhist perspective, the purpose of will's striving is targeted towards self-comprehension rather than self-repulsion (duhkha).
Will is firstly a sheer immediacy which, because it is immediate with itself has no knowledge of itself (avidya). This is really its blind striving, in other words. As the will conjures up this world (which is other to itself) it begins to see traces of itself. Finally, it comes into samadhic relationship with itself which is nirvana. The will cools down in other words. There is no more striving insofar as it has found itself, purely (visuddhicitta). Everywhere the will sees itself manifested which is the vision described in the Avatamsaka Sutra. This reminds me somewhat of Zen's understanding of final enlightenment.
Will is the very substance of all (substance is here not to be confused with essence). In the immediacy and ignorance of itself, there are mountains, and waters. But then will comes to realize that these are just empty manifestations. There are no real mountains and waters. Finally, by seeing that mountains and waters are creations of will, in which they are included in the will, itself, will comes to rest (nirvana). All is perfected (paramita). Mountains and waters are once again mountains and waters.
Schopenhauer was brilliant to a point. He just didn't grasp that the striving of will would stop when it comprehended itself. Heretofore, will's forms seemed blind and arbitrary which made it such. With will's actualization of itself all that changes. The world becomes beautiful. All things are manifestations of this Buddha-nature, i.e., the realized will.
Love ya'll
Bobby
Thank you for this, Bobby. I am taking my time reading it, and the rest of the site. Lots there. Yum!
That is not what I was saying at all. However, upon reviewing Bobby's post, I think that I may have misread what Perez-Ramon was saying the first time around, so my statement was misleading. I must have read the passage too quickly. Perhaps my coffee had not kicked in yet
Anyway, it seems that the passage referred to by Perez-Ramon supports the conventional interpretation of atta (in that instance) as the context of the passage was trying to determine who they should look to once the Buddha was gone. The Buddha responded that each individual should look to themselves & the dhamma as their guide & refuge, not on any other teacher. Taken in this context, I don't think there is any real conflict with the teaching that the khandas are anatta or mara. I imagine it would be highly difficult & arguably unnecessary for the Buddha to speak without personal pronouns & referring to the conventional self. I think that as long as one regards the conventional self in the proper manner (as an illusory perception created by the interaction of the khandas which is not self-existent & is in a constant state of flux), that there aren't any doctrinal problems with such statements. And in the instance referred to, I think it is quite clear that this is exactly what was meant by attasarana, though I can see how you might come to your conclusion. I guess we will have to agree to disagree in this instance. Now, in reference to the Phena Sutta & other suttas, I do not have a basis of knowledge, so I will refrain from commenting.
That said, my knowledge/mastery of the suttas/sutras & of the languages is quite lacking. For this reason I have decided to remain undecided (in any final sense) in regards to whether a transcendant atta/atman is being taught by means of via negativa. And while you all have made some good arguments, I prefer not to rely on the reasoning of others on such matters. Not that I think your reason is necessarily unsound, just that this is a difficult subject matter & I need a very high level of certainty which will require a lot more research on my part. Beyond that, I honestly don't find making such a decision to be of primary importance to my practice right now, and I'm not so sure when it will be.
Beyond that, I'm just going to stick to the statement that the 5 khandhas are anatta and the statement that 'conditioned phenomena are stressful (dukkha), conditioned phenomena are impermanent (anicca), and all phenomena are not-self (anatta). I will not venture any further than that. If you want to assume there is an Atta/Atman which is not conditioned, nor a phenomena, then that's fine (I guess). For me, I don't think it I need to do so, as far as my practice is concerned. And in regards to an Atta, which is not a phenomena & cannot be perceived (ineffible), can we really apply the ideas of existent/non-existent here in the same way which we apply them to perceptible phenomena. For example, space cannot be said to exist, but it cannot be said to not exist either. Same thing goes for mind. If you want to say something similar about Atta, then I can't really agree or disagree. In that sense, this conversation is moot (as far as I'm concerned).
With that, I will bow out of the debate for now, as I've already said everything I have to say multiple times.
take care
_/\_
metta
I`d like to let you know that your view is supported by Kathā Vatthu, IV,1 (Abhidhamma), which states that a housefather can als be a saint (i do not have the pali version but the word usually transated as saint is arhat). I recently read Seidenstücker`s comments on the buddhist differentations of the different "levels" (ordinary wordly person, stream entered, one time returner, never returner and arhat) and it came to my mind you mentioned the point here. Seidenstücker also lays down that a non-monk might even become an arhat, while being a monk is not even a "gurantee" for being stream-entered(sotapanna).
Here it seems quite clear that the word 'yourself' is meant in the conventional sense. I really don't see some higher self being implied here, as the Buddha refuted any view of 'self' that associated it with the khandhas. but rather developing maintaining proper awareness in regard oneself. This proper awareness in regard to oneself is none other than the 'Four Foundations of Mindfulness' which can be considered essential to Right View. Anyway, while this doesn't necessarily refute the Upanishadic Atman, it seem pretty clear that, in these instances, self is not meant in that sense. Considering how many times people were admonished in the Suttas for declaring what the Buddha did not declare,
I think we need to be very careful & avoid drawing too many imputations into the suttas. The Buddha was usually quite explicit. And statements such as the following make me think that pursuing this line of thought are not as important as we may think:
I know this has been posted before on this thread, but it has been quite a while. And, once again, this is all just my opinion based on what I've read & experienced, so take it for what it's worth.
_/\_
metta
When I was young, like so many of us, I tinkered with cars, dismantling and adjusting, etc. I knew about tappets and cylinder head bolt torques, e tutti quanti. Later, working for a connector manufacturer, I learned more about engine performance.
I have never been so fascinated that I have studied metallurgy in order to work for a new and better engine or body, but I am quite sure that there is much to learn about it.
Beyond that, there are the physics and chemistry of the components and fuel. And beyond even that, there is the mathematics of the universe!
I have no doubt at all that my search for 'essence' has distracted me from practice. Like Demeter seeking Persephone, there are fields lying fallow. At the same time, I remain convinced that there is something to investigate. And that it is important. Without comparing myself with such a genius, I am aware that Albert Einstein was in agony as he worked on his extraordinary discovery, as was Isaac Newton when he completely changed the understanding of the physics of light. Life would have been less painful (as would the lives of his family!) if AE had stuck to patents.
Whilst carrying on with my 'quest', I am also reminded, daily, that there is always a price to pay and that I shall go on being told, by many Buddhists, that I am looking for something that doesn't exist.
Wether self,myself or oneself etc, it refers to me. If we take for granted that we are merely an empircal person, the 5 aggregates are all we are, how could we be stable by any means?
"You are the 5 aggregates" does not make sense to me, really. They lack control, therefore are not the self, myself, oneself etc. even the convential use, atta as a reflexisve pronoun cannot refer to them. It refers to void at best, to myself which i have no idea of what it is except the things (aggreagets) which I am not. The viodness however does not rule out the existence, it just indicates the viodness of attributes of it.
I recently came across a sutta where the lack of control of the skandhas are given as reasons why they are not yourself. I think vaccha has adressed the control issue already, I will search for the sutta and give the reference here.
PS: Thanks for your open words Simon, I partly recognize myself in them
Thanks for posting this reference (DN 26).
