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In regards to the knowledge of scriptures same goes for me, I have to read (and hopefully understand) more first.
I might point out that it currently seems unjustifiable to me to negate a self absolutely, since it would be needed to identify non-self components. In other words, I am still "stuck" in a subject object epistemological pov. Even if the self at the end is free of all positive attributes, it recognizes impermanance permanently. Deconstructing a self-image is to realize what the self is not. I also don`t know how to make my point clearer currently and have no new insights or sources to offer, so i too will keep away from the thread for a while.
Thanks Bobby, I knew the site before but I am not sure what to think of it and the sutra for now. I certainly will explore it deeper in future and bring things i find there and think to be relevant to the anatta discussion here.
Honestly, I feel that taking absolute positions in regard to the existence or non-existence of a Self is not only unneccessary, but is arguably incorrect practice. Clinging to views is repudiated by the buddha & is a hindrance to practice, in my understanding & experience. Views, by definition, are conditioned phenomena and are dependent upon ignorance for their formation. — Not1not2
The view of self (sakkâya-ditthi) only arises from treating one or more of the five khandhas as the self. The self of which the Buddha speaks cannot be viewed. Alternatively, there is no perception of the true self.
The real danger lies in clinging to one or more of the five khandhas. For example, take the average mundane person. They believe that the life they experience through the body is real. But this body is the khandhas. And what sense of self they possess, based on the five khandhas, is only khandha view derived (e.g., my shape, my feelings, etc.).
Just a quick response. When you say it is not a perception, doesn't that mean it cannot be perceived? I ask this because, if it is not a perception & cannot be perceived, in what way can we verify that 'it' exists or doesn't exist?? If we cannot, by your own admission, verify it's existentence, then why are you arguing for its existence? Honestly, it seems that even if it somehow exists beyond verification, that there is no point in arguing about it at all. Perhaps this is why the Buddha said we should not make such statements. If something is beyond verification as to whether it is or isn't, should we really be trying to determine whether 'it is' or 'it is not', not to mention adamantly defending either position?
I could not resist I came across the following passage of the self in the Nirvana/Mahaparinirvana Sutra:
“The Self (ātman) is reality (tattva), the Self is permanent (nitya), the Self is virtue (guṇa), the Self is eternal (śāśvatā), the Self is stable (dhruva), the Self is peace (siva).” (Chapter Four, “Grief”).
First I`d like to say, I am always sceptic when someone offers me a final truth or whatever one would name it. It was promised to mankind from individuals of all Ideological/Religios color and did not work for now. But that`s just my pesonal habit, let`s got for the text.
Above we see a positive Definition of the self. However, it is not something personal. In contrast to the pudgalavadins, as far as i have understood their position, not a individual person is assumed but rather some universal traits that constitue the self.
If i might summarize that defintion: the self is something concrete, namely, virtue and a state of peace, and is in a certain way, namely enduring without interruption and never ending. I would say this self is an Ideal assumed to be real but hidden.
One would have to look after what`s meant by virtue exactly. If, and let me stress if, one would take that definition then for granted, everything moving one away from virtue and peace would not be the self. Currently I am not sure what a positive definition of the self would be good for, since to my understanding, the highest aims in buddhism is arhathood/bodhisttvahood, the final aim is nibbana, the means to that is enlightenment, the tools for that is the eightfold path.
I feel that the longing for th epositive definition of the self is rooted in a need for stability. I cannot see that it is of any use though, since i see the goals and means as stated above. maybe i am wrong, but I could imagine that the self stops to be an important issue the moment you do not mistake it any more with the skadhas, and there is no need any more to repudiate a view of a self nor to try to come up with a definition. This does not mean everyone who does not take issue with it has actually got the point though. In fact, not taking any issue at all about this could hint to a (wrong) view of "there is no self". I simply can`t say at the moment.
Perhaps much confusion arises because the post-Reformation West identifies the 'self' with the individual and, in a modern context, with personality. The text you quote, Fofoo, points to a 'self' which is neither. To use Hindu symbology, it is a spark of the flame and has no name on it.
While I can see how you impute the equation of anatta=mara, I'm not sure this is saying anything new or contradictory. My main problem is the way you are wording anatta as 'the not-self', as I stated in my earlier post (though even this isn't much of a problem). And I am still curious in regards to the logic behind & the implications of your statement that "taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!"
_/\_
metta
I have heard that grammatically speaking, the word "anatta" can be used in Pali as a noun, depending on the context. As a noun, the meaning, naturally, is "that which is not-self," or "the not-self". In any case, this is just a syntax issue and does not affect the meaning Bobby is trying to get across, being: "That which is known to be impermanent and suffering is mara, and also known to be not-self, therefore that which is called not-self is also called mara."
One of the "new" aspects of this discussion that I thought bringing in the concept of mara would illustrate is that the figure of mara represents the sphere of the khandhas (what Bobby is here briefly referring to as "an aggregate postion"), and that it is clear from several suttas that I know of at least that according to the illustrations employing mara, mara is a villain from which we can escape unharmed. This means that in some sense there is the possibility of going beyond the khandhas, "out of mara's range", which means that the arhat who has gone beyond must be fundamentally more than just the khandhas. In this long thread, we have not really approached the topic in this way yet . It's another way in which the suttas make that distinction which very strongly implies in this case (and in other cases simply states) that we are truly something more, something other, something else than the khandhas. Because if the khandhas are the domain of Mara, it is not possible that we, if we are wholly just the khandhas, could ever go beyond Mara's domain; Mara would always find us, the khandhas being his sphere. It will take some rooting around to find the exact reference, but I recall a certain sutta which describes Mara as a shape in the sky flitting back and forth, here and there, looking for the consciousness of a recently deceased arhat. The Buddha states that Mara can't find him because he has gone beyond Mara's range.
Thanks Vaccha for getting to that point again ( I realize I get easily distracted).
Mara as the five skandhas are presented in Samyutta Nikaya 23.12 and 23.23
I`d like to have a short excourse on the word mara itself.
The translation of the word Mara I read would be killer or death. It presumably is related to the latin word mors and the northern german word mahr,(source: http://www.palikanon.com/wtb/mara.html) which is also present in english as the ending -mare (Nachtmahr -> nightmare)
After googling a bit on the word, I read the that one of the OED`s definition of mare is : a kind of goblin supposed to produce a nightmare by sitting on the chest of the sleeper (I do not have an account there and so cannot check, native english speakers are welcomed to verify or falsify that definition )
If it`s true, it strikes me how near some words of every day use are to remotely believed concepts from buddhism without oneself even noticing it.
Perhaps much confusion arises because the post-Reformation West identifies the 'self' with the individual and, in a modern context, with personality. The text you quote, Fofoo, points to a 'self' which is neither. To use Hindu symbology, it is a spark of the flame and has no name on it.
The fire is also a valid metaphor in Buddhist Sutras. As far as I know, it should be understood as it was understood by the ancient indians, namely a fire that goes out is not annihilated but merely unbound from the things that fuels it, if i remeber correctly.Though I amnot aware that the fire is mention as universal and the sparks as indivuduals in buddhist sutras.
Vacchagotta, speaking of Mara, this passage I have submitted seems to validate what you said earlier. For anyone taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!
When there is form, Rahda, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. Therefore, Radha, see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. See it as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as really misery. Those who see it thus see rightly. When there if feeling ... When there is perception ... When there are volitional formations ... When there is consciousness, Radha, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. — S.iii.189
Admittedly this is an astonishing passage and as I recall, it appears to be omitted from access to insight. Why it is not included on their site for what is implies is surely odd. It does, by logical entailment, say the non-self is Mara.
A.E.
On a second reading and thought, I agree. If we look into sn 23.12 and sn23.23, the latter one clearly says(4): body,feeling, perception, form and conciousness are Mara. Saying the non-sef is Mara is not wrong. Anyone got an Enlgish version of both Sutras? I did neither find them on metta.lk nor accesstoinsight.
On a second reading and thought, I agree. If we look into sn 23.12 and sn23.23, the latter one clearly says(4): body,feeling, perception, form and conciousness are Mara. Saying the non-sef is Mara is not wrong. Anyone got an Enlgish version of both Sutras? I did neither find them on metta.lk nor accesstoinsight.
And 23 can be found here: Radha samyutta chapter 3
It may be noted they are redundant with regard to the sutta 1 of that samyutta: Radha samyutta chapter 1
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. this whole section of the samyutta nikaya is found to be fundamental to this discussion: samyutta 21 is the khandha samyutta, and 23 is the ditthi samyutta.
some of them may be redundand and yes, the whole section is relevant. However, the appearant redundancy serves its purpose imho, since it strengthens the position and it cannot be easily marginalized, e.g. as a minor less important view, it clearly is an issue.
Interesting also, that Radha asks for a short summarization of the dharma in order to be able to retreat and remain stable in the teaching. Then, the Buddha equates the skandhas with Mara and calls for giving up the desire for them. (Radha samyutta chapter 3 in metta.lk)
(My Translation says: It would be good if the blessed one could show me the teaching in short(summarize), so I can rest while retreated alone, isolated, never tyring, eager and resolutely after i heard the teaching ( "Gut wäre es, o Herr, wenn mir der Erhabene in Kürze die Lehre zeigte, damit ich, nachdem ich des Erhabenen Lehre vernommen, einsam, zurückgezogen, unermüdlich, eifrig und entschlossen weilen mag.) After that, the Buddha equates the skandhas with mara and calls for giving up the desire for them.
