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not1not2 In this one short snippet we see both the Buddha's definition of Samma Ditthi (Right View) and that the Buddha favors thinking in terms of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness rather than engaging into speculation. Also, while intuition is largely what guides on this path, it is not the measure which the buddha advised to evaluate things by:
Hi, not1not2, it is nice, that you have on something the pertinent snippet from sutta:-) But why did you not put forward snippet from sutta - the definition about anatta? There you enchanted with Nagarjuna and various author and Buddha was not good to you?
But not1not2, i think that thinkink in this way as you are trying "There is snippet from suttas, and this is all teaching" is a somewhat dry and tough way using suttas and it remind me chrisian with they bible..
The snippet from sutta is very good. But i dont found it there the limititaion you try to charge on our thinking or way of investigation.
To clarify, I simply wanted to try and get a few points across which I felt were important concerning all of these questions of self in a Buddhist context (albeit a predominately Theravada based one). I am not trying to argue that anyone’s beliefs and experiences are “wrong” per se, but I am trying to point out that they might be based upon previous experiences that are heavily influenced by various theistic faiths and doctrines—some of which are completely irrelevant in the Buddha’s dispensation. The reason I say this is that the majority of these faiths and doctrines are predicated upon a different set of assumptions, assumptions that the Buddha predominately had his followers avoid altogether because he viewed them as inappropriate attention in that they do not lead to the end of suffering (MN 2). In essence, I am not trying to argue against anyone’s experiences as much as I am trying to articulate how they could better relate to the Buddha’s teachings in the context of how we frame our questions—some of which the Buddha said are simply not worth asking. If you are of the mind to disagree with the way I present the Buddha's teachings, you are free to express your concerns and criticisms; however, I do not wish to be drawn into another atta versus anatta debate—therefore, you may have the last word if you so wish.
Respectfully,
Jason
Hi Jason
I ask what particular question here was useless?
I think, here are not people from different beliefs, with bag of their assumption.
Our debate has nothing to do with other theistic doctrines. You are trying divert from core our debate.
I thouht that we infer or are making statemnent on base of observatin and logic. Two thing wich seem to be in Buddha teaching very indespenseble.
Buddha nowhere commended "throw away your reason and logic".
Buddha nowhere said "there is no sufferer", as many started spekulated after.
Reason ask "suffering,yes and no sufferer"? "on which is based the term suffering" " to whom does it happen".
I think such questin are not spekulative, but are very direct and aim exactly on aim.
This questin are also question or examination which will every put during satipathana training.This question are aimed on thing here and now.
There is no assumption in them.
dhamma is opanayiko. Should be seen here and know. So all statements are to be checking up and the teachinkg draw attention what is here and now, this could bear in memory (sati)
And it seem to me, that just these very direct and important question you rejected as inapropriate question in buddhism! I think this not reasonable.
So dont speak about spekulation of automatic property any disscussion about "i".
The anatta is in fact proof that question about atta/atta is of most importance. anatta in fact contains above all confirmation of atta! For tha "a" in anatta" say what is not atta, it is like with word "unhealthy"
And if there spoke about spekulatin about "i" he meant, we should not put spekulation question in order to ask pertinent question.
It was not by accident that he adduced particual questions. But it were just the wrong question. This does not mean not put any question anyway!
Especially in todays when the teaching about absolut No Atta flourish in spite of there sutta is explicitlly said, "No atta" is wrong, astrayd views, which should man remove.
Why buddhist in this case ignore the sutta?
Bye.
ps- please dont resort to modern cliche about assumption we all subconsciuslly bear from other religion, and how buddhism demolish them with prosaic look at bare really or with sword of insight( in this case, the sword of suttas:-)
Let stay on the ground of facts and speak "i know, dont know or i think", then we will also better orientate
I contemplate things in terms of both the conventional (phenomena) level and the ultimate (noumena?) level. At the conventional level I do not deny the person. On the ultimate level, a person is just the play & flux of interdependent factors (khandas, 6 sense bases, 12 links of dependent origination).
Dear not1not2,
All skandhas, ayatanas, nidanas, etc., are on phenomenal level. And surely there is no flux on the level of noumena (paramarthas). So how could the person be regarded as a flux on paramarthika level?!
Santana, the flux that we are used to identify with the personal cross-incarnational unity of all fleeting phenomena making up our Ego, is not an ultimate thing (paramartha) itself. It is just another element, the eighth, of the phenomenal vijnana-skandha usually referred to as citta (consciousness).
On the other hand, Nagarjunians like to mutter the mantra of pudgala (person) not being present among the skandhas, not being identical with the pancaskandhaka (the real organism of the five skadnhas known as this Brahmana, as pronounced by Bhagavan in his Bharahara-sutra), and not being something outside the pancaskandakam. So no way for it to be the flux, on either level.
I kind of more like your next point
And on the ulimate level, nothing more can be said (or thought for that matter) that ultimately holds up to rigorous analysis (following the work of Nagarjuna).
Still, there is a small communication problem. If nothing can be said on paramarthika level, how are we to put to rigorous analysis something that cannot and has not been said? And the rigorous analysis itself being a concatenation of self-consistent statements, is surely not in the province of the noumenal.
And that includes even the distinction between the conventional & ultimate.
If there was ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), I would say this is the only truth that can possibly pretend for the status of ultimate. But there is not. Because all truths (satya) being something pronounced, are conventional.
Pursuing the logic of conventional/ultimate truth as parallel to the phenomenal/nomenal in a Kantian sense may only cause the paramarthika cow to produce yet another transcendental "dung," as is the case with the above-cited article of Garfield and Priest.
See the number of paralogisms and argumental seemingness (hetvabhasa) they managed to produce on the first two pages only of their otherwise impressive work.
I better go and practice nirvitarka-samadhi to dispense with all the antinomies of language and speech... because there is way to go to the nirvicara one where only the truths of Dharma-megha can be directly intuited.
Each gracious reply from you makes me blush to remember my unpleasant outburst!
Where the poroblem arises, for me, is exactly the same as with other sacred scriptures, be they Christian, Islamic, Judaic or 'pagan'. They are all sewn through with myth and legendary examples or contexts. Much as I love myth and see it as a primary teaching vehicle, it makes it hard to distinguish 'fact' from analogy or parable (a heavenly story with no earthly meaning).
The result is that each and every statement attributed to a Founder comes to me with a question mark attached.
I recognise that this presents me with serious problems, but it is not for nothing that Thomas the Twin is such a favourite of mine from the Jesus stories!
All skandhas, ayatanas, nidanas, etc., are on phenomenal level. And surely there is no flux on the level of noumena (paramarthas). So how could the person be regarded as a flux on paramarthika level?!
Santana, the flux that we are used to identify with the personal cross-incarnational unity of all fleeting phenomena making up our Ego, is not an ultimate thing (paramartha) itself. It is just another element, the eighth, of the phenomenal vijnana-skandha usually referred to as citta (consciousness).
On the other hand, Nagarjunians like to mutter the mantra of pudgala (person) not being present among the skandhas, not being identical with the pancaskandhaka (the real organism of the five skadnhas known as this Brahmana, as pronounced by Bhagavan in his Bharahara-sutra), and not being something outside the pancaskandakam. So no way for it to be the flux, on either level.
I kind of more like your next point
Still, there is a small communication problem. If nothing can be said on paramarthika level, how are we to put to rigorous analysis something that cannot and has not been said? And the rigorous analysis itself being a concatenation of self-consistent statements, is surely not in the province of the noumenal.
If there was ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), I would say this is the only truth that can possibly pretend for the status of ultimate. But there is not. Because all truths (satya) being something pronounced, are conventional.
Pursuing the logic of conventional/ultimate truth as parallel to the phenomenal/nomenal in a Kantian sense may only cause the paramarthika cow to produce yet another transcendental "dung," as is the case with the above-cited article of Garfield and Priest.
See the number of paralogisms and argumental seemingness (hetvabhasa) they managed to produce on the first two pages only of their otherwise impressive work.
I better go and practice nirvitarka-samadhi to dispense with all the antinomies of language and speech... because there is way to go to the nirvicara one where only the truths of Dharma-megha can be directly intuited.
Again words, words, words... :-)
Interesting food for thought. I guess my division in analysis wasn't proper. It seems like I was more saying that on an everyday conventional level we can still talk of self & other without any problem, but from an ultimate perspective there is no substantial reality. There is only this 'suchness'. hmm... I don't know.
I particularly liked this statement of yours.
Pursuing the logic of conventional/ultimate truth as parallel to the phenomenal/nomenal in a Kantian sense may only cause the paramarthika cow to produce yet another transcendental "dung," as is the case with the above-cited article of Garfield and Priest.
It seems that this is what we are trying to do on this self thing and it seems that, in this perspective, a good deal of this debate is just more dung (that includes what I'm saying). However, a skillful farmer will use that dung to strengthen his crop. I think this is also the gist of the snippet I provided from MN 72. The Tathagata has done away with 'positions' on these matters & favors knowledge in terms of the 4 noble truths & 4 foundations of mindfulness.
I completely understand. I am much like you in those regards. However, I have come to the decision that I must start somewhere, because I simply cannot verify everything written within one set of sacred scriptures in such a short lifespan—let alone everything in all of them combined. In my particular search, when I discovered Buddhism, I knew right away that it was something of value. I have since done my best to understand the more practical aspects of what the Blessed One taught. So, in relation to this site, I simply want to offer whatever advice or help I can to those in need of an answer—if I feel confident that I can answer in line with the Dhamma. Even though each statement attributed to the Buddha comes with a question mark attached, he nevertheless asked us to take each as a working hypothesis until we discover the truth for ourselves. Nevertheless, he still warned us that certain paths are dead ends—whether we choose to heed him or not. I admit that there is much that even I have a hard time understanding, but I am taking it on faith that the Buddha really did know what he was talking about. Otherwise I would simply resume my debaucherous Pagan practices, which are admittedly much more fun.
Setting at Savatthi. Then, in the morning, the bhikkhuni Vajira dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Savatthi for alms. When she had walked for alms in Savatthi and had returned from her alms round, after her meal she went to the Blind Men's Grove for the day's abiding. Having plunged into the Blind Men's Grove, she sat down at the foot of a tree for the day's abiding.
Then Mara the Evil One, desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, and terror in the bhikkhuni Vajira, desiring to make her fall away from concentration, approached her and addressed her in verse:
By whom has this being been created?
Where is the maker of the being?
Where has the being arisen?
Where does the being cease?
Then it occurred to the bhikkhuni Vajira: "Now who is this that recited the verse — a human being or a non-human being?" Then it occurred to her: "This is Mara the Evil One, who has recited the verse desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, and terror in me, desiring to make me fall away from concentration."
Then the bhikkhuni Vajira, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses:
Why now do you assume 'a being'?
Mara, have you grasped a view?
This is a heap of sheer constructions:
Here no being is found.
Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word 'chariot' is used,
So, when the aggregates are present,
There's the convention 'a being.'
It's only suffering that comes to be,
Suffering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suffering comes to be,
Nothing but suffering ceases.
Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, "The bhikkhuni Vajira knows me," sad and disappointed, disappeared right there.
Now who is this that recited the verse — a human being or a non-human being?
Ha, the question after the source of arisen question:-))
to vajjira sutta:
1. I would even say, that every thought or question, either thought about karma or dharma sangha,which are in anoother time very useful, when some should concentrate or abide in deep concetration can symbolic way called the ifluence of mara,
2. Who is mara? It is nice that these bikhunii does not constructed "being" but why she constructed "mara"?
Was it something visible, or does she felt some force of invisible being?
3. "it occur to me" - so is occuring a valuble and accepteble source of knowledge?
If someone occurs "this brahman what i experience" will be still valid?
4. How could Mara become disepointed and sad, when nobody has seen him?
I would understand to it, if Buddha commented it, what he with his supernormal sensory perception had seen.
So here we see that some suttas become a certain ilogical or mysteurious tone, is it? Then should we accept all literally?
ps-Elohim, will you answer me, what inepropriate question(s) was here asked?
The cited verse of Mara reminds me of the Cosmogonic Hymn, RgVeda X.129:
Who verily knows and who can here declare it,
whence it was born and whence comes this creation?
The gods are later than this world's production.
Who knows, then, whence it first came into being?
Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word 'chariot' is used,
So, when the aggregates are present,
There's the convention 'a being
It iccurs to me, the chariot is without charioter useless:-))
So every charion which is to moving has his chariot:-)
Aggregates are also convention.
Is body something real? no. It is convention.
But has its nature, which is only to enlightentent beign accecepteble, as well as nature of all.