This definitive passage is identical to that we have discussed in the Mahaparinibbana sutta, so does not offer any information which I have not used to support my analysis. Here again, on the other hand, is another example (as in the Phena sutta, where it is even more explicit since the ostensible topic is the emptiness of the khandhas, a text we discussed down thread) where having self as refuge occurs definitively divorced from any context of a question as to the authority of another, reliance on teachers, refuge in ritual, etc., with no mention of reliance on other persons as the issue at hand. The "conventional self," I hasten to add once again, is itself no lasting refuge and island against the overpowering waves of birth and death. In fact, it may be argued, and is argued often by the same people who insist on the conventionalist view, that such a self, the conventional identity, what we often call "ego" ("me" as opposed to "you"), is indeed the source of the problem, hardly any refuge! It is a contradictory position, especially given contextual cues we have already discussed (in the Phena sutta, the emptiness and inconstancy of the five khandhas--hardly to be relied upon as refuge; in the Mahaparinibbana sutta, the decay of the body, the fleetingness of personal existence--again, hardly any refuge)
To take refuge in self here, as in the Mahaparinibbana sutta, is defined not in terms of not relying on others (a teaching which would find itself sounding quite similar in phrasing and meaning to theme as presented in the Kalamas sutta, which does not, curiously enough, contain any reference, definitive or passing, to self as refuge--I note that this is proof that the Buddha was capable of conceiving a teaching on a conventional self-reliance without being forced to use the word "self," even in its paradoxical conventional sense), but rather, quite notably, in terms of "putting aside greed and distress (desire and sorrow) with reference to the world." We take care to remember that "the world" is notably defined in the Buddha's teaching in quite personal terms, is synonymous and interchangeable with the five clinging aggregates; in short "the world" refers exactly to that which the "conventionalist" refers to as self, yet is ever and always insistently called NOT-self by the Buddha, shown not to be a refuge and why, and declared to be for putting down, setting aside, casting off like a suit of armor after victory in battle (Mahaparinibbana sutta).
In brief, once again, the Buddha is given as defining "having self as refuge" as having put aside desire and sorrow with regard to that which is not-self! This, to my eye, all looks very plain, explicit, and up-front; it has nothing to do with imputation, inference, or trying to insert words and ideas into the Buddha's speech that are not explicitly there. It is based on what is there, which is what is so interesting about this issue, because those who would deny self or obscure its exalted usages in conventionalism, seem to think that this reading requires obscurantism and mystification, while in fact it is just out in the open in the Buddha's teaching, and the more familiar one is with these teachings the more insistent the theme begins to look.
Finally, I would like to note that I hesitate to call this "the Upanishadic Atman," for we require no reference to the Upanishads for support of the Buddha's advocacy for self; we need only look to the sutta pitaka as we have been doing.
in friendliness,
V.
Thanks for your clear, concise, candid post! I can only say I hope my thoughts on the topic have not become too analytical and repetitive!
in friendliness,
V.
I also agree that the khandhas are anatta (devoid of eternal, unchanging, independent existence). I never said otherwise. But you seem to be denying that the Buddha used the term 'self' in it's conventional meaning, or that such an interpretation is appropriate. I disagree & do not feel there is any conflict in the teachings. Also, I do not agree that the Phena sutta gets more explicit about the phrases 'yourself as a refuge' & 'dhamma as a refuge' as it not discussing this specific phrase. I am well aware that the world refers to the 6 sense bases (& the khandhas), and I do not think that this refutes what I am saying.
That said, I don't think our philosophical disagreement will affect our practice, as developing the 4 foundations of mindulness will have the same function & effect regardless of whether or not there is an Atta outside the khandas.
take care
_/\_
metta
Vacchagotta,
It is interesting that you bring this particular subject up, because I have always seen the five khandhas as the burden (as seen in SN 22.22) as well as the very same material we can use to construct the path (as seen in SN 22.79). The relationship between these two seemingly contradictory statements is not so hard to see when we take into consideration the role that intention plays in our overall experience, and how to use our experience of the five khandhas to observe and understand this process intimately. I could attempt to explain this relationship a bit further, but I fear that I would not do it just; therefore, I shall offer this essay by the Venerable Thanissaro in order to make this connection clearer: Five Piles of Bricks: The Khandhas as Burden & Path.
Respectfully,
Jason
I found it, it is Majjhima Nikaya 35
Aggivessana, you that say, matter is your self, do you wield power over that matter, as may my matter be thus, and not otherwise? .No, good Gotama. Attend carefully and reply Aggivessana. What you said earlier does not agree with what you say now.
Aggivessana, you that say, feelings are your self...
Aggivessana, you that say, determinations are your self....
Aggivessana, you that say, perceptions are your self...
Aggivessana, you that say, consciousness is your self....
What do you think, Aaggivessana, is matter permanent or impermanent? Impermanent good Gotama. That impermanent thing, is it unpleasant or pleasant? Unpleasant good Gotama. That impermanent, unpleasant, changing thing, is it suitable to be considered; that is mine, that I be, that is my self? No good Gotama.. Aggivessana, are feelings—are perceptions,--are determinations,--is consciousness permanent or impermanent? Impermanent good Gotama. That impermanent thing is it unpleasanat or pleasant? Unpleasant, good Gotama.That impermanent, unpleasant, changing thing, is it suitable to be considered, that is mine, that I be, that is my self? No, good Gotama..Aggivessana, a certain one clinging to unpleasantness, over powered by it, pressed down by it and reflecting it’s mine, would think it’s my self. Would he accurately understand unpleasaantness by himself or ward it off and abide? Good Gotama, how could it be. No, good Gotama, that would not happen.
Thanks, Jason, for your contribution. I'm glad that this reiteration of our respective thoughts has offered the opportunity for the conversation to address fresh texts on the topic. I guess occasionally the outcome of repetitiveness can be fruitful.
The explicit teaching of the sutta is in fact the opposite in meaning to taking refuge in the khandhas: to tear down, abandon, discard and scatter them! Regarding the Thanissaro article, I do not argue with the venerable in that he does not endeavor to reject the possibility of transcending the khandhas. In the article, interestingly enough, he writes in somewhat conservative fashion, of "As one of the discourses states, the freedom lying beyond the khandhas" and provides a list of descriptive indicators of this "total freedom", none of which is applicable to the khandhas, and which includes, notably: the island, shelter, harbor, refuge."
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. In reading this sutta, with appreciation for your having brought it to light, I was struck by How the Buddha defined "neither scattering nor piling up". Left unexplained, it could probably be interpreted as an expression of moderation, of tolerance, of leaving alone, or perhaps even as keeping the khandhas as the means and locus of liberation. Contrary to this, he defines it clearly as " stands having scattered it".
Perhaps I am mistaken; however, I do not understand how SN 22.79 is contrary to my interpretation because the sutta itself states that one reflects upon the various aspects of the five khandhas in such a way as to develop disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation with regard to the khandhas themselves. As the Venerable Thanissaro mentions, this suggests that there is the potential for each of the five khandhas to turn into discernible aggregates through the process of fabrication. This idea also is supported by the Buddha's statement:
In other words, an instructed disciple takes the five khandhas, which are inconstant, stressful, and not-self, and reflects upon them in such a way that they actively construct the path leading to disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation—one must first observe them, then discern them as they actually are, then abandon clinging for them, then grow disenchanted with them, then become dispassionate towards them, and finally, through dispassion, gain full release. This process of release is only possible due to the five khandhas themselves.
Respectfully,
Jason
from my understanding, detachment is the last step before full release. It is a result of disenchantement and dispassion, not vice versa. On what grounds could I gain detachment if I still am not disenchanted about the aggregates, and still am full of passion/desire for them? In other words, losing interest for them or detach from them is an act of dispassion, gained thru right (disenchanted) view towards the aggregates.
You can have a look at Samyutta Nikaya 23, Rādha-Samvutta: 1.Mara for that matter (http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/3Samyutta-Nikaya/Samyutta3/22-Radha-Samyutta/01-Pathamamaravaggo-e.html)
Regards
I was just going by what it said in this sutta:
Either way, isn't it all semantics at this point?
Regards,
Jason
Thought I'd throw this in here since it applies to this point (the sequence of liberation):
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/wheel277.html
Anyway, the statement that 'the whole of the holy life can be found within this fathom long body' can be found in many places, such as the one provided by Jason. This indicates that we are not attempting to go outside the khandas, but rather come to know them as they really are, which leads to the subsequent disenchantment, dispassion, & emancipation. We are not cultivating a knowledge of an Atta outside the khandhas here at all, but rather a knowledge of the self & the world which leads to the end of the holy life. This statement seems to confirm my interpretion of 'yourself' which is found in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta & the Cakkavatti Sutta as a conventional rendering.
_/\_
metta
I agree that we talk on a rather generic level about the things, and detaching-> disenchentment-> dispassion or any other order might not neccessarily be a static recipe for gaining release, but in fact it might constantly affecting eacht other when we talk about overall or general progress, not about the process of detaching from a specific kandha, like a certain feeling, thought and so on.