This may or may not be on topic. This will be in regard to anatman or in pali, anatta which is often translated as either no-self or not-self (I prefer not the self).
What I have submitted is from Vedic literature. It is my general sense that anatman was never used in anyway approaching its use in Theravada Abhidhamma. I also think it can be argued that the Buddha's concept of anatman was consistent with the Vedas in which he attempted to show that the five khandhas are mere attributes; not being substantially real. This would tie in with Mara as being synonymous with the khandhas.
I have put in bold the relevant parts.
"The gods and the Asuras, both born of Prajapati, were contending against each other. They were both soulless [an-atma]; [because] they were mortal; [for] he who is mortal, is soulless. Among these two (the gods and the Asuras) who were mortal, Agni alone was immortal....Now whichsoever [of the god] they (the Asuras) slew, he, indeed was so [slain]....They praised and practised austerities in the hope that they might overcome their enemies, the mortal Asuras. They saw this immortal "agnyâdhâya (consecrated fire). They said, "Come, let us place this immortal thing in our innermost soul"...The gods then established that [fire] in their innermost soul...and [thereby they] became immortal and unconquerable.' — Satapatha Brahmana II. 2.2. 8—10, 14 (P.S. Deshmukha, The Origin and Development of Religion in Vedic Literature [Oxford University Press: London, 1933], 363)
I think this is significant—not because the Buddha wholly subscribed to Vedanta but because there existed at the time a common lexicon of religious terms. Anyone who has done a little reading about Jainism will agree.
I think this is significant—not because the Buddha wholly subscribed to Vedanta but because there existed at the time a common lexicon of religious terms. Anyone who has done a little reading about Jainism will agree.
Bobby
If we really wanna get into that, we should explore the etymology and possible different meanings in time of atman/atta. Many including me are sceptic, and probalby rightly sceptic, of introducing any individal "spirutual" substance such as the notion of a western soul into Buddhism. It just does not bare any reality, the soul is a concept of a thing that is born, and after the body dies, is judged once and for all and then lives for eternity in heaven or hell. This surely cannot be called Budhist by any means imo.
I recently read a book called "Empty is the world" by Kurt Schmidt. He is "accused" of holding Georg Grimms view of a transcendental atta. As for one of his defenses for such an atta he refers to MN22, wher e it is stated that the bikhu whos mind/spirit(geist) is free (arhat) cannot be found even here and now:
Bhikkhus, if that released mind of the bhikkhu was to be searched by Inda, Brahmà, Pajàpati and their retinue, it would not be found; thus unsupported is the consciousness of the Thus Gone One. What is the reason: I say that the Thus Gone One cannot be found even here and now. To me who says thus and preaches thus, certain recluses and brahmins ingenuinely, untruthfully blame, the recluse Gotama the discipliner, purposefully shows the annihilation, destruction, and non evidence of beings. Bhikkhus, whatever I am not, that I do not proclaim, as a result these good recluses and brahmins ingenuinely, untruthfully blame, the recluse Gotama the discipliner purposefully shows the annihilation, destruction and non-evidence of beings. Earlier and now also I declare -Unpleasant and its cessation.
Thanks for the article, fofoo. It raises a good question or two. I will use this excerpt from the article as launching point, although I don't intended to take my analysis too far, except to make more grist for the discussion mill.
Even if it can be shown that an artifact like a chariot lacks self-nature (equivalently: that it reduces without remainder to its constituents), there must be something that has self-nature since there must be something that serves to unify the artifact's constituents.
I have, in the past, looked at this example from an Aristotelean perspective: that there are other causes (aitia) besides the material one, i.e., the chariot parts. One important cause is the efficient cause (svabhâva). The efficient cause, in this case, would be the chariot craftsman.
The chariot like the body can be reduced to a heap of parts. Looking over these parts we would find nothing in the way of an efficient cause. Only the material cause is apparent. But can we, from this material analysis, draw the conclusion that the chariot put itself together or that it just happen to be here since the beginning of time? I think not.
We know from experience that every constructed thing has a constructor which is the efficient cause; which cannot be found in the constructed thing. Using our own body as an example, the Buddha calls it previous karma which has been willed out.
"The five grasping aggregates are previously composed and willed out (purvam abhisamskrtany abhisañcetitani), and to be known as former deed (pauranam karma veditavyam). -- SA, 260, 65c-66a
Isn't this willing out the efficient cause of our body which is made up of the five khandhas?
The anatta theory, we might suggest, refers to the khandhas, that they are not the efficient cause, namely, the attan. If we wish to know the efficient cause we must first stop clinging to our constructs.
Are you saying, Bobby, that recognition of the skandhas is anatta but that the theory neither refutes nor satisfies the need for an attan? And that this is because it addresses a different level of the arising?
forgive me for not undestanding the phrase "to will out", maybe you can explain it to me.
Apearently, if I follow your terminology, the efficient cause of the skandhas obviously is kamma to me, or more perecicsely, kamma-cetanā, kammic wanting. kamma-cetanā, on the other hand, i currently understand as will, what i want, how i want etc.
Simon, there are some passages where attan is not treated in a negative way. Here is one. This is I.B. Horner's translation:
"There is the case, monk, where a well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- who has regard for nobles ones, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma; who has regard for men of integrity, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma -- does not assume form to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form. He does not assume feeling to be the self... does not assume perception to be the self... does not assume fabrications to be the self... He does not assume consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in consciousness" (MN III.18).
It runs through the usual list of khandhas but without the usual pattern of "form is an-atta" and so on with the rest of the khandhas. This passage, by the way, which is addressed to a monk, concerns the discipline of an ariya-savaka (noble disciple) which means he is no longer ordinary (puthujjana).
Right now I am going over the Khadhasamyutta section of the Samyutta-Nikaya. I found another similar passage at III.17. Bear in mind that an ariya-savaka is at least stream-entered who may eventually become an Arhat.
Peter Masefield, in his book, Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism, really opens a can of worms on the subject of ariya-savaka vs. ordinary followers (puthujjana) who are not yet stream-entered. Note, that just because one becomes a monk or a nun doesn't mean they are automatically ariya-savakas. I would also mention that one can become an ariya-savaka without being a monk or a nun. This I forewarn you is not a subject dear to Theravadins!
fofoo, "willing out" which in pali is abhisañcetitani is just a lose translation. The term is quite complicated. If you have the PTS dictionary handy you can break it down into its simplier elements. This is one of the things you have to get used to when getting deeper into Buddhism. This is why some of us learn enough pali or sanskrit (or Tibetan and Chinese) to be able to use a dictionary. Translators do the best they can. Buddhism is hardly an easy subject. We are getting into some highfalutin philosophy.
I could not find the word. How is it composed? abhi + ?
the PTS dictionary suggested I might be looking for Abhisañceteti [abhi + sañceteti or ˚cinteti]
I agree it is difficult to get deeper into the doctrine without knowing the original languages. I recently started to learn a bit Pali with the tools found on metta.lk, but I am still at the very beginning.
Thanks for the article, fofoo. It raises a good question or two. I will use this excerpt from the article as launching point, although I don't intended to take my analysis too far, except to make more grist for the discussion mill.
Even if it can be shown that an artifact like a chariot lacks self-nature (equivalently: that it reduces without remainder to its constituents), there must be something that has self-nature since there must be something that serves to unify the artifact's constituents.
I have, in the past, looked at this example from an Aristotelean perspective: that there are other causes (aitia) besides the material one, i.e., the chariot parts. One important cause is the efficient cause (svabhâva). The efficient cause, in this case, would be the chariot craftsman.
The chariot like the body can be reduced to a heap of parts. Looking over these parts we would find nothing in the way of an efficient cause. Only the material cause is apparent. But can we, from this material analysis, draw the conclusion that the chariot put itself together or that it just happen to be here since the beginning of time? I think not.
We know from experience that every constructed thing has a constructor which is the efficient cause; which cannot be found in the constructed thing. Using our own body as an example, the Buddha calls it previous karma which has been willed out.
I'm not sure whether the question of whether a chariot constructs itself really changes anything here. I think an important aspect of the chariot analogy is that a 'chariot' does not exist without a consciousness which conceives of it. From that conception, a craftsman brings together the parts to form the aggregation which fits corresponds to said conception. And furthermore, both the craftsman & the conception are without permanent, self-abiding substantiality as well. And thus, neither can be said to be the essence of the chariot.
Additionally, volition, or 'cetana'(sp?) is considered part of the aggregates, so there is no self there either. Anyway, I guess I'm not sure what your point is here. Are you saying that the will is the Atta? Are you saying that the crafstman is the Atta? If so, I'm not sure that equation holds up.
"The five grasping aggregates are previously composed and willed out (purvam abhisamskrtany abhisañcetitani), and to be known as former deed (pauranam karma veditavyam). -- SA, 260, 65c-66a
Isn't this willing out the efficient cause of our body which is made up of the five khandhas?
The anatta theory, we might suggest, refers to the khandhas, that they are not the efficient cause, namely, the attan. If we wish to know the efficient cause we must first stop clinging to our constructs.