And if being is only convention, is then suffering also convention?
Is seems to me, that this verse of bhikhuni is not of later date..
And present here any bhikhunii or bhikhu Buddha´s teaching?
I went through the hole thread while not neccessarily havng undestood and verified everything that has been said. I surely will do that again in the next days. i more and more understand that knowing no pali makes thing more difficult the more you go into details about elemantary issues.I want to bring to you something to attention however.
Samyutta Nikaya 22:96 states:
"There is no corporeality, no feeling, no perception, no mental formations, no consciousness that is permanent, enduring and lasting, and that, not subject to any change, will eternally remain the same. If there existed such an ego that is permanent, enduring and lasting, and not subject to any change, then the holy life leading to the complete extinction of suffering will not be possible"
1.) I would like to know how this is interpreted who claim no absloute denial of the self, only a relative one or even definde the self positivly.
2.)On the other hand, I wonder if the translation is correct since it denies a lasting ego, wheras stating self instead of ego would have made it clear. On the other hand, some sources equate self with ego.
3)If it is correct and self cannot be equated with ego, does that mean, that only the empirical person made up out of the 5 aggregates is as described above, if yes, what exists besides the empircal person? Is it categorically ruled out that one exists of more than the empircal person, is it left open but only unexpressable, not describable as well as nirvana cannot be spoken of. If I ask questions already answered in the post, and I merely did not understand, feel free to ignore this post.
regards
edit: I was not cautios enough in my formulations and since I do not want to misinform anyone, I stand corrected: Nirvana can be spoken of in negative terms , not this not that, not born /unorn, not intended/ unintended, and so on. A positive definition of it has yet to be shown to me.
Whatever you can point to - a physical thing, a person, a thought, an emotion - all are without self. All of them change. Even memory shows nothing but flux and change. There's nothing, no component of mind or body, that isn't in constant flux. Whether we talk about our physical body, or the bodies of the natural world - animals, plants, stones, lakes, raindrops, stars - or the objects of our purposeful world - chairs, windows, milk cartons, and sewing needles - we find nothing but flux and change. Every atom, every miniscule part of the universe, is nothing other than movement and change. The same is true of our mental experience, our feelings, thoughts and images.
It's an indisputable fact of experience - of our direct, immediate perception - that all things are empty of self. Yet we think and believe and act and hope otherwise. It's by holding onto this notion of self - and we hold it most dear - that we live in defiance of Reality.
This is the means by which we suffer, and suffer greatly. It hurts to defy Reality.
- Steve Hagen - Buddhism Plain and Simple
As Heraklit said, the same man can never cross the same river twice because the man and the river are never the same ever again.
But i think he consequently moved a step forward because he had to. Propagating a constant state of flux leads consequently to the fact that nothing could be describable. The moment you describe something, the moment it is not any more the same you describe. Nothing can be said at all.
This touches the dialectics of being and becoming, that lead heraklit to say sth like: We are constantly someone else and nevertheless remain the same. Thus, it is a question of Identity, or what makes up the self. A parable outside buddhism for that for anyone interested could be "The ship of theseus".
edit: But you can agree on using symbols, by knowing that as precise as you may desribe something, it never is completely acurate describable. that`s what language actually is symbolism of real things. if this thought is right, describing things once and forever for eternity, what they are in themselves, is impossible. I would apreciate feedback on this. Thank you all.
sorry for making so much noise, but i think my enthusiasm will cool down very quickly and my commnication will hit again a "normal" level.
I have not yet seen anyone addressing the buddha nature, layed down in Tathagatagarbha"-Sutras, that according to my understanding, set the inner essence (does someone dare to call it self?), Svabhava not as atman, not as soul but as everyone`s own buddha nature.
Georg Grimm has made a similar assertion, that the doctrine of the buddha was to show everyone their "true self" (he did not name it though afaik). His most prominet critics in the west were Helmut Galsenapp and Volker Zotz, if someone seeks for rather authorative sources. (at least in the west)
It`s up to anyone to either believe on of those, none of them and instead somebody else, ortry to get into the arguments that are being made. Proselytising is not my style.
I went through the hole thread while not neccessarily havng undestood and verified everything that has been said. I surely will do that again in the next days. i more and more understand that knowing no pali makes thing more difficult the more you go into details about elemantary issues.I want to bring to you something to attention however.
Samyutta Nikaya 22:96 states:
"There is no corporeality, no feeling, no perception, no mental formations, no consciousness that is permanent, enduring and lasting, and that, not subject to any change, will eternally remain the same. If there existed such an ego that is permanent, enduring and lasting, and not subject to any change, then the holy life leading to the complete extinction of suffering will not be possible"
1.) I would like to know how this is interpreted who claim no absloute denial of the self, only a relative one or even definde the self positivly.
2.)On the other hand, I wonder if the translation is correct since it denies a lasting ego, wheras stating self instead of ego would have made it clear. On the other hand, some sources equate self with ego.
3)If it is correct and self cannot be equated with ego, does that mean, that only the empirical person made up out of the 5 aggregates is as described above, if yes, what exists besides the empircal person? Is it categorically ruled out that one exists of more than the empircal person, is it left open but only unexpressable, not describable as well as nirvana cannot be spoken of. If I ask questions already answered in the post, and I merely did not understand, feel free to ignore this post.
regards
Fofoo,
Hello again, and I forgot to welcome you to the site! You've hit upon an interesting passage, one that was mentioned very briefly, far up thread in reference to its citation in the article What the Buddha Never Taught, which I criticized (the "lump of dung" sutta) in post number 156. Your instincts are pretty good on this one, as you identified that you may need to reference the Pali and pinpointed in the translation the word on which the interpretation of the sutta hinges (given above as "ego"). Now, I'm no grammarian and no expert in Pali, but I've learned how to find key words, use a dictionary, and cross-reference translations and contexts.
The word here translated as "ego" is attabhāvapaṭilābha. As a compound of atta + bhava + pati + labha, its definition in the PTS dictionary can be found under Attan, on page 23 under --bhava: "assumption of an existence, becoming reborn as an individual."
So, having established that, on to your questions.
1) I do not agree with the view that sees in the discourses of the Buddha an absolute denial of self. Face to face with this sutta, I don't see anything suprising or contradictory to the relative anatta reading. In context, the khandhasamyutta, the discourse is topically tied to the khandhas, which both absolute anatta and relative anatta adherents would agree are consistently and called not-self. Given the PTS definition especially together with the illustration given at the end of the sutta (a story relating one of the past lives of the Buddha, a particularly attractive one, the point being that all that is now gone), I believe we are compelled to read attabhāvapaṭilābha as referring to a single lifetime in the round of rebirths, a single form taken up, as the five khandhas as a whole. This fits in quite seamlessly into the sutta and its message, which begins with examination of the five khandhas respectively with regard to their eternity or non-eternity, and is summarized by the statement: "Then the blessed one took a lump of cowdung into his hand and said to that bhikkhu, 'Bhikkhu, there is not even this much of an individual existence that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain just so like unto the eternal." So attabhāvapaṭilābha must be taken as referring to the khandhas as a whole (the lump of dung taken as some small part of that (any of the khandhas, or any part of the khandha, taken up individually). This reading, of attabhāvapaṭilābha as referring to the individual birth, knowable as the khandhas (and not to a denied hypothetical transcendent attan) is perfectly natural, and reinforced by the illustration that refers to a past incarnation of the Buddha which is now gone forever.
2) In my opinion "ego" is not the best translation of this word. "Self" would be even worse.
It's obviously a complex concept and difficult to express in a single English word. Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation, "individual existence" is not bad, but does not fully account for the word's sense of an incarnation in the cycle of rebirths, or of as the khandhas as "taken up," "assumed." It would be difficult, however, to come up with a better one that is not unnecessarily awkward.
3)See the Mahanidana sutta of the Digha Nikaya, under the section "Assumptions of a Self." I think your instincts are pretty good on this point, too, insofar as it is pretty clearly shown to be beyond the limits of designation and expression. We find a discussion of this issue in reference to the tathagata after death and the four propositions as applied to the Self of one whose asavas are destroyed, after the dissolution of the khandhas:
"Now, Ananda, in as far as a monk does not assume feeling to be the self, nor the self as oblivious, nor that 'My self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by anything (does not cling to anything) in the world. Unsustained, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'
"If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind is thus released that 'The Tathagata exists after death,' is his view, that would be mistaken; that 'The Tathagata does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death' is his view, that would be mistaken. Why? Having directly known the extent of designation and the extent of the objects of designation, the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent of description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of discernment and the extent of the objects of discernment, the extent to which the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. [To say that,] 'The monk released, having directly known that, does not see, does not know is his opinion,' that would be mistaken.
It could be helpful to reference the thread on the "Buddhist tetralemma" here. "Does not exist," and "both" especially seem to contradict the denial of self in its two primary forms. As to "exists" being denied, it seems to me that it is being denied in recognition that our concept of existence comes from existing, objective, knowable things in the "real world," that whatever exists should be able to be pointed to and described, and shown to others such that they can agree it exists. Since "not exists" is also denied, the denial of "exists" cannot simply be taken as a total denial. As such, a transcendent does not bear the marks of everyday existents, so it cannot be clearly explained as existing. It is only "beyond range." Also helpful in this respect would be the sabba sutta
I hope any of that is helpful, even if you disagree.
It`s up to anyone to either believe on of those, none of them and instead somebody else, ortry to get into the arguments that are being made. Proselytising is not my style.
I agree with you that it's up to anyone. The Glasenapp article was mentioned and quoted earlier in the thread. I criticize one point Glasenapp attempts to make in post 160
. I don't think it is a very common error. It seems generally accepted today that Nibbana is at Udana 8. 2 described as "the infinite" (anantam) not as "the not-self" (anattam). And it makes better sense in the context of the sutta.
first, thanks for you comprehensive answer, especially the part about what word was translated as ego.To put it shortly, if you not already sensed it, I am of the kind that both denies an absolute denial or affirmation of the self.Having thought about it many times, it currently seems illogical to me that an individual that is subject to change, whose view of the world is made up by interdependend causal phenomena, can make any statement about anything absolute, meaning everlasting and not depended of any subject who recognizes it.
Putting aside now my personal view, I will try to answer the rest of your post in the next days.I will need some time since it requires some reading of different suttas, and i am a slow reader :scratch:
Regarding our small exchange about Georg Grimm. He in fact made never any affirmative statement of a "soul".What he did do however, was to challenge orthodoxies which brought him much praise from at least one profound sri lankan theravada scholar, and much critic, often even polemical personal attacks from other german neo-buddhists, especially dahlke was in the business of smearing him in a very ugly way. What Grimm actually wrote is this: (I translate it best I can from German):
- What I recognize of myself to be fading (changing/passing away) and what causes me suffering (dukkha) with its impermanence, this cannot be my being/nature.
- Now, I recognize everything that can be recognized as fading (changing/passing away)
and this causes me suffering (dukkha) with its impermanence
- Therefore, nothing that can be recognized is my true being/nature.
He called it the "The great syllogism", and according to prayer.de, he hits the thinking of the Pudgalavada sect (http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pudgalav.htm) with his thought that indeed seems to be not pursued by any modern sect (In how far the Buddha nature can be interpreted as a similar idea, for that i do not have enough knowledge). Dahlke went as so far to say:transcendental buddhism is not buddhism at all". Well, i do not agree with Dalke on that, but this seems to be exactly the point that generates much hard feelings today, even generates conspiracy theories of "hindus trying once more to destroy buddhism".
I agree with you that it's up to anyone. The Glasenapp article was mentioned and quoted earlier in the thread. I criticize one point Glasenapp attempts to make in post 160
. I don't think it is a very common error. It seems generally accepted today that Nibbana is at Udana 8. 2 described as "the infinite" (anantam) not as "the not-self" (anattam). And it makes better sense in the context of the sutta.
in friendliness,
V.
I additionally want to point out, that there might also be a flaw in the glasenapp article where he formulates grimms syllogism. The original term translated as ego is "Wesen", and grimm used this term in his publication of "the doctrine of the buddha" from the 6th to the 8th addition. you can look it up .
The full original quote of the great syllogism that i tried to translate you can find here: (5.1.1:"Was ich an mir vergehen...") http://www.payer.de/steinke/steink05.htm
So either the English translation is incorrect or Glasenapp had another source for Grimm than I do have. Point being made here is, that he never denies the empircal person to be made up of the 5 aggregates , being anatta. "Wesen" translates as being/nature/essence, you can look it up. He also never defines it positvly, he remains plainly in negative theology. So indeed it can be said that he touches the Pudgalavada sect`s doctrine, that the self is neither within the 5 aggregates nor outside the 5 aggregates. It cannot be defined positivly.
so, my 2 cents again: Everyone who goes beyond that sets imho human knowledge as an absolute, infinite, it postulates an observer, removes the observing subject out of the world and then claims things are as they are inthemsleves without acknowledging that it is still the world of the oververs that is described, even if they would all agree on everything. So, they make an ontological statement were according to the buddha, none should be made (the view that there is no self is wrong, "all" is the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & odors, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas., therefore anything related to the empirical person and please, if someone knows better, show me a sutta where all is put out of context of the empirical person, the observer, the observing subject)
As one person pointed out in an essay i recently read: the ones who categorically deny the self believe human knowledge is unlimited. the ones only relativly denying the self do not believe that human knowledge is unlimited. I am fine with both as long as I feel there is right intention, since I cannot judge who of the two has right view.
So, having established that, on to your questions.
2) In my opinion "ego" is not the best translation of this word. "Self" would be even worse.
It's obviously a complex concept and difficult to express in a single English word. Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation, "individual existence" is not bad, but does not fully account for the word's sense of an incarnation in the cycle of rebirths, or of as the khandhas as "taken up," "assumed." It would be difficult, however, to come up with a better one that is not unnecessarily awkward.
Maybe Individuation would describe it best, but i do not want to coin a wrong term, from your description I understood what is meant by the term. Thanks again.
3)See the Mahanidana sutta of the Digha Nikaya, under the section "Assumptions of a Self." I think your instincts are pretty good on this point, too, insofar as it is pretty clearly shown to be beyond the limits of designation and expression. We find a discussion of this issue in reference to the tathagata after death and the four propositions as applied to the Self of one whose asavas are destroyed, after the dissolution of the khandhas:
It fits the assumption that there is not indicated that something is not existant, but rather it cannot be spoken of. because it is not expressable.
Having directly known the extent of designation and the extent of the objects of designation, the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent of description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of discernment and the extent of the objects of discernment, the extent to which the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. [To say that,] "The monk released, having directly known that, does not see, does not know is his opinion," that would be mistaken.
"Does not exist," and "both" especially seem to contradict the denial of self in its two primary forms. As to "exists" being denied, it seems to me that it is being denied in recognition that our concept of existence comes from existing, objective, knowable things in the "real world," that whatever exists should be able to be pointed to and described, and shown to others such that they can agree it exists. Since "not exists" is also denied, the denial of "exists" cannot simply be taken as a total denial. As such, a transcendent does not bear the marks of everyday existents, so it cannot be clearly explained as existing. It is only "beyond range." Also helpful in this respect would be the sabba sutta
V.
I see it the same way. "All" as layed out in the sabba sutta spins around the six senses, refers to human sensation, not to anything as self, It refers to vedana, which as we know, is anatta. I believe the ones going beyond that risk to transform vedana to atman.
Aggregates are also convention.
Is body something real? no. It is convention.
But has its nature, which is only to enlightentent beign accecepteble, as well as nature of all.
And if being is only convention, is then suffering also convention?
As far as I read and hopefully understood the Pali discourses, the aggregates are real but to call them self is mere convention. "real" is always a dangerous expression though, of course everything we say is name calling but this does not mean it is not real. Let`s agree that they are impermanent and have no everlasting, unchanging reality, but many things we give names are actualy here and quite real i think, although they may lack an adequate desription that describes their nature of flux .
However, if there is no self it makes sense to ask if there is a sufferer, and if there is no sufferer, what`s the merit in having compassion? What would be the motive of becoming a bodhisattva instead of an Arhat, when there is noone to help, just skandahs to be dealt with? Obviously, this question would be not of concern to Theravadins.
Further, I wanna ask the more literate ones than me a question. I read on several occasions that in the Pali discourses, there is the claim that there is only suffering, no sufferer. This claim is attributed to Visuddhimagga" (XVI,90), But I cannot find it in my translations. If anyone could give me a hint on this, I would be thankful.
Regards
edit: the quotation i mean is this:
Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
Nibbana is, but not the man who attains it;
Although there is a path, there is no goer.
I guess that would depend on which translation you are in possession of. In the 1999 Buddhist Publication Society Pariyatti edition translated by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, for example, the passage appears in Chapter XVI on page 521. His translation is slightly different, however, and it is as follows:
For there is no suffering, but none who suffers;
Doing exists although there is no doer;
Extinction is but no extinguished person;
Although there is a path, there is no goer.
Or alternatively:
So void of lastingness, and beauty, pleasure, self,
Is the first pair, and void of self the deathless state,
And void of lastingness, of pleasure, and of self
Is the path too; for such is voidness in these four.
However, I should just like to point out that this idea did not originate solely with the Vissudhimagga. This idea can be also found in the Suttas as well, in other variations of course. One quick example that I can think of right now is found in the Samyutta Nikaya, and it is called the Vajira Sutta (SN 5.10):
Setting at Savatthi. Then, in the morning, the bhikkhuni Vajira dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Savatthi for alms. When she had walked for alms in Savatthi [135] and had returned from her alms round, after her meal she went to the Blind Men's Grove for the day's abiding. Having plunged into the Blind Men's Grove, she sat down at the foot of a tree for the day's abiding.
Then Mara the Evil One, desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, and terror in the bhikkhuni Vajira, desiring to make her fall away from concentration, approached her and addressed her in verse:
By whom has this being been created?
Where is the maker of the being?
Where has the being arisen?
Where does the being cease?
Then it occurred to the bhikkhuni Vajira: "Now who is this that recited the verse — a human being or a non-human being?" Then it occurred to her: "This is Mara the Evil One, who has recited the verse desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, and terror in me, desiring to make me fall away from concentration."
Then the bhikkhuni Vajira, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses:
Why now do you assume 'a being'?
Mara, have you grasped a view?
This is a heap of sheer constructions:
Here no being is found.
Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word 'chariot' is used,
So, when the aggregates are present,
There's the convention 'a being.'
It's only suffering that comes to be,
Suffering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suffering comes to be,
Nothing but suffering ceases.
Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, "The bhikkhuni Vajira knows me," sad and disappointed, disappeared right there.
Do you know what word is being translated as "being" from pali in SN 5.10? The german tanslation says "Lebewesen", which would probably translate to creature (literally "living being").
I would first like to warn you that I am not an expert in these matters, especially in regards to Pali, so please take my replies as mere personal opinion and interpretation rather than being authoritative in anyway.
As for your question, I believe that the word being translated here as "being" is sattoti, which comes from the root satta. Some translators do translate this as "creature" instead of "living being", but they basically mean the same thing. I believe that it primarily has to do with one's view concerning the aggregates as self in one way or another.
To me, the theme of this dialogue between Mara and Vajira is really about one's sakkayaditthi (self-identity view), and more precisely, how to correct one's wrong view in regards to this fetter of self-identification.
I would first like to warn you that I am not an expert in these matters, especially in regards to Pali, so please take my replies as mere personal opinion and interpretation rather than being authoritative in anyway.
As for your question, I believe that the word being translated here as "being" is sattoti, which comes from the root satta. Some translators do translate this as "creature" instead of "living being", but they basically mean the same thing. I believe that it primarily has to do with one's view concerning the aggregates as self in one way or another.
To me, the theme of this dialogue between Mara and Vajira is really about one's sakkayaditthi (self-identity view), and more precisely, how to correct one's wrong view in regards to this fetter of self-identification.
Jason
I was recently browsing the Samyutta Nikaya, and came across a sutta in the Radhasamyutta which could be of help to clarify the meaning of "satto.", the second sutta in that section, referred to, appropriately, as the Satta Sutta. For convenience, I'm cutting and pasting the translation from Accesstoinsight. It says:
Then Ven. Radha went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One: "'A being,' lord. 'A being,' it's said. To what extent is one said to be 'a being'?"
"Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Radha: when one is caught up1 there, tied up2 there, one is said to be 'a being.'3
"Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling... perception... fabrications...
"Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Radha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being.'
"Just as when boys or girls are playing with little sand castles:4 as long as they are not free from passion, desire, love, thirst, fever, & craving for those little sand castles, that's how long they have fun with those sand castles, enjoy them, treasure them, feel possessive of them. But when they become free from passion, desire, love, thirst, fever, & craving for those little sand castles, then they smash them, scatter them, demolish them with their hands or feet and make them unfit for play.
"In the same way, Radha, you too should smash, scatter, & demolish form, and make it unfit for play. Practice for the ending of craving for form.
I would first like to warn you that I am not an expert in these matters, especially in regards to Pali, so please take my replies as mere personal opinion and interpretation rather than being authoritative in anyway.
As for your question, I believe that the word being translated here as "being" is sattoti, which comes from the root satta. Some translators do translate this as "creature" instead of "living being", but they basically mean the same thing. I believe that it primarily has to do with one's view concerning the aggregates as self in one way or another.
To me, the theme of this dialogue between Mara and Vajira is really about one's sakkayaditthi (self-identity view), and more precisely, how to correct one's wrong view in regards to this fetter of self-identification.
Jason
I would like to warn you and everyone, too.:) I am no scholar and am just trying to get a deeper understanding of the Buddhadharma.
My sources are usually the German translations of the Tipitaka found on www.palikanon.com . They contain as credible recognized translations , e.g. the translation of the ANGUTTARA NIKāYA is from Nyanatiloka & Nyanaponika, the maintainer of the site I think is a Theravadin monk in Thailand. When I want to communicate with others, I first look after the translations on accesstoinsight, if a sutta is not found there, i usually look for other places but since i know no pali, i mostly remain sceptic and rely on authorites and what i believe are trustworthy sources. But this does not refrain me from posting other translations not found on primary sources or secondary works. So much for my sources and my aproach to the Pali discourses.
Reagarding SN5.10, I think it is useful to put the whole context of SN5. What do we find here? Several Bhikkhunis (female monks) who are tormented by doubtful thougts, they are "visited" by Mara.
Throughout the sutta, they struggle and defend themselves against wrong views. The views are in short, as I could understand it, that samsara cannot be escpaed and the best she can do is to enjoy pleasures and lust and she maybe regret it later if she does not go for it (1), that being female is an insuperable obstacle to arhathood (2), that her retreat is merely a result of bitterness and that what she really wants, is seeking uncounciously, is a new man (3), that she should enjoy music (today we would probably say party) instead of retreating (4), that she could be ambushed while being alone far away from any "civilization" (5), that she is ignoring the pleasures of live (6), that she merely does not want this indivudual life and wants to be reborn in other form (7), that her visual apperance could matter to the extend that she is identified with heretics who look the same (8), that her understanding of the 5 skandhas and the resulting image of a personality/"puppet" ( my commentary says the word "Attabhāva" is used here in the pali texts where "puppet" ist translatetd on accesstoinsight) is wrong (9), that she might mistakenly take the 5 aggregates as the self, seeing in a creature/living being a thing in itself. Obviously, she uses the famous comparison with the chariot from Milindapañha 2.1.1 which lead me to this conclusion (10).
Generally put, I see SN5 as techiques to defeat doubt and worries about one`s understanding of buddha`s teaching, while visualising the doubts and worries as Mara, therefore clearly sperating it from one`s mind seeking to put them away with confidence in and knowlege about the Buddhadharma.
Now regarding to the relevance of Anatta . I interpret it not as an absoulte denial of the self. In the highest truth(paramatthato), there is no "creature"/living being. She easly could have said in the hightest truth, there is no self. Further, it is clear that suffering is real and the cessation of suffering is possible, regardless of naming conventions. So even if there is no living being in the highest sense, suffering and ending of suffering remain the key issues.
Further, when we substitute the term satto with the definition Vaccha has posted here from SN 23.2, it reads : In the highest truth(paramatthato), one is not being caught up in desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, feeling, perception, fabrications or consciousness.
I came across this passage in the Samyutta-Nikaya (iii.178):
"Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire for whatever is non-self..."
If the Theravada position is one which markets the idea of non-self, its seems strange to find the Buddha telling his monks that they should abandon desire for it.
Again, at S.iv.3 I found this curious passage:
What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is nonself.
By logical entailment we have to conclude from the above that we should not abandon desire for the self; moreover, what is not suffering is the self!
Keeping in mind that the doctrine of non-self is central to Theravada Abhidhamma it seems contradictory that they should make non-self a major tenent when the Buddha appears to have taught otherwise.
I came across this passage in the Samyutta-Nikaya (iii.178):
"Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire for whatever is non-self..."
Again, at S.iv.3
What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is nonself.