From my personal understanding though, i feel that dispassion is needed for detachement, maybe I am wrong, but I think only when having reached dispassion towards any skandha or part of a skandha (a certain body e.g. a beloved one, a certain feeling and so on) releasing without suffering is possible, elsewise the passion/desire will cause suffering for the very try of detaching from things.
Talking plain english now, using both my authentic, original confusion and wisdom, I`d say I have to lose passion/desire first before I can detach without suffering
not1not2,
Thanks for your considered reply. Allow me to clarify what I said. You appear to have read my statement as offering that the Phena sutta gives a more definitive analysis of the phrases in question. That was not really my intention, as the sutta is only a case where the concept of refuge for/as self is mentioned without elaboration, except to reinforce that mindfulness is the means of self-refuge. What is more explicitly apparent in the Phena sutta, however, is the context in which this mention occurs, which I note once again is explicitly devoid of any mention of, question about, or concern with the issue of reliance on other persons which is so much the focus of the conventional-only reading. Namely the discourse's topic is that the khandhas (which would be the referent for a conventional-only reading of sarann'attano) are empty and valueless in terms of the holy life, not reliable, not lasting, not solid. They are compared to some of the most insubstantial, fleeting things of this world. To me this quite simply defies any conception of them as being adequate to being called self or especially not refuge, an expression of safety and stability, and escape.
It just seems such a glaring contradiction not only to call what is called empty and non-self by very term you are denying of it (self) and take that "mere conventionalism" further by giving it a transcendent value, a value clearly above the value given to "the world", saying it is a refuge. That interpretation would be helped greatly by the existence of some passage which clearly sets out this ambivalence in a phraseology that clearly defines the identity rather than the difference of what is called self and what is called not-self, such as "and what monks, is self? self is just the five khandhas" or "what is called not-self is the self". In fact the prevailing structure is quite the opposite: there are clear listed criteria by which that which is not-self fails to live up to being called self by the Buddha; also what is called not-self is semantically elaborated as being "not my self" (na me so atta), widening the interpretive gap rather than closing it. It seems more natural to read it that self as refuge is that which what has just been called empty and is ever and insistently called not-self is not. Not-self is not-self. Self is self.
This I can tentatively agree with. For me, suttas like this go a long way in giving us a fuller picture that the practice of mindfulness entails not only merely paying attention to the khandhas as ordinarily experienced (you find this taught in so many Zen centers), but rather to remember (Sati also carries a strong aroma of remembrance/recollection, as it also means "recollect"--in other words to keep in mind what we tend to forget) these deeper properties (anicca, dukkha, anatta) of the khandhas which make them inappropriate as safe harbor in the storm of birth and death. It is thereby, through constant remembrance of these truths, that one cultivates dispassion and detachment, abandoning joy and sorrow with regard to them.
in friendliness,
V.
I don't think I'm giving it a transcendent value here at all. What else than one's own experience (& the Dhamma) do we have to realize the fruition of the holy path? My interpretation of dual phrases of taking oneself as a refuge & the dhamma as a refuge does not conflict with the passages & analysis you have provided, IMO. And I really don't think that we can say that the conventional rendering places it above the value given to "the world." Once again, the buddha (in these passages) does not say to put aside the world, but rather our passion & distress in regard to it. And there is certainly no reference to a higher Atta in the buddhas explanation of what these statements mean. Otherwise, he would have launched into a discourse of the khandhas being anatta, rather than the 4 foundations of mindfulness which do not involve throwing away the khandas at all. The sutta indicates that we are to reflect on nothing but our own experience in the light of the Dhamma. Once again, this interpretation is supported by the statement that "the whole of the holy life is found within this fathom long body." Now, are you going to suggest that the Atta can be found within the body?
Anyway, I am getting tired of repeating myself, so I'm going to refrain from further discussion if all it is going to involve is rehashing the same arguments we have been posting for the past 20+ pages.
take care & be well
_/\_
metta
throwing away the kanddhas is nonsense imo. it translates to suicide, plain and simple.
It´s obvious to me that suffering is the result of the desire for the kandhas. They are, as Vaccha as pointed out correctly, impermanet, stressful and not yours, not yourself. They have to be looked at as something alien. What else should the not-self of the kandhas imply? Any attempt of creating an artifical identity based on them is wrong view, leads to suffering, distracts from the path.