I agree with the clinging to our constructs thing, but I'm not sure how fully that has been applied in this analysis either. As the 6 sense bases are all constructions, then any concept we come up with is bound to be off the mark. And I'm not so sure to what extent Aristotilean logic is appropriate or significant here. A questionable mixing & matching of philosophical models, imo.
This I forewarn you is not a subject dear to Theravadins!
This kind of language is highly questionable & you would do best to refrain from such statements which have an implicit tone of disrespect towards an entire school of buddhism. I have personally witnessed discussions along these lines among Theravadins & I have not picked up on any particular dislike of the subject. Rather, there is some debate dealing the fetters of a householder & in what manner a layperson may attain such a state. There are also Pali Suttas which speak of lay Arahats, which are not denied by Theravadins. Also, it really doesn't seem to have any relevence to the current discussion either (even if it is true). Once again, let's refrain from sect-bashing. If memory serves me, this is not the first time you've said something along these lines.
although I am not directly addressed, I want to answer something regarding to volition/will
In M IX,9, Majjhima Nikaya the 5 aggregates are rooted in the will. It says so in the German Translation of K.E Neumann, who was influenced by Schopenhauer and who is said to have mistranslated important words. Though the online edition claims to be largely corrected. on metta the term is interest.
That bhikkhu delighting and agreeing with the words of the Blessed One asked a further question. `Venerable sir, on what are these five holding masses based?û
ßBhikkhu, these five holding masses are based on interest.û
i think both terms indicate wanting, longing for the 5 aggregates, whatever of both might be more appropriate - we could also have a look at the Pali term for a more precise idea of it. However, speaking of the will or interest of atta (unchanging & permanent self) would be not justifiyable imo, if that would be the case, losing interest was not possible, therefore, detachment/releasing not possible, therefore nibbàna unreachable.
the word seems to be chandamålakà'ti, chanda i understand to mean desire(here:http://www.watthai.net/dictionary.htm under agatigamana). Maybe someone more skillfull than me can shed ligh into how the term could be described best.
Of some interest here is that it is ambivalent, as it is also used as a virtue, if connected with the path, with what is wholesome. Obviously, in the context we are discussing, chanda speaks of an unwholesome desiring, unwholesome willing.
However, speaking of the will or interest of atta (unchanging & permanent self) would be not justifiyable imo, if that would be the case, losing interest was not possible, therefore, detachment/releasing not possible, therefore nibbàna unreachable.
This is an interesting point, and one I am not certain to agree with, or one that perhaps I just do not yet fully understand. I believe it is contradicted by one of the criteria by which things are deemed to be not atta, namely self-determinacy, phrased as, for example "if form were atta, it would be possible to say 'let form be thus' and it would be thus." Not only does this imply a willing on the part of atta, but it implies the change that immediately results from such willing. The question is does any such change require us to think of that change as fundamental to the nature of atta. I don't think there is any such necessity. I think it may be possible to draw from the teachings of the Buddha an ambivalence of atta which is precisely its soteriological value. We cannot speak of any taming of the self, or of a self that inflicts harm on the self through evil, of an eternal wandering in samsara, nor really of any religious connection between man and atta unless the self is involved in samsara, something like a masked actor, a willing that it may, being self-determined, endeavor to free itself from. The difficulty comes through the mediacy of atta's situation of having become entangled in, clothed in, blinded by, identified with the khandhas. This self-identification of the atta with the khandhas is the mediacy with which is must struggle (the struggle is merely with itself, its own ignorance). Am I making any sense? I'd be happy to hear your idea in more depth.
The Khandha chapter of the Samyutta-Nikaya is a must read for anyone wishing to get a more in depth 'feel' for the khandha/atta relationship. As an example of what I mean, the Nakulapita discouse (S.iii.1) proves to be an interesting study.
What I draw from it is that ordinary people (puthujjana) are susceptible to becoming afflicted (âtura) in body (kaya) and mind (citta) whereas a noble disciple (ariyasavaka) is only capable of becoming afflicted in body.
The chief reason that an ordinary person is susceptible to becoming afflicted in mind is that such a person believes that he or she is the khandhas which constitute the psychobiological person. By comparison, the noble disciple does not regard the khandhas as the self. In other words, the self of the noble disciple is unconnected with the psychobiological person, whereas the self of an ordinary person is connected with the khandhas. With any change in khandhas, the self of the ordinary person changes while this is not the case with a noble disciple.
While all of us will eventually become afflicted in body (âturakaya) as a result of illness and old age, not everyone is so afflicted in mind who have become disciples (ariyasavakas). This is because Buddhism understands that mind is not a product of brain cells which means that mind is potentially independent. For the Buddha, mind is capable of complete separation from the psychobiological entity we call a human being. In fact, I might go so far as to suggest there are a number of degrees or grades of mind getting itself unbound from its former habitation with the psychobiological body.
This leads me to postulate that Buddhist self of atta is somewhat different than the Hindu notion of atman. The Buddhist self seems to be more of a signifier for what can only be described as the unchanging essence of mind insofar as mind is itself and luminous (pabhassara) rather than defiled (cf. Pabhassara sutta A.i.10 [I,v,9-10; I,vi,1-2]).
When mind is purified, that is, seen as luminous, we can speak of the release (vimokkhena) of the mind (cittassa) in which its is liberated (vimutto) (cp. UdA 223–224). Setting aside the semantic distinctions, this is no different than the self of a disciple or of the Buddha which is no longer confused with the five khandhas. The same runs true with the Tatathagata. The Tathagata is not identified with the khandhas. Moreover, Tathagata's mind is well liberated (su-vimukta-citta) (SA, 905, 226b).
This leads me to postulate that Buddhist self of atta is somewhat different than the Hindu notion of atman. The Buddhist self seems to be more of a signifier for what can only be described as the unchanging essence of mind insofar as mind is itself and luminous (pabhassara) rather than defiled (cf. Pabhassara sutta A.i.10 [I,v,9-10; I,vi,1-2]).
When mind is purified, that is, seen as luminous, we can speak of the release (vimokkhena) of the mind (cittassa) in which its is liberated (vimutto) (cp. UdA 223–224). Setting aside the semantic distinctions, this is no different than the self of a disciple or of the Buddha which is no longer confused with the five khandhas. The same runs true with the Tatathagata. The Tathagata is not identified with the khandhas. Moreover, Tathagata's mind is well liberated (su-vimukta-citta) (SA, 905, 226b).
Love ya'll
Bobby
Interesting passage you quoted. Nynatiloka Thera translates "When conciuousness is purified..."though. However, I do not understand it as an essence in mind, but as a state, stableness of the spirit/mind (citta-tthiti). The commentary here says the puthujjana does not have citta-tthiti, citta-pariggaha and vipassanā-bhāvanā, Maybe we could have a look at those terms.
fofoo, there is some basis for your idea if you mean that atta is a "state", that is, "stableness of spirit/mind (citt-tthiti)." Several times I have run across the idea that atta suggest controlling whereas, by comparison, the khandhas lack control. Here is the relevant passage from Masefield's commentary to the Udana:
The five aggregate-pentad is impermanent in the sense of its being non-existent after having been and dukkha in the sense of repeated oppression, and not the self in the sense of its proceeding uncontrolled (avasavattanatthena = in the sense of proceeding powerless). — UdA 376
I think there is a mini-dissertation here! The self or atta my well be the controlling agent or power by which we move and control the khandhas.
Back to my words that the atta is a signifier for the essence of the mind. I used the term essence in a philosophical sense (one could even argue that atta/atma originally meant 'essence'). For example, the essence chairness refers to what makes a chair unique and different from, say a table or a cabinet. Thus, the signifier atta denotes, as an essence, the unchangingness and purity of mind itself. This may well explain why the Buddha argued that the essence of the khandhas cannot be the self insofar as the latter is unchanging whereas the khandhas change every moment.
some argue that atman original meant to breathe, related to the German verb "atmen"(to breathe), it is not unlikely that given the common indo-european heritage of the langauges, it hints to the right direction. The argument is that breathing was equated with living, the significance of being aware of one`s breathing is evident in medition practice also in Buddhism. Hence also comparisons of the atman with the wind in the upanishads I believe.
The conversation has taken some very interesting turns lately. I agree it is possible on one level to speak of atta as a state; it is very much possible to interpret the teachings on atta as an ultimate value as implying this. "State" here is a very interesting word, sharing its roots with several similar words which approach the meaning of the important pali term thita, which is employed in connection both with citta (thitacitta) and with atta (thit'atta). In the PTS dictionary, the two terms are equated, and thitaatta is also directly combined with parinibbuto (parinibbuto ṭhitatto) at Sn 370 (found at 372 at metta.lk and LaTrobe U (KN) -- yet another instance where atta is revealed as adequate to parinibbana (whereas a "no-selfer" generally believes self is something ultimately to be abandoned). Such words as "stable", "steady", "static", "stasis" all share roots with "state."
Of some interest here is that it is ambivalent, as it is also used as a virtue, if connected with the path, with what is wholesome. Obviously, in the context we are discussing, chanda speaks of an unwholesome desiring, unwholesome willing.
This is an interesting point, and one I am not certain to agree with, or one that perhaps I just do not yet fully understand. I believe it is contradicted by one of the criteria by which things are deemed to be not atta, namely self-determinacy, phrased as, for example "if form were atta, it would be possible to say 'let form be thus' and it would be thus." Not only does this imply a willing on the part of atta, but it implies the change that immediately results from such willing. The question is does any such change require us to think of that change as fundamental to the nature of atta. I don't think there is any such necessity. I think it may be possible to draw from the teachings of the Buddha an ambivalence of atta which is precisely its soteriological value. We cannot speak of any taming of the self, or of a self that inflicts harm on the self through evil, of an eternal wandering in samsara, nor really of any religious connection between man and atta unless the self is involved in samsara, something like a masked actor, a willing that it may, being self-determined, endeavor to free itself from. The difficulty comes through the mediacy of atta's situation of having become entangled in, clothed in, blinded by, identified with the khandhas. This self-identification of the atta with the khandhas is the mediacy with which is must struggle (the struggle is merely with itself, its own ignorance). Am I making any sense? I'd be happy to hear your idea in more depth.
in friendliness,
V.
well, first thank you for pointing out that chandamulaka, if connected to the path, has also a positve notion. I didn`t know but I am not suprised since we encounter many pairs of what is good an what is harmfull in the suttas. If we speak of will, I still hold the view that it is not the self, specified as unchanging. Everlasting I could agree on on a second thought. All I can do is to want either this or that. It has ever been this way and will ever be so, I risk to predict .
Mind I consider merely a tool for the will, but I have to warn you that this might not be covered thru suttas ,this idea i draw from other sources and own experience.
we can maybe see the self as controller, as bobby has described it vividly with "controlling agent". Mind is our most powerful tool. With it, we can understand kamma, which is nothing more than volition, and we eventually can aviod negative kamma. In short,will is kamma for me, not the self, self realizes that the kandhas are constantly driven by it, as we have succesfully been able to show here with suttas, but self is not kamma, not will, or however you name it.
This gets problematic however when we look to the claim that arhats don`t produce kamma any more. From an ordinary being`s pov, there again only remain negativa to describe their states, in this case, will denying. Not sure if the equation kamma=will holds an indepth analysis, but the buddha said will/volition is kamma (cetanāham bhikkhave kammam vadāmi). After all, one can always argue, that will denying only is the term that the ordinary guy would use to describe an arhat`s state.
The conversation has taken some very interesting turns lately. I agree it is possible on one level to speak of atta as a state; it is very much possible to interpret the teachings on atta as an ultimate value as implying this. "State" here is a very interesting word, sharing its roots with several similar words which approach the meaning of the important pali term thita, which is employed in connection both with citta (thitacitta) and with atta (thit'atta). In the PTS dictionary, the two terms are equated, and thitaatta is also directly combined with parinibbuto (parinibbuto ṭhitatto) at Sn 370 (found at 372 at metta.lk and LaTrobe U (KN) -- yet another instance where atta is revealed as adequate to parinibbana (whereas a "no-selfer" generally believes self is something ultimately to be abandoned). Such words as "stable", "steady", "static", "stasis" all share roots with "state."
under citta2, section "as mental status", it gives for -ṭhita˚steadfast in body & soul (cp. ṭhitatta)". Very interesting. I realize I have to be more careful when using certain terms, in this case, not refuting soul, only certain notions of it, e.g. christian views (final judgement and eternal residence in heaven or hell) of it.
Early Christianity, it can be argued, was a hodgepodge of many religions which were popular in Rome (e.g., Mithraism). There is no reason to exclude influences of Buddhism on the Roman mind which may be embedded in early Christianity.
The Christian ideas of a devil (Mara), heaven (Saggo), a savior (the compassionate Buddha) are in Buddhism which is much older than Christianity. To the chagrin of many Western Buddhists, Buddhism has more in common with Paul's Christianity than with Stephen Batchelor's revisionist portrayal.
Turning back to the discussion about self, Joaquin Perez-Remon's book, Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism, which is published as an abridged dissertation, makes a powerful case with evidence that the Pali canon does not treat self in a completely pejorative manner. As expected, his insights are troubling for some Buddhists. I include this paragraph for the benefit of the discussion so each of you can see the tenor of his seemingly heterodox analysis which has made the critic’s ink flow.
"One thing seems to be certain, that attasara.nâ cannot be translated as 'be a refuge unto yourselves', because in that use dhammasara.nâ which follows immediately as part of the same sentence would have to be analogically translated as 'be a refuge unto dhamma', which clearly does not fit. Our position is confirmed by a passage where the Buddha is reported to refer to his bhikkhus and bhikkhunis as people who 'abide having him as their island, their cave of shelter, their stronghold, their refuge'.
The passage under discussion occurs in the Mahaparinibbanasutta. In the context, Ananda expresses his fear that the Tathagata might pass away without making some pronouncement for the benefit of the Order, we might say he expected a kind of spiritual last will and testament. Buddha replies that he has nothing more to say, that he has been a teacher who has not kept anything undisclosed. He adds that no one has a right to say that the Order will be under his care, and this applies even to the Tathagata who is about to complete his course through life. Then it is that he utters those memorable words:
Therefore, Ananda, stay as those who have the self as island,
as those who have the self as refuge,
as those who have no other refuge, etc.
It is difficult to conceive that a believer in absolute anattâ, denying to attâ any objective reality, would advise his disciples to take their stand on something that he taught was entirely unreal. That attâ of the context, together with dhamma and intimately connected with it, was expected to make up for the absence of the Buddha, who was about to leave the world" (page 21).
When such an analysis is admitted into the various forums of Buddhism (which, sad to say is not often the case imo) I cannot help but believe that Buddhism is made better. For one thing, we avoid falling back on dogma being, instead, compelled to give reasons for our views and claims.
A coda: I am one of those guys who happens to view self as part of a Copernican revolution in Buddhism which makes is easier to grasp. Note, that Copernicus found it difficult to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies from the perspective of earth. When he thought out of the box, he found it easier to explain the movements of heavenly bodies from the standpoint of the stars. Likewise, I think Buddhism makes more sense if we understand that the Buddha is refuting what is not the self in an effort to show the depth of the real self which is apart from the world of samsara.
That's interesting, but I don't think Mr. Perez-Ramon's conclusions are necessarily authoritative & I'm not sure I fully understand some of his reasoning. In regards to the attasarana/dhammasarana comparison, it seems that the logical dilemma contingent upon how one translates them & I'm not so sure that the translations he chose are the best. If you translate attasarana as 'taking oneself as a refuge', then dhammasarana would translate as something like 'taking the dhamma as a refuge.' Also, in my understanding, the attasarana is meant in the sense that one 'should not put anyone's head above his own.' After all, it is said that Awakening is simply awakening to the true nature of one's experience. It is a direct & proper knowing, rather than a confused, ignorant knowing. In this sense, I don't see this passage as creating too much of a problem for those who do not think we should imputing a higher Self. It seems we are back down to the same back & forth argument once again on whether & when atta is used in a conventional or transcendent sense. I'm really having difficulty in finding any concrete evidence for the latter & the former seems to be less exotic & dualistic.
maybe we should determine first what we mean by transcendent, i deleted my previous post in which i tried to get a clarification started because i now think it did not make sense. Do I assume rigthly that you all simply mean beyond range/experience when you use trancendent? A look to wikipedia for the term should give an idea how confusing the usage of the term out of context can be, additionally, there is a distinction between transcendend and transcendental since kant. (transzendental being the things neccessary (a prioiri) for experience, transzendent being the term of going beyond normal experience in scholastic philosophy)
If by transcendent merely is meant beyond range or experience, I would encourage everyone to use those terms instead of transcendent.
fofoo, I thought you might enjoy these definitions:
"Transcendentalism (in theology). The doctrine that the source of religious truth is an organ or process of super-ordinary apprehension called variously religious consciousness, mystical insight, or intuition, through which the truth is immediately realized. It is a form of religious MYSTICISM" (Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, James Mark Baldwin, p. 711).
In The Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, in line with the above, transcendent (from Latin, transcendere; from trans, across, over beyond. + scandere, climb) is defined as follows:
"1. Superior, supreme, surpassing, exalted, of superlative quality. 2. beyond what is given to our experience. 3. referring to that which is forever beyond the grasp of ordinary experience and scientific explanation. 4. independent and separate" (p. 315).
I would argue that Buddhism is a species of Indian transcendentalism in which 'self' is transcendent to the khandhas.
European Christian theology, reflecting the philosophical debates of the 19th and 20th centuries, has pondered long on the question of transcendence, which was seen as one of the distinguishing characteristics of God: "God is both transcendent over, and immanent in, his world" is how the 19th century described it.
In the 20th ventury, 'process theology' ditched the notion of a transcendent deity to focus on the notion of an 'immanent god' who is deeply and integrally involved in the evolving cosmos.
I bring these 'Abrahamic' notions into this discussion because I believe that the debate itself represents a deep malaise within western thought which began to appear in the 15th century with Brunelleschi and Alberti's exploration of the representation of perspective. This coincided with the development of optical techniques enabling the better observation of the world around us. Even psychological phenomena began to be described in terms appropriate to empiricism. In some ways, it can be argued that the Renaissance removed our attention from the inner world and set our sights outwards. The inner, the world of the mind, shrank while the outer expanded.
From the point of view of the long journey of human thought, the distinction between immanence and transcendence (trance sans dance as Prévert puts it) is both local and recent. It may also be considered artificial.
fofoo, I thought you might enjoy these definitions:
"Transcendentalism (in theology). The doctrine that the source of religious truth is an organ or process of super-ordinary apprehension called variously religious consciousness, mystical insight, or intuition, through which the truth is immediately realized. It is a form of religious MYSTICISM" (Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, James Mark Baldwin, p. 711).
In The Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, in line with the above, transcendent (from Latin, transcendere; from trans, across, over beyond. + scandere, climb) is defined as follows:
"1. Superior, supreme, surpassing, exalted, of superlative quality. 2. beyond what is given to our experience. 3. referring to that which is forever beyond the grasp of ordinary experience and scientific explanation. 4. independent and separate" (p. 315).
I would argue that Buddhism is a species of Indian transcendentalism in which 'self' is transcendent to the khandhas.
Love ya'll
Bobby
To me, it seems a little closer to the latter term, although I could see where you would argue for the former. I don't think Buddhism is precisely either one. Anyway, the traditions I have encountered which are explicitly Transcendentalism have a slightly different flavor than buddhism in regards to how the transcendent is viewed, in my experience. Transcendentalism seems to posit some exalted, divine state as its goal. Buddhism seems to be a bit apprehensive in taking such an approach & no particular state is to be clung to or pushed away. Once again, though, this is just the way I see it & I may be wrong.
Honestly, I don't think we can really fit Buddhism neatly into either of those categories, as it has & doesn't have characteristics of both. So, I won't really be able to distinguish between the two terms, Fofoo. I apologize for any difficulty in discussion this creates.
Here is one well known example from the Udana, which is often cited, which can only be called a species of transcendentalism. It is the PTS trans., Udana 80-81.
Monks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, a not-compounded. Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, there would be apparent no escape from this here that is born, become, made, compounded.
The following is from the commentary (atthakatha) which is taken from Masefield's two volume set of commentaries to the Udana.
That which is unborn, that which is unbecome, that which is uncreated, that which is unconditioned (ajâta.m abhûta.m akata.m asa.nkhatam); all these terms are synonymous with one another. Or alternatively, it is “that which is unborn” (ajâta.m) since, unlike sensations and so on, it has not been born (na jâta.m), has not come into being, by way of the harmony of causes reckoned as the conjunction of root-cause and condition, “that which is unbecome” (abhûta.m) since it has not become (na bhûta.m), has not appeared, has not arisen, either in the absence of such a cause or else solely of its own accord, (whilst) on account of its being so unborn, on account of its being so unbecome it is “that which is uncreated” (akata.m) since it has not been created (no kata.m) by way of any cause whatsoever, “that which is unconditioned” (asa.nkhata.m) being said with the aim of indicating that nibbâna, whose own nature is that of being unconditioned, does not possess the own nature of being born, become and created possessed by states that are conditioned, such as name-and-form and so on" (UdA 394–95).
"There exists, monks, that which is unborn, that which is unbecome, that which is uncreated, that which is unconditioned", then [the Buddha] says "For if there (were) not, monks" and so indicating the root-cause with respect thereto. This is its meaning in brief: Monks, if there were not (na abhavissa=na siya, synonyms) that unconditioned element having as it own nature that which is unborn and so on, there could not be made known, there could not be discovered, there could not be witnessed, here, this world, the escape, allayment wihout remainder, for that which is conditioned reckoned as the khandha-pentad of form and so on that has its own nature being born and so forth. For states associated with the ariyan path, such as right view and so on, as they proceed making nibbana their object, extirpate the defilements without remainder. In this way, there is made known in this connection the non-occurrence of, the disappearance of, the escape from, the entire dukkha belonging to the cycle" (UdA 395).
Elsewhere in the same commentary, which is quite long, it says "the unconditioned element itself exists in the highest sense, on account of its own nature..." There is no question that the passage cited and the commentary are partial to a transcendent reading.
I find any objections to a transcendent reading conspicuous by the absence of evidence to the contrary in which case the objections, themselves, appears to be little more than uneducated opinions. If the facts were otherwise, that nibbana were not transcendent, then it would suffer the same fate as all conditioned things. But the literature is straightforward in proclaiming the transcendent nature of nibbana. It also mentions that the attainment of nibbana is "attained with great difficulty" (UdA 393) because "the cultivation of the conditionless is something not easy for beings to do" (UdA 393). Indeed, truth is not easy to see or to attain for even a Buddha because we are constantly in the throes of craving what is presented by the khandhas. This is our burden—and it is not an easy one to lay down.
Simon you have a lot going on there—a lot of religious and philosophical history that is. I would briefly comment and say that both the transcendent and the immanent have been laid siege to, both in modernity and probably going as far back as late medieval times with the rise of nominalism.
As you are probably aware it was Aquinas who, to a large extent, secularized human nature who was, himself, enthralled by Aristotelian empiricism which is quite terrestrial. He was one of the main causes of the loss of the intellectual vision (Augustine).
Then came William of Ockham, a Franciscan, who put the knife to any kind of Augustinian illuminationist tradition (borrowed from Plotinus). He essentially said with regard to both Platonic and Aristotelian idealism, "We don't need them stinking forms to explain anything."
As we can see, God is undergoing a major change! The old Platonic God is giving way to a God of absolute power or 'divine voluntarism'. Accordingly, he is only limited by the law of non-contradiction (God can't destroy himself in other words). So now, God can do about anything he wants.
But not a lot of people were satisfied with this new remodeled version of God. Meister Eckhart (14th century Dominican scholar and teacher) was one of those. With Eckhart, he found a way to make the identity of mind, as the pure subject, central again (yes, back to immanent). Mind was potentially both transcendent (the spark of God) and immanent as we are connected with it.
Let me sum this up (I have to make some tea) by giving a opinion. I think the Church is still engaged with nominalism insofar as it sees God as absolute power and ordained power. The danger is of course obvious. And I feel it has led to the divine right of kings, Popes, and the modern state—all of which have shown great cruelty. But it also leaves mankind with nothing except a sense of its own powerlessness, also. I do firmly believe that the popularization of Buddhism like the popularity of Meister Eckhart amount to a counterattack on a God who is nothing less than a will-to-power erected by those who hate the idea of the transcendent and its immanent apprehension by us, the sheep.
well well, much hard stuff to think about, thanks all for sharing and it wasn`t meant as an offense not1not2, i really mean it, i sometimes simply lose track when terms are overloaded and getting to abstract, then i seek to pull them from the skys and dissolve them into something concrete, so no need for apology
Bobby, I am not sure what you said about Eckhart, i will hae some thoughts on the weekend as well as to rest of the stuff you guys posted here. Just let me say that I hold the idea of voluntarism as important and obviously the dominat view today (F*** you, i do what i want attitude, aka egoism).
With regards to Eckhart, it comes to mind that in one of his speech that was considered most heretic (of poverty), he wrote: "This is a poor man, who has nothing, knows nothing and wants nothing". Of course connected to the biblical saying that the poor are blessed. Interesting that one might be able to see it as an early attempt to overcome "absolute power"/voluntarism as the ultimate truth. I still interpreted Eckhard pretty much as someone who preached detachment and compassion thru insight, his view that god has to be born in one`s soul (or the soul to be come one with god) could be seen similar to the buddha nature, but now i am merely speculating about rough ideas, i have no clear idea currently of what eckhart ment with that nor the buddha nature.
Where I might take issue with your conclusion would be in what I perceive as a confusion between Christianity and theChurch. Whereas the latter has a real investment in a transcendent God, immanence has been at the heart of Christian thinking ever since the beginning.
Coming from that radition myself, I find little problem in understanding the quoted text as referring to a similar immanence rather than as a transcendent and separate 'entity'.
No offense was taken & I certainly did not feel you meant to do so either. I was just explaining that I have a hard time really nailing Buddhism down to one term or the other.
I guess the transcendent (here simply meaning apart from this world) character derives from the view that in samsara, everything underlies birth, age(becoming) and so forth I guess. I once read that early Buddhists (whatever is meant by that) believed indeed that nirvana would be totally out of samsara, meaning, not found in this world, completely seperate from it. Don`t remember where I read, in case i find it again i provide you the soruce.
Comments
I might point out that it currently seems unjustifiable to me to negate a self absolutely, since it would be needed to identify non-self components. In other words, I am still "stuck" in a subject object epistemological pov. Even if the self at the end is free of all positive attributes, it recognizes impermanance permanently. Deconstructing a self-image is to realize what the self is not. I also don`t know how to make my point clearer currently and have no new insights or sources to offer, so i too will keep away from the thread for a while.
Thanks everyone for participating and sharing
Thanks Bobby, I knew the site before but I am not sure what to think of it and the sutra for now. I certainly will explore it deeper in future and bring things i find there and think to be relevant to the anatta discussion here.
The view of self (sakkâya-ditthi) only arises from treating one or more of the five khandhas as the self. The self of which the Buddha speaks cannot be viewed. Alternatively, there is no perception of the true self.
The real danger lies in clinging to one or more of the five khandhas. For example, take the average mundane person. They believe that the life they experience through the body is real. But this body is the khandhas. And what sense of self they possess, based on the five khandhas, is only khandha view derived (e.g., my shape, my feelings, etc.).
Love ya'll,
Bobby
Just a quick response. When you say it is not a perception, doesn't that mean it cannot be perceived? I ask this because, if it is not a perception & cannot be perceived, in what way can we verify that 'it' exists or doesn't exist?? If we cannot, by your own admission, verify it's existentence, then why are you arguing for its existence? Honestly, it seems that even if it somehow exists beyond verification, that there is no point in arguing about it at all. Perhaps this is why the Buddha said we should not make such statements. If something is beyond verification as to whether it is or isn't, should we really be trying to determine whether 'it is' or 'it is not', not to mention adamantly defending either position?
_/\_
metta
“The Self (ātman) is reality (tattva), the Self is permanent (nitya), the Self is virtue (guṇa), the Self is eternal (śāśvatā), the Self is stable (dhruva), the Self is peace (siva).” (Chapter Four, “Grief”).
First I`d like to say, I am always sceptic when someone offers me a final truth or whatever one would name it. It was promised to mankind from individuals of all Ideological/Religios color and did not work for now.
Above we see a positive Definition of the self. However, it is not something personal. In contrast to the pudgalavadins, as far as i have understood their position, not a individual person is assumed but rather some universal traits that constitue the self.
If i might summarize that defintion: the self is something concrete, namely, virtue and a state of peace, and is in a certain way, namely enduring without interruption and never ending. I would say this self is an Ideal assumed to be real but hidden.
One would have to look after what`s meant by virtue exactly. If, and let me stress if, one would take that definition then for granted, everything moving one away from virtue and peace would not be the self. Currently I am not sure what a positive definition of the self would be good for, since to my understanding, the highest aims in buddhism is arhathood/bodhisttvahood, the final aim is nibbana, the means to that is enlightenment, the tools for that is the eightfold path.
I feel that the longing for th epositive definition of the self is rooted in a need for stability. I cannot see that it is of any use though, since i see the goals and means as stated above. maybe i am wrong, but I could imagine that the self stops to be an important issue the moment you do not mistake it any more with the skadhas, and there is no need any more to repudiate a view of a self nor to try to come up with a definition. This does not mean everyone who does not take issue with it has actually got the point though. In fact, not taking any issue at all about this could hint to a (wrong) view of "there is no self". I simply can`t say at the moment.
cheers
I have heard that grammatically speaking, the word "anatta" can be used in Pali as a noun, depending on the context. As a noun, the meaning, naturally, is "that which is not-self," or "the not-self". In any case, this is just a syntax issue and does not affect the meaning Bobby is trying to get across, being: "That which is known to be impermanent and suffering is mara, and also known to be not-self, therefore that which is called not-self is also called mara."
One of the "new" aspects of this discussion that I thought bringing in the concept of mara would illustrate is that the figure of mara represents the sphere of the khandhas (what Bobby is here briefly referring to as "an aggregate postion"), and that it is clear from several suttas that I know of at least that according to the illustrations employing mara, mara is a villain from which we can escape unharmed. This means that in some sense there is the possibility of going beyond the khandhas, "out of mara's range", which means that the arhat who has gone beyond must be fundamentally more than just the khandhas. In this long thread, we have not really approached the topic in this way yet . It's another way in which the suttas make that distinction which very strongly implies in this case (and in other cases simply states) that we are truly something more, something other, something else than the khandhas. Because if the khandhas are the domain of Mara, it is not possible that we, if we are wholly just the khandhas, could ever go beyond Mara's domain; Mara would always find us, the khandhas being his sphere. It will take some rooting around to find the exact reference, but I recall a certain sutta which describes Mara as a shape in the sky flitting back and forth, here and there, looking for the consciousness of a recently deceased arhat. The Buddha states that Mara can't find him because he has gone beyond Mara's range.
in friendliness,
V.
Mara as the five skandhas are presented in Samyutta Nikaya 23.12 and 23.23
I`d like to have a short excourse on the word mara itself.
The translation of the word Mara I read would be killer or death. It presumably is related to the latin word mors and the northern german word mahr,(source: http://www.palikanon.com/wtb/mara.html) which is also present in english as the ending -mare (Nachtmahr -> nightmare)
After googling a bit on the word, I read the that one of the OED`s definition of mare is : a kind of goblin supposed to produce a nightmare by sitting on the chest of the sleeper (I do not have an account there and so cannot check, native english speakers are welcomed to verify or falsify that definition )
If it`s true, it strikes me how near some words of every day use are to remotely believed concepts from buddhism without oneself even noticing it.
edit: Interesting also that there happens to be a mara in scandinavian folklore: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mara_%28folklore%29
edit2: A research on the word Nachtmahr, that is not used any more in modern German, turned out to mean "nightly ghost/demon"
According to Anguttara Nikaya IX.39, Mara cannot reach one in arūpāvacara-jjhāna, the state of non-corporal deepening of the mind/spirt.
It actually contains a question about Buddhism I am still not sure about. Is it going ex-directory or is it taking all calls equaly with stoicism? :-P
Fleeing the world or overcoming it. I guess i once again put things too simplistic
The fire is also a valid metaphor in Buddhist Sutras. As far as I know, it should be understood as it was understood by the ancient indians, namely a fire that goes out is not annihilated but merely unbound from the things that fuels it, if i remeber correctly.Though I amnot aware that the fire is mention as universal and the sparks as indivuduals in buddhist sutras.
On a second reading and thought, I agree. If we look into sn 23.12 and sn23.23, the latter one clearly says(4): body,feeling, perception, form and conciousness are Mara. Saying the non-sef is Mara is not wrong. Anyone got an Enlgish version of both Sutras? I did neither find them on metta.lk nor accesstoinsight.
edit: I stand corrected, the suttas are from Samyutta Nikāya, not Diga Nikāya, sorry for the confusion.Nevertheless i could not find the English versions. In case anyone is inerested in researching, German versions are here http://www.palikanon.com/samyutta/sam23.html#s23_23 & http://www.palikanon.com/samyutta/sam23.html#s23_12
Is there no universal standard for the way the suttas are listed?
At metta.lk ( Samyutta Nikaya ) the Radhasamyutta is number 22. So, sutta 12 can be found here:
Radha samyutta chapter 2
And 23 can be found here:
Radha samyutta chapter 3
It may be noted they are redundant with regard to the sutta 1 of that samyutta:
Radha samyutta chapter 1
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. this whole section of the samyutta nikaya is found to be fundamental to this discussion: samyutta 21 is the khandha samyutta, and 23 is the ditthi samyutta.
some of them may be redundand and yes, the whole section is relevant. However, the appearant redundancy serves its purpose imho, since it strengthens the position and it cannot be easily marginalized, e.g. as a minor less important view, it clearly is an issue.
Interesting also, that Radha asks for a short summarization of the dharma in order to be able to retreat and remain stable in the teaching. Then, the Buddha equates the skandhas with Mara and calls for giving up the desire for them. (Radha samyutta chapter 3 in metta.lk)
(My Translation says: It would be good if the blessed one could show me the teaching in short(summarize), so I can rest while retreated alone, isolated, never tyring, eager and resolutely after i heard the teaching ( "Gut wäre es, o Herr, wenn mir der Erhabene in Kürze die Lehre zeigte, damit ich, nachdem ich des Erhabenen Lehre vernommen, einsam, zurückgezogen, unermüdlich, eifrig und entschlossen weilen mag.) After that, the Buddha equates the skandhas with mara and calls for giving up the desire for them.
What I have submitted is from Vedic literature. It is my general sense that anatman was never used in anyway approaching its use in Theravada Abhidhamma. I also think it can be argued that the Buddha's concept of anatman was consistent with the Vedas in which he attempted to show that the five khandhas are mere attributes; not being substantially real. This would tie in with Mara as being synonymous with the khandhas.
I have put in bold the relevant parts.
I think this is significant—not because the Buddha wholly subscribed to Vedanta but because there existed at the time a common lexicon of religious terms. Anyone who has done a little reading about Jainism will agree.
Love ya'll
Bobby
If we really wanna get into that, we should explore the etymology and possible different meanings in time of atman/atta. Many including me are sceptic, and probalby rightly sceptic, of introducing any individal "spirutual" substance such as the notion of a western soul into Buddhism. It just does not bare any reality, the soul is a concept of a thing that is born, and after the body dies, is judged once and for all and then lives for eternity in heaven or hell. This surely cannot be called Budhist by any means imo.
Bhikkhus, if that released mind of the bhikkhu was to be searched by Inda, Brahmà, Pajàpati and their retinue, it would not be found; thus unsupported is the consciousness of the Thus Gone One. What is the reason: I say that the Thus Gone One cannot be found even here and now. To me who says thus and preaches thus, certain recluses and brahmins ingenuinely, untruthfully blame, the recluse Gotama the discipliner, purposefully shows the annihilation, destruction, and non evidence of beings. Bhikkhus, whatever I am not, that I do not proclaim, as a result these good recluses and brahmins ingenuinely, untruthfully blame, the recluse Gotama the discipliner purposefully shows the annihilation, destruction and non-evidence of beings. Earlier and now also I declare -Unpleasant and its cessation.
from: http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/Majjhima1/022-alagagaddupama-sutta-e1.html
http://dictionary.laborlawtalk.com/Souls#Buddhist_beliefs
http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/posts/1113849826.shtml
I have, in the past, looked at this example from an Aristotelean perspective: that there are other causes (aitia) besides the material one, i.e., the chariot parts. One important cause is the efficient cause (svabhâva). The efficient cause, in this case, would be the chariot craftsman.
The chariot like the body can be reduced to a heap of parts. Looking over these parts we would find nothing in the way of an efficient cause. Only the material cause is apparent. But can we, from this material analysis, draw the conclusion that the chariot put itself together or that it just happen to be here since the beginning of time? I think not.
We know from experience that every constructed thing has a constructor which is the efficient cause; which cannot be found in the constructed thing. Using our own body as an example, the Buddha calls it previous karma which has been willed out.
Isn't this willing out the efficient cause of our body which is made up of the five khandhas?
The anatta theory, we might suggest, refers to the khandhas, that they are not the efficient cause, namely, the attan. If we wish to know the efficient cause we must first stop clinging to our constructs.
Love ya'll
Bobby
Apearently, if I follow your terminology, the efficient cause of the skandhas obviously is kamma to me, or more perecicsely, kamma-cetanā, kammic wanting. kamma-cetanā, on the other hand, i currently understand as will, what i want, how i want etc.
It runs through the usual list of khandhas but without the usual pattern of "form is an-atta" and so on with the rest of the khandhas. This passage, by the way, which is addressed to a monk, concerns the discipline of an ariya-savaka (noble disciple) which means he is no longer ordinary (puthujjana).
Right now I am going over the Khadhasamyutta section of the Samyutta-Nikaya. I found another similar passage at III.17. Bear in mind that an ariya-savaka is at least stream-entered who may eventually become an Arhat.
Peter Masefield, in his book, Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism, really opens a can of worms on the subject of ariya-savaka vs. ordinary followers (puthujjana) who are not yet stream-entered. Note, that just because one becomes a monk or a nun doesn't mean they are automatically ariya-savakas. I would also mention that one can become an ariya-savaka without being a monk or a nun. This I forewarn you is not a subject dear to Theravadins!
Love ya'll
Bobby
Love ya'll
Bobby
the PTS dictionary suggested I might be looking for Abhisañceteti [abhi + sañceteti or ˚cinteti]
I agree it is difficult to get deeper into the doctrine without knowing the original languages. I recently started to learn a bit Pali with the tools found on metta.lk, but I am still at the very beginning.
cheers
I'm not sure whether the question of whether a chariot constructs itself really changes anything here. I think an important aspect of the chariot analogy is that a 'chariot' does not exist without a consciousness which conceives of it. From that conception, a craftsman brings together the parts to form the aggregation which fits corresponds to said conception. And furthermore, both the craftsman & the conception are without permanent, self-abiding substantiality as well. And thus, neither can be said to be the essence of the chariot.
Additionally, volition, or 'cetana'(sp?) is considered part of the aggregates, so there is no self there either. Anyway, I guess I'm not sure what your point is here. Are you saying that the will is the Atta? Are you saying that the crafstman is the Atta? If so, I'm not sure that equation holds up.
I agree with the clinging to our constructs thing, but I'm not sure how fully that has been applied in this analysis either. As the 6 sense bases are all constructions, then any concept we come up with is bound to be off the mark. And I'm not so sure to what extent Aristotilean logic is appropriate or significant here. A questionable mixing & matching of philosophical models, imo.
This kind of language is highly questionable & you would do best to refrain from such statements which have an implicit tone of disrespect towards an entire school of buddhism. I have personally witnessed discussions along these lines among Theravadins & I have not picked up on any particular dislike of the subject. Rather, there is some debate dealing the fetters of a householder & in what manner a layperson may attain such a state. There are also Pali Suttas which speak of lay Arahats, which are not denied by Theravadins. Also, it really doesn't seem to have any relevence to the current discussion either (even if it is true). Once again, let's refrain from sect-bashing. If memory serves me, this is not the first time you've said something along these lines.
Thanks,
Mark
_/\_
metta
In M IX,9, Majjhima Nikaya the 5 aggregates are rooted in the will. It says so in the German Translation of K.E Neumann, who was influenced by Schopenhauer and who is said to have mistranslated important words. Though the online edition claims to be largely corrected. on metta the term is interest.
That bhikkhu delighting and agreeing with the words of the Blessed One asked a further question. `Venerable sir, on what are these five holding masses based?û
ßBhikkhu, these five holding masses are based on interest.û
http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/Majjhima3/109-mahapunnama-e.html
i think both terms indicate wanting, longing for the 5 aggregates, whatever of both might be more appropriate - we could also have a look at the Pali term for a more precise idea of it. However, speaking of the will or interest of atta (unchanging & permanent self) would be not justifiyable imo, if that would be the case, losing interest was not possible, therefore, detachment/releasing not possible, therefore nibbàna unreachable.
http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/3Samyutta-Nikaya/Samyutta3/22-Radha-Samyutta/01-Pathamamaravaggo-e.html
cheers
The main definition being given as: "1. impulse, excitement; intention, resolution, will; desire for, wish for, delight in"
For chandamulaka, it gives: "(adj.) having its root in excitement A iv.339; v.107;"
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.1:1:1752.pali
Of some interest here is that it is ambivalent, as it is also used as a virtue, if connected with the path, with what is wholesome. Obviously, in the context we are discussing, chanda speaks of an unwholesome desiring, unwholesome willing.
This is an interesting point, and one I am not certain to agree with, or one that perhaps I just do not yet fully understand. I believe it is contradicted by one of the criteria by which things are deemed to be not atta, namely self-determinacy, phrased as, for example "if form were atta, it would be possible to say 'let form be thus' and it would be thus." Not only does this imply a willing on the part of atta, but it implies the change that immediately results from such willing. The question is does any such change require us to think of that change as fundamental to the nature of atta. I don't think there is any such necessity. I think it may be possible to draw from the teachings of the Buddha an ambivalence of atta which is precisely its soteriological value. We cannot speak of any taming of the self, or of a self that inflicts harm on the self through evil, of an eternal wandering in samsara, nor really of any religious connection between man and atta unless the self is involved in samsara, something like a masked actor, a willing that it may, being self-determined, endeavor to free itself from. The difficulty comes through the mediacy of atta's situation of having become entangled in, clothed in, blinded by, identified with the khandhas. This self-identification of the atta with the khandhas is the mediacy with which is must struggle (the struggle is merely with itself, its own ignorance). Am I making any sense? I'd be happy to hear your idea in more depth.
in friendliness,
V.
What I draw from it is that ordinary people (puthujjana) are susceptible to becoming afflicted (âtura) in body (kaya) and mind (citta) whereas a noble disciple (ariyasavaka) is only capable of becoming afflicted in body.
The chief reason that an ordinary person is susceptible to becoming afflicted in mind is that such a person believes that he or she is the khandhas which constitute the psychobiological person. By comparison, the noble disciple does not regard the khandhas as the self. In other words, the self of the noble disciple is unconnected with the psychobiological person, whereas the self of an ordinary person is connected with the khandhas. With any change in khandhas, the self of the ordinary person changes while this is not the case with a noble disciple.
While all of us will eventually become afflicted in body (âturakaya) as a result of illness and old age, not everyone is so afflicted in mind who have become disciples (ariyasavakas). This is because Buddhism understands that mind is not a product of brain cells which means that mind is potentially independent. For the Buddha, mind is capable of complete separation from the psychobiological entity we call a human being. In fact, I might go so far as to suggest there are a number of degrees or grades of mind getting itself unbound from its former habitation with the psychobiological body.
This leads me to postulate that Buddhist self of atta is somewhat different than the Hindu notion of atman. The Buddhist self seems to be more of a signifier for what can only be described as the unchanging essence of mind insofar as mind is itself and luminous (pabhassara) rather than defiled (cf. Pabhassara sutta A.i.10 [I,v,9-10; I,vi,1-2]).
When mind is purified, that is, seen as luminous, we can speak of the release (vimokkhena) of the mind (cittassa) in which its is liberated (vimutto) (cp. UdA 223–224). Setting aside the semantic distinctions, this is no different than the self of a disciple or of the Buddha which is no longer confused with the five khandhas. The same runs true with the Tatathagata. The Tathagata is not identified with the khandhas. Moreover, Tathagata's mind is well liberated (su-vimukta-citta) (SA, 905, 226b).
Love ya'll
Bobby
Interesting passage you quoted. Nynatiloka Thera translates "When conciuousness is purified..."though. However, I do not understand it as an essence in mind, but as a state, stableness of the spirit/mind (citta-tthiti). The commentary here says the puthujjana does not have citta-tthiti, citta-pariggaha and vipassanā-bhāvanā, Maybe we could have a look at those terms.
I think there is a mini-dissertation here! The self or atta my well be the controlling agent or power by which we move and control the khandhas.
Back to my words that the atta is a signifier for the essence of the mind. I used the term essence in a philosophical sense (one could even argue that atta/atma originally meant 'essence'). For example, the essence chairness refers to what makes a chair unique and different from, say a table or a cabinet. Thus, the signifier atta denotes, as an essence, the unchangingness and purity of mind itself. This may well explain why the Buddha argued that the essence of the khandhas cannot be the self insofar as the latter is unchanging whereas the khandhas change every moment.
Love ya'll
Bobby
PTS entry: Thita
in friendliness,
V.
well, first thank you for pointing out that chandamulaka, if connected to the path, has also a positve notion. I didn`t know but I am not suprised since we encounter many pairs of what is good an what is harmfull in the suttas. If we speak of will, I still hold the view that it is not the self, specified as unchanging. Everlasting I could agree on on a second thought. All I can do is to want either this or that. It has ever been this way and will ever be so, I risk to predict
Mind I consider merely a tool for the will, but I have to warn you that this might not be covered thru suttas ,this idea i draw from other sources and own experience.
we can maybe see the self as controller, as bobby has described it vividly with "controlling agent". Mind is our most powerful tool. With it, we can understand kamma, which is nothing more than volition, and we eventually can aviod negative kamma. In short,will is kamma for me, not the self, self realizes that the kandhas are constantly driven by it, as we have succesfully been able to show here with suttas, but self is not kamma, not will, or however you name it.
This gets problematic however when we look to the claim that arhats don`t produce kamma any more. From an ordinary being`s pov, there again only remain negativa to describe their states, in this case, will denying. Not sure if the equation kamma=will holds an indepth analysis, but the buddha said will/volition is kamma (cetanāham bhikkhave kammam vadāmi). After all, one can always argue, that will denying only is the term that the ordinary guy would use to describe an arhat`s state.
under citta2, section "as mental status", it gives for -ṭhita˚steadfast in body & soul (cp. ṭhitatta)". Very interesting. I realize I have to be more careful when using certain terms, in this case, not refuting soul, only certain notions of it, e.g. christian views (final judgement and eternal residence in heaven or hell) of it.
The Christian ideas of a devil (Mara), heaven (Saggo), a savior (the compassionate Buddha) are in Buddhism which is much older than Christianity. To the chagrin of many Western Buddhists, Buddhism has more in common with Paul's Christianity than with Stephen Batchelor's revisionist portrayal.
Turning back to the discussion about self, Joaquin Perez-Remon's book, Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism, which is published as an abridged dissertation, makes a powerful case with evidence that the Pali canon does not treat self in a completely pejorative manner. As expected, his insights are troubling for some Buddhists. I include this paragraph for the benefit of the discussion so each of you can see the tenor of his seemingly heterodox analysis which has made the critic’s ink flow.
When such an analysis is admitted into the various forums of Buddhism (which, sad to say is not often the case imo) I cannot help but believe that Buddhism is made better. For one thing, we avoid falling back on dogma being, instead, compelled to give reasons for our views and claims.
A coda: I am one of those guys who happens to view self as part of a Copernican revolution in Buddhism which makes is easier to grasp. Note, that Copernicus found it difficult to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies from the perspective of earth. When he thought out of the box, he found it easier to explain the movements of heavenly bodies from the standpoint of the stars. Likewise, I think Buddhism makes more sense if we understand that the Buddha is refuting what is not the self in an effort to show the depth of the real self which is apart from the world of samsara.
Love ya'll
Bobby
Just my opinion though
_/\_
metta
If by transcendent merely is meant beyond range or experience, I would encourage everyone to use those terms instead of transcendent.
In The Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, in line with the above, transcendent (from Latin, transcendere; from trans, across, over beyond. + scandere, climb) is defined as follows:
I would argue that Buddhism is a species of Indian transcendentalism in which 'self' is transcendent to the khandhas.
Love ya'll
Bobby
In the 20th ventury, 'process theology' ditched the notion of a transcendent deity to focus on the notion of an 'immanent god' who is deeply and integrally involved in the evolving cosmos.
I bring these 'Abrahamic' notions into this discussion because I believe that the debate itself represents a deep malaise within western thought which began to appear in the 15th century with Brunelleschi and Alberti's exploration of the representation of perspective. This coincided with the development of optical techniques enabling the better observation of the world around us. Even psychological phenomena began to be described in terms appropriate to empiricism. In some ways, it can be argued that the Renaissance removed our attention from the inner world and set our sights outwards. The inner, the world of the mind, shrank while the outer expanded.
From the point of view of the long journey of human thought, the distinction between immanence and transcendence (trance sans dance as Prévert puts it) is both local and recent. It may also be considered artificial.
To me, it seems a little closer to the latter term, although I could see where you would argue for the former. I don't think Buddhism is precisely either one. Anyway, the traditions I have encountered which are explicitly Transcendentalism have a slightly different flavor than buddhism in regards to how the transcendent is viewed, in my experience. Transcendentalism seems to posit some exalted, divine state as its goal. Buddhism seems to be a bit apprehensive in taking such an approach & no particular state is to be clung to or pushed away. Once again, though, this is just the way I see it & I may be wrong.
Honestly, I don't think we can really fit Buddhism neatly into either of those categories, as it has & doesn't have characteristics of both. So, I won't really be able to distinguish between the two terms, Fofoo. I apologize for any difficulty in discussion this creates.
_/\_
metta
The following is from the commentary (atthakatha) which is taken from Masefield's two volume set of commentaries to the Udana.
Elsewhere in the same commentary, which is quite long, it says "the unconditioned element itself exists in the highest sense, on account of its own nature..." There is no question that the passage cited and the commentary are partial to a transcendent reading.
I find any objections to a transcendent reading conspicuous by the absence of evidence to the contrary in which case the objections, themselves, appears to be little more than uneducated opinions. If the facts were otherwise, that nibbana were not transcendent, then it would suffer the same fate as all conditioned things. But the literature is straightforward in proclaiming the transcendent nature of nibbana. It also mentions that the attainment of nibbana is "attained with great difficulty" (UdA 393) because "the cultivation of the conditionless is something not easy for beings to do" (UdA 393). Indeed, truth is not easy to see or to attain for even a Buddha because we are constantly in the throes of craving what is presented by the khandhas. This is our burden—and it is not an easy one to lay down.
Love ya'll
Bobby
_/\_
metta
As you are probably aware it was Aquinas who, to a large extent, secularized human nature who was, himself, enthralled by Aristotelian empiricism which is quite terrestrial. He was one of the main causes of the loss of the intellectual vision (Augustine).
Then came William of Ockham, a Franciscan, who put the knife to any kind of Augustinian illuminationist tradition (borrowed from Plotinus). He essentially said with regard to both Platonic and Aristotelian idealism, "We don't need them stinking forms to explain anything."
As we can see, God is undergoing a major change! The old Platonic God is giving way to a God of absolute power or 'divine voluntarism'. Accordingly, he is only limited by the law of non-contradiction (God can't destroy himself in other words). So now, God can do about anything he wants.
But not a lot of people were satisfied with this new remodeled version of God. Meister Eckhart (14th century Dominican scholar and teacher) was one of those. With Eckhart, he found a way to make the identity of mind, as the pure subject, central again (yes, back to immanent). Mind was potentially both transcendent (the spark of God) and immanent as we are connected with it.
Let me sum this up (I have to make some tea) by giving a opinion. I think the Church is still engaged with nominalism insofar as it sees God as absolute power and ordained power. The danger is of course obvious. And I feel it has led to the divine right of kings, Popes, and the modern state—all of which have shown great cruelty. But it also leaves mankind with nothing except a sense of its own powerlessness, also. I do firmly believe that the popularization of Buddhism like the popularity of Meister Eckhart amount to a counterattack on a God who is nothing less than a will-to-power erected by those who hate the idea of the transcendent and its immanent apprehension by us, the sheep.
Love ya'll
Bobby
Bobby, I am not sure what you said about Eckhart, i will hae some thoughts on the weekend as well as to rest of the stuff you guys posted here. Just let me say that I hold the idea of voluntarism as important and obviously the dominat view today (F*** you, i do what i want attitude, aka egoism).
With regards to Eckhart, it comes to mind that in one of his speech that was considered most heretic (of poverty), he wrote: "This is a poor man, who has nothing, knows nothing and wants nothing". Of course connected to the biblical saying that the poor are blessed. Interesting that one might be able to see it as an early attempt to overcome "absolute power"/voluntarism as the ultimate truth. I still interpreted Eckhard pretty much as someone who preached detachment and compassion thru insight, his view that god has to be born in one`s soul (or the soul to be come one with god) could be seen similar to the buddha nature, but now i am merely speculating about rough ideas, i have no clear idea currently of what eckhart ment with that nor the buddha nature.
Thank you.
Where I might take issue with your conclusion would be in what I perceive as a confusion between Christianity and theChurch. Whereas the latter has a real investment in a transcendent God, immanence has been at the heart of Christian thinking ever since the beginning.
Coming from that radition myself, I find little problem in understanding the quoted text as referring to a similar immanence rather than as a transcendent and separate 'entity'.
No offense was taken & I certainly did not feel you meant to do so either. I was just explaining that I have a hard time really nailing Buddhism down to one term or the other.
_/\_
metta
P.S.-I do like the work of Mr. Ekhart
I guess the transcendent (here simply meaning apart from this world) character derives from the view that in samsara, everything underlies birth, age(becoming) and so forth I guess. I once read that early Buddhists (whatever is meant by that) believed indeed that nirvana would be totally out of samsara, meaning, not found in this world, completely seperate from it. Don`t remember where I read, in case i find it again i provide you the soruce.