By logical entailment we have to conclude from the above that we should not abandon desire for the self; moreover, what is not suffering is the self!
Keeping in mind that the doctrine of non-self is central to Theravada Abhidhamma it seems contradictory that they should make non-self a major tenent when the Buddha appears to have taught otherwise.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
IMO wait..........
Just, who is this "I" that thinks that there is an opinion to be thought.
Am I not composed of the non-self elements the earth, wind, clouds, sun, the entire cosmos. I do not have to seek answers about it, because I am in them, and they are in me.
And just what really makes this "me", what it is where it is. Once again I look to the
non-self elements of myself. My parents, grand parents, teachers, children, lovers, haters, and what of these labels and discriptions that I carry within me, these are non-self elements. Do I choose to mourn, anguish, or feel an angst that comes with having no real control over natural phenomenon, when my perception of how these things don't change to how I would like them to be, or when changes come to the things that I find favorable. They are in me, and I in them.
Sound familiar
" You stop clinging to concepts, you stop suffering." says the Buddha.
"Why are you clinging to not clinging to concepts?", asked the Buddha. :winkc:
I appreciated your thoughts and comments, as well those of Mr. Lanier. I did especially enjoy that you were able to expand on the passage's usage of the term satta. Also regarding the bhikkhuni sutta under discussion, I remember who/what Mara is in terms of the discourses, what his range and domain is. And you (together with Bhikkhuni Vajira) correctly identified that whatever Mara talks about, it's the range of the five khandhas, because that is all that Mara can see (but, alas for Mara, the arhat goes beyond; where there is no clinging to the khandhas, Mara cannot find him). Thinking on this, it strikes me that there is a kind of irony to the no-self argument on the whole because it seemingly unknowingly works from Mara's point of view, thus defined above; meaning it argues from a position that the five khandhas is the extent of a person, and that if there were a self for a person by which he could be liberated from the impermanence and suffering of existence, it would have to be found in the khandhas. And based on this kind of Mara-like thinking, the natural conclusion would be that there is no self. But the evidence of the discourses, to my thinking, is that the Buddha taught something quite contrary to that line of thought.
Imo, I read you as affirming that you are the non-self (atta/atma). With regard to the aggregates (khandhas) and by implication the non-self (anatta), the Buddha said he was not the aggregates. So we can conclude that he affirmed that he was not the non-self (i.e., the aggregates).
Vacchagotta, speaking of Mara, this passage I have submitted seems to validate what you said earlier. For anyone taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!
When there is form, Rahda, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. Therefore, Radha, see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. See it as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as really misery. Those who see it thus see rightly. When there if feeling ... When there is perception ... When there are volitional formations ... When there is consciousness, Radha, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. — S.iii.189
Admittedly this is an astonishing passage and as I recall, it appears to be omitted from access to insight. Why it is not included on their site for what is implies is surely odd. It does, by logical entailment, say the non-self is Mara.
It just came to my mind that we could look for concepts that make soft affirmations of the self, like the Buddha Nature/Matrix, not to weight them heigher than the Tipitaka, but in order to look how it was justified by philosphers later.
I am just at the beginning of my research and it consumes much time. If I am not mistaken, the Buddha Nature reads as a compromise, since it affirms a kind of self but at the same time states it is not different from all others. At first glance, this sounds similar to me like Advaita, where the Atman is equated with Brahman.
After all I read, I prefer to understand Buddhism as an Indian. though a heterodox line of thinking. Currently I think the statement "there is no self" cannot be justified with the Tipitaka. One can argue that the Buddha teached to simple people, therefore never used complex speech, but instead gave simple examples. One can argue that Buddha did not want to shock people, and so on. Iam familiar with these arguments but the fact remains, this all is speculation about Gautama`s hidden motives while we all know it is said that he teached with open hands. Further, saying x,y,z are not myelf, therfore nothing is myself is a logical fallacy imho, since it uses induction to reduce a complex teaching that should be explored, lived and deepend into a mere phrase that never was heard from the Buddha himself.
Obvisously, the moment you make an absoulte judgement, like there is no self, one or all of your skandhas must speak the absolute truth, which of course is self-defeating. The relatvie denying, aka negative theology, already seen in the upanishads (though there are still positive definitions of the self found) makes most sense to me.
Admittedly this is an astonishing passage and as I recall, it appears to be omitted from access to insight. Why it is not included on their site for what is implies is surely odd.
Why don't you have translations of ALL the suttas from the Pali canon?
This website aims to be selective rather than comprehensive. My goal has never been to publish translations of every single one of the Tipitaka's 10,000-plus suttas. What you see here is a selection of suttas that meet three criteria: (1) they are, in my opinion, good translations; (2) I have personally found them useful; and (3) their copyright holders have provided them for free distribution.
There are many other fine translations of important suttas available in print today, and I encourage you to support their continued publication by purchasing copies. Someday, perhaps, these publishers will make those translations available freely to all. Until then, however, we must learn to make do with what we have. *
How do you decide which texts to include on the website?
One overarching principle has guided my choice of what to include in these pages, and what to leave out: a conviction that the teachings found in the Pali canon are just as relevant today as when they were first put into practice 2,600 years ago. Despite all the obvious material advances in the human world since the Buddha's time, the Four Noble Truths appear to be as vital today as ever: suffering and stress still pervade our lives; the cause still appears to be craving in all its insidious manifestations; and there is no reason to suspect that the Noble Eightfold Path is any less effective today at bringing an end to all that suffering and stress. Unlike some popular writers on Buddhism today, I find little in the Canon that cries out for "modernization" or reform to suit the unique demands of modern times. I believe that the Buddha's teachings of Awakening are concerned with fundamental principles of human nature that transcend any social, cultural, or political agendas. One teacher has summed it up well: "The West has far more to learn from Theravada, than does Theravada from the West."
The emphasis here is on practice. For the most part I've selected books, articles, and sutta translations that I've found helpful to develop a personal understanding of the Buddha's teachings, rather than texts that tend to fuel intellectual debates on abstract philosophical concepts. Beyond these basic principles, it all comes down to a matter of personal taste. *
As far as I understand the passage that you have provided, it does not say that anatta is Mara explicitly or otherwise; it says that one should see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. Not only in Mara a well-known metaphor for death, but this passage itself is implying a perception, more precisely, a perception that leads one to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to stilling, to direct knowledge, to Awakening, to Unbinding.
The Buddha did not conform with those priests and contemplatives who were exponents of annihilationism, nor did he conform with those priests and contemplatives who were exponents of eternalism. Therefore, in my opinion, to take the Dhamma expounded by the Buddha for such a purpose as to argue the existence or non-existence of a self is going against the intended usage of that exposition—the intended meaning was simply to put an end to suffering.
Vacchagotta, speaking of Mara, this passage I have submitted seems to validate what you said earlier. For anyone taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!
When there is form, Rahda, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. Therefore, Radha, see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. See it as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as really misery. Those who see it thus see rightly. When there if feeling ... When there is perception ... When there are volitional formations ... When there is consciousness, Radha, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. — S.iii.189
Admittedly this is an astonishing passage and as I recall, it appears to be omitted from access to insight. Why it is not included on their site for what is implies is surely odd. It does, by logical entailment, say the non-self is Mara.
A.E.
Firstly, I'm not sure why this is so astonishing. Could you please explain why you find it to be so?
Secondly, you state 'the non-self' as though it is a positive quality. It is simply a statement that the aggregates are anatta {without self, are not the self, and do not pertain to a self}. This sutta quote seems to simply state that if you regard form as the self, you are deceived by Mara (form being mara), and so on through the other 4 aggregates. So, by regarding form as Mara, we are recognizing that form is illusory & is not-self. So, I really don't see how this sheds any new light on the subject as it does not seem to venture into the territory of whether there is a Self outside of the aggregates. Nor do I see this sutta as an indictment of Accesstoinsight for leaving leaving out some key sutta that is essential to practice or contradicts other suttas. So, if you are implying some sort of conspiracy on the part of AccesstoInsight, you're going to have to present a lot more than you have.
Thirdly, could you please elaborate on the implications of your first statement that "anyone taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!" It almost sounds as if you are stating that if we say that form is anatta, then we are in league with the devil. If that's what you meant I really don't see how you got that out of the sutta passage you provided.
Anyway, I can see why people want to assert something along the lines of an Upanishadic Atman. I don't see this as a huge problem in and of itself. However, I can also see why others are uncomfortable asserting anything beyond what he explicitly stated on this subject. Due to the debate over whether atta is used in a reflexive or transcendent sense in the suttas, I really cannot come to a solid conclusion based on these statements. Now, my main position on this discussion is that it lies beyond range. Any answer we can come up with is simply a fabrication. So, in this sense, even if you can prove that the Buddha was asserting a transcendent Self outside the aggregates, the argument itself is a mental formation, which by the very sutta quoted above, is Mara. Similarly, even if you can prove that the Buddha was not asserting a transcendent Self outside the aggregates, this argument is also a mental formations, which are Mara according to the above sutta. And I don't really see how we can come to either conclusion with any certainty in the first place. Additionally, as these formations are conditioned, impermanent objects, they simply cannot satisfy us. Only direct knowledge will do here. And I find it highly doubtful that any of us here have 'attained' Nibbana, in order to make an accurate statement. So this just seems like a bunch of speculation to me anyway, and that is not a good basis for our practice, imo. I really don't think we should be taking solid positions on this until we reach the stage of realization beyond doubt.
As far as I understand the passage that you have provided, it does not say that anatta is Mara explicitly or otherwise; it says that one should see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. Not only in Mara a well-known metaphor for death, but this passage itself is implying a perception, more precisely, a perception that leads one to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to stilling, to direct knowledge, to Awakening, to Unbinding.
The Buddha did not conform with those priests and contemplatives who were exponents of annihilationism, nor did he conform with those priests and contemplatives who were exponents of eternalism. Therefore, in my opinion, to take the Dhamma expounded by the Buddha for such a purpose as to argue the existence or non-existence of a self is going against the intended usage of that exposition—the intended meaning was simply to put an end to suffering.
Sincerely,
Jason
Excellent response, Jason. I think you got straight to the point.
As far as I understand the passage that you have provided, it does not say that anatta is Mara explicitly or otherwise; it says that one should see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. Not only in Mara a well-known metaphor for death, but this passage itself is implying a perception, more precisely, a perception that leads one to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to stilling, to direct knowledge, to Awakening, to Unbinding. — Elohim
By logical entailment is does. Western Buddhists seem to over look the role of implication in Buddhism (I have been writing an as yet unpublished paper on this to pad my CV). If the khandhas are non-self, then it follows logically, since the khandhas are also Mara, that the non-self is Mara.
The self in Buddhism is not far off from G-d in Orthodox Judaism. It is not treated as a sematic object least it cause one to conceptualize it. Nor is the self ever equated with the aggregates. We can, however, observe the territory of the aggregates which are devoid of the self. We can observe how formed things in it are transitory. We can see for ourselves than any deep grasping of the sensible will eventually inflict suffering.
In the Pali canon especially the five aggregates are fungible with Mara, suffering, the impermanent, and the non-self.
Yes, the Buddha does state that one who sees form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations as Mara sees them rightly in the sense that form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations are inconstant, stressful and not-self. Essentially, if one were to attach to form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations as self, then at the break-up of the body, that self would experience death.
However, if one cultivates and develops disenchantment and dispassion towards form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations and becomes unattached in regards to them, then at the break-up of the body, there is no longer any self that would experience death. Remember that there are four types of clinging mentioned in the Suttas—sensual clinging, view clinging, precept & practice clinging, and doctrine of self clinging.
As far as your argument of logical entailment goes, I agree with the Venerable Thanissaro that just because an idea can be logically inferred from the Dhamma does not mean that the idea is valid or useful *. The Buddha himself makes the same point in AN 2.25:
"Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one whose meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who explains a discourse whose meaning has already been fully drawn out as one whose meaning needs to be inferred..."
I am not sure if I can help with this thought, but I feel that the self in question is the indivudual self, i.e. meaning a substance or the like that makes a being uniquie. I can find no affirmation for such a self until now, also not in later mahayana writings. They point to a self that unites every living being, meaning there is no room for a judeo-christian concept of a soul in terms of an indivudually immortal substance, but rather an absolute in us that never dies. the moment one does not talk any more of an individual self, the moment becomes the absolute (universal self in everyone). The absolute in later mahayana wrtings is shunya, void of all positive attribute. It is not the wind like e.g. an upanishadic self is defined, is not defined at all, it remains as a void label after all elements of samsara are removed, yet this does not mean an ontological nihl, merely a relative nihil (nihil privativum). This means, one could list all elements of samsara and call them non-self on after another, calling "everything" void of a self however goes to far since you would use induction to arrive there, not real experience that actually tells you the truth.Maybe I got it totally wrong
sorry if this was confusing, i could not express myself better. And of course obligatory, it is my PoV, at least currently.
As far as I understand the passage that you have provided, it does not say that anatta is Mara explicitly or otherwise; it says that one should see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. Not only in Mara a well-known metaphor for death, but this passage itself is implying a perception, more precisely, a perception that leads one to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to stilling, to direct knowledge, to Awakening, to Unbinding. — Elohim
By logical entailment is does. Western Buddhists seem to over look the role of implication in Buddhism (I have been writing an as yet unpublished paper on this to pad my CV). If the khandhas are non-self, then it follows logically, since the khandhas are also Mara, that the non-self is Mara.
The self in Buddhism is not far off from G-d in Orthodox Judaism. It is not treated as a sematic object least it cause one to conceptualize it. Nor is the self ever equated with the aggregates. We can, however, observe the territory of the aggregates which are devoid of the self. We can observe how formed things in it are transitory. We can see for ourselves than any deep grasping of the sensible will eventually inflict suffering.
In the Pali canon especially the five aggregates are fungible with Mara, suffering, the impermanent, and the non-self.
Love ya'all,
Bobby
While I can see how you impute the equation of anatta=mara, I'm not sure this is saying anything new or contradictory. My main problem is the way you are wording anatta as 'the not-self', as I stated in my earlier post (though even this isn't much of a problem). And I am still curious in regards to the logic behind & the implications of your statement that "taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!"
_/\_
metta
P.S.-I would also appreciate response in regards to signing as "A.E." in your previous post, as this is used by Zenmar, and you normally sign "Love ya'all, Bobby."
A. From the statements that you have been making so far, it appears that you are suggesting that ultimately, the five khandhas (which you logical entail are anatta (not-self) and Mara (death)) are one thing and that the self (which you are unable to define, yet are able to assure us is not the five khandhas) is another. If that is the case, then that is a position that was already refuted by the Buddha.
B. From the statements that you have been making so far, it appears that you are guilty of doing exactly what you accuse the Theravada Abhidhammikas of doing, namely the opposing contradiction in that you are making self a major tenant when the Buddha appears to have taught otherwise. Perhaps the middle ground here is that both sides of this debate are taking these teachings out of context.
For me, the bottom line is:
Thus it seems more this discourse's discussion of "All" is meant to limit the use of the word "all" throughout the Buddha's teachings to the six sense spheres and their objects. As the following discourse shows, this would also include the consciousness, contact, and feelings connected with the sense spheres and their objects. Nibbana would lie outside of the word, "all." This would fit in with another point made several times in the Canon: that dispassion is the highest of all dhammas (Iti 90), while the arahant has gone beyond even dispassion (Sn 4.6; Sn 4.10).
As AN 4.174 states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the cessation of the six sense spheres is to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to complicate the uncomplicated — see the Introduction to MN 18). The range of differentiation goes only as far as the "All." Perceptions of self or not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond the "All." When the cessation of the "All" is experienced, all differentiation is allayed. (From Note to SN 35.23)
I am not sure if I can help with this thought, but I feel that the self in question is the indivudual self, i.e. meaning a substance or the like that makes a being uniquie.
The only thing that is unique of any individual node of receptivity is the resulting point of view. I refer you to my previous remarks.
From the statements that you have been making so far, it appears that you are suggesting that ultimately, the five khandhas (which you logical entail are anatta (not-self) and Mara (death)) are one thing and that the self (which you are unable to define, yet are able to assure us is not the five khandhas) is another. If that is the case, then that is a position that was already refuted by the Buddha. — Elohim
It seems fairly obvious from the following passage below which is from the Samyutta-Nikaya that the Buddha does, in fact, make the five khandhas one thing and the self another.
"Bhikkhus, form is impermanent ... Feeling is impermanent ... Perception is impermanent ...Volitional formations are impermanent ... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is not a self (yam dukkham tad an-atta). What is not a self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self (netam mama, neso'hamasmi, na me so atta). (iii.45)"
Let me finish by saying that it is hardly necessary to define the self. It is realized by prajña, that is, self's distinction from the five khandhas. It should be obvious that any definition is problematic insofar as it might be compared against one or more of the five khandhas, either as a form (rupa); a feeling (vedana), an image (samjñâ), etc. Clearly, it is not a khandha. Nor is the self, Mara the Evil One.
I am not sure if I can help with this thought, but I feel that the self in question is the indivudual self, i.e. meaning a substance or the like that makes a being uniquie. I can find no affirmation for such a self until now, also not in later mahayana writings. — fofoo
The Mahaparinirvana Sutra is all about the Buddha's final teaching which points to the "great self".
Dr. Nakamura writes:
"That Mahaparinirvana Sutra claims to be the last sermon before the passing away of the Buddha, saying that it reveals the secret teaching which had not been preached before (i.e., in other Sutras). Formerly, Buddhism, advocating the theory of Non-Ego, was against the theory of âtman, but here in this scripture the Buddha teaches the theory of the Great Atman. (Indian Buddhism, 213)"
In addition the Mahaparinirvana Sutra is on the Internet. Dr. Tony Page runs the site.
I think what it boils down to is that Buddhists disagree as to what the Buddha taught. Jodo Shinshu, for example, accepts the great self whereas Theravadins base the teaching on non-self or in Pali, anattâ.
I have been on both sides of the issue. Recently I completed reading the published dissertation of Steven Collins, Selfless Persons. I am not convinced he made a good case for accepting the Thervada dogma of non-self which attempts to refute any idea of a changeless subject. One simple matter he has overlooked concerns the Bodhisat in the Jatakas.
The rebirths of the Bodhisat (Skt. bodhisattva) in the Jataka stories demonstrate continuity. In the Jatakas, the Buddha will say, speaking on behalf of the Bodhisat, “ I was then 'X' or I was then ‘Y’”. In the Jatakas themselves, we observe the repeated survival of the self-same Bodhisat who is reborn into a number different forms. The genealogical path the Bodhisat takes is one of perfecting himself, going through the paramitas; eventually winding up as Buddha.
"That Mahaparinirvana Sutra claims to be the last sermon before the passing away of the Buddha, saying that it reveals the secret teaching which had not been preached before (i.e., in other Sutras). Formerly, Buddhism, advocating the theory of Non-Ego, was against the theory of âtman, but here in this scripture the Buddha teaches the theory of the Great Atman. (Indian Buddhism, 213)"
This statement seems suspect to me, as it is regarded in the Pali Suttas that the Buddha did not withhold information or teachings from his disciples. To state that this Sutra got missed or were too advanced for disciples such as MahaKassapa seems downright strange. So, while I think that this Sutra may suit certain people quite well, I would in no way consider it as more authoritative than other sutras/suttas (as the website so boldly claims, at least in regards to the other Mahayana Sutras).
Now, as you said, different schools disagree, and appeal to different types. However, the buddha said not to cling to any doctrine which absolutely states 'there is a self' or 'there is no self'. There are some schools that do highlight the teaching of the Tathagatagarbha (womb of the thus come one) & Buddha-dhatu (buddha-nature), but it is questionable whether they regard Buddha-dhatu as an eternal, unchanging 'Self'. Now, the Yogachara school of Buddhism posits a an AlayaVijnana (storehouse consciousness) which contains all past impressions of all the lives of a particular nama-rupa stream. However, I would argue that this does not mean the Alayavijnana is somehow other than our current consciousness. That would be necessarily dualistic. I would also say it does not necessitate some permanent, fixed, self-existent Atman; but rather, only necessitates that there are successive karmic events that carry over from one rupa-continuum to another. Now, if you simply regard 'Atman' as a convenient concept to denote the uncreated, unconditioned reality, and recognize that concepts & viewpoints are not to be clung to, then I don't have much of a problem with what you are saying. However, if you are declaring that the Buddha implicitly proclaimed an Atman identicle to that of the Upanishads, then I say you have gone too far & are distorting the teachings to fit your predisposition.
Honestly, I feel that taking absolute positions in regard to the existence or non-existence of a Self is not only unneccessary, but is arguably incorrect practice. Clinging to views is repudiated by the buddha & is a hindrance to practice, in my understanding & experience. Views, by definition, are conditioned phenomena and are dependent upon ignorance for their formation. They are also subject to change. Putting too much stock into any view is inadviseable. Granted, they have their utility, but that utility is always limited. So, that said, I think you have some legitimacy in your argument that some Abhidhammists go too far in their application of anatta and border on an annihilationist doctrine, but that does not mean that you are not going too far in the other direction.
The rebirths of the Bodhisat (Skt. bodhisattva) in the Jataka stories demonstrate continuity. In the Jatakas, the Buddha will say, speaking on behalf of the Bodhisat, “ I was then 'X' or I was then ‘Y’”. In the Jatakas themselves, we observe the repeated survival of the self-same Bodhisat who is reborn into a number different forms. The genealogical path the Bodhisat takes is one of perfecting himself, going through the paramitas; eventually winding up as Buddha.
Nonetheless, as strange as it may seem, no such thing as a permanent, individual Atman need be asserted here to explain the process of rebirth & the culmination of Buddhahood. It may be convenient for the sake of thinking & speaking, but it is not essential or absolutely correct to do so.
While always interesting, I am once again going to step aside of this discussion for the time being. The first reason is that I have nothing new to add as I have already covered these points in the past. I would simply be regurgitating what I have previously contributed; and if it did nothing to change people's minds then, it will certainly not do anything to change them now.
The second reason is that I have limited myself to studying the teachings preserved in the Pali Canon, and any discussions that go out side of this particular body of literature are beyond my range of knowledge. I simply do not feel comfortable enough in my knowledge of other traditions and their teachings, as well as Sanskrit, to offer anything worthwhile in this area.
The third and final reason (for those of you who care) is that I am simply bored of this entire topic. It has certainly served its purpose, and produced some very entertaining dialogues; however, it has continued to repeat the same points and references ad nauseum. As the old saying goes, we are beating a dead horse. Although, I must thank you all for being civil.
Comments
Hi, not1not2, it is nice, that you have on something the pertinent snippet from sutta:-)
But why did you not put forward snippet from sutta - the definition about anatta? There you enchanted with Nagarjuna and various author and Buddha was not good to you?
But not1not2, i think that thinkink in this way as you are trying "There is snippet from suttas, and this is all teaching" is a somewhat dry and tough way using suttas and it remind me chrisian with they bible..
The snippet from sutta is very good. But i dont found it there the limititaion you try to charge on our thinking or way of investigation.
Hi Jason
I ask what particular question here was useless?
I think, here are not people from different beliefs, with bag of their assumption.
Our debate has nothing to do with other theistic doctrines. You are trying divert from core our debate.
I thouht that we infer or are making statemnent on base of observatin and logic. Two thing wich seem to be in Buddha teaching very indespenseble.
Buddha nowhere commended "throw away your reason and logic".
Buddha nowhere said "there is no sufferer", as many started spekulated after.
Reason ask "suffering,yes and no sufferer"? "on which is based the term suffering" " to whom does it happen".
I think such questin are not spekulative, but are very direct and aim exactly on aim.
This questin are also question or examination which will every put during satipathana training.This question are aimed on thing here and now.
There is no assumption in them.
dhamma is opanayiko. Should be seen here and know. So all statements are to be checking up and the teachinkg draw attention what is here and now, this could bear in memory (sati)
And it seem to me, that just these very direct and important question you rejected as inapropriate question in buddhism! I think this not reasonable.
So dont speak about spekulation of automatic property any disscussion about "i".
The anatta is in fact proof that question about atta/atta is of most importance.
anatta in fact contains above all confirmation of atta! For tha "a" in anatta" say what is not atta, it is like with word "unhealthy"
And if there spoke about spekulatin about "i" he meant, we should not put spekulation question in order to ask pertinent question.
It was not by accident that he adduced particual questions. But it were just the wrong question. This does not mean not put any question anyway!
Especially in todays when the teaching about absolut No Atta flourish in spite of there sutta is explicitlly said, "No atta" is wrong, astrayd views, which should man remove.
Why buddhist in this case ignore the sutta?
Bye.
ps- please dont resort to modern cliche about assumption we all subconsciuslly bear from other religion, and how buddhism demolish them with prosaic look at bare really or with sword of insight( in this case, the sword of suttas:-)
Let stay on the ground of facts and speak "i know, dont know or i think", then we will also better orientate
Dear not1not2,
All skandhas, ayatanas, nidanas, etc., are on phenomenal level. And surely there is no flux on the level of noumena (paramarthas). So how could the person be regarded as a flux on paramarthika level?!