As long as we are in samsara, we have the kandhas. Nibbana is desribed as loss of passion and detachment from the kandhas. If one of us achieves paranibbana, they will be gone. that is my understanding. since all phenomena will be gone then, nothing is left that can be described.throwing away the kandhas is no active process, like throwing away a body, e.g.jumping from a bridge, it rather results from will acting, whenthere is no more kamma left, no ground, no new fuel for the kandhas is there.
there are some symbols that desribe it, like a fire gone out but the place were it where is still warm (nibbana), while paranibbana being the fire out and the place being cold. I don`t know how to express it better, throwing away the kandhas is not actively destryoing them, but it rather results from having no desire for them. When no kamma is left, their birth has ended, they have not been killed, they rather find nonew ground after the death of the individual person.
...
Jason
It strikes me that in saying the khandhas may be our refuge that we could be mixing our metaphors, mistaking the path and the means of the path for that which the path aims for (refuge). If we say that the path which is enacted in life (in this fathom long body) is like a raft or a chariot, we say so in distinction to the refuge, the home, the goal which we aim them towards. That is why the Buddha spoke of relay chariots which are successively abandoned and also of leaving the raft behind. The raft is not our refuge. The other shore is.
This talk of the fathom-long body sutta strikes me as somewhat taken out of context. The sutta in which this passage occurs voices no question regarding self and non-self, nor does it say that the fathom-long body is itself any kind of refuge or can be made into any kind of refuge. It is just that freedom from suffering is neither gained by travelling nor by changing form of existence. Pretty plain, it seems to me. Regarding the question of self "in the body," or the idea that the khandhas are the sum total of the person, the Yamaka sutta should be studied carefully.
in friendliness,
V.
Such a refuge will fall victim to random change since it is conditioned. We can not form any kandha according to our wishes. What we can form however, are the wishes themselves, having no desire or wish in reagrds to the kandhas i consider to be the fruit of the path, as the sutta you provided says, the eightfold path results in kamma that will end all kamma.
In other words, the kandhas are the results of our kamma, but we have nomeans of directly manipulating them. Elsewise we could say, let form be thus, let feeling be thus and so on. They are not under our direct control. Our means are looking after our kamma-formations since this is what we create and are able to control and change. That`s my understanding I drew from the debate until now.
_/\_
metta
P.S.-I do understand the essential role that volitional action plays in this
Perhaps things would be clearer if the posts as well as the references were read a bit more thoroughly. I would just hope that someone takes the time to carefully sift through all this information and seriously contemplate their profundity before they merely take a position and argue it endlessly. The Dhamma is more than an intellectual's game of debate; it is a path of practice to be implemented for the one's own long term welfare and happiness.
Sincerely,
Jason
I really cannot understand why you chose to make that statement. Interestingly, you take a postion yourself at the end of your post, I wonder where you got it from, I always thought the Dhamma is about the ending of suffering which is not the same as happiness.
Anyways, since I feel adressed by your critique and I admit I tend to answer selectivly and do not study all given references before posting, I will bail out again of the debate for a while and observe it.
Regards
I apologize if you are unhappy with my statement; nevertheless, I made that statement because I felt that it was worth mentioning. If you disagree with my assessment, that is fine; however, I have seen people simply continue their arguments without actually addressing the posts and/or references that they are apparently arguing against. It makes this entire dialogue counterproductive. Concerning one's long term welfare and happiness, perhaps reading AN 3.65, DN 16, MN 21, and MN 135 will help to answer your questions about where I got it from.
Regards,
Jason
I find it important to note that the fetters/chains are destroyed, not the kandhas, birth is prevented, not the kandhas literally murdered. It`s obvious that elsewise, the prejudice that Buddhism is hostile towards life that some circles have would be falsely given new fuel.
I still find it problematic to speak of happyness as a summary of the dhamma though, if you read the sources you gave earlier and the one not1not2 gave, cessation of suffering (dukkha) is more safe to say imo, the 3th noble truth is also about the ending of suffering/stress/dissatisfaction...(dukkha), not the creation of happyness. I do not hold this to be merely a word game, but an important and maybe very subtle difference.
I will take your advice now and study the sources given by you and others lately more deeply and eventually return when I have something new and worthwhile to say.
cheers
Chris
Short Note before I have my break:
I finished "The Buddha Nature: Death and Eternal Soul in Buddhism", the Dalai Lama argues in there that the Buddha merely argued against against an upanishadic self,outside of body and mind, not against a self per se. What case the Dalai wants to make, what kind ofself he advoctes remained unlcear to me after finishing the book.
If we accept his reasoning then we may conclude that one of the main goals of the Buddha's mission was to get people to stop treating the self or attâ as if it were a phenomenon. Indeed, the Buddha's smilies are to the point, that the khandhas cannot be the referent. While seeming to be real for the ordinary person, they are, nevertheless, ephemeral. Form, for example, is said to be like a lump of foam. Feeling is like a water bubble and so on to the last khandha in which the Buddha says that consciousness in but an illusion (S.iii.142). In no discourse of which I am aware does the Buddha unambiguously say or suggest that the attâ or self is ephemeral.
It is my opinion that people who find it difficult to accept that the Buddha taught the ephemerality of the five khandhas and not the self are confused about the Buddhist religion is general. They have mistaken Buddhism for an ancient version of materialism in which the nonmaterial is denied. Fundamentally, they believe in what their senses perceive which adds up, also, to the philosophy of naive realism. There is, however, little or no evidence for such a position in Buddhism. One of the major themes of Buddhism is that all things (thing is the sense of a quality or attribute) are impermanent, suffering and are without a self (anattâ). Nowhere does the Buddha indicate that the self is included in phrase "all things". In particular, what comprises the "all" (sabbe) are the six senses (S.iv.15). The referent we can judge is beyond the range of the six senses. It is the one who knows that it is not, itself, in pain but that its fixation on the ephemeral entity is pain-causing.
I think any credible scholar worth their salt would agree that all the passages relating to attâ or aelf must be counted and weighted by a variety of means (e.g., hemeneutics) avoiding the doctrinaire. This is the way evidence works. We have to become convinced by the mix of quantity and quality. On the other hand, deploying ingeniousness without evidence; trying to prove the assertion that the Buddha denied the self is little more than putting the conclusion ahead of the evidence. This is the a priori fallacy.
The habit of selecting passages from the Buddhist canon then twisting them into proofs of a so-called no-self doctrine is also the habit of ignoring numerous other passages in which the no-self doctrine is inapplicable as Joaquin Perez-Remon shows in his work, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. The earlier parts of the canon, including the commentaries, it should be underscored, makes no clear establishment of a no-self doctrine anymore than say the Christian Gospels explicitly formulate a Trinitarian doctrine. The no-self doctrine is the handiwork of post-parinirvana Buddhist monks in which the Buddha is but a passing memory. Their added basket, the Abhidhamma, doesn't stand the evidentiary test of being part of the founder's original teaching. If anything, it is a taxonomy of error in which any vestige of the ephemeral we might cherish as the self is negated. Our present body, in this context, is precisely what we are not. And any reason to cling to it only invites more suffering for the referent.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
They have mistaken Buddhism for an ancient version of materialism in which the nonmaterial is denied.Fundamentally, they believe in what their senses perceive which adds up, also, to the philosophy of naive realism
Do you have references to suttas where the materialists (Cārvāka/Lokyāta) are explicitly addressed?
Regards
Chris
All that junk inside your trunk?
I'ma get, get, get, get, you drunk,
Get you love drunk off my hump.
My hump, my hump, my hump, my hump, my hump,
My hump, my hump, my hump, my lovely little lumps. (Check it out)
I drive these brothers crazy,
I do it on the daily,
They treat me really nicely,
They buy me all these ices.
Dolce & Gabbana,
Fendi and Donna
Karan, they be sharin'
All their money got me wearin' fly
brother I ain't askin,
They say they love my ass ‘n,
Seven Jeans, True Religion's,
I say no, but they keep givin'
So I keep on takin'
And no I ain't taken
We can keep on datin'
I keep on demonstrating.
My love, my love, my love, my love
You love my lady lumps,
My hump, my hump, my hump,
My humps they got u,
She's got me spending.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me and spending time on me.
She's got me spendin'.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me, up on me, on me
What you gon' do with all that junk?
All that junk inside that trunk?
I'ma get, get, get, get, you drunk,
Get you love drunk off my hump.
What u gon' do with all that ass?
All that ass inside them jeans?
I'm a make, make, make, make you scream
Make u scream, make you scream.
Cos of my hump, my hump, my hump, my hump.
My hump, my hump, my hump, my lovely lady lumps. (Check it out)
I met a girl down at the disco.
She said hey, hey, hey yea let's go.
I could be your baby, you can be my honey
Let's spend time not money.
mix your milk wit my cocoa puff,
Milky, milky cocoa,
Mix your milk with my cocoa puff, milky, milky riiiiiiight.
They say I'm really sexy,
The boys they wanna sex me.
They always standing next to me,
Always dancing next to me,
Tryin' a feel my hump, hump.
Lookin' at my lump, lump.
U can look but you can't touch it,
If you touch it I'ma start some drama,
You don't want no drama,
No, no drama, no, no, no, no drama
So don't pull on my hand boy,
You ain't my man, boy,
I'm just tryn'a dance boy,
And move my hump.
My hump, my hump, my hump, my hump,
My hump, my hump, my hump, my hump, my hump, my hump.
My lovely lady lumps (lumps)
My lovely lady lumps (lumps)
My lovely lady lumps (lumps)
In the back and in the front (lumps)
My lovin' got u,
She's got me spendin'.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me and spending time on me.
She's got me spendin'.
(Oh) Spendin' all your money on me, up on me, on me.
What you gon' do wit all that junk?
All that junk inside that trunk?
I'ma get get get get you drunk
Get you love drunk off my hump.
What you gon' do wit all the ass
All that ass inside those jeans.
I'ma make make make make you scream
Make you scream, make you scream.
What you gon' do wit all that junk
All that junk inside that trunk
I'ma get get get get you drunk
Get you love drunk off this hump.
What you gon' do wit all that breast?
Sh'all that breast inside that shirt?
I'ma make, make, make, make you work
Make you work, work, make you work.
She's got me spendin'.
Spendin all your money on me and spendin' time on me
She's got me spendin'.
Spendin' all your money on me, up on me, on me.
I could dedcuce critique of the Cārvāka/Lokyāta, but I would be interested if there are some Suttas where they are explicitly adressed, meaning the term appears, or a philospher of them. I know one where Makkhali Gosala is adressed and dismissed but he wasn`t a materialist, he affirmed kamma and rebirth but denied free will, hence he was a determinist/fatalist.
If I understood correctly, "consuming junkies" are merely a part of the materialists that are dismissed by the buddha. Socialists, followers of scientism and all other groups that deny all spiritual concepts like kamma and rebirth fall into that category too.
Now I will keep my promise and reflect on other things that have been said first
regards
BTW, you still never answered my question as to why you signed your name as A.E. (post #333) a ways back. I am honestly very suspicious of your agenda here, considering the constistent attacks on the Theravada tradition you keep posting.
thanks
_/\_
K.N. Jayatilleke's book, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge is a must read if you wish to immerse yourself in the almost ignominious details of the materialists.
These might give you some direction as least from the Indian side:
Related to this and hopefully helpful for you, Jayatilleke points out that some of the Upanisadic conceptions of the atman are notably materialistic insofar as the atman is conceived of as being 'the size of a thumb' or as being 'smaller than a grain of rice'.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
bobby: thanks for recommendations! I surely will have a look. In western Philosophy, outside of the traditional idealistic philosphers, Kant is important to that, his thing in itself that designates pure objectivity is not to be recognized. Schopenhauer also wrote that "...materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself." In his "fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason", he argued that the battle between realists and nominalists were to break out again,he`d rather side with the nominalists (since it reflects the position that objects only can be known in relation to a subject I guess). I`ll end the excourse on that at this point, should i find suttas were materialists are explicitly adressed, I will give you all the references.
Regards