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The mind if behavior
Talisman
Veteran
So, for a recent lesson in behavior analysis, we got into moral and legal rule control in society and the differences between spiritual and materialistic mentalism, methodological behaviorim, and radical behaviorism. Keep in mind that the person whow rote the book and runs my university behaviorism department is a radical behaviorist in more than ways than one and is very open about his stance in that regard.
Anyways, he gets into talking about how one of the flaws of traditional psychology and recent developments in cognitive behavior modification is that these methods and ideologies always assert that behavior is caused by a mond/soul/cognitive structure rather than the consequences of the behavior itself. His definition of mind is "An entity of collection of entities assumed to cause behavior. It may be either material or nonmaterial, but it is not the behavior itself."
He also states in his classification of radical behaviorism that is is similar to methedological behaviorism in the fact that they both believe that behavior is affected by direct-acting behavioral contingencies such as reinforcement and punishment, but that radical behaviorists also believe that covert behavior (responses that cannot be empirically observed by two other independent observers) also affects behavior in organisms that are capable of complex language. He also states that behaviorism is similar to materialistic mentalism in that both ideologies assert that there is only a material reality and that there is no existence of an immaterial reality.
First of all, for all intents and purposes, I am a pretty radical behaviorist as well, just to put that out there.
However, in my opinion he is wrong in several ways. First of all, his assertion that there is only a material reality is incorrect. The Buddha states that to state that the world is material, immaterial, both mateirl and immaterial, or neither material nor immaterial are all incorrect statements about the nature of reality. In my opinion a scientist should not assert any of this erroneous views, especially when considering something like behavior that is oftentimes very abstract.
Second, he is making the assumption that there is no mind, and that there is only behavior. I think this is an incorrect assumption as well. To state that there is no such thing as covert, purely mental, cognition, attention, inclination, fabrication, sensation, perception, volition, etc. is liek pulling wool over one's eyes and commits the same error as simplistic methodological behaviorist (namely that humans do not think).
I would like to make three assertions.
First, the mind is behavior. Perception, cognition, volition, inclination, habituation, visualization, attention, etc. is all covert behavior performed mentally and cannot be emperically observed.
Second, there is no organism. There is no agent performing the behavior in question. Instead the behavior, the processes, constitute the illusion of a responding agent.
Third, all behavior is mind behavior. This statement is a departure from the field of emperical scientific inquiry and enters into the domain of subjective understanding of the nature of reality. The reason I say this is because it is impossible to assert the existence of any reality outside of that which is immediately apprehended in a subjective way via the 6-sense-media and formless meditative states. In this way, there is no way to say "I open my hand" is a behavior in the absolute sense. The only actual behavior being performed is the thought "I open my hand" brought about by the tactile sensation of "hand opening" and the visual sensation of "hand opening". To assert that the hand opens itself because the opening of the "physical hand" was reinforced in the past by the following state of "hand open" does not address how the reinforcing quality of "hand open" affects the "physical hand" opening. Instead there is the mind behavior "I open my hand" reinforced by the mental stimuli "hand open" which reinforces that behavior to occur with higher frequency in the future.
What do you think?
Anyways, he gets into talking about how one of the flaws of traditional psychology and recent developments in cognitive behavior modification is that these methods and ideologies always assert that behavior is caused by a mond/soul/cognitive structure rather than the consequences of the behavior itself. His definition of mind is "An entity of collection of entities assumed to cause behavior. It may be either material or nonmaterial, but it is not the behavior itself."
He also states in his classification of radical behaviorism that is is similar to methedological behaviorism in the fact that they both believe that behavior is affected by direct-acting behavioral contingencies such as reinforcement and punishment, but that radical behaviorists also believe that covert behavior (responses that cannot be empirically observed by two other independent observers) also affects behavior in organisms that are capable of complex language. He also states that behaviorism is similar to materialistic mentalism in that both ideologies assert that there is only a material reality and that there is no existence of an immaterial reality.
First of all, for all intents and purposes, I am a pretty radical behaviorist as well, just to put that out there.
However, in my opinion he is wrong in several ways. First of all, his assertion that there is only a material reality is incorrect. The Buddha states that to state that the world is material, immaterial, both mateirl and immaterial, or neither material nor immaterial are all incorrect statements about the nature of reality. In my opinion a scientist should not assert any of this erroneous views, especially when considering something like behavior that is oftentimes very abstract.
Second, he is making the assumption that there is no mind, and that there is only behavior. I think this is an incorrect assumption as well. To state that there is no such thing as covert, purely mental, cognition, attention, inclination, fabrication, sensation, perception, volition, etc. is liek pulling wool over one's eyes and commits the same error as simplistic methodological behaviorist (namely that humans do not think).
I would like to make three assertions.
First, the mind is behavior. Perception, cognition, volition, inclination, habituation, visualization, attention, etc. is all covert behavior performed mentally and cannot be emperically observed.
Second, there is no organism. There is no agent performing the behavior in question. Instead the behavior, the processes, constitute the illusion of a responding agent.
Third, all behavior is mind behavior. This statement is a departure from the field of emperical scientific inquiry and enters into the domain of subjective understanding of the nature of reality. The reason I say this is because it is impossible to assert the existence of any reality outside of that which is immediately apprehended in a subjective way via the 6-sense-media and formless meditative states. In this way, there is no way to say "I open my hand" is a behavior in the absolute sense. The only actual behavior being performed is the thought "I open my hand" brought about by the tactile sensation of "hand opening" and the visual sensation of "hand opening". To assert that the hand opens itself because the opening of the "physical hand" was reinforced in the past by the following state of "hand open" does not address how the reinforcing quality of "hand open" affects the "physical hand" opening. Instead there is the mind behavior "I open my hand" reinforced by the mental stimuli "hand open" which reinforces that behavior to occur with higher frequency in the future.