Santana, the flux that we are used to identify with the personal cross-incarnational unity of all fleeting phenomena making up our Ego, is not an ultimate thing (paramartha) itself. It is just another element, the eighth, of the phenomenal vijnana-skandha usually referred to as citta (consciousness).
On the other hand, Nagarjunians like to mutter the mantra of pudgala (person) not being present among the skandhas, not being identical with the pancaskandhaka (the real organism of the five skadnhas known as this Brahmana, as pronounced by Bhagavan in his Bharahara-sutra), and not being something outside the pancaskandakam. So no way for it to be the flux, on either level.
I kind of more like your next point
Still, there is a small communication problem. If nothing can be said on paramarthika level, how are we to put to rigorous analysis something that cannot and has not been said? And the rigorous analysis itself being a concatenation of self-consistent statements, is surely not in the province of the noumenal.
If there was ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), I would say this is the only truth that can possibly pretend for the status of ultimate. But there is not. Because all truths (satya) being something pronounced, are conventional.
Pursuing the logic of conventional/ultimate truth as parallel to the phenomenal/nomenal in a Kantian sense may only cause the paramarthika cow to produce yet another transcendental "dung," as is the case with the above-cited article of Garfield and Priest.
See the number of paralogisms and argumental seemingness (hetvabhasa) they managed to produce on the first two pages only of their otherwise impressive work.
I better go and practice nirvitarka-samadhi to dispense with all the antinomies of language and speech... because there is way to go to the nirvicara one where only the truths of Dharma-megha can be directly intuited.
Again words, words, words... :-)
Each gracious reply from you makes me blush to remember my unpleasant outburst!
Where the poroblem arises, for me, is exactly the same as with other sacred scriptures, be they Christian, Islamic, Judaic or 'pagan'. They are all sewn through with myth and legendary examples or contexts. Much as I love myth and see it as a primary teaching vehicle, it makes it hard to distinguish 'fact' from analogy or parable (a heavenly story with no earthly meaning).
The result is that each and every statement attributed to a Founder comes to me with a question mark attached.
I recognise that this presents me with serious problems, but it is not for nothing that Thomas the Twin is such a favourite of mine from the Jesus stories!
Interesting food for thought. I guess my division in analysis wasn't proper. It seems like I was more saying that on an everyday conventional level we can still talk of self & other without any problem, but from an ultimate perspective there is no substantial reality. There is only this 'suchness'. hmm... I don't know.
I particularly liked this statement of yours.
It seems that this is what we are trying to do on this self thing and it seems that, in this perspective, a good deal of this debate is just more dung (that includes what I'm saying). However, a skillful farmer will use that dung to strengthen his crop. I think this is also the gist of the snippet I provided from MN 72. The Tathagata has done away with 'positions' on these matters & favors knowledge in terms of the 4 noble truths & 4 foundations of mindfulness.
_/\_
metta
I completely understand. I am much like you in those regards. However, I have come to the decision that I must start somewhere, because I simply cannot verify everything written within one set of sacred scriptures in such a short lifespan—let alone everything in all of them combined. In my particular search, when I discovered Buddhism, I knew right away that it was something of value. I have since done my best to understand the more practical aspects of what the Blessed One taught. So, in relation to this site, I simply want to offer whatever advice or help I can to those in need of an answer—if I feel confident that I can answer in line with the Dhamma. Even though each statement attributed to the Buddha comes with a question mark attached, he nevertheless asked us to take each as a working hypothesis until we discover the truth for ourselves. Nevertheless, he still warned us that certain paths are dead ends—whether we choose to heed him or not. I admit that there is much that even I have a hard time understanding, but I am taking it on faith that the Buddha really did know what he was talking about. Otherwise I would simply resume my debaucherous Pagan practices, which are admittedly much more fun.
Jason
Ha, the question after the source of arisen question:-))
to vajjira sutta:
1. I would even say, that every thought or question, either thought about karma or dharma sangha,which are in anoother time very useful, when some should concentrate or abide in deep concetration can symbolic way called the ifluence of mara,
2. Who is mara? It is nice that these bikhunii does not constructed "being" but why she constructed "mara"?
Was it something visible, or does she felt some force of invisible being?
3. "it occur to me" - so is occuring a valuble and accepteble source of knowledge?
If someone occurs "this brahman what i experience" will be still valid?
4. How could Mara become disepointed and sad, when nobody has seen him?
I would understand to it, if Buddha commented it, what he with his supernormal sensory perception had seen.
So here we see that some suttas become a certain ilogical or mysteurious tone, is it? Then should we accept all literally?
ps-Elohim, will you answer me, what inepropriate question(s) was here asked?
Who verily knows and who can here declare it,
whence it was born and whence comes this creation?
The gods are later than this world's production.
Who knows, then, whence it first came into being?
The word 'chariot' is used,
So, when the aggregates are present,
There's the convention 'a being
It iccurs to me, the chariot is without charioter useless:-))
So every charion which is to moving has his chariot:-)
Aggregates are also convention.
Is body something real? no. It is convention.
But has its nature, which is only to enlightentent beign accecepteble, as well as nature of all.
And if being is only convention, is then suffering also convention?
Is seems to me, that this verse of bhikhuni is not of later date..
And present here any bhikhunii or bhikhu Buddha´s teaching?
I went through the hole thread while not neccessarily havng undestood and verified everything that has been said. I surely will do that again in the next days. i more and more understand that knowing no pali makes thing more difficult the more you go into details about elemantary issues.I want to bring to you something to attention however.
Samyutta Nikaya 22:96 states:
"There is no corporeality, no feeling, no perception, no mental formations, no consciousness that is permanent, enduring and lasting, and that, not subject to any change, will eternally remain the same. If there existed such an ego that is permanent, enduring and lasting, and not subject to any change, then the holy life leading to the complete extinction of suffering will not be possible"
1.) I would like to know how this is interpreted who claim no absloute denial of the self, only a relative one or even definde the self positivly.
2.)On the other hand, I wonder if the translation is correct since it denies a lasting ego, wheras stating self instead of ego would have made it clear. On the other hand, some sources equate self with ego.
3)If it is correct and self cannot be equated with ego, does that mean, that only the empirical person made up out of the 5 aggregates is as described above, if yes, what exists besides the empircal person? Is it categorically ruled out that one exists of more than the empircal person, is it left open but only unexpressable, not describable as well as nirvana cannot be spoken of. If I ask questions already answered in the post, and I merely did not understand, feel free to ignore this post.
regards
edit: I was not cautios enough in my formulations and since I do not want to misinform anyone, I stand corrected: Nirvana can be spoken of in negative terms , not this not that, not born /unorn, not intended/ unintended, and so on. A positive definition of it has yet to be shown to me.
As Heraklit said, the same man can never cross the same river twice because the man and the river are never the same ever again.
But i think he consequently moved a step forward because he had to. Propagating a constant state of flux leads consequently to the fact that nothing could be describable. The moment you describe something, the moment it is not any more the same you describe. Nothing can be said at all.
This touches the dialectics of being and becoming, that lead heraklit to say sth like: We are constantly someone else and nevertheless remain the same. Thus, it is a question of Identity, or what makes up the self. A parable outside buddhism for that for anyone interested could be "The ship of theseus".
edit: But you can agree on using symbols, by knowing that as precise as you may desribe something, it never is completely acurate describable. that`s what language actually is symbolism of real things. if this thought is right, describing things once and forever for eternity, what they are in themselves, is impossible. I would apreciate feedback on this. Thank you all.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notself.html
I have not yet seen anyone addressing the buddha nature, layed down in Tathagatagarbha"-Sutras, that according to my understanding, set the inner essence (does someone dare to call it self?), Svabhava not as atman, not as soul but as everyone`s own buddha nature.
Georg Grimm has made a similar assertion, that the doctrine of the buddha was to show everyone their "true self" (he did not name it though afaik). His most prominet critics in the west were Helmut Galsenapp and Volker Zotz, if someone seeks for rather authorative sources. (at least in the west)
one article of of Glasenapp, Vedanta and Buddhism, has been republished on accesstoinsight. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/vonglasenapp/wheel002.html
It`s up to anyone to either believe on of those, none of them and instead somebody else, ortry to get into the arguments that are being made. Proselytising is not my style.
Fofoo,
Hello again, and I forgot to welcome you to the site! You've hit upon an interesting passage, one that was mentioned very briefly, far up thread in reference to its citation in the article What the Buddha Never Taught, which I criticized (the "lump of dung" sutta) in post number 156. Your instincts are pretty good on this one, as you identified that you may need to reference the Pali and pinpointed in the translation the word on which the interpretation of the sutta hinges (given above as "ego"). Now, I'm no grammarian and no expert in Pali, but I've learned how to find key words, use a dictionary, and cross-reference translations and contexts.
The word here translated as "ego" is attabhāvapaṭilābha. As a compound of atta + bhava + pati + labha, its definition in the PTS dictionary can be found under Attan, on page 23 under --bhava: "assumption of an existence, becoming reborn as an individual."
So, having established that, on to your questions.
1) I do not agree with the view that sees in the discourses of the Buddha an absolute denial of self. Face to face with this sutta, I don't see anything suprising or contradictory to the relative anatta reading. In context, the khandhasamyutta, the discourse is topically tied to the khandhas, which both absolute anatta and relative anatta adherents would agree are consistently and called not-self. Given the PTS definition especially together with the illustration given at the end of the sutta (a story relating one of the past lives of the Buddha, a particularly attractive one, the point being that all that is now gone), I believe we are compelled to read attabhāvapaṭilābha as referring to a single lifetime in the round of rebirths, a single form taken up, as the five khandhas as a whole. This fits in quite seamlessly into the sutta and its message, which begins with examination of the five khandhas respectively with regard to their eternity or non-eternity, and is summarized by the statement: "Then the blessed one took a lump of cowdung into his hand and said to that bhikkhu, 'Bhikkhu, there is not even this much of an individual existence that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain just so like unto the eternal." So attabhāvapaṭilābha must be taken as referring to the khandhas as a whole (the lump of dung taken as some small part of that (any of the khandhas, or any part of the khandha, taken up individually). This reading, of attabhāvapaṭilābha as referring to the individual birth, knowable as the khandhas (and not to a denied hypothetical transcendent attan) is perfectly natural, and reinforced by the illustration that refers to a past incarnation of the Buddha which is now gone forever.
2) In my opinion "ego" is not the best translation of this word. "Self" would be even worse.
It's obviously a complex concept and difficult to express in a single English word. Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation, "individual existence" is not bad, but does not fully account for the word's sense of an incarnation in the cycle of rebirths, or of as the khandhas as "taken up," "assumed." It would be difficult, however, to come up with a better one that is not unnecessarily awkward.
3)See the Mahanidana sutta of the Digha Nikaya, under the section "Assumptions of a Self." I think your instincts are pretty good on this point, too, insofar as it is pretty clearly shown to be beyond the limits of designation and expression. We find a discussion of this issue in reference to the tathagata after death and the four propositions as applied to the Self of one whose asavas are destroyed, after the dissolution of the khandhas:
It could be helpful to reference the thread on the "Buddhist tetralemma" here. "Does not exist," and "both" especially seem to contradict the denial of self in its two primary forms. As to "exists" being denied, it seems to me that it is being denied in recognition that our concept of existence comes from existing, objective, knowable things in the "real world," that whatever exists should be able to be pointed to and described, and shown to others such that they can agree it exists. Since "not exists" is also denied, the denial of "exists" cannot simply be taken as a total denial. As such, a transcendent does not bear the marks of everyday existents, so it cannot be clearly explained as existing. It is only "beyond range." Also helpful in this respect would be the sabba sutta
I hope any of that is helpful, even if you disagree.
in friendliness,
V.
I agree with you that it's up to anyone. The Glasenapp article was mentioned and quoted earlier in the thread. I criticize one point Glasenapp attempts to make in post 160
. I don't think it is a very common error. It seems generally accepted today that Nibbana is at Udana 8. 2 described as "the infinite" (anantam) not as "the not-self" (anattam). And it makes better sense in the context of the sutta.
in friendliness,
V.
first, thanks for you comprehensive answer, especially the part about what word was translated as ego.To put it shortly, if you not already sensed it, I am of the kind that both denies an absolute denial or affirmation of the self.Having thought about it many times, it currently seems illogical to me that an individual that is subject to change, whose view of the world is made up by interdependend causal phenomena, can make any statement about anything absolute, meaning everlasting and not depended of any subject who recognizes it.
Putting aside now my personal view, I will try to answer the rest of your post in the next days.I will need some time since it requires some reading of different suttas, and i am a slow reader :scratch:
Regarding our small exchange about Georg Grimm. He in fact made never any affirmative statement of a "soul".What he did do however, was to challenge orthodoxies which brought him much praise from at least one profound sri lankan theravada scholar, and much critic, often even polemical personal attacks from other german neo-buddhists, especially dahlke was in the business of smearing him in a very ugly way. What Grimm actually wrote is this: (I translate it best I can from German):
- What I recognize of myself to be fading (changing/passing away) and what causes me suffering (dukkha) with its impermanence, this cannot be my being/nature.
- Now, I recognize everything that can be recognized as fading (changing/passing away)
and this causes me suffering (dukkha) with its impermanence
- Therefore, nothing that can be recognized is my true being/nature.
He called it the "The great syllogism", and according to prayer.de, he hits the thinking of the Pudgalavada sect (http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pudgalav.htm) with his thought that indeed seems to be not pursued by any modern sect (In how far the Buddha nature can be interpreted as a similar idea, for that i do not have enough knowledge). Dahlke went as so far to say:transcendental buddhism is not buddhism at all". Well, i do not agree with Dalke on that, but this seems to be exactly the point that generates much hard feelings today, even generates conspiracy theories of "hindus trying once more to destroy buddhism".
Regards
I additionally want to point out, that there might also be a flaw in the glasenapp article where he formulates grimms syllogism. The original term translated as ego is "Wesen", and grimm used this term in his publication of "the doctrine of the buddha" from the 6th to the 8th addition. you can look it up .
The full original quote of the great syllogism that i tried to translate you can find here: (5.1.1:"Was ich an mir vergehen...") http://www.payer.de/steinke/steink05.htm
So either the English translation is incorrect or Glasenapp had another source for Grimm than I do have. Point being made here is, that he never denies the empircal person to be made up of the 5 aggregates , being anatta. "Wesen" translates as being/nature/essence, you can look it up. He also never defines it positvly, he remains plainly in negative theology. So indeed it can be said that he touches the Pudgalavada sect`s doctrine, that the self is neither within the 5 aggregates nor outside the 5 aggregates. It cannot be defined positivly.
so, my 2 cents again: Everyone who goes beyond that sets imho human knowledge as an absolute, infinite, it postulates an observer, removes the observing subject out of the world and then claims things are as they are inthemsleves without acknowledging that it is still the world of the oververs that is described, even if they would all agree on everything. So, they make an ontological statement were according to the buddha, none should be made (the view that there is no self is wrong, "all" is the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & odors, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas., therefore anything related to the empirical person and please, if someone knows better, show me a sutta where all is put out of context of the empirical person, the observer, the observing subject)
As one person pointed out in an essay i recently read: the ones who categorically deny the self believe human knowledge is unlimited. the ones only relativly denying the self do not believe that human knowledge is unlimited. I am fine with both as long as I feel there is right intention, since I cannot judge who of the two has right view.
Regards
Maybe Individuation would describe it best, but i do not want to coin a wrong term, from your description I understood what is meant by the term. Thanks again.
It fits the assumption that there is not indicated that something is not existant, but rather it cannot be spoken of. because it is not expressable.
Regards
I see it the same way. "All" as layed out in the sabba sutta spins around the six senses, refers to human sensation, not to anything as self, It refers to vedana, which as we know, is anatta. I believe the ones going beyond that risk to transform vedana to atman.
Regards
As far as I read and hopefully understood the Pali discourses, the aggregates are real but to call them self is mere convention. "real" is always a dangerous expression though, of course everything we say is name calling but this does not mean it is not real. Let`s agree that they are impermanent and have no everlasting, unchanging reality, but many things we give names are actualy here and quite real i think, although they may lack an adequate desription that describes their nature of flux
However, if there is no self it makes sense to ask if there is a sufferer, and if there is no sufferer, what`s the merit in having compassion? What would be the motive of becoming a bodhisattva instead of an Arhat, when there is noone to help, just skandahs to be dealt with? Obviously, this question would be not of concern to Theravadins.
Further, I wanna ask the more literate ones than me a question. I read on several occasions that in the Pali discourses, there is the claim that there is only suffering, no sufferer. This claim is attributed to Visuddhimagga" (XVI,90), But I cannot find it in my translations. If anyone could give me a hint on this, I would be thankful.
Regards
edit: the quotation i mean is this:
Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
Nibbana is, but not the man who attains it;
Although there is a path, there is no goer.
I guess that would depend on which translation you are in possession of. In the 1999 Buddhist Publication Society Pariyatti edition translated by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, for example, the passage appears in Chapter XVI on page 521. His translation is slightly different, however, and it is as follows:
However, I should just like to point out that this idea did not originate solely with the Vissudhimagga. This idea can be also found in the Suttas as well, in other variations of course. One quick example that I can think of right now is found in the Samyutta Nikaya, and it is called the Vajira Sutta (SN 5.10):
Regards,
Jason
Do you know what word is being translated as "being" from pali in SN 5.10? The german tanslation says "Lebewesen", which would probably translate to creature (literally "living being").
Regards
I would first like to warn you that I am not an expert in these matters, especially in regards to Pali, so please take my replies as mere personal opinion and interpretation rather than being authoritative in anyway.
As for your question, I believe that the word being translated here as "being" is sattoti, which comes from the root satta. Some translators do translate this as "creature" instead of "living being", but they basically mean the same thing. I believe that it primarily has to do with one's view concerning the aggregates as self in one way or another.
To me, the theme of this dialogue between Mara and Vajira is really about one's sakkayaditthi (self-identity view), and more precisely, how to correct one's wrong view in regards to this fetter of self-identification.
Jason
I was recently browsing the Samyutta Nikaya, and came across a sutta in the Radhasamyutta which could be of help to clarify the meaning of "satto.", the second sutta in that section, referred to, appropriately, as the Satta Sutta. For convenience, I'm cutting and pasting the translation from Accesstoinsight. It says: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn23/sn23.002.than.html
http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/3Samyutta-Nikaya/Samyutta3/22-Radha-Samyutta/01-Pathamamaravaggo-e.html
in friendliness,
V.
thank you both for the information you share here.
I would like to point you also to "Clearing the path", a book written by Nanavira Thera. It is freely downloadable for non-commercial use here: http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/ctp_book-2up_v1.pdf#search=%22sattoti%20pali%22
His reflections about sattoti/satta start at page 41
Brief Reflections on Anatta & Nibbana of him you can find besides in the book also here:
http://www.quangduc.com/English/psychology/16nirvana.html
Regards
I would like to warn you and everyone, too.:) I am no scholar and am just trying to get a deeper understanding of the Buddhadharma.
My sources are usually the German translations of the Tipitaka found on www.palikanon.com . They contain as credible recognized translations , e.g. the translation of the ANGUTTARA NIKāYA is from Nyanatiloka & Nyanaponika, the maintainer of the site I think is a Theravadin monk in Thailand. When I want to communicate with others, I first look after the translations on accesstoinsight, if a sutta is not found there, i usually look for other places but since i know no pali, i mostly remain sceptic and rely on authorites and what i believe are trustworthy sources. But this does not refrain me from posting other translations not found on primary sources or secondary works. So much for my sources and my aproach to the Pali discourses.
Reagarding SN5.10, I think it is useful to put the whole context of SN5. What do we find here? Several Bhikkhunis (female monks) who are tormented by doubtful thougts, they are "visited" by Mara.
Throughout the sutta, they struggle and defend themselves against wrong views. The views are in short, as I could understand it, that samsara cannot be escpaed and the best she can do is to enjoy pleasures and lust and she maybe regret it later if she does not go for it (1), that being female is an insuperable obstacle to arhathood (2), that her retreat is merely a result of bitterness and that what she really wants, is seeking uncounciously, is a new man (3), that she should enjoy music (today we would probably say party) instead of retreating (4), that she could be ambushed while being alone far away from any "civilization" (5), that she is ignoring the pleasures of live (6), that she merely does not want this indivudual life and wants to be reborn in other form (7), that her visual apperance could matter to the extend that she is identified with heretics who look the same (8), that her understanding of the 5 skandhas and the resulting image of a personality/"puppet" ( my commentary says the word "Attabhāva" is used here in the pali texts where "puppet" ist translatetd on accesstoinsight) is wrong (9), that she might mistakenly take the 5 aggregates as the self, seeing in a creature/living being a thing in itself. Obviously, she uses the famous comparison with the chariot from Milindapañha 2.1.1 which lead me to this conclusion (10).
Generally put, I see SN5 as techiques to defeat doubt and worries about one`s understanding of buddha`s teaching, while visualising the doubts and worries as Mara, therefore clearly sperating it from one`s mind seeking to put them away with confidence in and knowlege about the Buddhadharma.
Now regarding to the relevance of Anatta . I interpret it not as an absoulte denial of the self. In the highest truth(paramatthato), there is no "creature"/living being. She easly could have said in the hightest truth, there is no self. Further, it is clear that suffering is real and the cessation of suffering is possible, regardless of naming conventions. So even if there is no living being in the highest sense, suffering and ending of suffering remain the key issues.
Further, when we substitute the term satto with the definition Vaccha has posted here from SN 23.2, it reads : In the highest truth(paramatthato), one is not being caught up in desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, feeling, perception, fabrications or consciousness.
"Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire for whatever is non-self..."
If the Theravada position is one which markets the idea of non-self, its seems strange to find the Buddha telling his monks that they should abandon desire for it.
Again, at S.iv.3 I found this curious passage:
What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is nonself.
By logical entailment we have to conclude from the above that we should not abandon desire for the self; moreover, what is not suffering is the self!
Keeping in mind that the doctrine of non-self is central to Theravada Abhidhamma it seems contradictory that they should make non-self a major tenent when the Buddha appears to have taught otherwise.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
IMO wait..........
Just, who is this "I" that thinks that there is an opinion to be thought.
Am I not composed of the non-self elements the earth, wind, clouds, sun, the entire cosmos. I do not have to seek answers about it, because I am in them, and they are in me.
And just what really makes this "me", what it is where it is. Once again I look to the
non-self elements of myself. My parents, grand parents, teachers, children, lovers, haters, and what of these labels and discriptions that I carry within me, these are non-self elements. Do I choose to mourn, anguish, or feel an angst that comes with having no real control over natural phenomenon, when my perception of how these things don't change to how I would like them to be, or when changes come to the things that I find favorable. They are in me, and I in them.
Sound familiar
" You stop clinging to concepts, you stop suffering." says the Buddha.
"Why are you clinging to not clinging to concepts?", asked the Buddha. :winkc:
I appreciated your thoughts and comments, as well those of Mr. Lanier. I did especially enjoy that you were able to expand on the passage's usage of the term satta. Also regarding the bhikkhuni sutta under discussion, I remember who/what Mara is in terms of the discourses, what his range and domain is. And you (together with Bhikkhuni Vajira) correctly identified that whatever Mara talks about, it's the range of the five khandhas, because that is all that Mara can see (but, alas for Mara, the arhat goes beyond; where there is no clinging to the khandhas, Mara cannot find him). Thinking on this, it strikes me that there is a kind of irony to the no-self argument on the whole because it seemingly unknowingly works from Mara's point of view, thus defined above; meaning it argues from a position that the five khandhas is the extent of a person, and that if there were a self for a person by which he could be liberated from the impermanence and suffering of existence, it would have to be found in the khandhas. And based on this kind of Mara-like thinking, the natural conclusion would be that there is no self. But the evidence of the discourses, to my thinking, is that the Buddha taught something quite contrary to that line of thought.
in friendliness,
V.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
When there is form, Rahda, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. Therefore, Radha, see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. See it as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as really misery. Those who see it thus see rightly. When there if feeling ... When there is perception ... When there are volitional formations ... When there is consciousness, Radha, there might be Mara, or the killer, or the one who is killed. — S.iii.189
Admittedly this is an astonishing passage and as I recall, it appears to be omitted from access to insight. Why it is not included on their site for what is implies is surely odd. It does, by logical entailment, say the non-self is Mara.
A.E.
It just came to my mind that we could look for concepts that make soft affirmations of the self, like the Buddha Nature/Matrix, not to weight them heigher than the Tipitaka, but in order to look how it was justified by philosphers later.
I am just at the beginning of my research and it consumes much time. If I am not mistaken, the Buddha Nature reads as a compromise, since it affirms a kind of self but at the same time states it is not different from all others. At first glance, this sounds similar to me like Advaita, where the Atman is equated with Brahman.
After all I read, I prefer to understand Buddhism as an Indian. though a heterodox line of thinking. Currently I think the statement "there is no self" cannot be justified with the Tipitaka. One can argue that the Buddha teached to simple people, therefore never used complex speech, but instead gave simple examples. One can argue that Buddha did not want to shock people, and so on. Iam familiar with these arguments but the fact remains, this all is speculation about Gautama`s hidden motives while we all know it is said that he teached with open hands. Further, saying x,y,z are not myelf, therfore nothing is myself is a logical fallacy imho, since it uses induction to reduce a complex teaching that should be explored, lived and deepend into a mere phrase that never was heard from the Buddha himself.
Obvisously, the moment you make an absoulte judgement, like there is no self, one or all of your skandhas must speak the absolute truth, which of course is self-defeating. The relatvie denying, aka negative theology, already seen in the upanishads (though there are still positive definitions of the self found) makes most sense to me.
Is that "A.E." as in A.E. Hollingsworth, aka Zenmar??
_/\_
metta
Sincerely,
Jason
As far as I understand the passage that you have provided, it does not say that anatta is Mara explicitly or otherwise; it says that one should see form as Mara, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. Not only in Mara a well-known metaphor for death, but this passage itself is implying a perception, more precisely, a perception that leads one to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to stilling, to direct knowledge, to Awakening, to Unbinding.
The Buddha did not conform with those priests and contemplatives who were exponents of annihilationism, nor did he conform with those priests and contemplatives who were exponents of eternalism. Therefore, in my opinion, to take the Dhamma expounded by the Buddha for such a purpose as to argue the existence or non-existence of a self is going against the intended usage of that exposition—the intended meaning was simply to put an end to suffering.
Sincerely,
Jason
Secondly, you state 'the non-self' as though it is a positive quality. It is simply a statement that the aggregates are anatta {without self, are not the self, and do not pertain to a self}. This sutta quote seems to simply state that if you regard form as the self, you are deceived by Mara (form being mara), and so on through the other 4 aggregates. So, by regarding form as Mara, we are recognizing that form is illusory & is not-self. So, I really don't see how this sheds any new light on the subject as it does not seem to venture into the territory of whether there is a Self outside of the aggregates. Nor do I see this sutta as an indictment of Accesstoinsight for leaving leaving out some key sutta that is essential to practice or contradicts other suttas. So, if you are implying some sort of conspiracy on the part of AccesstoInsight, you're going to have to present a lot more than you have.
Thirdly, could you please elaborate on the implications of your first statement that "anyone taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!" It almost sounds as if you are stating that if we say that form is anatta, then we are in league with the devil. If that's what you meant I really don't see how you got that out of the sutta passage you provided.
Anyway, I can see why people want to assert something along the lines of an Upanishadic Atman. I don't see this as a huge problem in and of itself. However, I can also see why others are uncomfortable asserting anything beyond what he explicitly stated on this subject. Due to the debate over whether atta is used in a reflexive or transcendent sense in the suttas, I really cannot come to a solid conclusion based on these statements. Now, my main position on this discussion is that it lies beyond range. Any answer we can come up with is simply a fabrication. So, in this sense, even if you can prove that the Buddha was asserting a transcendent Self outside the aggregates, the argument itself is a mental formation, which by the very sutta quoted above, is Mara. Similarly, even if you can prove that the Buddha was not asserting a transcendent Self outside the aggregates, this argument is also a mental formations, which are Mara according to the above sutta. And I don't really see how we can come to either conclusion with any certainty in the first place. Additionally, as these formations are conditioned, impermanent objects, they simply cannot satisfy us. Only direct knowledge will do here. And I find it highly doubtful that any of us here have 'attained' Nibbana, in order to make an accurate statement. So this just seems like a bunch of speculation to me anyway, and that is not a good basis for our practice, imo. I really don't think we should be taking solid positions on this until we reach the stage of realization beyond doubt.
_/\_
metta
Excellent response, Jason. I think you got straight to the point.
_/\_
metta
By logical entailment is does. Western Buddhists seem to over look the role of implication in Buddhism (I have been writing an as yet unpublished paper on this to pad my CV). If the khandhas are non-self, then it follows logically, since the khandhas are also Mara, that the non-self is Mara.
The self in Buddhism is not far off from G-d in Orthodox Judaism. It is not treated as a sematic object least it cause one to conceptualize it. Nor is the self ever equated with the aggregates. We can, however, observe the territory of the aggregates which are devoid of the self. We can observe how formed things in it are transitory. We can see for ourselves than any deep grasping of the sensible will eventually inflict suffering.
In the Pali canon especially the five aggregates are fungible with Mara, suffering, the impermanent, and the non-self.
Love ya'all,
Bobby
Yes, the Buddha does state that one who sees form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations as Mara sees them rightly in the sense that form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations are inconstant, stressful and not-self. Essentially, if one were to attach to form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations as self, then at the break-up of the body, that self would experience death.
However, if one cultivates and develops disenchantment and dispassion towards form, feelings, perceptions, consciousness, and volitional formations and becomes unattached in regards to them, then at the break-up of the body, there is no longer any self that would experience death. Remember that there are four types of clinging mentioned in the Suttas—sensual clinging, view clinging, precept & practice clinging, and doctrine of self clinging.
Sincerely,
Jason
As far as your argument of logical entailment goes, I agree with the Venerable Thanissaro that just because an idea can be logically inferred from the Dhamma does not mean that the idea is valid or useful *. The Buddha himself makes the same point in AN 2.25:
Sincerely,
Jason
sorry if this was confusing, i could not express myself better. And of course obligatory, it is my PoV, at least currently.
While I can see how you impute the equation of anatta=mara, I'm not sure this is saying anything new or contradictory. My main problem is the way you are wording anatta as 'the not-self', as I stated in my earlier post (though even this isn't much of a problem). And I am still curious in regards to the logic behind & the implications of your statement that "taking an aggregate position, which includes anatta, they appear to be in league with the devil!"
_/\_
metta
P.S.-I would also appreciate response in regards to signing as "A.E." in your previous post, as this is used by Zenmar, and you normally sign "Love ya'all, Bobby."
I see two problems here:
A. From the statements that you have been making so far, it appears that you are suggesting that ultimately, the five khandhas (which you logical entail are anatta (not-self) and Mara (death)) are one thing and that the self (which you are unable to define, yet are able to assure us is not the five khandhas) is another. If that is the case, then that is a position that was already refuted by the Buddha.
B. From the statements that you have been making so far, it appears that you are guilty of doing exactly what you accuse the Theravada Abhidhammikas of doing, namely the opposing contradiction in that you are making self a major tenant when the Buddha appears to have taught otherwise. Perhaps the middle ground here is that both sides of this debate are taking these teachings out of context.
For me, the bottom line is:
It begs to ask, why bother?
Sincerely,
Jason
The only thing that is unique of any individual node of receptivity is the resulting point of view. I refer you to my previous remarks.
It seems fairly obvious from the following passage below which is from the Samyutta-Nikaya that the Buddha does, in fact, make the five khandhas one thing and the self another.
"Bhikkhus, form is impermanent ... Feeling is impermanent ... Perception is impermanent ...Volitional formations are impermanent ... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is not a self (yam dukkham tad an-atta). What is not a self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self (netam mama, neso'hamasmi, na me so atta). (iii.45)"
Let me finish by saying that it is hardly necessary to define the self. It is realized by prajña, that is, self's distinction from the five khandhas. It should be obvious that any definition is problematic insofar as it might be compared against one or more of the five khandhas, either as a form (rupa); a feeling (vedana), an image (samjñâ), etc. Clearly, it is not a khandha. Nor is the self, Mara the Evil One.
Love ya'll
Bobby
The Mahaparinirvana Sutra is all about the Buddha's final teaching which points to the "great self".
Dr. Nakamura writes:
"That Mahaparinirvana Sutra claims to be the last sermon before the passing away of the Buddha, saying that it reveals the secret teaching which had not been preached before (i.e., in other Sutras). Formerly, Buddhism, advocating the theory of Non-Ego, was against the theory of âtman, but here in this scripture the Buddha teaches the theory of the Great Atman. (Indian Buddhism, 213)"
In addition the Mahaparinirvana Sutra is on the Internet. Dr. Tony Page runs the site.
http://www.nirvanasutra.org.uk/
I think what it boils down to is that Buddhists disagree as to what the Buddha taught. Jodo Shinshu, for example, accepts the great self whereas Theravadins base the teaching on non-self or in Pali, anattâ.
I have been on both sides of the issue. Recently I completed reading the published dissertation of Steven Collins, Selfless Persons. I am not convinced he made a good case for accepting the Thervada dogma of non-self which attempts to refute any idea of a changeless subject. One simple matter he has overlooked concerns the Bodhisat in the Jatakas.
The rebirths of the Bodhisat (Skt. bodhisattva) in the Jataka stories demonstrate continuity. In the Jatakas, the Buddha will say, speaking on behalf of the Bodhisat, “ I was then 'X' or I was then ‘Y’”. In the Jatakas themselves, we observe the repeated survival of the self-same Bodhisat who is reborn into a number different forms. The genealogical path the Bodhisat takes is one of perfecting himself, going through the paramitas; eventually winding up as Buddha.
Love ya'll
Bobby
Can one wind up as ( become ) a buudha, or is it that threw such pratices one comes to the full expression of thier buddha nature?:winkc:
This statement seems suspect to me, as it is regarded in the Pali Suttas that the Buddha did not withhold information or teachings from his disciples. To state that this Sutra got missed or were too advanced for disciples such as MahaKassapa seems downright strange. So, while I think that this Sutra may suit certain people quite well, I would in no way consider it as more authoritative than other sutras/suttas (as the website so boldly claims, at least in regards to the other Mahayana Sutras).
Now, as you said, different schools disagree, and appeal to different types. However, the buddha said not to cling to any doctrine which absolutely states 'there is a self' or 'there is no self'. There are some schools that do highlight the teaching of the Tathagatagarbha (womb of the thus come one) & Buddha-dhatu (buddha-nature), but it is questionable whether they regard Buddha-dhatu as an eternal, unchanging 'Self'. Now, the Yogachara school of Buddhism posits a an AlayaVijnana (storehouse consciousness) which contains all past impressions of all the lives of a particular nama-rupa stream. However, I would argue that this does not mean the Alayavijnana is somehow other than our current consciousness. That would be necessarily dualistic. I would also say it does not necessitate some permanent, fixed, self-existent Atman; but rather, only necessitates that there are successive karmic events that carry over from one rupa-continuum to another. Now, if you simply regard 'Atman' as a convenient concept to denote the uncreated, unconditioned reality, and recognize that concepts & viewpoints are not to be clung to, then I don't have much of a problem with what you are saying. However, if you are declaring that the Buddha implicitly proclaimed an Atman identicle to that of the Upanishads, then I say you have gone too far & are distorting the teachings to fit your predisposition.
Honestly, I feel that taking absolute positions in regard to the existence or non-existence of a Self is not only unneccessary, but is arguably incorrect practice. Clinging to views is repudiated by the buddha & is a hindrance to practice, in my understanding & experience. Views, by definition, are conditioned phenomena and are dependent upon ignorance for their formation. They are also subject to change. Putting too much stock into any view is inadviseable. Granted, they have their utility, but that utility is always limited. So, that said, I think you have some legitimacy in your argument that some Abhidhammists go too far in their application of anatta and border on an annihilationist doctrine, but that does not mean that you are not going too far in the other direction.
Nonetheless, as strange as it may seem, no such thing as a permanent, individual Atman need be asserted here to explain the process of rebirth & the culmination of Buddhahood. It may be convenient for the sake of thinking & speaking, but it is not essential or absolutely correct to do so.
_/\_
metta
While always interesting, I am once again going to step aside of this discussion for the time being. The first reason is that I have nothing new to add as I have already covered these points in the past. I would simply be regurgitating what I have previously contributed; and if it did nothing to change people's minds then, it will certainly not do anything to change them now.
The second reason is that I have limited myself to studying the teachings preserved in the Pali Canon, and any discussions that go out side of this particular body of literature are beyond my range of knowledge. I simply do not feel comfortable enough in my knowledge of other traditions and their teachings, as well as Sanskrit, to offer anything worthwhile in this area.
The third and final reason (for those of you who care) is that I am simply bored of this entire topic. It has certainly served its purpose, and produced some very entertaining dialogues; however, it has continued to repeat the same points and references ad nauseum. As the old saying goes, we are beating a dead horse. Although, I must thank you all for being civil.
Sincerely,
Jason