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This is such an odd repetition of an odd occurrence. I don't understand the motivation for this at all. Are we dealing with someone who is mentally ill or just mischievous? I can't understand what the payoff is for this repeated behavior. It leaves me baffled. Is this person somehow scared of the notion that the self has no absolute reality? Why would someone be so frightened of that? Is he so terrified that he has to go to seemingly ridiculous lengths to argue some kind of counterpoint over and over again everywhere he goes? What strange behavior. I don't mean to be insulting, even if this is the same person who caused all that kerfuffle last time. I really mean it. What odd behavior.
I don't really know why I'm asking these questions. I guess I'm just curious about the motivation behind it. But I suppose wondering about his motivation is as unskillful and as much of a waste of time as is his arguing this erroneous idea of the self. Again, I'm really not trying to insult anyone, really I'm not.
Maybe we could make a thread just for him entitled "Unskillful argument" as an illustration for new Buddhists about what not to waste their time on and how not to go about it. He could make up a number of different email addresses and names and argue with himself to his content. O.K. Now I'm being insulting on purpose. I will stop myself from continuing my unskillful speach because even the tiniest amount of harm to myself over this is not worth it.
This has been fun but it looks like the party's winding down so I'm off home.
I don't think it's a bad thing. There are some of us here who are much more learn-ed and may come to some new understanding by discussing some of the deeper and finer points of the Dharma.
I don't think it's a bad thing, because through reasoning together, someone may come to a new understanding regarding a topic. We have a lot of talk about "non-self" and it's only fair that if someone truly believes "self" - that they have the opportunity to speak their mind and how they see the teachings. You have to admit, that there are some good arguments.
I think the only thing that gets me is the "unthoughtful" way some things come about after a bit and the masked sarcasm or upset.
BTW, there are multiple individuals in AE's circle of friends. So there is no guarantee that this is in fact AE. Also, both the individuals in question were already registered before AE was banned for multiple user-names. This group of individuals generally try to frequent the same forums in order to give the appearance that their position is more prevalent than it really is. Basically, they seem to have a belief system devoloped around Light and Self/soul. I have heard them refering to the buddha as the "Light-bringer" and my personal theory is that this could extend from some sort of Luciferian 'theology' on the part of AE (as one of his listed user groups on B-net was appears to suggest this background. Also, they apparently feel that some schools of buddhism (especially Theravada) are annihilationist. Then they seek to remedy this perceived problem by making it eternalist.
The problem here is one of straw man fallacy. The definition of annihilationist they are using is simply not supported by buddhist scripture. There are many, many references to rebirth and buddhism does not limit reality to materiality (form/rupa). Additionally, the buddha labeled annihilationism as wrong view as do the vast majority of buddhists (including Theravadans). They also state argue in a manner which makes the other people in the debate appear to be holding a view (ditthi) of no-self which was also refuted by the buddha. This is to establish an upper ground in which they somehow can assert that the buddha did assert a self outside the aggregates.
They often refer to obscure scriptures to convey some sort of vast mistake on the part of the Pali-Canon/Tipitaka (or at least the Abhidamma). Some of them, such as AncientBuddhism (yahoo username) of www.attan.com, assert that they have access to the 'original' or 'true' Buddhist teachings and assert that the Pali scriptures are corrupted. However, AncientBuddhism has stated to me on yahoo that he is more of a NeoPlatonist & Vedantist, and considers those teachings to be higher than buddhist teachings.
Sometimes they try to create an illusion that their position has been an oppressed undercurrent of buddhism over the course of the millenia by referring to modern translations of sutras such as the Nirvana Sutra. Then they equate the Tathagatagharba doctrine and the buddha-nature doctrine with a Self. AE (aka Zenmar of www.darkzen.com) even wrote an article called "The Most Dangerous Sutta" about how the Nirvana sutra was hidden from the public in some sort of conspiratorial manner and goes on to explain other sensationalistic events surrounding the sutra which are largely unfounded (or at least blown out of proportion).
Anyway, we should be thankful that the current discussion has been, thus far, conducted in a civil manner. That is not always the case. Over at B-net (I am told) that threatening e-mails occured and in general a whole lot of ugliness. Additionally, it is still a possibility that we are jumping to conclusion here, though the posts of those in question bear an uncanny resemblance to what I've come across before.
I think we can now see why early Buddhism and Abhidharma have
often mistakenly been seen as Eliminativist. The error arises
through attending solely to what is said at the ultimate
level of truth, and failing to appreciate the relation
between the ultimate and conventional levels of truth.
Eliminativism is not simply the view that talk of persons may
in principle be eliminated. Both Reductionist and
Eliminativist maintain that ultimately there are no persons.
But the Eliminativist urges in addition that the claim that
there are persons be seen as conventionally false as well,
since the Eliminativist maintains that our commonsense theory
of persons is incoherent, or at least so misleading as to be
more troubling and confusing than theoretically useful.[13]
By contrast, the Reductionist holds that while unquestioning
adherence to the commonsense theory of persons does result in
misguided views about how we should live our lives, the
theory does have its uses, which fact requires explanation;
hence it is conventionally true, though ultimately false,
that there are persons. Like Milinda's wrong view about adult
and infant, the reading of early Buddhism as Eliminativist
results from the failure to consider the semantic dimension
of the dispute.
---
Buddhism is often said to be a kind of middle path between
two extremes. A number of different pairs of opposing extreme
views are identified in the tradition, but one such pair is
frequently singled out for special emphasis, namely that of
eternalism and annihilationism. Eternalism is the view that
there is an eternal self, and thus that rebirth is
transmigration. Annihilationism is usually portrayed as the
view that the self ceases to exist at the end of a single
lifetime. Eternalism is said to have the normative
consequence that since one will deserve the karmic fruits
reaped in the next life from one's present deeds, we all have
a reason to act in accordance with the karmic moral rules.
Annihilationism, by contrast, is said to result in a radical
antinomianism: since there can be no karmic retribution
beyond this present life, one has no reason to act morally
where doing so involves sacrificing one's own immediate
gratification. Both views are, the Buddhist claims, false
because of their shared presupposition that a self exists.
Yet some of the normative consequences of eternalism must be
preserved, since belief in the karmic moral order is required
if persons are to progress toward enlightenment.
The middle path between eternalism and annihilationism thus
consists of a demonstration that rebirth is compatible with
the nonexistence of the self. Since the continued existence
of a person in one life just consists in the obtaining of
appropriate causal connections among various physical and
psychological events, the continued existence of a person
over several lives is likewise possible in the absence of an
enduring self, provided the right sorts of causal connections
obtain between lives. And our alleged ability to recall
events from past lives presumably shows that such connections
do obtain. Thus to the extent that one is justified in
feeling concern for what happens to oneself in the later
stages of this life, concern is equally justified with
respect to one's future lives. Annihilationism wrongly
assumes that only the continued existence of a self could
give one a reason for self-interested concern, yet this is
clearly false in the case of a single lifetime. As the life
of the enlightened person demonstrates, one can know that
there is no self yet not lose oneself in a "solipsism of the
present moment."[16] While enlightened persons do not exhibit
self-interested concern in the same way and to the same
extent as the unenlightened, they do appear to be motivated
by considerations concerning how their present acts will
affect them in the future.
I think this addresses the concerns of anatta quite well. I think a lot of individuals argue against what they perceive to be the traditional view of anatta, assuming that it is a flat denial of the individual and other conventional designations. The article linked gives a nice explanation of this:
One passage in the early Buddhist text Milindapanha[9]
clearly exhibits signs of Reductionism. The text as a whole
is in the form of a dialogue between the Buddhist monk
Nagasena and a king, Milinda by name, who seeks to enhance
his understanding of Buddhism by asking Nagasena a series of
probing questions concerning the system. The passage in
question opens with Milinda asking whether adult and infant
are the same person or distinct persons. Nagasena replies
that they are neither the same person nor distinct
persons,[10] and asks Milinda's view. The king replies that
adult and infant are distinct persons. This answer is rather
surprising, since throughout the work Milinda tends to
represent the commonsense view of things, and most people
would judge the adult Milinda to be the same person as the
infant Milinda. But it appears from the context as if in this
case the king is not to serve as representative of our
commonsense intuitions, but is rather expressing a certain
understanding of the Buddha's teachings on persons. The king
has already learned through his discussions with Nagasena
that the person is made up of five skandhas, none of which
exists continuously throughout the course of a lifetime, and
thus that the person is devoid of a self. He now reasons that
since none of the skandhas that made up the infant is present
in the adult, adult and infant must be distinct persons. He
supposes, that is, that personal identity over time requires
the continued existence of some one entity through the
distinct stages in the life of a person; since the skandha
analysis reveals the absence of any such entity, it follows
that personal identity does not extend over any substantial
portion of a lifetime.
Anyone who has taught the early Buddhist argument for nonself
(anatman) from the impermanence of the skandhas will
recognize this response, since it is quite common for
students to understand the Buddhist teaching in just this
way. But Nagasena makes it clear through a series of
reductios that Milinda has reasoned incorrectly. By the same
reasoning, it would follow that there are no mothers or
fathers, no educated persons, and no one who deserves
punishment for past crimes. A mother, for instance, is a
person who conceives, bears to term, and then gives birth.
But the skandhas making up the woman who conceives are no
longer present, for example, in the woman carrying a
second-trimester fetus. By Milinda's reasoning, then, the
woman who gives birth is not the same person as the woman who
conceived, or the woman who bore the fetus, and so is not a
mother. Milinda agrees that these results are unacceptable,
and asks Nagasena how he views the matter. Nagasena replies
that adult and infant are the same person. This would appear
to contradict his earlier response, that adult and infant are
neither the same person nor distinct persons. But Nagasena
goes on to explain that those skandhas making up the adult
have as their causal antecedents the skandhas that made up
the infant; impermanent elements existing at distinct times
are collected together--that is, make up a person--when they
bear the right sorts of causal relations to one another.
This is illustrated with the example of the one light that
shone all night. If a lamp were to be lit in the evening and
burned continuously until the morning, we would agree that
there was one light--one source of illumination--that shone
all night. Yet it is agreed that that which actually
illuminates at any one moment during the night, namely a
flame, is numerically distinct from that which illuminates at
any other moment. This follows from the physics of flames,
for a flame is a collection of fire atoms (by classical
Indian physics) or incandescent hydrocarbon molecules (by our
physics), these entities undergoing constant replacement. Yet
we do not, for all that, say that there were many distinct
lights illuminating the room over the course of the night; it
is not incorrect to say that there was just one light shining
all night. This, explains Nagasena, is because the flame at
4:00 A.M. has as its remote causal antecedent the very first
flame in the series, that which occurred when the lamp was
lit at 9:00 P.M. As long as the right conditions obtain, a
given collection of fire atoms will, in going out of
existence, cause a new collection to come into existence.
Whenever distinct flames form such a causal series, this may
be referred to as one continuously existing light.
For those who bothered to read these long passages (sorry!), I hope this made things clear, rather than more obscure.
This is precisely why it is so important for us to read the Suttas, and to see what the Buddha himself said about these things. We must each discover that understanding for ourselves. There are so many different possibilities, and numerous perspectives to each individual question, that we need to be diligent in our studies as well as our meditation practice. A true Buddhist should be willing to do the very best that they can in order to understand what the Blessed One taught 2,600 years ago. And that means that we have to be willing to investigate. The Buddha did not say that there was a self, and the Buddha did not say there was not a self, so what did the Buddha say? As daunting as the task of reading through the thousands upon thousands of Suttas seems, it is the only way for us to truly find out.
For example, what does the Buddha mean by 'annihilationism'? How was this word used in context? What particular definition was implied by the Buddha when using this particular word? How often did he use this word, and to whom did he use it for?
If we were to look at it one way, annihilation could only occur if and when there was some 'thing' (permanent and unchanging) existing independently of the five aggregates that was destroyed. But, what if there never was anything permanent to begin with? What if this processs of arising and ceasing that we call a 'person' is just that, a process of conditionality? When the process of becoming is stopped, what is actually destroyed? Nothing. There is simply cessation. Everything that is involved in this particular process of arising and ceasing aflame with the fires of greed, hatred, and delusion is set free, and it will simply 'grow cold right here'. From this perspective, both 'self' and 'no self' do not apply due to the very nature of conditionality. But, you could still say that in this process of becoming there is unsatisfactoriness, inconstancy, and that all of this is not-self.
Now, I am not saying that this is the correct answer to this particular question, but it is one of the many possibilities. If I were to tell you that this is what the Buddha taught, however, how would you know that I was correct? Even if I were to give you some Sutta quotes, what would make you so confident that I took them from reputable sources, and that I had interpreted them correctly? The hard fact of the matter is that you wouldn't know. You might have a lot confidence in my personal abilities, and strong faith in my character, but you would still be taking my words on a type of conviction--not direct insight. That is why the Buddha invited all those truly interested in his teachings to come and see for themselves.
In this world with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, in this generation with its priests and contemplatives, its royalty and common-folk, we can never rely solely on the motivations of others, we can never rely solely on the support of others, we can never rely solely on the guidance of others, and we can never expect others do the work for us. The motives of others may be more out of greed than out of generosity, the support of others may be more out of hatred than out of compassion, the guidance of others may be more out of delusion than out of clear comprehension, and it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception and intellect, that suffering, the origination of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering may be known. This very existence is fuelled by ignorance of the Four Noble Truths, and that fuel must be removed. We must take the responsibility upon ourselves to do whatever we must do in order to walk the Buddha's Path to the very end.
Good posts!! I really liked these! I'm even saving them to think about later.
This is the kind of thing that's helpful, to me at least. I still have only the most basic of apprehensions regarding this subtle subject but I take to heart what Elohim says about being vigilant in our study and understanding of what the Buddha actually taught and the contexts in which he taught. I just want to be able to begin to understand. I don't want to read a convoluted and deceiving debate by those who clearly have an agenda other than understanding the Dharma. I wish they would leave us alone. But I'm also keeping in mind what Not1 said about the possibility of mistaken identity.
As soon as you see the link to the spurious translation of the Nirvana Sutra (sic) you can be sure it's one of the Dark Zen crowd. Nobody who actually knows anything about the Suttas and Sutras, or about the point of the Buddha's teaching on non self/self and incorrect views, would lower themselves to use that. As to a clear outline of what the issue is, this from Steve Hagen, sets out the Buddhist position with some clarity:
The resolution lies with neither "yes" nor "no". But nor does it lie in "don't know," because the fact of the matter is that we do know. We're just not very good at recognizing what it is that we actually know.
The Buddha saw through this seemingly unanswerable question. What he found was a view that has no counter, a view that appears the same to all who see. In doing so, he understood that both the eternalists' view ("there is a Self") and the materialists' view ("there is no self, only matter") were extreme and unverifiable accounts of Reality.
In the eternalists' group of views it was denied that all things come to an end. The Buddha, relying on direct experience alone, not only found no evidence of beginnings or endings, he could find no evidence of any separate, persisting thing that could have a beginning or end.
But this is not to say that there's no experience, there is only matter - the view the materialists took. The Buddha rejected this nihilistic view as well. He regarded it as extreme, since it didn't account for the presence of consciousness - a presence which is, of course, self-evident.
The Buddha-Dharma is called the Middle Way because it rejects any extreme view, what the Buddha called "frozen views." These are views that attempt to wrap Reality into nice, neat packages.
We're strongly inclinded to hold tight to certain views since they give us a sense of solidity under our feet. Unfortunately, they simply can't hold Reality, and thus they always leave us susceptible to doubt and confusion - dukkha. Most of the views we hold might not seem extreme to us at first glance, but the more closely we examine them, the more extreme (and absurd) they become.
All of the views we hold (and hold dear) appear in sets of two or more. Most often, they appear as pairs of opposites; pro and con, Western and Eastern, liberal and conservative, dualistic and non-dualistic. For example, "People are basically good" posits an ultimate quality of goodness, then attributes this quality to every member of our species. As soon as it's offered, however, it immediately invites a counter view: "People are basically evil." This is essentially the same view, but leaning in the opposite direction.
Can you see, based on your immediate experience alone, that neither of these views point to Reality? They are both concepts - attempts to freeze Reality into something hard, fast, solid and packaged...
The Buddha repudiated all such views. Because they are by nature conceptual, they attempt to freeze the world into solid, separate entities, whether those entities are Goodness, Evil, selves, non-selves, books, light, enlightenment, Buddhism, or any thing or thought whatsoever. Of course, all such attempts fail. The world of experience simply isn't frozen. Reality won't be condensed into concepts. Our immediate, direct experience bears this out....
Many people understand that the Buddha denied the existence of an everlasting, unchanging self. And they're right. Buddha did see through the extreme view of the eternalists. What is less understood, however, is that the Buddha also denied the opposite extreme view, that of the materialists, or nihilists. What is worse, many people think, "The Buddha said there is no self; therefore Buddhism is a religion of nihilism." This is like thinking, "Since you don't believe that God is a handsome, elderly gentleman with a long, white beard who lives in the clouds, you must be an atheist."
It's very easy to get caught up in such dualities without realizing that we're doing so. To deny the concept is not to embrace it's opposite. When you say no to the question, "Is the boogeyman still hiding in your closet?" you're not saying that the boogeyman has gone out for the day. You are denying the validity of the question itself.
The Buddha denied the question "Is there a self or not?" in just the same way. The Buddha saw that neither option - neither extreme - reflects actual experience. In fact, the question itself pertains no more to Reality than does the question "Is the boogeyman still hiding in your closet?" They are both based on totally unsubstantiated assumptions about Reality...
It's an indisputable fact of experience - of our direct, immediate perception - that all things are empty of self. Yet we think and believe and act and hope otherwise. It's by holding onto this notion of self - and we hold it most dear - that we live in defiance of Reality.
This is the means by which we suffer, and suffer greatly. It hurts to defy Reality.
But don't we need the concept of a self in order to explain experience? How can there be experience without a self to have that experience? The Truth is that we don't need such an explanation, and that's all the self is: an explanation of experience.
Reality needs no explanation. In fact, Reality is precisely what doesn't need an explanation, since any explanation removes us from direct experience to the realm of concepts.
Reality is simply thus - immediate, direct experience, prior to any ideas or explanations at all. To explain Reality is to box it up and cart it away. It's to ignore the territory for the map.
The Buddha saw that the notion of a self is not required to account for actual experience. He saw that the self is merely a concept formed out of our desire to get a handle on things rather than accept our experience as Real but ungraspable.
- Steve Hagen - Buddhism Plain and Simple
This is also why, though at first the Dark Zenner's position seems to have a veneer of intellectual debate and validity to it, from the standpoint of the Dharma and Reality, it's a very unsubtle and simple minded, in fact desparate and sad attempt to deny Reality. Nothing more, nothing less.
0
federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited March 2006
* I've just stickied this thread because it has some really valid posts in it, on all manner of subjects. ZenMonk's above post is one of great significance, both on educational and cautionary levels. *
Being that we are an open forum, is it not valid for people to post their interpretations of Buddha's teachings that they feel supports the belief of a "self"?
Not that everyone has to agree to it - but to possibly agree to disagree?
At this point, I don't know how I feel about reincarnation. I don't honestly feel that I believe there is a Pure Land. I don't believe that by chanting the name of Amitabha will get me to the Pure Land. I don't believe in all the various demons and such that are associated with some of the teachings - but no one is casting any stones at me regarding this (yet!).
This is precisely why it is so important for us to read the Suttas, and to see what the Buddha himself said about these things. We must each discover that understanding for ourselves. There are so many different possibilities, and numerous perspectives to each individual question, that we need to be diligent in our studies as well as our meditation practice. A true Buddhist should be willing to do the very best that they can in order to understand what the Blessed One taught 2,600 years ago. And that means that we have to be willing to investigate.
Though I have to disagree with much that has been written since my last post, I heartily agree with the above.
More to come.
This is such an odd repetition of an odd occurrence. I don't understand the motivation for this at all. Are we dealing with someone who is mentally ill or just mischievous? I can't understand what the payoff is for this repeated behavior. It leaves me baffled. Is this person somehow scared of the notion that the self has no absolute reality? Why would someone be so frightened of that? Is he so terrified that he has to go to seemingly ridiculous lengths to argue some kind of counterpoint over and over again everywhere he goes? What strange behavior. I don't mean to be insulting, even if this is the same person who caused all that kerfuffle last time. I really mean it. What odd behavior.
I don't really know why I'm asking these questions. I guess I'm just curious about the motivation behind it. But I suppose wondering about his motivation is as unskillful and as much of a waste of time as is his arguing this erroneous idea of the self. Again, I'm really not trying to insult anyone, really I'm not.
Maybe we could make a thread just for him entitled "Unskillful argument" as an illustration for new Buddhists about what not to waste their time on and how not to go about it. He could make up a number of different email addresses and names and argue with himself to his content. O.K. Now I'm being insulting on purpose. I will stop myself from continuing my unskillful speach because even the tiniest amount of harm to myself over this is not worth it.
This has been fun but it looks like the party's winding down so I'm off home.
Brigid
Why do I post my opinions and thoughts on a Buddhist Bulletin board? For the same reasons everyone else does. I like to, and it promotes learning and understanding on my part as a Buddhist. Doesn't that make sense to you? You seem to assume that because my view is different than yours that I have some different kind motivation for voicing it. I speak for myself. I don't speak for "dark zen" or any other sect.
Now I have a few questions.
Why would you want to characterize someone who disagrees with your views as mentally ill, mischievous, unskillful, wasting time, etc? Why even participate if you don't even have a valid point to make? If you truly saw what you wrote as unskillful speech, why did you even write it? Why let it sit there on the screen like a fallen log (in the woods where noone is around to hear it)? Why hit the submit button?
Can't we disagree on this issue without disparaging others?
I'm actually quite in awe at the belittling tone of some of the posters in this thread. If my view isn't worth arguing against, or you don't actually have a topical point to make, please just ignore it. If it is, and you do have something worthwhile to say (as several disagreeing posters have, and I appreciate that), please address my posts directly. But let's please keep this discussion polite and please refrain from insulting or pejorative tone.
It's the least I can ask since that is what I have offered for my own part in the discussion.
Why do I post my opinions and thoughts on a Buddhist Bulletin board? For the same reasons everyone else does. I like to, and it promotes learning and understanding on my part as a Buddhist. Doesn't that make sense to you? You seem to assume that because my view is different than yours that I have some different kind motivation for voicing it. I speak for myself. I don't speak for "dark zen" or any other sect.
Now I have a few questions.
Why would you want to characterize someone who disagrees with your views as mentally ill, mischievous, unskillful, wasting time, etc? Why even participate if you don't even have a valid point to make? If you truly saw what you wrote as unskillful speech, why did you even write it? Why let it sit there on the screen like a fallen log (in the woods where noone is around to hear it)? Why hit the submit button?
Can't we disagree on this issue without disparaging others?
I'm actually quite in awe at the belittling tone of some of the posters in this thread. If my view isn't worth arguing against, or you don't actually have a topical point to make, please just ignore it. If it is, and you do have something worthwhile to say (as several disagreeing posters have, and I appreciate that), please address my posts directly. But let's please keep this discussion polite and please refrain from insulting or pejorative tone.
It's the least I can ask since that is what I have offered for my own part in the discussion.
in friendliness,
V.
Dear V,
Please refer to the last paragraph of my earlier post (#101)
Anyway, that's my take, and I am not wishing to stir things up too much. My main concern is based on past experience with a certain individual and his associates, coming onto boards under various guises disparaging the tipitaka and 'Nikaya views' as inferior, forged, incorrect and so on, also implying that Theravadans are nihilists. It is unfortunate that such disruptive individuals continually make their way onto forums after repeated banishments and compromise the integrity of discussion. I have reasons to believe that this is what is occuring now, though it may just be projection based on past experiences. I sincerely apologize for making implicit (though masked) accusations of this at Bobby Lanier (& perhaps towards Vacchagota by association), if I am wrong on these matters.
We had a Dark Zenner on here for a bit that quite quite obnoxious, passive-aggresive and belittling in their participation.
Once banned - they continued to join under various names - which had to keep being banned.
I think some people are just cautious when someone posts the same ideas that this other person used to - makes them think, "Hmmm... did he finally join up under a new name?"
But, you have not exhibited the traits that he had - so I apologize if you have not been made to feel welcome here.
LOL! And by definition Vacchagotta, since you take a vedantic viewpoint, you are not a Buddhist, so don't be suprised when people here take issue with you and yes, you're a Dark Zenner, nobody else, after investigation would find the sources you use credible in any way. If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, lays duck eggs and goes quack... :winkc:
I think there is a further context to be seen in the Mahaparinibbanasutta for this notion of Self as refuge (either as island or as light). The context we mainly see discussed is the physical death of the Buddha and the community of monks, who have taken refuge in him as their teacher, face to face primarily with his impending absence and wondering what they are going to do without him.
I agree that clearly, this is a major theme of the discourse, but if we look at the immediate context of the "attadipa" passage we can see another point being made:
Quote:
"Now I am frail, Ananda, old, aged, far gone in years. This is my eightieth year, and my life is spent. Even as an old cart, Ananda, is held together with much difficulty, so the body of the Tathagata is kept going only with supports. It is, Ananda, only when the Tathagata, disregarding external objects, with the cessation of certain feelings, attains to and abides in the signless concentration of mind, 19 that his body is more comfortable.
33. "Therefore, Ananda, be islands unto yourselves, refuges unto yourselves, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as your island, the Dhamma as your refuge, seeking no other refuge.
"And how, Ananda, is a bhikkhu an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge?
34. "When he dwells contemplating the body in the body, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world; when he dwells contemplating feelings in feelings, the mind in the mind, and mental objects in mental objects, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; having the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge.
35. "Those bhikkhus of mine, Ananda, who now or after I am gone, abide as an island unto themselves, as a refuge unto themselves, seeking no other refuge; having the Dhamma as their island and refuge, seeking no other refuge: it is they who will become the highest, 20 if they have the desire to learn."
Sounds to me like the buddha was saying, 'hey I'm getting old now, and dwelling in this body to teach is causing me distress/discomfort. The only thing that eases this distress is maintaining signless concentration of mind. Oh yeah, and I'm not going to be around much longer. You guys can't depend on me anymore. You gotta figure this stuff out on your own. You should learn only to depend on yourself for understanding, having no external supports. The only support you should have to aid yourself in understanding realization is the Dhamma, what I have taught. Everyone who practices the 4 foundations of mindfulness, going beyond desire & sorrow for things of this world, can be said to have done this. In other words get to it, having faith in your experience and the dhamma, and you will realize this teaching for yourself.
The Buddha is here clearly referring to the transience of his existing nama-rupa individuality. He's saying this old cart is going to fall apart soon, using his own physical death as an object lesson on the unreliability of the khandhas which we remember are what? Anatta: not-self. In contrast, he says, be a refuge unto yourself (Self) by "overcoming desire and sorrow in regard to the world" ("The World" is defined in terms of aggregated experience, and is interchangeable with "sabbe dhamma," "Nama-rupa," "Sakkaya," and "the five khandhas" equally.). Also of note is the point that this is a teaching not only for a time when the teacher is absent, but is also a teaching for "Those bhikkhus of mine, Ananda, who now or after I am gone, abide as an island unto themselves..."
In my understanding, 'sabbe dhamma' does not indicate aggregated experience, but rather all experience and things, be they conditioned or unconditioned, manifest or unmanifest. 'Sabbe sankhara' implies aggregated experience.
Now a note about this purported "mere" reflexivity. I feel that from my perspective the "merely reflexive" argument here willfully does not address a couple of important issues surrounding anatta. Let's look at them. Firstly that Self, if worthy at all of the word, is already to be recognized as reflexive. Going to the Dhammapada, the AttaVagga states "Atta is Lord of Atta," referring that one Self excercises a reflexivity, a self-determination, over itSElf. Well, one who adheres to the "merely reflexive" usage would stick to his guns at this and say that the AttaVagga of the Dhp is also only using the word in the conventional, "merely" reflexive sense. But we must duly note that the statement here cited from the Dhp is very heavily reminiscent of one of those criteria by which the khandhas are said to fail to pass muster in being called Self: specifically that: "Form, monks, is not self. If form were the self, this form would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' But precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'"
So the khandhas, individually or taken together, which a conventionalist interpreter who denies a transcendent Self would argue encompass the totality of man, by definition lack this fundamental soteriological (soteriological in that one who makes refuge of oneself "will become the highest"--and one could even say that without this capability there is no liberation from samsara) feature: that of self-determination, of reflexivity. We would have to ask how one can take refuge in oneself if there is in fact no Self and if the remaining totality of our being is fraught with the unsatisfactory feature of not having any reflexive, self-determining power (ie is actually incapable by definition of making a refuge of itself) to begin with. So the way I see it, the argument that the word is used in a merely conventional, reflexive sense sort of collapses in on itself in two ways, not by adhering to the teaching of anatta but actually by ignoring one of its key points.
in friendliness,
V.
The thing is you are defining Self as reflexive, just on an ultimate level. You seem to stop at 'form is not-self' and then miss perception, feeling, formations, and consciousness. The reflexive form of Atta, 'transcendent' or not, does not exist outside of the skandhas. If it does, there would be no way to verify this by any sort of investigation, and is basically a pointless position to take for this reason.
In regards to the 'Atta is lord of Atta' here is a link:
Let us now see how two scholars, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and I. B. Horner, already discussed briefly have mistranslated certain Pali terms to demonstrate that Buddha affirmed the existence of atta. They argue that Buddha did indeed claim that the five aggregates are not atta, but that He never directly denied the existence of atta. The five aggregates are not atta, but there is something apart from the five aggregates that we can call atta, self or soul, these scholars claim.”’ Whenever Coomaraswamy and Horner see the word atta, they try to imagine that it means eternal self or soul.
One of the passages they point to is found in Dhammapada (verse I60): “Atta hi attano natho.” They translate is as “Self is the lord of self.” They say that it means that the big Self is the lord of the little self. Actually, it means, “One is one’s own lord or refuge,” or, “One is one’s own support.” The second line of the verse reads, “Ko hi natho paro siya,?” or “Who else can be the lord or refuge?” In Pali, the word atta can mean self, soul, or eternal self, in the Hindu sense, or it can simply be a part of a reflexive pronoun like himself, yourself, or myself. Thus when Buddha says “Atta hi attano natho, ko hi natho paro siya?” mean “One is one’s own lord or refuge; who else can be the lord or refuge”, it is clear that atta means oneself, not soul.
Buddha urges people to rely on themselves, on their own effort, and not to rely on others in their spiritual practice. Another passage which is misinterpreted in the book by Coomaraswamy and Horner is from the Mahaparinibbana Sutta’: “Attadipa viharatha anannasarana.” The meaning is, “Dwell having yourself as an island, having yourself as a refuge and not anyone else as a refuge.” Here also they interpret atta to mean soul or eternal self.
They claim that Buddha was instructing us to make the soul our island or refuge. But in the next line, Buddha says, “Dhammadipa viharatha dhammasarana anannasarana,” which means, “Dwell having the Dhamma (Buddha’s teachings) as an island, having the Dhamma as a refuge, nothing else as a refuge.” Buddha is instructing his followers to rely on their own effort and on the teachings, especially as He was soon to be gone from this earth.
The idea of atta as soul is completely foreign to this passage. Moreover Buddha went on to say, “How is the monk to dwell making himself an island?” He then went on to describe the practice of the four foundations of mindfulness. The Buddha really meant that one should make Satipatthana meditation (contemplation of the body, feelings, mind, and dhamma objects) one’s refuge.
Anyway, I guess that's all I have to say for now. BTW, Vachagotta, what translation of the Dhammapada do you get your quote from? Translation directly affects our understanding of the teachings.
In the famous Brahmajala Sutta which is recommended for those who want to study an explanation of wrong views, Buddha describes and classifies all conceivable wrong views and speculations about reality. One of those wrong views is the belief that there exists an eternal self. Buddha says of this view:
“Therein, bhikkhus, when those recluses and brahmins who are eternalists proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal - that is only the agitation and vacillaation of those who do not know and do not see; that is only the agitation and vacillation of those who are immersed in craving.”
Coomaraswamy and Horner argue that Buddha’s denial of atta refers only to the phenomenal self, and that His denial is really an affirmation of what they call the Great Self (mah’atta) . They argue that Buddha stated that the five aggregates are not atta, but that He never categorically stated that there is no atta, or Self.
They claim that Buddha was only directing us not to see the real Self in the personal ego - a view identical to the Hindu view. They reason that Buddha’s denial of certain things being atta indicates that He affirmed a true atta of a different nature. When Buddha said, “This is not atta,” these scholars insert the following argument: “But a moment’s consideration of the logic of the words will show that they assume the reality of a Self that is not any one or all of the ‘things’ that are denied of it.”
But let us say, for the sake of argument, that I have five animal horns here. If I say “None of these horns is the horn of a rabbit,” does it mean that there exists somewhere else or in another form such a thing as a horn of a rabbit?
No. A horn of a rabbit is just a designation, an abstraction, without any corresponding reality. Similarly Buddha often said, “This is not atta. That is not atta. Nothing here is atta.” Does that indicate that Buddha means that there exists somewhere something that can be called atta? No.
I will conclude this section by explaining a very important statement found in Patisambhidamagga and in Majjhima Nikaya: “Sabbe sankhara anicca; sabbe sankhara dukkha (not in M.N.); sabbe dhamma anatta.” The first sentence means, "AII conditioned things are impermanent.” The second means, ‘All conditioned things are suffering.”
The third sentence, however is different. Here, Buddha does not use the word sankhara, but He uses dhamma instead. Dhamma here means all things without exception. So the third sentence means, ‘AII things, conditioned or unconditioned, are anatta, are void of self and soul.” This means that even Nibbana, which is asankhara, unconditioned, is not atta or is void of atta. This statement unequivocally denies atta of any kind, even in ultimate Truth and Enlightenment, even in Nibbana.
I was referring to the individual who kept badgering us, under different names and after repeated bannings. If this isn't you and you have no connection to this individual, there's no need to take anything I said personally.
LOL! And by definition Vacchagotta, since you take a vedantic viewpoint, you are not a Buddhist, so don't be suprised when people here take issue with you and yes, you're a Dark Zenner, nobody else, after investigation would find the sources you use credible in any way. If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, lays duck eggs and goes quack... :winkc:
First of all, perhaps I should have been more meticulous in citing my sources in this discussion. Obviously, in the first place I base my practice as a Buddhist on the teachings of the Pali discourses of the Buddha. That's the primary source, the Sutta Pitaka. As for the translations I cut and pasted, perhaps I should have been more meticulous in my citations and linking, Because they're all from www.accesstoinsight.org ! If you don't find those translations credible enough, I could always go back to the old PTS versions, but I would prefer not to since I don't have them in cut and pasteable format so I'd have to spend a lot of my time here typing from a book. Alternatively, www.metta.lk has a growing collection of online translations, but access has a better indexing system in place so I haven't used their versions in this discussion. It's far more convenient to be able to search for relevant suttas by keyword.
When I have more time, I'd like to comment in more detail on the article Khantichayo Bhikkhu wrote "What the Buddha Never Taught." I've found it to contain some problematic arguments from my point of view. I certainly can't speak for such as IB Horner or AK Coomaraswamy, since since the article was cited against my own interpretations, I feel obliged to point out where I believe bhante was using a flawed argument. But perhaps another day when I have more time.
Sounds to me like the buddha was saying, 'hey I'm getting old now, and dwelling in this body to teach is causing me distress/discomfort. The only thing that eases this distress is maintaining signless concentration of mind. Oh yeah, and I'm not going to be around much longer. You guys can't depend on me anymore. You gotta figure this stuff out on your own. You should learn only to depend on yourself for understanding, having no external supports. The only support you should have to aid yourself in understanding realization is the Dhamma, what I have taught. Everyone who practices the 4 foundations of mindfulness, going beyond desire & sorrow for things of this world, can be said to have done this. In other words get to it, having faith in your experience and the dhamma, and you will realize this teaching for yourself.
Obviously, the interpretation you voiced is the usual one and I am familiar with it. While I do recognize that meaning is certainly inferrable, I still feel there is the deeper meaning right there to be plucked, and there are a couple of reasons behind my reaction to the text.
Firstly, the usual interpretation you voiced sounds a great deal like the advice given in the Kalama sutta. Refer to http://accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/anguttara/an03-065a.html and http://accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_09.html
"Therefore, did we say, Kalamas, what was said thus, 'Come Kalamas. Do not go upon what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon tradition; nor upon rumor; nor upon what is in a scripture; nor upon surmise; nor upon an axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon a bias toward a notion that has been pondered over; nor upon another's seeming ability; nor upon the consideration, "The monk is our teacher." Kalamas, when you yourselves know: "These things are good; these things are not blamable; these things are praised by the wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to benefit and happiness," enter on and abide in them.'
Maybe you wouldn't agree to that, but that's the impression I get. And I understand the context is different, but the way I see it the message is the same: "instead of relying on others, rely on what you can know for yourselves." In the Kalama sutta, the Buddha goes on to instruct the Kalamas in the four brahma-viharas, and does not go into his own unique teaching of the Eightfold path, which he probably would have done after they take refuge.
But we don't really even find similar wording much less the formula. For me the pivotal phrase which makes this distinction is found at: "after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; having the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge." Can you see the distinction? It does not say he has overcome reliance on others, reliance on a teacher. It says he has overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world (which we remember is anatta: "not-'himself'") and is "truly" an island unto himself. I can understand this distinction is difficult to communicate to one who is entrenched in the usual interpretation, because it is only a very slight shift in interpretive emphasis. But it can make a world of difference when there is an extant argument against any hint of positive references to the self in the discourses. I can but reiterate the basis of the teaching: The world is not yours, not your self, let it go. Overcome desire and sorrow with regard to the world (the crux of it, the key to Buddhist practice), and that is how you will be an island unto your self. Its really very simple to me. We could discuss the point in more detail, possibly with cross-references, as the discussion continues. But for now I just wanted to focus on that aspect. In practice, as Buddhists, we are all trying to live this, are we not? To overcome desire and sorrow with regard to the world. As Buddhists, having this in common, we have far more in common than most here would seem to like to recognize, despite such a huge diversity of views between Buddhist individuals not to mention various schools of Buddhism.
You go on to say:
In my understanding, 'sabbe dhamma' does not indicate aggregated experience, but rather all experience and things, be they conditioned or unconditioned, manifest or unmanifest. 'Sabbe sankhara' implies aggregated experience.
The issue of how inclusive 'sabbe dhamma' is, we may regard as still debatable. To begin, let's look at the definitive sutta on the term as the Buddha used it:
The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas.
What I see there is a definition of sabba as indicating aggregated experience. I'm not going to get into Abhidhamma, but we can easily reason that the eye and forms (etc) indicates an aggregate: namely consciousness.
Now, the point that all this is debatable is indicated very aptly by the footnote that Thanissaro Bhikkhu has included. Far be it from Thanissaro to advance a theory of Self (I wouldn't be suprised if he took the conventionalists' view of DN 16 as we discussed above...and he skillfully elides the issue by referring to the allayment of all differentiation--a philosophical ground which does not itself deny the Self but denies all ditthi regarding Self), he nevertheless recognizes (the entirety of footnote 1 following):
1. The Commentary's treatment of this discourse is very peculiar. To begin with, it delineates three other "All's" in addition to the one defined here, one of them supposedly larger in scope than the one defined here: the Allness of the Buddha's omniscience (literally, All-knowingness). This, despite the fact that the discourse says that the description of such an all lies beyond the range of explanation.
Secondly, the Commentary includes nibbana (unbinding) within the scope of the All described here — as a dhamma, or object of the intellect — even though there are many other discourses in the Canon specifically stating that nibbana lies beyond the range of the six senses and their objects. Sn V.6, for instance, indicates that a person who has attained nibbana has gone beyond all phenomena (sabbe dhamma), and therefore cannot be described. MN 49 discusses a "consciousness without feature" (viññanam anidassanam) that does not partake of the "Allness of the All." Furthermore, the following discourse (SN XXXV.24) says that the "All" is to be abandoned. At no point does the Canon say that nibbana is to be abandoned. Nibbana follows on cessation (nirodha), which is to be realized. Once nibbana is realized, there are no further tasks to be done.
Thus it seems more this discourse's discussion of "All" is meant to limit the use of the word "all" throughout the Buddha's teachings to the six sense spheres and their objects. As the following discourse shows, this would also include the consciousness, contact, and feelings connected with the sense spheres and their objects. Nibbana would lie outside of the word, "all." This would fit in with another point made several times in the Canon: that dispassion is the highest of all dhammas (Iti 90), while the arahant has gone beyond even dispassion (Sn IV.6; Sn IV.10).
This raises the question, if the word "all" does not include nibbana, does that mean that one may infer from the statement, "all phenomena are not-self" that nibbana is self? The answer is no. As AN IV.174 states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the cessation of the six sense spheres is to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to complicate the uncomplicated — see the Introduction to MN 18). The range of differentiation goes only as far as the "All." Perceptions of self or not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond the "All." When the cessation of the "All" is experienced, all differentiation is allayed.
See also: SN XXXV.24
So, at least, you can see by that that it is not settled among all Buddhists that "sabbe dhamma" includes what is beyond, namely the arhat/nibbana.
Moving on to your last point:
The thing is you are defining Self as reflexive, just on an ultimate level. You seem to stop at 'form is not-self' and then miss perception, feeling, formations, and consciousness. The reflexive form of Atta, 'transcendent' or not, does not exist outside of the skandhas. If it does, there would be no way to verify this by any sort of investigation, and is basically a pointless position to take for this reason.
I wouldn't have been so careless as to miss the other four khandhas. I assumed you would be familiar enough with the suttas as to know that the others were included, for brevity's sake. The fact remains that the other four khandhas lack reflexive power as well.
Despite the assertion that we are here being told to only rely on our self as a "conventional way of speaking" to say it is us as individual personalities that walk the path for ourselves and no other, it is still true that one's own personality (sakkaya) is, according to rest of the teachings not a refuge not a mainstay, not a protector, not something to be loved and valued and trusted by virtue of the three marks which are all equally applied to the khandhas as to "the world" (loka--"the world," "the All," "the five khandhas" are interchangeable in the discourses; what is said about one in one place can be equally said about another). For, if there is absolutely no self, by what are we individual if not the khandhas? You see, that's the heart of the dilemma for him who would absolutely deny self and thus be required to interpret these positive occurrences of the word for "self" as merely conventional, merely reflexive. Why, as one of Buddha's most esteemed teachings, take refuge in something that is entirely entangled with dukkha (the conventional self, the individual personality, the sakkaya, the khandhas)?
You certainly raise some thought provoking points. This is a very complex subject, and you raise some important points that must be understood, not intellectually, but through direct experience. Why should we rely on 'our' provisional selves if they are synonomous with the 5 skandhas, which are marked by impermanence and dukkha? Good question.
My understanding is that this basically means, that it is better to rely on one's own provisional self, then the provisional self of another. After all, one must realize the dhamma for themselves and by themselves. The buddha cannot save us. Nothing can save us but our own determined efforts at practicing the dhamma. It also suggests that this provisional self is the very basis of awakening. We fortunately have to look nowhere else than our own provisional selves & the dhamma to realize the truths of anicca, dukkha & anatta. Relying on the realization of others is not going to bring about one's own emancipation. So, in regards to your last paragraph, the teaching of the buddha is simply to be Awake to what is. Be awake to dukkha. Do not push it away, that is aversion. Be awake to sukkha. Do not cling to it, that is craving. It is not implying escaping from the unsatisfactory skandhas, but rather realizing the truth of them, note the arising, abiding and passing away of them. Noticing this in order to realize that they are not to be the basis of one's happiness and identity. Realizing that they do not constitute any eternal, unchanging entity.
Additionally, you quoted the footnote from Thanissaro Bhikkhu to argue the sabbe dhamma point (which I will partially concede), but you seem to have glossed over the final paragraph:
This raises the question, if the word "all" does not include nibbana, does that mean that one may infer from the statement, "all phenomena are not-self" that nibbana is self? The answer is no. As AN IV.174 states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the cessation of the six sense spheres is to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to complicate the uncomplicated — see the Introduction to MN 18). The range of differentiation goes only as far as the "All." Perceptions of self or not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond the "All." When the cessation of the "All" is experienced, all differentiation is allayed.
You have asserted that because nothing in the 6 sense spheres (& five khandhas) cannot be regarded as a Self, then the self must be outside the 6 sense spheres. This passage directly refutes this assertion/implication. To assert or imply a self outside the sense spheres and the khandhas is to 'complicate the uncomplicated' and to 'differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated'. Also, this gets to the point I was attempting to make in regards to the following:
The thing is you are defining Self as reflexive, just on an ultimate level. You seem to stop at 'form is not-self' and then miss perception, feeling, formations, and consciousness. The reflexive form of Atta, 'transcendent' or not, does not exist outside of the skandhas. If it does, there would be no way to verify this by any sort of investigation, and is basically a pointless position to take for this reason.
I wouldn't have been so careless as to miss the other four khandhas. I assumed you would be familiar enough with the suttas as to know that the others were included, for brevity's sake. The fact remains that the other four khandhas lack reflexive power as well.
My point here was not to imply that you are not aware of the four other khandas, however I am afraid the words I used indicate otherwise. My point was that you are asserting an ultimate self that is still reflexive. I don't see how you can have a reflexive form of Self that is not within the realm of the skandhas. I say this based on the fact that one cannot verify the existence of anything outside of the 5 skandhas. Outside of form, perception, sensation, formations and consciousnesses, how can one experience at all? The only thing regarded as 'outside' of the khandhas is their cessation (Nibbana). If all you are referring to by the term Self is Nibbana, then why do you complicate the issue by asserting an existent Self? Why are we having this debate at all?? Nibbana is translated as a blowing out of the skandhas, not as an underlying, eternal abiding entity. Self implies entity. Nibbana does not. And even then, nibbana is just a word which designates a concept which refers to a direct experience which must be realized. Perhaps you are defining self as pure or bare awareness? Why not then just state pure or bare awareness?
Also, it is said that the buddha taught with an open hand (I can't remember the source right now). In other words, no hidden meaning. No veiled teachings. If the buddha taught there was a self outside the khandhas, then why didn't he just say so? Why didn't he address this matter in the suttas? For that matter, why did his disciples, among which there were arahats, treat this matter more explicitly in the abhidamma? Why did they, in fact, indicate an opposite position? Did they get it wrong? Did they just not understand? MahaKashapa was said to understand, and he was a prevalent figure in the formation of the Tipitaka. How would he have failed to address such an essential point explicitly, if he was said to understand?
I guess that's all I have to say for now on this issue.
_/\_
metta
P.S.-BTW, while my article directly addressed Coomaraswamy and Horner, I used it because it directly refuted the "Atta is lord of Atta" translation. I have not seen such a translation outside of them and a translation from www.attan.com which relies heavily on Coomaraswamy's work as well as a Ken Wheeler (of Dark Zen circles) translation. And it is my opinion that 'Self is the lord of self' is a substantially different statement than 'your own self is your own mainstay'. The implications of each statement point in different directions.
New socialist website...
As if we socialists would have $800.00 to buy the domian name.
But honestly ask yourself this, is some of the jargon at all really user friendly?
No, it's just elitist nonsence. I rather get out there in my community help real people with real problems and find the truth there. Buddhist is a straight forward concept, it's people that make it complicated.
"BF the revoltion is in your mind my friend." quote from HH.
I am trying to find the name of a song/poem that goes "The revolution will not..." it was about early to mid '90's. around the same time as King missile wrote the song "Detachable Penis"-anyone know what the hell i'm asking about?
UPDATE!!!! Found it, It's called "the revolution will not be televised". sorry for the interruption
Ok Mr X you got me there. The only thing I can think of is "The Revolution will not be televised" by Gil Scott Heron.
It was kind off ripped off by the Disposable Heroes of Hiphoprisy's. They had a hit with "Television, the drug of the nation".
I just wanted to say that I appreciate the interesting discussion we have going here. I would have to admit that among all those who have voice disagreement with my view to some degree, that your feeling for dhamma comes closest to agreement with mine. I only wish I had more time to exhaustively reply to all of the points you have made.
Regarding the translation of the Dhammapada, I have to admit some carelessness in recognizing the source of my translation of the passage in question. I realize I came close to Coomaraswamy's version, but I don't feel the same need to make the awkward and maybe cryptic distinction making one atta into "Self" and the other into "self". For me it is sufficent that self is lord of self. I was actually paraphrasing my old second-hand store copy published by noonday press and translated by one P. Lal (ever heard of him? neither have I ). His version actually seems to me find a happy medium: "One's self is the lord of onself;"
I just wanted to say that I appreciate the interesting discussion we have going here. I would have to admit that among all those who have voice disagreement with my view to some degree, that your feeling for dhamma comes closest to agreement with mine. I only wish I had more time to exhaustively reply to all of the points you have made.
Regarding the translation of the Dhammapada, I have to admit some carelessness in recognizing the source of my translation of the passage in question. I realize I came close to Coomaraswamy's version, but I don't feel the same need to make the awkward and maybe cryptic distinction making one atta into "Self" and the other into "self". For me it is sufficent that self is lord of self. I was actually paraphrasing my old second-hand store copy published by noonday press and translated by one P. Lal (ever heard of him? neither have I ). His version actually seems to me find a happy medium: "One's self is the lord of onself;"
I have also been enjoying this discussion. It's been very engaging and has required me to really search my own understanding. So, in that sense, I consider your presence a boon to my practice. While I don't really agree with some of your reasoning, I can't say you aren't on to something very important.
Basically, I don't find that taking any view on self is unnecessary for realization and liberation (and is actually counterproductive to some extent). However, if this is where you are in your practice & understanding right now, then that's precisely where you are right now. Just make sure that you realize that your current knowledge and understanding is always developing and changing. I know mine does. My conceptual basis in relation to buddhism has certainly grown and changed since I first encountered this wonderful practice.
I think that my main point is that I don't thing we can consider Atta to be part of the buddhist ontology. Please do read the link I posted earlier on elimitavism vs reductionism. It was pretty heavy reading at first (as I haven't studied these concepts before), but cleared things up for me.
I think that my main point is that I don't thing we can consider Atta to be part of the buddhist ontology. Please do read the link I posted earlier on elimitavism vs reductionism. It was pretty heavy reading at first (as I haven't studied these concepts before), but cleared things up for me.
I've finally had the chance to read the article you linked, and not suprisingly I had some problems with it as it regards this issue. There are several small points which seemed to me incompletely understood or somewhat mischaracterized, but two major issues struck me as nagging failures on the part of the author.
Let's say that the first is really the foundation of the article. While certainly the author brings in other complementary ideas, his primary basis for Buddhist philosophy on the "person" is the well-known section of the Milindapanha which elucidates the later simile of the disassembled Chariot, and adjunct ideas by which the "parts" of a person are called into play. I call this a later simile not only because the Milindapanha itself is a "quasi-canonical" text, but because we find a much different emphasis in Chariot similes of the earlier discoures.
Take for example AN V.28:
"Suppose there were a chariot on level ground at four crossroads, harnessed to thoroughbreds, waiting with whips lying ready, so that a skilled driver, a trainer of tamable horses, might mount and — taking the reins with his left hand and the whip with his right — drive out and back, to whatever place and by whichever road he liked; in the same way, when a monk has developed and pursued the five-factored noble right concentration in this way, then whichever of the six higher knowledges he turns his mind to know and realize, he can witness them for himself whenever there is an opening."
the Dhammapada XVII:
"When anger arises,
whoever keeps firm control
as if with a racing chariot:
him
I call a master charioteer.
Anyone else,
a rein-holder —
that's all."
and VII:
"He whose senses are steadied
like stallions
well-trained by the charioteer,
his conceit abandoned,
free of effluent,
Such:
even devas adore him."
or perhaps most fittingly s i, 5, 6 (Division I, book 1, Chapter 5 verse 6):
"They chariot is the 'Silent Runner' named,
With Wheels of Righteous Effort fitted well.
Conscience the Leaning-board; the Drapery
is Heedfulness; Dhamma the Driver is,
I tell you; Right View he who runs before.
And be it woman, be it man for whom
Such chariot doth wait, by that same car
Into Nibbana's presence shall they come.
(alternate translation):
"ßUpright, is the name of the path, no fear is the direction.
Not crooked is the name of the chariot with the eye of the Teaching.
Shame is the brakes and the accessories are mindfulness.
Charioteer I say is the Teaching and right view, the attendant
If any woman or man goes in this direction,
He reaches close up to extinction in this vehicle.û"
In these examples from the discourses we find that the emphasis is precisely on the charioteer, the destination, and the rider. We find a chariot that is a symbol of the path, an able vehicle with the best driver and the best destination. If we take the latter simile in this context, we imagine that the rider has stopped the chariot and is now taking it apart in search of the "chariot". We find a dilapidated metaphor, literally broken apart and unable to make progress. What is the chariot in this latter simile? Of course, it is the khandhas being examined in contemplation as not-self. As such this does not tell us anything new in reference to the Buddha's teaching, but the author would here like to add the conclusion (which, as we discussed, is specifically repudiated by the Buddha) "there is no self" to the examination of the khandhas as not-self. In all this, of course, we have nonetheless forgotten the rider. For in the latter metaphor of the chariot, it is not the "chariot" (assembled or not, it is just the khandhas, a conditioned heap) we should be looking for, but the rider.
So we have as the basis of this Buddhist "reductionism," a question-begging preoccupation with examining the khandhas (which we are already emphatically assured by the Buddha are not-self) for any whiff of a Self that one disbelieves in the first place and one knows one will not find amongst the compounded phenomena. To emply an analogy, it makes me think of a thirsty man in the desert continually showing his long-empty canteen to his companion, saying "see? there is no water!", not heeding the oasis behind him.
This brings me to my second nagging problem with the article. Throughout the early part of the article, I found myself always thinking, "This is all very interesting, but where does the Buddha's soteriology fit in here? What of Nibbana, of vimutti? How here is the author not going to talk of the cessation of suffering at all?" Just about the time that that question was really beginning to bother me about the article, the author put out this impoverished offering:
"Suppose that I, realizing that the action I now contemplate
will result in future pain for me, am deterred through
anticipating that I shall experience pain. Now there is no
further fact that makes it the case that the person who will
feel that pain will be me; this fact just consists in the
obtaining of certain relations among certain purely
impersonal present and future entities and events. I do
nonetheless have a special reason for refraining from the
action, namely the fact that this is (typically) the best way
to insure that that future pain does not occur. Because pain
is bad, we all have a reason to try to prevent its
occurrence; and in general I am better positioned than anyone
else to prevent my own future pains. Existential dread may be
unjustifiable, but a moderate degree of concern over one's
anticipated future pain does have considerable utility."
That's about it. I say the author's view here is impoverished specifically because it is an interpretation of Buddhism that disregards the utmost goal of Buddhism and speaks not of any method by which to attain that goal. The picture we have of a "middle path" presented by the author is little other than an intellectual picture of a quasi-Freudian relative adjustment to a hopeless position and at best a doctrine of "mere morality" or karma-based production of a relatively better (though, the Buddha recognizes, still impermanent and therefore dukkha) future. It is that contrast with the Buddha's more intimate teaching (the discourses), which is utterly concerned with the goal, with Nibbana, and the practical way to the goal, which is very much in highlight here. Thus, while it was interesting to read, I don't find this article helpful in lending intelligibility to the Buddha's teaching. Actually, I'm going to have to say that when I said "nagging failures" at the beginning of my post, that was an inapt wording, because I don't find that the author was here actually concerned with Buddha's teaching except as an elaborate philosophy needing to be placed in a dry taxonomy of ideas. As such it may have been a success on its own terms, but for me fairly heedless of the Buddha's teaching as a matter of a way to the cessation of suffering.
How about this reference from the Samyutta Nikaya, translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi?:
Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rajagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: "Bhikkhus!"
"Venerable Sir!" those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:
"Bhikkhus, this life span of human beings is short. One has to go on to the futire life. One should do what is wholesome and lead the holy life; for one who has taken birth there is no avioding death. One who lives long, bhikkhus, lives a hundred years or a little longer."
Then Mara te Evil One approached the Blessed One and addressed him in verse:
"The days and nights do not fly by,
Life does not come to a stop.
The life span of mortals rolls along Like the chariots's felly round the hub"*
[The Blesses One:]
"The days and nights go flying by,
Life comes to a stop.
The life span of mortals is depleted
Like the water in rivulets."
Then Mara the Evil One ... dissapears right there. - SN IV.10
* Note #280: The point may be that as the felly revolves around the stable hub, so the changing forms of life revolve around a stable soul of life-principle. The verse seems to be alluding to a similie in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad II.5.15: "And as all spokes are contained in the axle and in the felly of a wheel, all beings, and all those selves (of the eath, water, etc.), are contained in that Self" (Muller, The Upanshads, 2:116). See too Chandogya Upanisad VII.15.1 (The Upanisads, 1:120).
While I certainly agree with not1not2 that you raise some very interesting points, I am not sure that I completely understand your point of view. The main problem that I see with your argument, if I understand it correctly, is that the Buddha was very clear about what he wanted to teach. Everything that he felt was truly important, that is everything leading to the end of suffering, was covered over and over again in every conceivable way. The Buddha did not leave anything left unanswered when it dealt specifically with this goal, and he did his utmost to thoroughly explain each and every last detail. It seems, however, that you [as well as some of our newer members] are implying that there is at least one things that the Buddha didn't directly teach about, but somehow stressed in very subtle and obscure ways. The idea here seems to be that instead of being very open and clear about this self that so many were confident existed, the Buddha supposedly remained silent while cleverly pointing at something that wasn't in aggregates, apart of the aggregates, or the totality of the aggregates, but was still an unchanging self.
All I can say is that I see absolutely no evidence for this view whatsoever. First, the Buddha was quite clear that the five aggregates were not-self, so this self that is supposed to be here for us to discover would have to lie outside of the five aggregates. Why? Because the Buddha said that there was absolutely nothing permanent and unchanging in the five aggregates whatsoever. And, further more, the Buddha did not openly teach about any such self outside of the five aggregates. In fact, that is precisely one of the wrong views that the Buddha warns Vacchagotta about, referring to them as a 'thicket of views'. So, what exactly is this self? Where is this self? What place does this self have in the chain of dependent co-arising? Why did the Buddha not just teach his bhikkhus openly about this self? It has already been shown that the Buddha did not teach Nibbana as a self, so what else is left? If you cannot find any references in the Pali Canon which mention this self directly, or point to it yourself, then what is the use of even trying to prove its existence? It seems like an utter waste of time. The simply fact of the matter is, if it were not a waste of time, the Buddha would have given a discourse about it.
As for the quotation you took from the Maha-parinibbana sutta, "...after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; having the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge.", it basically sounds like the Buddha is describing someone who has freed themselves of the asavas. The asavas, or mental effluents, are what go out into the world and condition the arising of sensuality, becoming, and ignorance. It is they, along with ignorance, that create a kind of feed-back loop which fuels the entire cycle of samsara. I could be wrong, but the Buddha could have simply been directing his bhikkhus to practice diligently, and not allow their minds to seek out and grasp at external things. As Sariputta explained, contact, mental volition, and consciousness are the nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be, and for the support of those seeking a new existence. To take refuge in the Dhamma [i.e. the teachings] means to take refuge in the Noble Eightfold Path, which is the only way leading to the cessation of the effluents, as well as ignorance. It doesn't appear to be a self that the Buddha is encouraging Ananda to take refuge in here, but it is instead the practice of Dhamma. For it is only this practice by which one entirely abandons the underlying tendency to lust, one abolishes the underlying tendency to aversion, one extirpates the underlying tendency to the view and conceit 'I am,' and by abandoning ignorance and arousing true knowledge one here and now makes an end of suffering.
This comment from the Ven. Nanavira might help to clarify what I mean:
But attá is not an indefiniteness; it is a deception, and a deception (a mirage, for example) can be as definite as you please -- the only thing is, that it is not what one takes it for. To make any assertion, positive or negative, about attá is to accept the false coin at its face value. If you will re-read the Vacchagotta Sutta (Avyákata Samy. 8: iv,395-7), you will see that the Buddha refrains both from asserting and from denying the existence of attá for this very reason. (In this connection, your implication that the Buddha asserted that there is no self requires modification. What the Buddha said was 'sabbe dhammá anattá' -- no thing is self --, which is not quite the same. 'Sabbe dhammá anattá' means 'if you look for a self you will not find one', which means 'self is a mirage, a deception'. It does not mean that the mirage, as such, does not exist.) - L.37
Academic evidence doesn't really do the Buddha's teachings justice. Beyond just being studied, these teachings were meant to be put into practice as well. Without the compliments of observing the precepts, meditation, and direct insight into phenomena, nobody's understanding of what the Buddha taught will ever be complete. We must remember that the Buddha said that his teachings were not to be used to simply argue with other contemplatives, but they were to be skillfully put into practice. To only focus on one side of the practice or the other destroys this carefully constructed balance designed by the Buddha.
What the Buddha seems to be teaching in regards to 'anatta' is that, anywhere whatsoever that you may look for a permanent, ever-lasting self, you will simply find yourself grasping at unsatisfactoriness and inconstancy out of ignorance. The conditioned world is ruled by conditionality, not by a hidden self. For example, the Buddha went on to explain that not only was the body not-self, but the mind was not-self as well. In short, the five clinging-aggregates are not-self because they are unsatisfactory and inconstant. But, the Buddha doesn't just stop there. He continues to explain that if one were to say:
'Repudiating this All [referring to the five aggregates], I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range. - SN XXXV.23
So, while the question remains open if there is actually 'something' there or not, to even speculate as to the answer is clearly going against the Buddha's teachings. Everything that we can possibly experience in this body and mind of ours is unsatisfactory and inconstant, therefore, everything that we can possibly experience in this body and mind is also said to be not-self. However, when looking beyond this body and mind for an eternal essence that can be viewed or grasped onto as a self is impossible. As the Buddha said, such a thing lies beyond range. A search in that direction only leads one to grief.
When people try to use Nibbana as an example of what lies beyond range, but can be experienced at some point, they also forget to include the various teachings concerning that attainment. For one, to even experience Nibbana, all forms of self view must be abandoned. There is no longer any thoughts of "I", "me", or "mine". To intellectually try and uncover a self in that experience is merely trying to complicate the uncomplicated. As the Venerable Sariputta explained when he was asked if there was anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the cessation of the six sense spheres:
"The statement, 'With the remainderless stopping & fading of the six contact-media [vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch, & intellection] is it the case that there is anything else?' complicates non-complication. The statement, '... is it the case that there is not anything else ... is it the case that there both is & is not anything else ... is it the case that there neither is nor is not anything else?' complicates non-complication. However far the six contact-media go, that is how far complication goes. However far complication goes, that is how far the six contact media go. With the remainderless fading & stopping of the six contact-media, there comes to be the stopping, the allaying of complication. - AN IV.174
That is why I do not enjoy delving to deeply into this particular topic. It is ultimately unskillful, and considered by the Buddha himself to be inappropriate attention. Our focus is taken off of the immeditate practice, and instead becomes lost within speculative thoughts about the various views of self. It is a trap that the noble disciple must learn to avoid, for it only leads one to more suffering, more becoming, more craving, and it does not lead one to the abandoning of ignorance, abandoning of craving, Nibbana. As the Buddha cautioned his followers in regards to these kinds of inappropriate attention thus:
"This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?'
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress. - MN 2
Jason,
Thanks for your comments.
Your second post does in fact clarify your own position somewhat. Though I have to say that when you write "It is ultimately unskillful, and considered by the Buddha himself to be inappropriate attention. Our focus is taken off of the immeditate practice, and instead becomes lost within speculative thoughts about the various views of self." I must disagree because this issue has everything to do with practice, and I don't feel that our discussion has actually strayed from discussing the Dhamma in very real (practical: for the meanings of how we interpret the teaching is a very practical matter at its heart) and very orthodox ways. I think we each have to take anatta seriously on a very intimate, individual level in the way we each must weigh it intuitively in our own experience, on a continual basis. In order to do this, we have to understand the reasoning of the anatta teaching, and a discussion like this, if undertaken in earnest, should help each of us in clarifying for ourselves the inner meaning. Now maybe you and I differ on the reasoning behind it in some basic way, but on a practical level I can't but sense that we must agree: the five khandhas are anatta, and are for relinquishing if we are ever to make an end of suffering. I guess it is confusing to me how my comments have led to the assumption that we are off on a speculative tangent here. Perhaps I don't think that my actual position is being understood. I'm not here to advance any false theories of Self (I'm thoroughly familiar with the Brahmajala). Nevertheless the points I'm trying to make are being characterized as clinging to some thing or another as being Self or as a dualistic seeking outside body and mind for Self; absurdities I'm not trying to advance here. This is the very real stuff of Buddhist contemplation. Anatta could be considered one of the most practical topics of Buddhism because it concerns the point of view we should cultivate with regard to all things, the attitude (ditthi) which forms the basis of our practice. I personally find that when meditation is informed by contemplation of anatta, the practice is more fruitful. Don't you? I thought we might agree on at least that. And that's a lot.
--"If anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of the eye are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self.' So the eye is not-self....
That a person — through abandoning passion-obsession with regard to a feeling of pleasure, through abolishing resistance-obsession with regard to a feeling of pain, through uprooting ignorance-obsession with regard to a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, through abandoning ignorance and giving rise to clear knowing — would put an end to suffering & stress in the here & now: such a thing is possible.
"Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows disenchanted with the eye, disenchanted with forms, disenchanted with consciousness at the eye, disenchanted with contact at the eye, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with craving.
"He grows disenchanted with the ear...
"He grows disenchanted with the nose...
"He grows disenchanted with the tongue...
"He grows disenchanted with the body...
"He grows disenchanted with the intellect, disenchanted with ideas, disenchanted with consciousness at the intellect, disenchanted with contact at the intellect, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with craving. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully released.' He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'" --MN 148
I might be getting the entirely wrong impression here, but I think that you are just having a bit of fun with us. Admittedly, I may be completely wrong about this, and I sincerely apologize if I am. However, I can't help but wonder if it's true. Perhaps it would benefit us all if you were less vague, and more specific when it comes to what you are trying to get across. All you seem to be doing is trying to refute each poster in turn while being quite vague as to your own position--which appears to change from time to time. It is, of course, your choice if you wish to delve into the areas where the Buddha warns his disciples not to, but please do not attempt to confuse the issue any further by pretending that it is in line with the Buddha's teachings. You're very clever, I'll certainly give you that, but lets not forget your analogy of the gold (Nibbana) and its impurities (defilements). If I recall correctly, you said that, "This is the case of Self being bound to aggregated existence by ignorance." Care to tell me exactly how this is considered orthodox? If you're not here to advance any false theories of Self, then please explain what you are here to do.
Sorry if I make the impression that I'm not serious about this. I'll admit that we have a fundamental interpretive disagreement here. Perhaps it runs so deep that the obviousness (to our own way of thinking) of our respective positions inhibits dialogue somewhat. I must admit I do lately find it very difficult to read into the Buddha's discourse a denial of Self, where I formerly did. So I can imagine you are finding it difficult to imagine that I could be basing my position in all this on the very same discourses, quite often the very same translations, that you do. But I am!
Maybe some clarification is in order. You seem to read into my posts that the Buddha's teaching on Self is some kind of subtle, obscure teaching, sort of a rabbit I pulled out of the hat, some kind of sophists trickery. Well, first of all, I must say that the Buddha's teaching, though certainly clear, we all probably agree runs quite deep and that our tendency for suffering goes to subtle levels. But, I really don't think I'm trying to communicate a hidden teaching here. What I'm offering is a more obvious (to me) interpretation of those teachings that do talk of Self in a very straightforward, maybe we should even say practical manner. And do so, in my opinion, without breaking up the carefully constructed teaching of anatta/apophasis. Some of these, for instance the Dhammapada Atta Vagga or the Mahaparinibbana sutta of the Digha Nikaya, have already been discussed. We must both admit that these texts use the word atta which in other choice contexts (just about every other one) you would say does in fact mean Self (in the sense of essence), only not here or there where it seems to have a positive value. So I feel that what we have here is an exegetical disagreement. On the other hand, I am trying to counter what I find to be a curiosity: That many Buddhists are so fond of asserting that there is no Self or the Buddha taught there is no Self, even in the face of unequivocal repudiation of such a view by the Buddha. Sometimes we find people who, in the face of this dilemma, take what could be called the moderate view; that the Buddha only denied a Self that can transcend the khandhas, but not the self that is provisional, the illusory identity of the khandhas...but this version is indistinguishable from the annihilationist view. Sometimes we find someone who accepts that denial of Self is also a view to be gotten rid of, but after all their discussion of the fact, they will still, quite ironically, infer "but seriously, now, there is no Self". It seems that to me this doesn't have to be a highly complicated philosophical discussion about the characteristics of said Self because what Buddhism is really concerned with is disengaging oneself from the machinery of suffering.
Though I have to say that when you write "It is ultimately unskillful, and considered by the Buddha himself to be inappropriate attention. Our focus is taken off of the immeditate practice, and instead becomes lost within speculative thoughts about the various views of self." I must disagree because this issue has everything to do with practice, and I don't feel that our discussion has actually strayed from discussing the Dhamma in very real (practical: for the meanings of how we interpret the teaching is a very practical matter at its heart) and very orthodox ways
Not according to the suttas:
§ 50. "There is the case where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person — who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for people of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma — does not discern what ideas are fit for attention or what ideas are unfit for attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas fit for attention and attends [instead] to ideas unfit for attention...
"This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?'
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self ... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self ... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self ... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.
"The well-instructed noble disciple — who has regard for noble ones, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma; who has regard for men of integrity, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma — discerns what ideas are fit for attention and what ideas are unfit for attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas unfit for attention and attends [instead] to ideas fit for attention...
"He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices. These are called the fermentations to be abandoned by seeing."
— MN 2
I know this has already been posted, but the buddha made it very clear that formulating the view of 'self' you seem to be formulating is not 'fit for attention'. In other words, it is inadvisable, in a practical sense.
I see your angle, and I must say that I am sad to see that my impression of you appears to be confirmed. You are indeed attempting to complicate the uncomplicated, and trying your best to insert a belief of Self into the Buddha's teachings. While you certainly do bring up some interesting ideas, ideas which often need to be sorted out by those investigating Buddhism, you are doing the Buddha's dispensation a diservice by promoting the idea that he does talk about a Self. As much as you know about Buddhism, you seem to be missing the whole purpose of its existence.
For one thing, there is no annihilationist view when you take into account the doctrine of this/that conditionality, or as it is better known as, paticca-samuppada (dependent co-arising). It is due to the not understanding and not penetrating of this profound doctrine that beings are not freed from suffering. People overlook this teaching at their own peril. And further more, you are taking the conventional usage of a particular word, and trying to apply it to mean some essence, which is only interpretable due to someone's poor understanding of Pali in my opinion.
As Vacchagotta did so many times before, you are merely declaring what has not been declared by the Blessed One. Anatta is a teaching that has a very specific purpose, and it must be understood in relation to all the other doctrines expounded upon by the Buddha. The Blessed One did not teach a doctrine of Self in any shape or form. This is what seems to be so hard for people to accept, but the simple straightforward fact of the matter is that the Buddha did not teach a doctrine of Self. Period. This can be see the clearest in the Buddha's meeting with Malunkyaputta:
I have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was staying near Savatthi at Jeta's Grove, Anathapindika's monastery. Then, as Ven. Malunkyaputta was alone in seclusion, this train of thought arose in his awareness: "These positions that are undeclared, set aside, discarded by the Blessed One — 'The cosmos is eternal,' 'The cosmos is not eternal,' 'The cosmos is finite,' 'The cosmos is infinite,' 'The soul & the body are the same,' 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' 'After death a Tathagata exists,' 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist' — I don't approve, I don't accept that the Blessed One has not declared them to me. I'll go ask the Blessed One about this matter. If he declares to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,' that 'The cosmos is not eternal,' that 'The cosmos is finite,' that 'The cosmos is infinite,' that 'The soul & the body are the same,' that 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' that 'After death a Tathagata exists,' that 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' that 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' or that 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' then I will live the holy life under him. If he does not declare to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,'... or that 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' then I will renounce the training and return to the lower life."
Then, when it was evening, Ven. Malunkyaputta arose from seclusion and went to the Blessed One. On arrival, having bowed down, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One, "Lord, just now, as I was alone in seclusion, this train of thought arose in my awareness: 'These positions that are undeclared, set aside, discarded by the Blessed One... I don't approve, I don't accept that the Blessed One has not declared them to me. I'll go ask the Blessed One about this matter. If he declares to me that "The cosmos is eternal,"... or that "After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist," then I will live the holy life under him. If he does not declare to me that "The cosmos is eternal,"... or that "After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist," then I will renounce the training and return to the lower life.'
"Lord, if the Blessed One knows that 'The cosmos is eternal,' then may he declare to me that 'The cosmos is eternal.' If he knows that 'The cosmos is not eternal,' then may he declare to me that 'The cosmos is not eternal.' But if he doesn't know or see whether the cosmos is eternal or not eternal, then, in one who is unknowing & unseeing, the straightforward thing is to admit, 'I don't know. I don't see.'... If he doesn't know or see whether after death a Tathagata exists... does not exist... both exists & does not exist... neither exists nor does not exist,' then, in one who is unknowing & unseeing, the straightforward thing is to admit, 'I don't know. I don't see.'"
"Malunkyaputta, did I ever say to you, 'Come, Malunkyaputta, live the holy life under me, and I will declare to you that 'The cosmos is eternal,' or 'The cosmos is not eternal,' or 'The cosmos is finite,' or 'The cosmos is infinite,' or 'The soul & the body are the same,' or 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' or 'After death a Tathagata exists,' or 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'?"
"No, lord."
"And did you ever say to me, 'Lord, I will live the holy life under the Blessed One and [in return] he will declare to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,' or 'The cosmos is not eternal,' or 'The cosmos is finite,' or 'The cosmos is infinite,' or 'The soul & the body are the same,' or 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' or 'After death a Tathagata exists,' or 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'?"
"No, lord."
"Then that being the case, foolish man, who are you to be claiming grievances/making demands of anyone?
"Malunkyaputta, if anyone were to say, 'I won't live the holy life under the Blessed One as long as he does not declare to me that "The cosmos is eternal,"... or that "After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,"' the man would die and those things would still remain undeclared by the Tathagata.
"It's just as if a man were wounded with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. His friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives would provide him with a surgeon, and the man would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the man who wounded me was a noble warrior, a priest, a merchant, or a worker.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know the given name & clan name of the man who wounded me... until I know whether he was tall, medium, or short... until I know whether he was dark, ruddy-brown, or golden-colored... until I know his home village, town, or city... until I know whether the bow with which I was wounded was a long bow or a crossbow... until I know whether the bowstring with which I was wounded was fiber, bamboo threads, sinew, hemp, or bark... until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was wild or cultivated... until I know whether the feathers of the shaft with which I was wounded were those of a vulture, a stork, a hawk, a peacock, or another bird... until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was bound with the sinew of an ox, a water buffalo, a langur, or a monkey.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was that of a common arrow, a curved arrow, a barbed, a calf-toothed, or an oleander arrow.' The man would die and those things would still remain unknown to him.
"In the same way, if anyone were to say, 'I won't live the holy life under the Blessed One as long as he does not declare to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,'... or that 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' the man would die and those things would still remain undeclared by the Tathagata.
"Malunkyaputta, it's not the case that when there is the view, 'The cosmos is eternal,' there is the living of the holy life. And it's not the case that when there is the view, 'The cosmos is not eternal,' there is the living of the holy life. When there is the view, 'The cosmos is eternal,' and when there is the view, 'The cosmos is not eternal,' there is still the birth, there is the aging, there is the death, there is the sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair, & distress whose destruction I make known right in the here & now.
"It's not the case that when there is the view, 'The cosmos is finite,' there is the living of the holy life. And it's not the case that when there is the view, 'The cosmos is infinite,' there is the living of the holy life. When there is the view, 'The cosmos is finite,' and when there is the view, 'The cosmos is infinite,' there is still the birth, there is the aging, there is the death, there is the sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair, & distress whose destruction I make known right in the here & now.
"It's not the case that when there is the view, 'The soul & the body are the same,' there is the living of the holy life. And it's not the case that when there is the view, 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' there is the living of the holy life. When there is the view, 'The soul & the body are the same,' and when there is the view, 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' there is still the birth, there is the aging, there is the death, there is the sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair, & distress whose destruction I make known right in the here & now.
"It's not the case that when there is the view, 'After death a Tathagata exists,' there is the living of the holy life. And it's not the case that when there is the view, 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' there is the living of the holy life. And it's not the case that when there is the view, 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' there is the living of the holy life. And it's not the case that when there is the view, 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist' there is the living of the holy life. When there is the view, 'After death a Tathagata exists'... 'After death a Tathagata does not exist'... 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist'... 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' there is still the birth, there is the aging, there is the death, there is the sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair, & distress whose destruction I make known right in the here & now.
"So, Malunkyaputta, remember what is undeclared by me as undeclared, and what is declared by me as declared. And what is undeclared by me? 'The cosmos is eternal,' is undeclared by me. 'The cosmos is not eternal,' is undeclared by me. 'The cosmos is finite'... 'The cosmos is infinite'... 'The soul & the body are the same'... 'The soul is one thing and the body another'... 'After death a Tathagata exists'... 'After death a Tathagata does not exist'... 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist'... 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' is undeclared by me.
"And why are they undeclared by me? Because they are not connected with the goal, are not fundamental to the holy life. They do not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are undeclared by me.
"And what is declared by me? 'This is stress,' is declared by me. 'This is the origination of stress,' is declared by me. 'This is the cessation of stress,' is declared by me. 'This is the path of practice leading to the cessation of stress,' is declared by me. And why are they declared by me? Because they are connected with the goal, are fundamental to the holy life. They lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are declared by me.
"So, Malunkyaputta, remember what is undeclared by me as undeclared, and what is declared by me as declared."
That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Malunkyaputta delighted in the Blessed One's words. - MN 63
I do not think that the Buddha can get any clearer when it comes to his position on doctrines, views, or theories of a Self. These are discerned by the wise as being unfit for attention. While I realize that my words may appear to be harsh and arrogant, I find that having these discussions more and more a little suspicious. Whether or not you are sincere in your beliefs and studies, or just another person trying to cause trouble on this site for their own enjoyment, unless you can offer me some convincing evidence for your views, I do not see any reason to take them seriously.
There is no reason to take those views seriously Jason, but I do admire your persistence in clarifying something for a person who deliberately chooses to distort the Dharma.
I know this has already been posted, but the buddha made it very clear that formulating the view of 'self' you seem to be formulating is not 'fit for attention'. In other words, it is inadvisable, in a practical sense.
_/\_
metta
Not1Not2,
Yes, this has been posted already, and I am familiar with this discourse (I believe I may have quoted it in part myself, I don't remember). Of current interest to me is the final passage of your quote "He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices. These are called the fermentations to be abandoned by seeing."
— MN 2
I have attempted to stress these "appropriate attentions" in all that I say, especially in consideration of the khandhas as described by the three characteristics. That you don't see this, is a problem I am quite puzzled as to how I can remedy through my words, in how I phrase (or not phrase, as the case may be) my view. Alas, and I am sure you are thinking the same thing of your view for me: I fear I can't convince you of it. I've already said that your view is very much the closest to mine that I've come across on this thread in that you are honestly wary of views of Self which outrightly deny Self. With that, I must bring up something that has been nagging the discussion perhaps from the beginning, and that is the notion of "Eternalism" as faced by the Buddha. All repudiated views of Self as in the discourses are defined in relation to "the world" or the khandhas. This is even true in the Milindapanha, which many take to be the final word confirming their own nihilism with regard to Self (as I stated before, even the "degraded" chariot metaphor still only deals with the existing being, the heap of khandhas). The brahmajala sutta was cited in reference to this, and one sees that it is the case. This is to say, with reference to the much-reviled Eternalism, that for the Buddha the Eternalist is one who maintains the eternity and Self-identification of something which is observable as not eternal and as not-self. In other words the Eternalist is maintaining, in some fashion, that one or all of the khandhas, or the notion "world" ("world" in Buddhism is defined as experience, and sassatavada is described by "so loka so atta" meaning roughly "this the Self, indentical with the World") is myself and eternal, thus being the foundation for my own perpetual existence as an experiencing being (let us say, sentient being, or satta). My view is not such a view, because I take the not-self teaching with regard to the khandhas very seriously. Such a guarantee of perpetual satta (existing being--in other words a doctrine of eternal clinging) as sassatavada is, according to the truth of the three characteristics, a guarantee of inescapable eternal dukkha and therefore obviously not acceptable.
That our rejection of sassata should only be in reference to what we see as impermanent (in other words, we do not simply reject ANY notion of sassata without due consideration) is reinforced by the fact that Nibbana is defined using the notion. from the PTS dictionary article on anicca(impermanent; under the entry on nicca--permanent): http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:227.pali
Opposed to this ever -- fluctuating impermanence is Nibbāna (q. v.), which is therefore marked with the attributes of constancy & stableness (cp. dhuva, sassata amata, vipariṇāma).
I am not here advocating some kind of speculative contemplation of atta as possessed of certain discernable attributes (that would be a kind of sassatavada as defined above) but moreso quite actively opposing the notion that anatta specifically implies a total denial of Self. Also rather trying to suggest that in disengaging from self-identification with what is not-self, requiring a serious (appropriate) attendance on what is not-self and what it means to be not-self, I am more wholly "myself," than I ever was. In Nibbana, the arhat most completely fulfills the philosophical criteria of "Self" by which the khandhas are defined as "not-self". If we redefine this "self" as being a mere convention, a heap of aggregates, we philosophically destroy the possibility of liberation, of Nibbana, of true sassata. For if all we are is these aggregates, which are by natural definition dukkha, anicca, anatta (a working definition of annihilationism), there can actually be no sassata amata nibbana. If we adopt that view, aren't we forced to somehow say that the aggregates are capable of liberating themselves? Mustn't we be somehow positing that the aggregate of consciousness can free itself from the three characteristics, forever ridding itself of the asavas in spite of all we know about consciousness; namely that it is based on our senses (thus literally does not exist after the death of the body), is itself ever-changing (we might ask why Nibbana would be final for anybody) lacking in self-determination, and dukkha for one who has thus seen it? That would be indistinguishable from our sassatavada. Or are we forced to contradict and say that Nibbana is not permanent, not eternal, not stable? Or to say that Nibbana is the extinguishment of our very selves? All these are unacceptable to the Buddha in a very real sense: the sense of whether or not there remains the possibility of total liberation from suffering. The denial of Self is as untenable in practical (that is, in terms of the four noble truths) terms as is the assertion of an eternal existing being (satta).
Please be patient with a bit of defensiveness on my own part here.
There is an insistence in this thread that I am maybe not serious in my pursuit of Buddhism, that I am just joking around, that I'm just trying to disrupt the forums, that I'm deliberately trying to distort the Buddhadharma, that I'm just a vedantist in disguise, in short that my views cannot be taken seriously.
I'm quite aware that all these suggestions, if accepted by the moderatorship, have an end result: restriction from posting to the forums. Obviously, it's something, as a person who enjoys participating in dialogues on Buddhism, (like, I'm assuming, everybody else here) is something I would not like to happen. So I am disappointed at the insistence of some in making these accusations, and I really don't know how else to convince you that I am sincere here. Simply that I radically disagree on this or that interpretation of the Buddha's teaching should not be considered evidence to the contrary. Nor should your own annoyance at the continuance of the thread. Frankly put, if you don't want to participate in the discussion, you shouldn't participate in this thread. If you do want to participate, fine, but try to do so in a way that you are comfortable with.
I have tried to set out the reasons for the way I interpet this topic in as comprehensive a way possible for me in such a disjointed medium. I've been civil in the way I do it, I've tried not to make flat assertions without discussing, even if briefly, the thinking behind it or the texts which support it. I'm not here to set out a doctoral thesis. I don't want people to think I'm going to be able to write the book that ultimately convinces you of a view you clearly don't want to adopt. We all tend to hold those who hold an opposing viewpoint to a higher standard of conviction anyways. It's simply harder for us to agree with them than the person we already agree with. Let's not let that get in the way of anybody's forum participation. I'm here to have a dialogue and as such hopefully to refine the way the topic is discussed through the interactive dialectic. That is why we participate in these forums, isn't it?
Not1Not2,
Yes, this has been posted already, and I am familiar with this discourse (I believe I may have quoted it in part myself, I don't remember). Of current interest to me is the final passage of your quote "He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices. These are called the fermentations to be abandoned by seeing."
— MN 2
I have attempted to stress these "appropriate attentions" in all that I say, especially in consideration of the khandhas as described by the three characteristics. That you don't see this, is a problem I am quite puzzled as to how I can remedy through my words, in how I phrase (or not phrase, as the case may be) my view. Alas, and I am sure you are thinking the same thing of your view for me: I fear I can't convince you of it. I've already said that your view is very much the closest to mine that I've come across on this thread in that you are honestly wary of views of Self which outrightly deny Self. With that, I must bring up something that has been nagging the discussion perhaps from the beginning, and that is the notion of "Eternalism" as faced by the Buddha. All repudiated views of Self as in the discourses are defined in relation to "the world" or the khandhas. This is even true in the Milindapanha, which many take to be the final word confirming their own nihilism with regard to Self (as I stated before, even the "degraded" chariot metaphor still only deals with the existing being, the heap of khandhas). The brahmajala sutta was cited in reference to this, and one sees that it is the case. This is to say, with reference to the much-reviled Eternalism, that for the Buddha the Eternalist is one who maintains the eternity and Self-identification of something which is observable as not eternal and as not-self. In other words the Eternalist is maintaining, in some fashion, that one or all of the khandhas, or the notion "world" ("world" in Buddhism is defined as experience, and sassatavada is described by "so loka so atta" meaning roughly "this the Self, indentical with the World") is myself and eternal, thus being the foundation for my own perpetual existence as an experiencing being (let us say, sentient being, or satta). My view is not such a view, because I take the not-self teaching with regard to the khandhas very seriously. Such a guarantee of perpetual satta (existing being--in other words a doctrine of eternal clinging) as sassatavada is, according to the truth of the three characteristics, a guarantee of inescapable eternal dukkha and therefore obviously not acceptable.
That our rejection of sassata should only be in reference to what we see as impermanent (in other words, we do not simply reject ANY notion of sassata without due consideration) is reinforced by the fact that Nibbana is defined using the notion. from the PTS dictionary article on anicca(impermanent; under the entry on nicca--permanent): http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:227.pali
Opposed to this ever -- fluctuating impermanence is Nibbāna (q. v.), which is therefore marked with the attributes of constancy & stableness (cp. dhuva, sassata amata, vipariṇāma).
I am not here advocating some kind of speculative contemplation of atta as possessed of certain discernable attributes (that would be a kind of sassatavada as defined above) but moreso quite actively opposing the notion that anatta specifically implies a total denial of Self. Also rather trying to suggest that in disengaging from self-identification with what is not-self, requiring a serious (appropriate) attendance on what is not-self and what it means to be not-self, I am more wholly "myself," than I ever was. In Nibbana, the arhat most completely fulfills the philosophical criteria of "Self" by which the khandhas are defined as "not-self". If we redefine this "self" as being a mere convention, a heap of aggregates, we philosophically destroy the possibility of liberation, of Nibbana, of true sassata. For if all we are is these aggregates, which are by natural definition dukkha, anicca, anatta (a working definition of annihilationism), there can actually be no sassata amata nibbana. If we adopt that view, aren't we forced to somehow say that the aggregates are capable of liberating themselves? Mustn't we be somehow positing that the aggregate of consciousness can free itself from the three characteristics, forever ridding itself of the asavas in spite of all we know about consciousness; namely that it is based on our senses (thus literally does not exist after the death of the body), is itself ever-changing (we might ask why Nibbana would be final for anybody) lacking in self-determination, and dukkha for one who has thus seen it? That would be indistinguishable from our sassatavada. Or are we forced to contradict and say that Nibbana is not permanent, not eternal, not stable? Or to say that Nibbana is the extinguishment of our very selves? All these are unacceptable to the Buddha in a very real sense: the sense of whether or not there remains the possibility of total liberation from suffering. The denial of Self is as untenable in practical (that is, in terms of the four noble truths) terms as is the assertion of an eternal existing being (satta).
You still seem to be holding to some view that there is a Self, eternally abiding outside the skandhas, saying the buddha only said the skandhas are not self. Please reread this from post #101:
From MN 22:
Alagaddupama Sutta
Translated from the Pali by
Nyanaponika Thera
Impermanence and Not-self
22. "You may well take hold of a possession, O monks, that is permanent, stable, eternal, immutable, that abides eternally the same in its very condition. (But) do you see, monks, any such possession?" — "No, Lord." — "Well, monks, I, too, do not see any such possession that is permanent, stable, eternal, immutable, that abides eternally the same in its very condition."
23. "You may well accept, monks, the assumption of a self-theory from the acceptance of which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. (But) do you see, monks, any such assumption of a self-theory?" — "No, Lord." — "Well, monks, I, too, do not see any such assumption of a self-theory from the acceptance of which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair."
24. "You may well rely, monks, on any supporting (argument) for views from the reliance on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair. (But) do you see, monks, any such supporting (argument) for views?" — "No, Lord." — "Well, monks, I, too, do not see any such supporting (argument) for views from the reliance on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair."
25. "If there were a self, monks, would there be my self's property?" — "So it is, Lord." — "Or if there is a self's property, would there by my self?" — "So it is, Lord." — "Since in truth and in fact, self and self's property do not obtain, O monks, then this ground for views, 'The universe is the Self. That I shall be after death; permanent, stable, eternal, immutable; eternally the same shall I abide, in that very condition' — is it not, monks, an entirely and perfectly foolish idea?" — "What else should it be, Lord? It is an entirely and perfectly foolish idea."
Here the buddha says he cannot find anything which would constitute a Self, inside or outside of the skandhas. BTW, have you read Vasubandhu's refutation??
_/\_
metta
0
federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited March 2006
Has anyone here ever heard the term,
"We'll have to agree to differ.".....?
Far be it from me to criticise, (I personally lost all meaning to this thread at around post two...) But is it absolutely imperative for anyone to be RIGHT?
The words 'flogging a dead horse' spring to mind.... :hohum: :scratch: :grumble: :nonono:
I thought everyone was thoroughly enjoying this discussion though.
Actually, Vacha never really responded to this quote the first time I posted it, so I was wondering how he was going to get around it (aside from brushing it off). So, I was actually trying to redirect the debate a bit from the passages we have been referring to. And honestly, I'm not so much concerned about being right, but reaching some sort of mutual agreement by exposing what underlies my own views and the views of Vachagotta.
Anyway, Vacha, you said this: If we redefine this "self" as being a mere convention, a heap of aggregates, we philosophically destroy the possibility of liberation, of Nibbana, of true sassata. For if all we are is these aggregates, which are by natural definition dukkha, anicca, anatta (a working definition of annihilationism), there can actually be no sassata amata nibbana. If we adopt that view, aren't we forced to somehow say that the aggregates are capable of liberating themselves?
First off, the convention is the word 'self' which is a conventional desigation of an actual experience. So we are not reducing the actual experience to a convention, but are instead using a conventional term which points to it. However, the experience is actually real, but it is illusory, like a mirage. Ultimately, it is the co-mingling of the skandhas which give rise to the mental discrimination of 'myself' and 'other' as a useful tool in assessing phenomenal reality, and the entity of 'myself' is a bi-product of this comingling rather than a permanent underlying entity.
The Short Staff
Shuzan held out his short staff and said, "If you call this a short staff, you oppose its reality. If you do not call it a short staff, you ignore the fact. Now what do you wish to call this?"
Second, we are, in a way, saying the aggregates liberate themselves. What is happening in samsara is a feedback loop which behaves in the manner described in paticca samuppada. What the buddha realized is that any sense of me and mine (whether in the conventional or ultimate sense) is a bi-product of other factors which have no independent reality. What these teachings do is introduce different things into the feedback loop of consciousness which awaken consciousness to its own nature and the nature of the other skandhas. Through this awakening comes an unbinding, or a release from any kind of mental entanglement which is experienced. This truth is meant to be applied in one's direct experience. Playing around with it intellectually is worthless and can actually be harmful, giving rise to the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. BTW, both eternalism and nihilism are fabrications which are dependent on conditiosn. So, the point is to get beyond any fabrication. All dhammas are anatta, not just yourself and myself. This means, the computer I'm typing on, the chair I'm sitting in and so on. This is not saying that I am not sitting on a chair, just that the truth of this chair goes far beyond what is apparent and ultimately there is no difference between this chair and the sun, moon, stars, my mother and so on. This is all the idea of suchness. We move beyond the discriminative, seperate identifications which are apparent and see the suchness of all things. Perhaps this is what you mean by Atta, but it can never be said to be the same, never said to be different. So, it does not fit the definition of an eternal, unchanging entity which the word Atta implies.
You still seem to be holding to some view that there is a Self, eternally abiding outside the skandhas, saying the buddha only said the skandhas are not self. Please reread this from post #101:
Here the buddha says he cannot find anything which would constitute a Self, inside or outside of the skandhas. BTW, have you read Vasubandhu's refutation??
_/\_
metta
I apologize for keeping you waiting on that quote (it's the one from the Alagaddupama sutta, right?). I don't have time to exhaustively respond to all points (though, if we are patient and persistent with the topic we will probably eventually cover all the bases) brought up by everyone. I still wish to take the time to examine some of the (from my point of view) faulty points in the article "What the Buddha never taught", but have not carved out the time for it.
I guess now is the time to take a crack at the sutta you wish to highlight. Obviously, the sutta itself covers a lot of ground. It starts out with one specific pernicious view held by the disciple arittha, which then serves as the occasion for the simile of the snake and a fairly exhaustive coverage of the wrong ways which the "snake" can be grasped. The passage you quoted is focused on wrong views regarding Self, more specifically eternalist views. I think my main response to this would be that we need to pay careful attention to how the Buddha here defines the false view of self...and this applies both to sassatavada (eternalism) and to ucchedavada (annihilationism). He defines self-view as a view which presumes identity in some form with what is here called "universe" (cosmos, sabbe dhamma, loka), as expressed in the phrase "so loka so atta". Here it is translated "The universe is the Self."
"O monks, then this ground for views, 'The universe is the Self. That I shall be after death; permanent, stable, eternal, immutable; eternally the same shall I abide, in that very condition' — is it not, monks, an entirely and perfectly foolish idea?"
This is a crucial point, and I'm not sure if it is forgotten because one wants to emphasize a rejection of the eternal in general (which I mentioned before we can't, because Nibbana is described in terms of sassata), or if it is simply understood differently. We're talking about an existing Self, and existance (and non-existance) are categories of being reliant upon the world for support. That which exists we say exists by virtue of being part of the substance and experience of the world, we say it is observable in its arising and in its passing away. That which does not exist has passed away or never arose as a phenomenon, and, having no support beyond the world, is, we say, annihilated or simply not. That Buddhism accepts the possibility of transcending existance by this criteria and non-existance by this criteria is unmistakeable by the third noble truth. By contrast, here is how the Buddha sees the world with which the Eternalists identify themselves:
Then a certain monk went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to the Blessed One: "'The world, the world'1 it is said. In what respect does the word 'world' apply?
"Insofar as it disintegrates,2 monk, it is called the 'world.' Now what disintegrates? The eye disintegrates. Forms disintegrate. Consciousness at the eye disintegrates. Contact at the eye disintegrates. And whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the eye — experienced as pleasure, pain or neither-pleasure-nor-pain — that too disintegrates.
"The ear disintegrates. Sounds disintegrate...
"The nose disintegrates. Aromas disintegrate...
"The tongue disintegrates. Tastes disintegrate...
"The body disintegrates. Tactile sensations disintegrate...
"The intellect disintegrates. Ideas disintegrate. Consciousness at the intellect consciousness disintegrates. Contact at the intellect disintegrates. And whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the intellect — experienced as pleasure, pain or neither-pleasure-nor-pain — that too disintegrates.
"Insofar as it disintegrates, it is called the 'world.'"
It occurs to me, perhaps mischievously, that a nihilist with regard to atta would be pleased if in the above quoted sutta on "world", the word "loka" would be replaced with "atta" so that it would read, "in what respect does the word 'self' apply? Insofar as it disintegrates, it is called "self"". It seems he would hardly see the difference in emphasis the change would create, not seeing that: "The arising & falling away of the eye are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self.'"
I just think that's such an important thing to remember with regard to the sassatavada, that the Buddha identifies it as a doctrine on the sameness of the world and self, and the eternity of both (or the non-eternity with regard to uchedavada). Completely unacceptable because it is not in accord with the reasoning behind that the world is described as not-self, and for abandoning ( http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-024.html ).
We do agree to disagree on this topic; at least I do. With tongue in cheek, Federica, I'd like to point out that as Buddhists we do have a need to be "right" (as in "samma"). Of course that has nothing to do with the pride of winning a debate; your point is not lost. And I wouldn't go so far as to suggest that anyone is not a Buddhist based on the way they sincerely interpret the teaching of the Buddha, no matter how far off course I personally believe it to be. Even the Buddha's monks were found to occasionally maintain various false views (until, of course, they were set straight), but this did not mean they were unserious or not sincerely under the tutelage of Lord Gotama. I have been enjoying this dialogue because we've covered the subject from many different angles not so often discussed this exhaustively. That the discussion can become repetitive on certain specific points does highlight that the views being discussed do diverge so significantly that often it seems impossible that the other person can see it the way they do. We can lighten up about it and see that as an amusing paradox, explain our own reason as best we can, and continue to enjoy the dialogue in friendliness. Or we can hang on to the thread simultaneously grumbling that it continues. We can even choose not to participate if it has no vitality (dead horse) for us. It's about choice, and about attitude.
In friendliness,
V.
0
federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited March 2006
Well gentlemen, that's good...
If you were to meet, I would like to think that you would embrace one another, and continue your discussions side by side.... and you'd take a walk together in the courtyard, walking round and round, deep in conversation and discussion, your heads together, your arm alternately moving to emphasise, through gestures, your salient point... and you'd be oblivious to all and sundry, and to the passing of time, and ultimately, you would wear a perfect circular path, at least three inches beneath ground level, and others would marvel at the intensity, yet friendliness of your discussion.....
As I am truly not scholarly enough to contribute to this discussion constructively, so permit the mind wandering in this fashion, while I watch, and try to learn, at least - !!
Vacha,
While I see what you are saying in regards to the world, I would say the Alagaddupama Sutta goes beyond the definition of world you are using, and states that the buddha himself did not find ANYthing which can be discerned "that is permanent, stable, eternal, immutable, that abides eternally the same in its very condition" or any view "on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair". But that is my opinion.
However, I will ask you this: What is there which has no form, cannot be percieved, cannot be felt, does not fabricate, and that we cannot be conscious of and is not consciousness? If none of those things can be said, then we can say it is effectively non-existent. If it was existent, there would be no way to perceive or verify its existence anyway. So what exactly is the point of seeking after it? If we find it, we will have no way of knowing, as knowing is an dependent upon perception and consciousness. Basically, after all these qualifiers are gone, there is nothing left to be construed as anything. That is why Nibbana (cessation) is the only term which is applicable in my understanding.
Also, in my understanding, based on the methodology repeated over and over again in the suttas, is that it's all right here 'within this fathom long body'. Dukkha and the cessation of dukkha is all experienced right here. Not outside of this very experience (known as the world) is the path realized and the goal attained. That is why I consider Nibbanna to be the only term advisable to point to this reality.
Once again this is my own opinion based on my own practice and studies. There is no 'mover and shaker' of things, just the 'moving and shaking'. So in that, the 'moving and shaking' is the 'mover and shaker'. No doer, only Doing.
Comments
I don't really know why I'm asking these questions. I guess I'm just curious about the motivation behind it. But I suppose wondering about his motivation is as unskillful and as much of a waste of time as is his arguing this erroneous idea of the self. Again, I'm really not trying to insult anyone, really I'm not.
Maybe we could make a thread just for him entitled "Unskillful argument" as an illustration for new Buddhists about what not to waste their time on and how not to go about it. He could make up a number of different email addresses and names and argue with himself to his content. O.K. Now I'm being insulting on purpose. I will stop myself from continuing my unskillful speach because even the tiniest amount of harm to myself over this is not worth it.
This has been fun but it looks like the party's winding down so I'm off home.
Brigid
I don't think it's a bad thing. There are some of us here who are much more learn-ed and may come to some new understanding by discussing some of the deeper and finer points of the Dharma.
I don't think it's a bad thing, because through reasoning together, someone may come to a new understanding regarding a topic. We have a lot of talk about "non-self" and it's only fair that if someone truly believes "self" - that they have the opportunity to speak their mind and how they see the teachings. You have to admit, that there are some good arguments.
I think the only thing that gets me is the "unthoughtful" way some things come about after a bit and the masked sarcasm or upset.
That I can do without.
-bf
The problem here is one of straw man fallacy. The definition of annihilationist they are using is simply not supported by buddhist scripture. There are many, many references to rebirth and buddhism does not limit reality to materiality (form/rupa). Additionally, the buddha labeled annihilationism as wrong view as do the vast majority of buddhists (including Theravadans). They also state argue in a manner which makes the other people in the debate appear to be holding a view (ditthi) of no-self which was also refuted by the buddha. This is to establish an upper ground in which they somehow can assert that the buddha did assert a self outside the aggregates.
They often refer to obscure scriptures to convey some sort of vast mistake on the part of the Pali-Canon/Tipitaka (or at least the Abhidamma). Some of them, such as AncientBuddhism (yahoo username) of www.attan.com, assert that they have access to the 'original' or 'true' Buddhist teachings and assert that the Pali scriptures are corrupted. However, AncientBuddhism has stated to me on yahoo that he is more of a NeoPlatonist & Vedantist, and considers those teachings to be higher than buddhist teachings.
Sometimes they try to create an illusion that their position has been an oppressed undercurrent of buddhism over the course of the millenia by referring to modern translations of sutras such as the Nirvana Sutra. Then they equate the Tathagatagharba doctrine and the buddha-nature doctrine with a Self. AE (aka Zenmar of www.darkzen.com) even wrote an article called "The Most Dangerous Sutta" about how the Nirvana sutra was hidden from the public in some sort of conspiratorial manner and goes on to explain other sensationalistic events surrounding the sutra which are largely unfounded (or at least blown out of proportion).
Anyway, we should be thankful that the current discussion has been, thus far, conducted in a civil manner. That is not always the case. Over at B-net (I am told) that threatening e-mails occured and in general a whole lot of ugliness. Additionally, it is still a possibility that we are jumping to conclusion here, though the posts of those in question bear an uncanny resemblance to what I've come across before.
Take care & be well
_/\_
metta
Here's an excerpt from an interesting (though heady) article I came across when doing some searching on the topic of annihilationism:
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/siderit.htm
I think this addresses the concerns of anatta quite well. I think a lot of individuals argue against what they perceive to be the traditional view of anatta, assuming that it is a flat denial of the individual and other conventional designations. The article linked gives a nice explanation of this:
For those who bothered to read these long passages (sorry!), I hope this made things clear, rather than more obscure.
take care & be well
_/\_
metta
This is precisely why it is so important for us to read the Suttas, and to see what the Buddha himself said about these things. We must each discover that understanding for ourselves. There are so many different possibilities, and numerous perspectives to each individual question, that we need to be diligent in our studies as well as our meditation practice. A true Buddhist should be willing to do the very best that they can in order to understand what the Blessed One taught 2,600 years ago. And that means that we have to be willing to investigate. The Buddha did not say that there was a self, and the Buddha did not say there was not a self, so what did the Buddha say? As daunting as the task of reading through the thousands upon thousands of Suttas seems, it is the only way for us to truly find out.
For example, what does the Buddha mean by 'annihilationism'? How was this word used in context? What particular definition was implied by the Buddha when using this particular word? How often did he use this word, and to whom did he use it for?
If we were to look at it one way, annihilation could only occur if and when there was some 'thing' (permanent and unchanging) existing independently of the five aggregates that was destroyed. But, what if there never was anything permanent to begin with? What if this processs of arising and ceasing that we call a 'person' is just that, a process of conditionality? When the process of becoming is stopped, what is actually destroyed? Nothing. There is simply cessation. Everything that is involved in this particular process of arising and ceasing aflame with the fires of greed, hatred, and delusion is set free, and it will simply 'grow cold right here'. From this perspective, both 'self' and 'no self' do not apply due to the very nature of conditionality. But, you could still say that in this process of becoming there is unsatisfactoriness, inconstancy, and that all of this is not-self.
Now, I am not saying that this is the correct answer to this particular question, but it is one of the many possibilities. If I were to tell you that this is what the Buddha taught, however, how would you know that I was correct? Even if I were to give you some Sutta quotes, what would make you so confident that I took them from reputable sources, and that I had interpreted them correctly? The hard fact of the matter is that you wouldn't know. You might have a lot confidence in my personal abilities, and strong faith in my character, but you would still be taking my words on a type of conviction--not direct insight. That is why the Buddha invited all those truly interested in his teachings to come and see for themselves.
In this world with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, in this generation with its priests and contemplatives, its royalty and common-folk, we can never rely solely on the motivations of others, we can never rely solely on the support of others, we can never rely solely on the guidance of others, and we can never expect others do the work for us. The motives of others may be more out of greed than out of generosity, the support of others may be more out of hatred than out of compassion, the guidance of others may be more out of delusion than out of clear comprehension, and it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception and intellect, that suffering, the origination of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering may be known. This very existence is fuelled by ignorance of the Four Noble Truths, and that fuel must be removed. We must take the responsibility upon ourselves to do whatever we must do in order to walk the Buddha's Path to the very end.
Sincerely,
Jason
This is the kind of thing that's helpful, to me at least. I still have only the most basic of apprehensions regarding this subtle subject but I take to heart what Elohim says about being vigilant in our study and understanding of what the Buddha actually taught and the contexts in which he taught. I just want to be able to begin to understand. I don't want to read a convoluted and deceiving debate by those who clearly have an agenda other than understanding the Dharma. I wish they would leave us alone. But I'm also keeping in mind what Not1 said about the possibility of mistaken identity.
Brigid
The resolution lies with neither "yes" nor "no". But nor does it lie in "don't know," because the fact of the matter is that we do know. We're just not very good at recognizing what it is that we actually know.
The Buddha saw through this seemingly unanswerable question. What he found was a view that has no counter, a view that appears the same to all who see. In doing so, he understood that both the eternalists' view ("there is a Self") and the materialists' view ("there is no self, only matter") were extreme and unverifiable accounts of Reality.
In the eternalists' group of views it was denied that all things come to an end. The Buddha, relying on direct experience alone, not only found no evidence of beginnings or endings, he could find no evidence of any separate, persisting thing that could have a beginning or end.
But this is not to say that there's no experience, there is only matter - the view the materialists took. The Buddha rejected this nihilistic view as well. He regarded it as extreme, since it didn't account for the presence of consciousness - a presence which is, of course, self-evident.
The Buddha-Dharma is called the Middle Way because it rejects any extreme view, what the Buddha called "frozen views." These are views that attempt to wrap Reality into nice, neat packages.
We're strongly inclinded to hold tight to certain views since they give us a sense of solidity under our feet. Unfortunately, they simply can't hold Reality, and thus they always leave us susceptible to doubt and confusion - dukkha. Most of the views we hold might not seem extreme to us at first glance, but the more closely we examine them, the more extreme (and absurd) they become.
All of the views we hold (and hold dear) appear in sets of two or more. Most often, they appear as pairs of opposites; pro and con, Western and Eastern, liberal and conservative, dualistic and non-dualistic. For example, "People are basically good" posits an ultimate quality of goodness, then attributes this quality to every member of our species. As soon as it's offered, however, it immediately invites a counter view: "People are basically evil." This is essentially the same view, but leaning in the opposite direction.
Can you see, based on your immediate experience alone, that neither of these views point to Reality? They are both concepts - attempts to freeze Reality into something hard, fast, solid and packaged...
The Buddha repudiated all such views. Because they are by nature conceptual, they attempt to freeze the world into solid, separate entities, whether those entities are Goodness, Evil, selves, non-selves, books, light, enlightenment, Buddhism, or any thing or thought whatsoever. Of course, all such attempts fail. The world of experience simply isn't frozen. Reality won't be condensed into concepts. Our immediate, direct experience bears this out....
Many people understand that the Buddha denied the existence of an everlasting, unchanging self. And they're right. Buddha did see through the extreme view of the eternalists. What is less understood, however, is that the Buddha also denied the opposite extreme view, that of the materialists, or nihilists. What is worse, many people think, "The Buddha said there is no self; therefore Buddhism is a religion of nihilism." This is like thinking, "Since you don't believe that God is a handsome, elderly gentleman with a long, white beard who lives in the clouds, you must be an atheist."
It's very easy to get caught up in such dualities without realizing that we're doing so. To deny the concept is not to embrace it's opposite. When you say no to the question, "Is the boogeyman still hiding in your closet?" you're not saying that the boogeyman has gone out for the day. You are denying the validity of the question itself.
The Buddha denied the question "Is there a self or not?" in just the same way. The Buddha saw that neither option - neither extreme - reflects actual experience. In fact, the question itself pertains no more to Reality than does the question "Is the boogeyman still hiding in your closet?" They are both based on totally unsubstantiated assumptions about Reality...
It's an indisputable fact of experience - of our direct, immediate perception - that all things are empty of self. Yet we think and believe and act and hope otherwise. It's by holding onto this notion of self - and we hold it most dear - that we live in defiance of Reality.
This is the means by which we suffer, and suffer greatly. It hurts to defy Reality.
But don't we need the concept of a self in order to explain experience? How can there be experience without a self to have that experience? The Truth is that we don't need such an explanation, and that's all the self is: an explanation of experience.
Reality needs no explanation. In fact, Reality is precisely what doesn't need an explanation, since any explanation removes us from direct experience to the realm of concepts.
Reality is simply thus - immediate, direct experience, prior to any ideas or explanations at all. To explain Reality is to box it up and cart it away. It's to ignore the territory for the map.
The Buddha saw that the notion of a self is not required to account for actual experience. He saw that the self is merely a concept formed out of our desire to get a handle on things rather than accept our experience as Real but ungraspable.
- Steve Hagen - Buddhism Plain and Simple
This is also why, though at first the Dark Zenner's position seems to have a veneer of intellectual debate and validity to it, from the standpoint of the Dharma and Reality, it's a very unsubtle and simple minded, in fact desparate and sad attempt to deny Reality. Nothing more, nothing less.
I do have a valid question regarding this...
Being that we are an open forum, is it not valid for people to post their interpretations of Buddha's teachings that they feel supports the belief of a "self"?
Not that everyone has to agree to it - but to possibly agree to disagree?
At this point, I don't know how I feel about reincarnation. I don't honestly feel that I believe there is a Pure Land. I don't believe that by chanting the name of Amitabha will get me to the Pure Land. I don't believe in all the various demons and such that are associated with some of the teachings - but no one is casting any stones at me regarding this (yet!).
Are we a non Dark Zen site?
What are your thoughts?
-bf
Though I have to disagree with much that has been written since my last post, I heartily agree with the above.
More to come.
Why do I post my opinions and thoughts on a Buddhist Bulletin board? For the same reasons everyone else does. I like to, and it promotes learning and understanding on my part as a Buddhist. Doesn't that make sense to you? You seem to assume that because my view is different than yours that I have some different kind motivation for voicing it. I speak for myself. I don't speak for "dark zen" or any other sect.
Now I have a few questions.
Why would you want to characterize someone who disagrees with your views as mentally ill, mischievous, unskillful, wasting time, etc? Why even participate if you don't even have a valid point to make? If you truly saw what you wrote as unskillful speech, why did you even write it? Why let it sit there on the screen like a fallen log (in the woods where noone is around to hear it)? Why hit the submit button?
Can't we disagree on this issue without disparaging others?
I'm actually quite in awe at the belittling tone of some of the posters in this thread. If my view isn't worth arguing against, or you don't actually have a topical point to make, please just ignore it. If it is, and you do have something worthwhile to say (as several disagreeing posters have, and I appreciate that), please address my posts directly. But let's please keep this discussion polite and please refrain from insulting or pejorative tone.
It's the least I can ask since that is what I have offered for my own part in the discussion.
in friendliness,
V.
Please refer to the last paragraph of my earlier post (#101)
take care & be well
_/\_
metta
We had a Dark Zenner on here for a bit that quite quite obnoxious, passive-aggresive and belittling in their participation.
Once banned - they continued to join under various names - which had to keep being banned.
I think some people are just cautious when someone posts the same ideas that this other person used to - makes them think, "Hmmm... did he finally join up under a new name?"
But, you have not exhibited the traits that he had - so I apologize if you have not been made to feel welcome here.
-bf
Innit.
HH
What are you complaining about, you're not even Buddhist!
You're only here because there isn't a www.newsocialist.com website, my friend!
-bf
Sounds to me like the buddha was saying, 'hey I'm getting old now, and dwelling in this body to teach is causing me distress/discomfort. The only thing that eases this distress is maintaining signless concentration of mind. Oh yeah, and I'm not going to be around much longer. You guys can't depend on me anymore. You gotta figure this stuff out on your own. You should learn only to depend on yourself for understanding, having no external supports. The only support you should have to aid yourself in understanding realization is the Dhamma, what I have taught. Everyone who practices the 4 foundations of mindfulness, going beyond desire & sorrow for things of this world, can be said to have done this. In other words get to it, having faith in your experience and the dhamma, and you will realize this teaching for yourself.
In my understanding, 'sabbe dhamma' does not indicate aggregated experience, but rather all experience and things, be they conditioned or unconditioned, manifest or unmanifest. 'Sabbe sankhara' implies aggregated experience.
The thing is you are defining Self as reflexive, just on an ultimate level. You seem to stop at 'form is not-self' and then miss perception, feeling, formations, and consciousness. The reflexive form of Atta, 'transcendent' or not, does not exist outside of the skandhas. If it does, there would be no way to verify this by any sort of investigation, and is basically a pointless position to take for this reason.
In regards to the 'Atta is lord of Atta' here is a link:
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Runway/5787/anatta6.html
Anyway, I guess that's all I have to say for now. BTW, Vachagotta, what translation of the Dhammapada do you get your quote from? Translation directly affects our understanding of the teachings.
take care & be well
_/\_
metta
_/\_
metta
:rockon:
(Never thought I would use that smilie!!)
Vache,
I was referring to the individual who kept badgering us, under different names and after repeated bannings. If this isn't you and you have no connection to this individual, there's no need to take anything I said personally.
Brigid
First of all, perhaps I should have been more meticulous in citing my sources in this discussion. Obviously, in the first place I base my practice as a Buddhist on the teachings of the Pali discourses of the Buddha. That's the primary source, the Sutta Pitaka. As for the translations I cut and pasted, perhaps I should have been more meticulous in my citations and linking, Because they're all from www.accesstoinsight.org ! If you don't find those translations credible enough, I could always go back to the old PTS versions, but I would prefer not to since I don't have them in cut and pasteable format so I'd have to spend a lot of my time here typing from a book. Alternatively, www.metta.lk has a growing collection of online translations, but access has a better indexing system in place so I haven't used their versions in this discussion. It's far more convenient to be able to search for relevant suttas by keyword.
When I have more time, I'd like to comment in more detail on the article Khantichayo Bhikkhu wrote "What the Buddha Never Taught." I've found it to contain some problematic arguments from my point of view. I certainly can't speak for such as IB Horner or AK Coomaraswamy, since since the article was cited against my own interpretations, I feel obliged to point out where I believe bhante was using a flawed argument. But perhaps another day when I have more time.
For today I'd like to just make a few comments on post number 120 by not1not2, with regard to the mahaparinibbanasutta and to the reflexiveness of atta.
refer to:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/digha/dn-16-sv0.html
Obviously, the interpretation you voiced is the usual one and I am familiar with it. While I do recognize that meaning is certainly inferrable, I still feel there is the deeper meaning right there to be plucked, and there are a couple of reasons behind my reaction to the text.
Firstly, the usual interpretation you voiced sounds a great deal like the advice given in the Kalama sutta. Refer to http://accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/anguttara/an03-065a.html and http://accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_09.html
Maybe you wouldn't agree to that, but that's the impression I get. And I understand the context is different, but the way I see it the message is the same: "instead of relying on others, rely on what you can know for yourselves." In the Kalama sutta, the Buddha goes on to instruct the Kalamas in the four brahma-viharas, and does not go into his own unique teaching of the Eightfold path, which he probably would have done after they take refuge.
But we don't really even find similar wording much less the formula. For me the pivotal phrase which makes this distinction is found at: "after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; having the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge." Can you see the distinction? It does not say he has overcome reliance on others, reliance on a teacher. It says he has overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world (which we remember is anatta: "not-'himself'") and is "truly" an island unto himself. I can understand this distinction is difficult to communicate to one who is entrenched in the usual interpretation, because it is only a very slight shift in interpretive emphasis. But it can make a world of difference when there is an extant argument against any hint of positive references to the self in the discourses. I can but reiterate the basis of the teaching: The world is not yours, not your self, let it go. Overcome desire and sorrow with regard to the world (the crux of it, the key to Buddhist practice), and that is how you will be an island unto your self. Its really very simple to me. We could discuss the point in more detail, possibly with cross-references, as the discussion continues. But for now I just wanted to focus on that aspect. In practice, as Buddhists, we are all trying to live this, are we not? To overcome desire and sorrow with regard to the world. As Buddhists, having this in common, we have far more in common than most here would seem to like to recognize, despite such a huge diversity of views between Buddhist individuals not to mention various schools of Buddhism.
You go on to say:
The issue of how inclusive 'sabbe dhamma' is, we may regard as still debatable. To begin, let's look at the definitive sutta on the term as the Buddha used it: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-023.html
What I see there is a definition of sabba as indicating aggregated experience. I'm not going to get into Abhidhamma, but we can easily reason that the eye and forms (etc) indicates an aggregate: namely consciousness.
Now, the point that all this is debatable is indicated very aptly by the footnote that Thanissaro Bhikkhu has included. Far be it from Thanissaro to advance a theory of Self (I wouldn't be suprised if he took the conventionalists' view of DN 16 as we discussed above...and he skillfully elides the issue by referring to the allayment of all differentiation--a philosophical ground which does not itself deny the Self but denies all ditthi regarding Self), he nevertheless recognizes (the entirety of footnote 1 following):
So, at least, you can see by that that it is not settled among all Buddhists that "sabbe dhamma" includes what is beyond, namely the arhat/nibbana.
Moving on to your last point:
I wouldn't have been so careless as to miss the other four khandhas. I assumed you would be familiar enough with the suttas as to know that the others were included, for brevity's sake. The fact remains that the other four khandhas lack reflexive power as well.
To me it really doesn't matter whether you translate the dhammapada passage "Your own self is
your own mainstay," (as Thanissaro does: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/dhp/tb0/dhp-12-tb0.html )
or as "One truly is the protector of oneself" as Buddharakkhita does ( http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/dhp/ab0/dhp-12-ab0.html )
Despite the assertion that we are here being told to only rely on our self as a "conventional way of speaking" to say it is us as individual personalities that walk the path for ourselves and no other, it is still true that one's own personality (sakkaya) is, according to rest of the teachings not a refuge not a mainstay, not a protector, not something to be loved and valued and trusted by virtue of the three marks which are all equally applied to the khandhas as to "the world" (loka--"the world," "the All," "the five khandhas" are interchangeable in the discourses; what is said about one in one place can be equally said about another). For, if there is absolutely no self, by what are we individual if not the khandhas? You see, that's the heart of the dilemma for him who would absolutely deny self and thus be required to interpret these positive occurrences of the word for "self" as merely conventional, merely reflexive. Why, as one of Buddha's most esteemed teachings, take refuge in something that is entirely entangled with dukkha (the conventional self, the individual personality, the sakkaya, the khandhas)?
My understanding is that this basically means, that it is better to rely on one's own provisional self, then the provisional self of another. After all, one must realize the dhamma for themselves and by themselves. The buddha cannot save us. Nothing can save us but our own determined efforts at practicing the dhamma. It also suggests that this provisional self is the very basis of awakening. We fortunately have to look nowhere else than our own provisional selves & the dhamma to realize the truths of anicca, dukkha & anatta. Relying on the realization of others is not going to bring about one's own emancipation. So, in regards to your last paragraph, the teaching of the buddha is simply to be Awake to what is. Be awake to dukkha. Do not push it away, that is aversion. Be awake to sukkha. Do not cling to it, that is craving. It is not implying escaping from the unsatisfactory skandhas, but rather realizing the truth of them, note the arising, abiding and passing away of them. Noticing this in order to realize that they are not to be the basis of one's happiness and identity. Realizing that they do not constitute any eternal, unchanging entity.
Additionally, you quoted the footnote from Thanissaro Bhikkhu to argue the sabbe dhamma point (which I will partially concede), but you seem to have glossed over the final paragraph:
You have asserted that because nothing in the 6 sense spheres (& five khandhas) cannot be regarded as a Self, then the self must be outside the 6 sense spheres. This passage directly refutes this assertion/implication. To assert or imply a self outside the sense spheres and the khandhas is to 'complicate the uncomplicated' and to 'differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated'. Also, this gets to the point I was attempting to make in regards to the following:
My point here was not to imply that you are not aware of the four other khandas, however I am afraid the words I used indicate otherwise. My point was that you are asserting an ultimate self that is still reflexive. I don't see how you can have a reflexive form of Self that is not within the realm of the skandhas. I say this based on the fact that one cannot verify the existence of anything outside of the 5 skandhas. Outside of form, perception, sensation, formations and consciousnesses, how can one experience at all? The only thing regarded as 'outside' of the khandhas is their cessation (Nibbana). If all you are referring to by the term Self is Nibbana, then why do you complicate the issue by asserting an existent Self? Why are we having this debate at all?? Nibbana is translated as a blowing out of the skandhas, not as an underlying, eternal abiding entity. Self implies entity. Nibbana does not. And even then, nibbana is just a word which designates a concept which refers to a direct experience which must be realized. Perhaps you are defining self as pure or bare awareness? Why not then just state pure or bare awareness?
Also, it is said that the buddha taught with an open hand (I can't remember the source right now). In other words, no hidden meaning. No veiled teachings. If the buddha taught there was a self outside the khandhas, then why didn't he just say so? Why didn't he address this matter in the suttas? For that matter, why did his disciples, among which there were arahats, treat this matter more explicitly in the abhidamma? Why did they, in fact, indicate an opposite position? Did they get it wrong? Did they just not understand? MahaKashapa was said to understand, and he was a prevalent figure in the formation of the Tipitaka. How would he have failed to address such an essential point explicitly, if he was said to understand?
I guess that's all I have to say for now on this issue.
_/\_
metta
P.S.-BTW, while my article directly addressed Coomaraswamy and Horner, I used it because it directly refuted the "Atta is lord of Atta" translation. I have not seen such a translation outside of them and a translation from www.attan.com which relies heavily on Coomaraswamy's work as well as a Ken Wheeler (of Dark Zen circles) translation. And it is my opinion that 'Self is the lord of self' is a substantially different statement than 'your own self is your own mainstay'. The implications of each statement point in different directions.
As if we socialists would have $800.00 to buy the domian name.
But honestly ask yourself this, is some of the jargon at all really user friendly?
No, it's just elitist nonsence. I rather get out there in my community help real people with real problems and find the truth there. Buddhist is a straight forward concept, it's people that make it complicated.
BF the revoltion is in your mind my friend.
HH
I am trying to find the name of a song/poem that goes "The revolution will not..." it was about early to mid '90's. around the same time as King missile wrote the song "Detachable Penis"-anyone know what the hell i'm asking about?
UPDATE!!!! Found it, It's called "the revolution will not be televised". sorry for the interruption
It was kind off ripped off by the Disposable Heroes of Hiphoprisy's. They had a hit with "Television, the drug of the nation".
HH
I love both of those.
cool.
Xrayman
I just wanted to say that I appreciate the interesting discussion we have going here. I would have to admit that among all those who have voice disagreement with my view to some degree, that your feeling for dhamma comes closest to agreement with mine. I only wish I had more time to exhaustively reply to all of the points you have made.
Regarding the translation of the Dhammapada, I have to admit some carelessness in recognizing the source of my translation of the passage in question. I realize I came close to Coomaraswamy's version, but I don't feel the same need to make the awkward and maybe cryptic distinction making one atta into "Self" and the other into "self". For me it is sufficent that self is lord of self. I was actually paraphrasing my old second-hand store copy published by noonday press and translated by one P. Lal (ever heard of him? neither have I
I have also been enjoying this discussion. It's been very engaging and has required me to really search my own understanding. So, in that sense, I consider your presence a boon to my practice. While I don't really agree with some of your reasoning, I can't say you aren't on to something very important.
Basically, I don't find that taking any view on self is unnecessary for realization and liberation (and is actually counterproductive to some extent). However, if this is where you are in your practice & understanding right now, then that's precisely where you are right now. Just make sure that you realize that your current knowledge and understanding is always developing and changing. I know mine does. My conceptual basis in relation to buddhism has certainly grown and changed since I first encountered this wonderful practice.
I think that my main point is that I don't thing we can consider Atta to be part of the buddhist ontology. Please do read the link I posted earlier on elimitavism vs reductionism. It was pretty heavy reading at first (as I haven't studied these concepts before), but cleared things up for me.
Take care
_/\_
metta
P.S.- Here's that link:
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/siderit.htm
I've finally had the chance to read the article you linked, and not suprisingly I had some problems with it as it regards this issue. There are several small points which seemed to me incompletely understood or somewhat mischaracterized, but two major issues struck me as nagging failures on the part of the author.
Let's say that the first is really the foundation of the article. While certainly the author brings in other complementary ideas, his primary basis for Buddhist philosophy on the "person" is the well-known section of the Milindapanha which elucidates the later simile of the disassembled Chariot, and adjunct ideas by which the "parts" of a person are called into play. I call this a later simile not only because the Milindapanha itself is a "quasi-canonical" text, but because we find a much different emphasis in Chariot similes of the earlier discoures.
Take for example AN V.28:
"Suppose there were a chariot on level ground at four crossroads, harnessed to thoroughbreds, waiting with whips lying ready, so that a skilled driver, a trainer of tamable horses, might mount and — taking the reins with his left hand and the whip with his right — drive out and back, to whatever place and by whichever road he liked; in the same way, when a monk has developed and pursued the five-factored noble right concentration in this way, then whichever of the six higher knowledges he turns his mind to know and realize, he can witness them for himself whenever there is an opening."
the Dhammapada XVII:
"When anger arises,
whoever keeps firm control
as if with a racing chariot:
him
I call a master charioteer.
Anyone else,
a rein-holder —
that's all."
and VII:
"He whose senses are steadied
like stallions
well-trained by the charioteer,
his conceit abandoned,
free of effluent,
Such:
even devas adore him."
or perhaps most fittingly s i, 5, 6 (Division I, book 1, Chapter 5 verse 6):
"They chariot is the 'Silent Runner' named,
With Wheels of Righteous Effort fitted well.
Conscience the Leaning-board; the Drapery
is Heedfulness; Dhamma the Driver is,
I tell you; Right View he who runs before.
And be it woman, be it man for whom
Such chariot doth wait, by that same car
Into Nibbana's presence shall they come.
(alternate translation):
"ßUpright, is the name of the path, no fear is the direction.
Not crooked is the name of the chariot with the eye of the Teaching.
Shame is the brakes and the accessories are mindfulness.
Charioteer I say is the Teaching and right view, the attendant
If any woman or man goes in this direction,
He reaches close up to extinction in this vehicle.û"
In these examples from the discourses we find that the emphasis is precisely on the charioteer, the destination, and the rider. We find a chariot that is a symbol of the path, an able vehicle with the best driver and the best destination. If we take the latter simile in this context, we imagine that the rider has stopped the chariot and is now taking it apart in search of the "chariot". We find a dilapidated metaphor, literally broken apart and unable to make progress. What is the chariot in this latter simile? Of course, it is the khandhas being examined in contemplation as not-self. As such this does not tell us anything new in reference to the Buddha's teaching, but the author would here like to add the conclusion (which, as we discussed, is specifically repudiated by the Buddha) "there is no self" to the examination of the khandhas as not-self. In all this, of course, we have nonetheless forgotten the rider. For in the latter metaphor of the chariot, it is not the "chariot" (assembled or not, it is just the khandhas, a conditioned heap) we should be looking for, but the rider.
So we have as the basis of this Buddhist "reductionism," a question-begging preoccupation with examining the khandhas (which we are already emphatically assured by the Buddha are not-self) for any whiff of a Self that one disbelieves in the first place and one knows one will not find amongst the compounded phenomena. To emply an analogy, it makes me think of a thirsty man in the desert continually showing his long-empty canteen to his companion, saying "see? there is no water!", not heeding the oasis behind him.
This brings me to my second nagging problem with the article. Throughout the early part of the article, I found myself always thinking, "This is all very interesting, but where does the Buddha's soteriology fit in here? What of Nibbana, of vimutti? How here is the author not going to talk of the cessation of suffering at all?" Just about the time that that question was really beginning to bother me about the article, the author put out this impoverished offering:
"Suppose that I, realizing that the action I now contemplate
will result in future pain for me, am deterred through
anticipating that I shall experience pain. Now there is no
further fact that makes it the case that the person who will
feel that pain will be me; this fact just consists in the
obtaining of certain relations among certain purely
impersonal present and future entities and events. I do
nonetheless have a special reason for refraining from the
action, namely the fact that this is (typically) the best way
to insure that that future pain does not occur. Because pain
is bad, we all have a reason to try to prevent its
occurrence; and in general I am better positioned than anyone
else to prevent my own future pains. Existential dread may be
unjustifiable, but a moderate degree of concern over one's
anticipated future pain does have considerable utility."
That's about it. I say the author's view here is impoverished specifically because it is an interpretation of Buddhism that disregards the utmost goal of Buddhism and speaks not of any method by which to attain that goal. The picture we have of a "middle path" presented by the author is little other than an intellectual picture of a quasi-Freudian relative adjustment to a hopeless position and at best a doctrine of "mere morality" or karma-based production of a relatively better (though, the Buddha recognizes, still impermanent and therefore dukkha) future. It is that contrast with the Buddha's more intimate teaching (the discourses), which is utterly concerned with the goal, with Nibbana, and the practical way to the goal, which is very much in highlight here. Thus, while it was interesting to read, I don't find this article helpful in lending intelligibility to the Buddha's teaching. Actually, I'm going to have to say that when I said "nagging failures" at the beginning of my post, that was an inapt wording, because I don't find that the author was here actually concerned with Buddha's teaching except as an elaborate philosophy needing to be placed in a dry taxonomy of ideas. As such it may have been a success on its own terms, but for me fairly heedless of the Buddha's teaching as a matter of a way to the cessation of suffering.
So... was I getting an "Atta-boy" or an "Aw Sh!t" with your response HH?
I don't even know what this was in regards to.
-bf
How about this reference from the Samyutta Nikaya, translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi?:
Jason
I was just offering some additional references since, as you point out, we find a much different emphasis in Chariot similes of the earlier discoures.
Jason
While I certainly agree with not1not2 that you raise some very interesting points, I am not sure that I completely understand your point of view. The main problem that I see with your argument, if I understand it correctly, is that the Buddha was very clear about what he wanted to teach. Everything that he felt was truly important, that is everything leading to the end of suffering, was covered over and over again in every conceivable way. The Buddha did not leave anything left unanswered when it dealt specifically with this goal, and he did his utmost to thoroughly explain each and every last detail. It seems, however, that you [as well as some of our newer members] are implying that there is at least one things that the Buddha didn't directly teach about, but somehow stressed in very subtle and obscure ways. The idea here seems to be that instead of being very open and clear about this self that so many were confident existed, the Buddha supposedly remained silent while cleverly pointing at something that wasn't in aggregates, apart of the aggregates, or the totality of the aggregates, but was still an unchanging self.
All I can say is that I see absolutely no evidence for this view whatsoever. First, the Buddha was quite clear that the five aggregates were not-self, so this self that is supposed to be here for us to discover would have to lie outside of the five aggregates. Why? Because the Buddha said that there was absolutely nothing permanent and unchanging in the five aggregates whatsoever. And, further more, the Buddha did not openly teach about any such self outside of the five aggregates. In fact, that is precisely one of the wrong views that the Buddha warns Vacchagotta about, referring to them as a 'thicket of views'. So, what exactly is this self? Where is this self? What place does this self have in the chain of dependent co-arising? Why did the Buddha not just teach his bhikkhus openly about this self? It has already been shown that the Buddha did not teach Nibbana as a self, so what else is left? If you cannot find any references in the Pali Canon which mention this self directly, or point to it yourself, then what is the use of even trying to prove its existence? It seems like an utter waste of time. The simply fact of the matter is, if it were not a waste of time, the Buddha would have given a discourse about it.
As for the quotation you took from the Maha-parinibbana sutta, "...after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then, truly, he is an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; having the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge.", it basically sounds like the Buddha is describing someone who has freed themselves of the asavas. The asavas, or mental effluents, are what go out into the world and condition the arising of sensuality, becoming, and ignorance. It is they, along with ignorance, that create a kind of feed-back loop which fuels the entire cycle of samsara. I could be wrong, but the Buddha could have simply been directing his bhikkhus to practice diligently, and not allow their minds to seek out and grasp at external things. As Sariputta explained, contact, mental volition, and consciousness are the nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be, and for the support of those seeking a new existence. To take refuge in the Dhamma [i.e. the teachings] means to take refuge in the Noble Eightfold Path, which is the only way leading to the cessation of the effluents, as well as ignorance. It doesn't appear to be a self that the Buddha is encouraging Ananda to take refuge in here, but it is instead the practice of Dhamma. For it is only this practice by which one entirely abandons the underlying tendency to lust, one abolishes the underlying tendency to aversion, one extirpates the underlying tendency to the view and conceit 'I am,' and by abandoning ignorance and arousing true knowledge one here and now makes an end of suffering.
Respectfully,
Jason
This comment from the Ven. Nanavira might help to clarify what I mean:
This relates directly to my previous post:
I hope that this makes my position clear.
Jason
Jason,
Thanks for your comments.
Your second post does in fact clarify your own position somewhat. Though I have to say that when you write "It is ultimately unskillful, and considered by the Buddha himself to be inappropriate attention. Our focus is taken off of the immeditate practice, and instead becomes lost within speculative thoughts about the various views of self." I must disagree because this issue has everything to do with practice, and I don't feel that our discussion has actually strayed from discussing the Dhamma in very real (practical: for the meanings of how we interpret the teaching is a very practical matter at its heart) and very orthodox ways. I think we each have to take anatta seriously on a very intimate, individual level in the way we each must weigh it intuitively in our own experience, on a continual basis. In order to do this, we have to understand the reasoning of the anatta teaching, and a discussion like this, if undertaken in earnest, should help each of us in clarifying for ourselves the inner meaning. Now maybe you and I differ on the reasoning behind it in some basic way, but on a practical level I can't but sense that we must agree: the five khandhas are anatta, and are for relinquishing if we are ever to make an end of suffering. I guess it is confusing to me how my comments have led to the assumption that we are off on a speculative tangent here. Perhaps I don't think that my actual position is being understood. I'm not here to advance any false theories of Self (I'm thoroughly familiar with the Brahmajala). Nevertheless the points I'm trying to make are being characterized as clinging to some thing or another as being Self or as a dualistic seeking outside body and mind for Self; absurdities I'm not trying to advance here. This is the very real stuff of Buddhist contemplation. Anatta could be considered one of the most practical topics of Buddhism because it concerns the point of view we should cultivate with regard to all things, the attitude (ditthi) which forms the basis of our practice. I personally find that when meditation is informed by contemplation of anatta, the practice is more fruitful. Don't you? I thought we might agree on at least that. And that's a lot.
--"If anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of the eye are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self.' So the eye is not-self....
That a person — through abandoning passion-obsession with regard to a feeling of pleasure, through abolishing resistance-obsession with regard to a feeling of pain, through uprooting ignorance-obsession with regard to a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, through abandoning ignorance and giving rise to clear knowing — would put an end to suffering & stress in the here & now: such a thing is possible.
"Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows disenchanted with the eye, disenchanted with forms, disenchanted with consciousness at the eye, disenchanted with contact at the eye, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with craving.
"He grows disenchanted with the ear...
"He grows disenchanted with the nose...
"He grows disenchanted with the tongue...
"He grows disenchanted with the body...
"He grows disenchanted with the intellect, disenchanted with ideas, disenchanted with consciousness at the intellect, disenchanted with contact at the intellect, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with craving. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully released.' He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'" --MN 148
in friendliness,
V.
I might be getting the entirely wrong impression here, but I think that you are just having a bit of fun with us. Admittedly, I may be completely wrong about this, and I sincerely apologize if I am. However, I can't help but wonder if it's true. Perhaps it would benefit us all if you were less vague, and more specific when it comes to what you are trying to get across. All you seem to be doing is trying to refute each poster in turn while being quite vague as to your own position--which appears to change from time to time. It is, of course, your choice if you wish to delve into the areas where the Buddha warns his disciples not to, but please do not attempt to confuse the issue any further by pretending that it is in line with the Buddha's teachings. You're very clever, I'll certainly give you that, but lets not forget your analogy of the gold (Nibbana) and its impurities (defilements). If I recall correctly, you said that, "This is the case of Self being bound to aggregated existence by ignorance." Care to tell me exactly how this is considered orthodox? If you're not here to advance any false theories of Self, then please explain what you are here to do.
Jason
Sorry if I make the impression that I'm not serious about this. I'll admit that we have a fundamental interpretive disagreement here. Perhaps it runs so deep that the obviousness (to our own way of thinking) of our respective positions inhibits dialogue somewhat. I must admit I do lately find it very difficult to read into the Buddha's discourse a denial of Self, where I formerly did. So I can imagine you are finding it difficult to imagine that I could be basing my position in all this on the very same discourses, quite often the very same translations, that you do. But I am!
Maybe some clarification is in order. You seem to read into my posts that the Buddha's teaching on Self is some kind of subtle, obscure teaching, sort of a rabbit I pulled out of the hat, some kind of sophists trickery. Well, first of all, I must say that the Buddha's teaching, though certainly clear, we all probably agree runs quite deep and that our tendency for suffering goes to subtle levels. But, I really don't think I'm trying to communicate a hidden teaching here. What I'm offering is a more obvious (to me) interpretation of those teachings that do talk of Self in a very straightforward, maybe we should even say practical manner. And do so, in my opinion, without breaking up the carefully constructed teaching of anatta/apophasis. Some of these, for instance the Dhammapada Atta Vagga or the Mahaparinibbana sutta of the Digha Nikaya, have already been discussed. We must both admit that these texts use the word atta which in other choice contexts (just about every other one) you would say does in fact mean Self (in the sense of essence), only not here or there where it seems to have a positive value. So I feel that what we have here is an exegetical disagreement. On the other hand, I am trying to counter what I find to be a curiosity: That many Buddhists are so fond of asserting that there is no Self or the Buddha taught there is no Self, even in the face of unequivocal repudiation of such a view by the Buddha. Sometimes we find people who, in the face of this dilemma, take what could be called the moderate view; that the Buddha only denied a Self that can transcend the khandhas, but not the self that is provisional, the illusory identity of the khandhas...but this version is indistinguishable from the annihilationist view. Sometimes we find someone who accepts that denial of Self is also a view to be gotten rid of, but after all their discussion of the fact, they will still, quite ironically, infer "but seriously, now, there is no Self". It seems that to me this doesn't have to be a highly complicated philosophical discussion about the characteristics of said Self because what Buddhism is really concerned with is disengaging oneself from the machinery of suffering.
in friendliness,
V.
Not according to the suttas:
I know this has already been posted, but the buddha made it very clear that formulating the view of 'self' you seem to be formulating is not 'fit for attention'. In other words, it is inadvisable, in a practical sense.
_/\_
metta
I see your angle, and I must say that I am sad to see that my impression of you appears to be confirmed. You are indeed attempting to complicate the uncomplicated, and trying your best to insert a belief of Self into the Buddha's teachings. While you certainly do bring up some interesting ideas, ideas which often need to be sorted out by those investigating Buddhism, you are doing the Buddha's dispensation a diservice by promoting the idea that he does talk about a Self. As much as you know about Buddhism, you seem to be missing the whole purpose of its existence.
For one thing, there is no annihilationist view when you take into account the doctrine of this/that conditionality, or as it is better known as, paticca-samuppada (dependent co-arising). It is due to the not understanding and not penetrating of this profound doctrine that beings are not freed from suffering. People overlook this teaching at their own peril. And further more, you are taking the conventional usage of a particular word, and trying to apply it to mean some essence, which is only interpretable due to someone's poor understanding of Pali in my opinion.
As Vacchagotta did so many times before, you are merely declaring what has not been declared by the Blessed One. Anatta is a teaching that has a very specific purpose, and it must be understood in relation to all the other doctrines expounded upon by the Buddha. The Blessed One did not teach a doctrine of Self in any shape or form. This is what seems to be so hard for people to accept, but the simple straightforward fact of the matter is that the Buddha did not teach a doctrine of Self. Period. This can be see the clearest in the Buddha's meeting with Malunkyaputta:
I do not think that the Buddha can get any clearer when it comes to his position on doctrines, views, or theories of a Self. These are discerned by the wise as being unfit for attention. While I realize that my words may appear to be harsh and arrogant, I find that having these discussions more and more a little suspicious. Whether or not you are sincere in your beliefs and studies, or just another person trying to cause trouble on this site for their own enjoyment, unless you can offer me some convincing evidence for your views, I do not see any reason to take them seriously.
Sincerely,
Jason
Not1Not2,
Yes, this has been posted already, and I am familiar with this discourse (I believe I may have quoted it in part myself, I don't remember). Of current interest to me is the final passage of your quote "He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices. These are called the fermentations to be abandoned by seeing."
— MN 2
I have attempted to stress these "appropriate attentions" in all that I say, especially in consideration of the khandhas as described by the three characteristics. That you don't see this, is a problem I am quite puzzled as to how I can remedy through my words, in how I phrase (or not phrase, as the case may be) my view. Alas, and I am sure you are thinking the same thing of your view for me: I fear I can't convince you of it. I've already said that your view is very much the closest to mine that I've come across on this thread in that you are honestly wary of views of Self which outrightly deny Self. With that, I must bring up something that has been nagging the discussion perhaps from the beginning, and that is the notion of "Eternalism" as faced by the Buddha. All repudiated views of Self as in the discourses are defined in relation to "the world" or the khandhas. This is even true in the Milindapanha, which many take to be the final word confirming their own nihilism with regard to Self (as I stated before, even the "degraded" chariot metaphor still only deals with the existing being, the heap of khandhas). The brahmajala sutta was cited in reference to this, and one sees that it is the case. This is to say, with reference to the much-reviled Eternalism, that for the Buddha the Eternalist is one who maintains the eternity and Self-identification of something which is observable as not eternal and as not-self. In other words the Eternalist is maintaining, in some fashion, that one or all of the khandhas, or the notion "world" ("world" in Buddhism is defined as experience, and sassatavada is described by "so loka so atta" meaning roughly "this the Self, indentical with the World") is myself and eternal, thus being the foundation for my own perpetual existence as an experiencing being (let us say, sentient being, or satta). My view is not such a view, because I take the not-self teaching with regard to the khandhas very seriously. Such a guarantee of perpetual satta (existing being--in other words a doctrine of eternal clinging) as sassatavada is, according to the truth of the three characteristics, a guarantee of inescapable eternal dukkha and therefore obviously not acceptable.
That our rejection of sassata should only be in reference to what we see as impermanent (in other words, we do not simply reject ANY notion of sassata without due consideration) is reinforced by the fact that Nibbana is defined using the notion. from the PTS dictionary article on anicca(impermanent; under the entry on nicca--permanent):
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1:227.pali
Opposed to this ever -- fluctuating impermanence is Nibbāna (q. v.), which is therefore marked with the attributes of constancy & stableness (cp. dhuva, sassata amata, vipariṇāma).
I am not here advocating some kind of speculative contemplation of atta as possessed of certain discernable attributes (that would be a kind of sassatavada as defined above) but moreso quite actively opposing the notion that anatta specifically implies a total denial of Self. Also rather trying to suggest that in disengaging from self-identification with what is not-self, requiring a serious (appropriate) attendance on what is not-self and what it means to be not-self, I am more wholly "myself," than I ever was. In Nibbana, the arhat most completely fulfills the philosophical criteria of "Self" by which the khandhas are defined as "not-self". If we redefine this "self" as being a mere convention, a heap of aggregates, we philosophically destroy the possibility of liberation, of Nibbana, of true sassata. For if all we are is these aggregates, which are by natural definition dukkha, anicca, anatta (a working definition of annihilationism), there can actually be no sassata amata nibbana. If we adopt that view, aren't we forced to somehow say that the aggregates are capable of liberating themselves? Mustn't we be somehow positing that the aggregate of consciousness can free itself from the three characteristics, forever ridding itself of the asavas in spite of all we know about consciousness; namely that it is based on our senses (thus literally does not exist after the death of the body), is itself ever-changing (we might ask why Nibbana would be final for anybody) lacking in self-determination, and dukkha for one who has thus seen it? That would be indistinguishable from our sassatavada. Or are we forced to contradict and say that Nibbana is not permanent, not eternal, not stable? Or to say that Nibbana is the extinguishment of our very selves? All these are unacceptable to the Buddha in a very real sense: the sense of whether or not there remains the possibility of total liberation from suffering. The denial of Self is as untenable in practical (that is, in terms of the four noble truths) terms as is the assertion of an eternal existing being (satta).
There is an insistence in this thread that I am maybe not serious in my pursuit of Buddhism, that I am just joking around, that I'm just trying to disrupt the forums, that I'm deliberately trying to distort the Buddhadharma, that I'm just a vedantist in disguise, in short that my views cannot be taken seriously.
I'm quite aware that all these suggestions, if accepted by the moderatorship, have an end result: restriction from posting to the forums. Obviously, it's something, as a person who enjoys participating in dialogues on Buddhism, (like, I'm assuming, everybody else here) is something I would not like to happen. So I am disappointed at the insistence of some in making these accusations, and I really don't know how else to convince you that I am sincere here. Simply that I radically disagree on this or that interpretation of the Buddha's teaching should not be considered evidence to the contrary. Nor should your own annoyance at the continuance of the thread. Frankly put, if you don't want to participate in the discussion, you shouldn't participate in this thread. If you do want to participate, fine, but try to do so in a way that you are comfortable with.
I have tried to set out the reasons for the way I interpet this topic in as comprehensive a way possible for me in such a disjointed medium. I've been civil in the way I do it, I've tried not to make flat assertions without discussing, even if briefly, the thinking behind it or the texts which support it. I'm not here to set out a doctoral thesis. I don't want people to think I'm going to be able to write the book that ultimately convinces you of a view you clearly don't want to adopt. We all tend to hold those who hold an opposing viewpoint to a higher standard of conviction anyways. It's simply harder for us to agree with them than the person we already agree with. Let's not let that get in the way of anybody's forum participation. I'm here to have a dialogue and as such hopefully to refine the way the topic is discussed through the interactive dialectic. That is why we participate in these forums, isn't it?
You still seem to be holding to some view that there is a Self, eternally abiding outside the skandhas, saying the buddha only said the skandhas are not self. Please reread this from post #101:
Here the buddha says he cannot find anything which would constitute a Self, inside or outside of the skandhas. BTW, have you read Vasubandhu's refutation??
_/\_
metta
"We'll have to agree to differ.".....?
Far be it from me to criticise, (I personally lost all meaning to this thread at around post two...) But is it absolutely imperative for anyone to be RIGHT?
The words 'flogging a dead horse' spring to mind.... :hohum: :scratch: :grumble: :nonono:
fine, fine.
I thought everyone was thoroughly enjoying this discussion though.
Actually, Vacha never really responded to this quote the first time I posted it, so I was wondering how he was going to get around it (aside from brushing it off). So, I was actually trying to redirect the debate a bit from the passages we have been referring to. And honestly, I'm not so much concerned about being right, but reaching some sort of mutual agreement by exposing what underlies my own views and the views of Vachagotta.
Anyway, Vacha, you said this:
If we redefine this "self" as being a mere convention, a heap of aggregates, we philosophically destroy the possibility of liberation, of Nibbana, of true sassata. For if all we are is these aggregates, which are by natural definition dukkha, anicca, anatta (a working definition of annihilationism), there can actually be no sassata amata nibbana. If we adopt that view, aren't we forced to somehow say that the aggregates are capable of liberating themselves?
First off, the convention is the word 'self' which is a conventional desigation of an actual experience. So we are not reducing the actual experience to a convention, but are instead using a conventional term which points to it. However, the experience is actually real, but it is illusory, like a mirage. Ultimately, it is the co-mingling of the skandhas which give rise to the mental discrimination of 'myself' and 'other' as a useful tool in assessing phenomenal reality, and the entity of 'myself' is a bi-product of this comingling rather than a permanent underlying entity.
This [URL="[url]http://www.chinapage.com/zen/koan1.html[/url]"]koan[/URL] illustrates my point:
Second, we are, in a way, saying the aggregates liberate themselves. What is happening in samsara is a feedback loop which behaves in the manner described in paticca samuppada. What the buddha realized is that any sense of me and mine (whether in the conventional or ultimate sense) is a bi-product of other factors which have no independent reality. What these teachings do is introduce different things into the feedback loop of consciousness which awaken consciousness to its own nature and the nature of the other skandhas. Through this awakening comes an unbinding, or a release from any kind of mental entanglement which is experienced. This truth is meant to be applied in one's direct experience. Playing around with it intellectually is worthless and can actually be harmful, giving rise to the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. BTW, both eternalism and nihilism are fabrications which are dependent on conditiosn. So, the point is to get beyond any fabrication. All dhammas are anatta, not just yourself and myself. This means, the computer I'm typing on, the chair I'm sitting in and so on. This is not saying that I am not sitting on a chair, just that the truth of this chair goes far beyond what is apparent and ultimately there is no difference between this chair and the sun, moon, stars, my mother and so on. This is all the idea of suchness. We move beyond the discriminative, seperate identifications which are apparent and see the suchness of all things. Perhaps this is what you mean by Atta, but it can never be said to be the same, never said to be different. So, it does not fit the definition of an eternal, unchanging entity which the word Atta implies.
take care
_/\_
metta
I apologize for keeping you waiting on that quote (it's the one from the Alagaddupama sutta, right?). I don't have time to exhaustively respond to all points (though, if we are patient and persistent with the topic we will probably eventually cover all the bases) brought up by everyone. I still wish to take the time to examine some of the (from my point of view) faulty points in the article "What the Buddha never taught", but have not carved out the time for it.
I guess now is the time to take a crack at the sutta you wish to highlight. Obviously, the sutta itself covers a lot of ground. It starts out with one specific pernicious view held by the disciple arittha, which then serves as the occasion for the simile of the snake and a fairly exhaustive coverage of the wrong ways which the "snake" can be grasped. The passage you quoted is focused on wrong views regarding Self, more specifically eternalist views. I think my main response to this would be that we need to pay careful attention to how the Buddha here defines the false view of self...and this applies both to sassatavada (eternalism) and to ucchedavada (annihilationism). He defines self-view as a view which presumes identity in some form with what is here called "universe" (cosmos, sabbe dhamma, loka), as expressed in the phrase "so loka so atta". Here it is translated "The universe is the Self."
This is a crucial point, and I'm not sure if it is forgotten because one wants to emphasize a rejection of the eternal in general (which I mentioned before we can't, because Nibbana is described in terms of sassata), or if it is simply understood differently. We're talking about an existing Self, and existance (and non-existance) are categories of being reliant upon the world for support. That which exists we say exists by virtue of being part of the substance and experience of the world, we say it is observable in its arising and in its passing away. That which does not exist has passed away or never arose as a phenomenon, and, having no support beyond the world, is, we say, annihilated or simply not. That Buddhism accepts the possibility of transcending existance by this criteria and non-existance by this criteria is unmistakeable by the third noble truth. By contrast, here is how the Buddha sees the world with which the Eternalists identify themselves: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-082.html
further insight into "the world":
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/udana/ud3-10.html
It occurs to me, perhaps mischievously, that a nihilist with regard to atta would be pleased if in the above quoted sutta on "world", the word "loka" would be replaced with "atta" so that it would read, "in what respect does the word 'self' apply? Insofar as it disintegrates, it is called "self"". It seems he would hardly see the difference in emphasis the change would create, not seeing that: "The arising & falling away of the eye are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self.'"
I just think that's such an important thing to remember with regard to the sassatavada, that the Buddha identifies it as a doctrine on the sameness of the world and self, and the eternity of both (or the non-eternity with regard to uchedavada). Completely unacceptable because it is not in accord with the reasoning behind that the world is described as not-self, and for abandoning ( http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn35-024.html ).
We do agree to disagree on this topic; at least I do. With tongue in cheek, Federica, I'd like to point out that as Buddhists we do have a need to be "right" (as in "samma").
In friendliness,
V.
If you were to meet, I would like to think that you would embrace one another, and continue your discussions side by side.... and you'd take a walk together in the courtyard, walking round and round, deep in conversation and discussion, your heads together, your arm alternately moving to emphasise, through gestures, your salient point... and you'd be oblivious to all and sundry, and to the passing of time, and ultimately, you would wear a perfect circular path, at least three inches beneath ground level, and others would marvel at the intensity, yet friendliness of your discussion.....
As I am truly not scholarly enough to contribute to this discussion constructively, so permit the mind wandering in this fashion, while I watch, and try to learn, at least - !!
While I see what you are saying in regards to the world, I would say the Alagaddupama Sutta goes beyond the definition of world you are using, and states that the buddha himself did not find ANYthing which can be discerned "that is permanent, stable, eternal, immutable, that abides eternally the same in its very condition" or any view "on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair". But that is my opinion.
However, I will ask you this: What is there which has no form, cannot be percieved, cannot be felt, does not fabricate, and that we cannot be conscious of and is not consciousness? If none of those things can be said, then we can say it is effectively non-existent. If it was existent, there would be no way to perceive or verify its existence anyway. So what exactly is the point of seeking after it? If we find it, we will have no way of knowing, as knowing is an dependent upon perception and consciousness. Basically, after all these qualifiers are gone, there is nothing left to be construed as anything. That is why Nibbana (cessation) is the only term which is applicable in my understanding.
Also, in my understanding, based on the methodology repeated over and over again in the suttas, is that it's all right here 'within this fathom long body'. Dukkha and the cessation of dukkha is all experienced right here. Not outside of this very experience (known as the world) is the path realized and the goal attained. That is why I consider Nibbanna to be the only term advisable to point to this reality.
Once again this is my own opinion based on my own practice and studies. There is no 'mover and shaker' of things, just the 'moving and shaking'. So in that, the 'moving and shaking' is the 'mover and shaker'. No doer, only Doing.
take care
_/\_
metta