What do you think?
0
Comments
As to radical behaviorism, I'm not that schooled in the arguments but from the little I've observed of little children they seem to come out with a certain differing set point. Then there is the issue of identical twins seperated at birth. Seemingly they would have different environmental conditions but often end up quite alike.
I have seen and read the claims of scientists who say that it is entirely plausible that none of us are 'real' in any sense, that we are all simply programs running in a massive computer simulation that is the "reality" we know. And no, I am not regurgitating the plot of the movie "The Matrix". There are actual scientists out there who say that at this time, there is no definitive way to refute that assertion.
The reason I bring that up is that I believe it is not really possible at all to say why people do the things they do with any certainty, nor is it possible to claim that all is mind, or all is material. The fact is we simply do not, and in some instances because of our still limited technology, cannot know with any certainty.
I can say that I don't necessarily agree with your second assertion, that there is no "organism", no agent performing the behavior. Perhaps, in a completely metaphysical sense, that is true. But if we believe what the Buddha and other masters said, there is One organism of which we all are a part. Perhaps that is what you meant by your statement...? And if so, well - then I agree!
Many Blessings,
KwanKev
"To what extent, Ananda, does one not delineate when not delineating a self? Either not delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, not delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and infinite.'
"Now, the one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite does not obsess him.
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite does not obsess him.
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and finite, does not delineate it as formless and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite does not obsess him.
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and infinite, does not delineate it as formless and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite does not obsess him."
-DN 15
if that were to be the case, there need to be some better define terms in there so things can be clearer.
ps:
why do you precise a behavior is "performed mentally"?
where else would behaviors originate?
As in there is no mental process involved. It's hard to explain.
mechanical, physical thing?
Whereas he states that the mind is "An entity of collection of entities assumed to cause behavior. It may be either material or nonmaterial, but it is not the behavior itself."
your position: behaviors give rise to mind.
mind causes behaviors.
therefore behaviors causes behaviors.
so his problem with traditional psychology is that they believe behaviors to be caused by a mind/soul/cognitive structure rather than the consequences of the behavior itself.
Therefore he believes that behaviors are a consequence of behaviors.
Which you seem to agree with (see "your position")
the material version of this "entity" would be a collection of behaviors?
this would match your position as well.
I think that the error he is making is that he is looking at the mentalistic approach as incorrect because it implies that the mind CAUSES behavior, which he is correct to refute, but I do not think that that implies there is NO MIND, only that the mind itself IS BEHAVIOR.
Nice to know there are some people capable of thought at these deep levels. I used to be, but found the truth, at least for me, to be infinitely more simple than I had imagined it. Andrew Cohen, in his book Evolutionary Enlightenment, sums it up as "I Am That."
That works for me, and keeps my head from hurting too much ; )
KwanKev
I think that Buddhism isn't a philosophy.
But trying to proof a professor of being wrong, may not be what Buddhism is for. The Buddha didn't just say to people "this and that is the way the mind and the world is, agree or be wrong". He said he only taught suffering and the end of suffering, for which he gave us a path of practice, not a philosofical idea.
With metta,
Sabre
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.001.than.html
Though I am not of course saying that you shouldn't analyze this. You are more familiar with the mentations of the Pali Canon so maybe you can instruct me!!
The way behavior analysis views behavior, even the opening of a hand, is that the frequency of which that response occurs is contingent on what stimuli arose directly after the reponse occured in the past.
So, "hand opening" gives rise to the stimulus "hand open." Because "hand open" immediately followed "hand opening" and "hand open" is a reinforcing outcome, "hand opening" will occur more freqeuntly in the future. This is not to say that an organism "expects" that opening the hand will produce "hand open" only that in the pressence of certain discriminative stimuli, "hand open" reinforced "hand opening." So in the future, in the pressence of the discriminative stimuli, the frequency of "hand opening" will increase since it has been reinforced in the past by "hand open" while in the pressence of that discriminative stimuli.
I didn't intend it to be personal, just my opinion that came up when reading the tread.
With metta,
Sabre
:scratch:
volition = group of thoughts.
thoughts and/or group of thoughts = behaviors.
The reason the Buddha expresses the need for mindfulness, which I would consider to be a behavior associated with constant attending upon all directly expienced stimuli as well as all behaviors being performed, is that by maintaining mindfulness, one's behavior can more easily be controlled by ethical rules involving smaller immediate outcomes but cumulatively significant outcomes, as apposed to behaviors that produce immediate outcomes but may be injurious to the individual or others (and thus lead to woeful or harmful conditions due to the fruition of karma).
Not only that, but the majority of behavior analysts do not look at things from the radical perspective and either assert the existence of a governing soul, or go so far as to assert that humans do not THINK. Some of the ideas presented in my behavior analysis program, such as rule-governed behavior, covert behavior, and mental stimuli like fear are completely tossed aside by most of the modern scientific community because such things are unemperical, impossible to measure, impossible to validate or falsify, and unworthy of scientific inquiry.
So before real effort can be put toward understanding the more complex processes behind behavior, particulalrly complex language-based behavior like that of humans, the dogma against these more controversial subjects needs to be broken by innovative and proven new methods of study.
Here's the video if interested: