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The word sakkaya, which is often translated as personality, self-identity, or existing group, is said to correspond to the Sanskrit word sat-kaya (existing group). In the suttas, it is used as another name for the five clinging-aggregates. It is most widely known for its use in the compound sakkaya-ditthi (self-identification view). In relation to this self-identification view, it refers to a belief of self tied in with one or all of the five clinging-aggregates that is only abandoned with stream-entry.
The tenth book of the Khuddakanikaya is called the Jataka which is supposed to contain, by definition, tales of the Buddha's previous births. The canonical Jataka book comprises 6653 verses, constituting 547 Jatakas. The Jatakas have been grouped under twenty-two nipatas, depending on the number of verses in each nipata. In majority of verses there is no story, neither in prose nor in verse. The shorter Jatakas are but teachings of moral or religious precepts, or even of some practical knowledge, but in some verses there are hints to background stories. The Vidhurajataka (no. 545) and the Vessantarajataka (no. 547) present complete outlines of the tales. The gathas of the Jataka book must have been associated with suitable stories in oral tradition, most probably in languages other than Pali. The Pali gathas have only been preserved in the canon and later on the author of the Jatakatthakatha built the grand edifice of the Jataka stories on the foundation of these gathas with the help of the oral and written traditions prevalent in India and Sri Lanka. *
You might also want to read the introduction to The Illustrated Jataka: Other Stories of the Buddha by C.B. Varma for some more detailed information. I think that these two references cover everything concerning your questions regarding the Jataka stories as well as verses. I hope that this is what you were looking for.
Elohim, Sakkaya is not translated as 'self-identity' in the PTS Dictionary. I.B. Horner translates sakkaya as "own body" throughout the Majjhima-Nikaya. It is primarily fungible with the five khandhas. The view of sakkaya arises, in fact, when one believes a khandha to be the self. On the other hand, when one assumes that the self is not a khandha, the view of sakkaya does not come about.
I am aware that certain translators tend to translate sakkaya based on the assumption that it correspnds to the Sanskrit word sva-kaya (own body, own group). However, according to the commentaries, it corresponds to the Sanskrit word sat-kaya (exisiting group), which makes sense to me since khandha can be translated as existing group, groups of clinging, et cetera.
At any rate, I already said that, "In the suttas, sakkaya is used as another name for the five clinging-aggregates. It is most widely known for its use in the compound sakkaya-ditthi (self-identification view). In relation to this self-identification view, it refers to a belief of self tied in with one or all of the five clinging-aggregates that is only abandoned with stream-entry."
But just on a side not, the Jataka stories are not canonical, only the Jataka verses are.
Jason
I have trouble following you here. Afaik, Jataka refers
1.) To a set of books of the Pali Canon
2.) To a variety of non-canoncial literature of the same genre
When I look to my online Jakarta Edition of the canon, there are 22 books, many of them contain not only verses for educational purposes, but also much story material. Are you saying that within the books, the verses are canonical or authorative, the story lines around them not?
Elohim, The problematic is how do you get 'self-identity' from sat-kaya. 'Self' is simply not there. Nor is the notion of identity—let alone self-identity or self-identification.
In breaking down sakkaya, 'sat' can be rendered as existential while kâyo is 'aggregate'. Hence, sakkaya refers to the aggregates which are not the self. This is abundantly clear in the Culavedalla Sutta (44) of the Majjhima-Nikaya.
I think this breakdown of the word "sakkaya" is one of those details that was probably needed in this lengthy discussion. "existing body/aggregate" seems the fittest translation whereas more fanciful creations, as Bobby pointed out, such as "self-identity", result in the not-uncommon but nonetheless sloppy and misleading idea that "sakkaya ditthi" is acceptably seen as generically meaning "Self-view".
So, sakkayaditthi is view of self derived through the murky vantage of the existing aggregate aka the five aggregates of existing personality, or even more literally "view of existing personality". This is a very limited vantage point on a number of levels, one being that if my view of self is derived entirely from this existing aggregate, it annihilates any understanding of previous forms of existence and of the fate (because my concern then, is whether or not this being I think I am now will fare on or be annihilated) of this form---leading to such doctrines as sassatavada (the perpetuity of some one or more elements of the existing aggregates as self) and ucchedavada (the view of the annihilation of some one or more elements of the existing aggregates as self). Each view, as most tend to, has a grain of truth but is fundamentally wrong on the basis of the error of sakkayaditthi, the view that the self is the existing personality structure. The grain of truth of the sassatavada is the eternity of the self, but its error is a failure to extract the self from the aggregates, and so taking one or some of the aggregates to be eternal. The grain of truth of the ucchedavada is the impermanence of the aggregates, but its error is the same: failure to extract the self from the the aggregates, and so taking the self to be impermanent. So we see each of the two extremes of sakkayaditthi grasp half the truth and, as is canonically asserted, owe their basis to the identification of self with the existing personality structure, as if they mirror each other. The whole truth is derived from erasing the basic error from a superimposition of the two extremes.
I do believe Bobby's idea that to say of the existing aggregate "this is not my Self" in the affirmative is not an expression of sakkaya ditthi is correct.
I see no problem at all all. I guess that we'll just have to agree to disagree about this one. I have no reason to believe that the ancient commentaries are wrong about this. As for the rest, the point that sakkaya is another term that is used for the clinging-aggregates, I think that we have already covered this multiple times. That is the only thing that is not in question here. Perhaps we could move on?
I apologize for not being clear enough. As far as I know (which means that I could be wrong), the Jataka verses are canonical, but the stories that go with the verses are not part of the canon itself but are considered to be post-canonical commentarial literature. It is the same as with the Dhammapada and its commentary. I am not saying that one is authoritative and one is not authoritative, but I am saying that one is canonical and one is post-canonical. That, however, is as much as I know.
...................... I am not saying that one is authoritative and one is not authoritative, but I am saying that one is canonical and one is post-canonical. That, however, is as much as I know.
I think that it is fairly obvious, but I shall try to humor you once again. The Jataka verses are canonical, which means that they are officially a part of the Pali Canon. The verses are accepted as being buddhavacana (word of the Buddha), whereas the prose portions are regarded as being atthakatha (commentarial).
If you want to have a doctrinal discussion or debate, it is good to know what is the word of the Buddha and what is not in such a discussion or debate. This does not mean that what is canonical is automatically more authoritative than what is commentarial, but what is canonical should certainly carry more weight.
The Jataka verses are canonical, which means that they are officially a part of the Pali Canon. The verses are accepted as being buddhavacana (word of the Buddha), whereas the prose portions are regarded as being atthakatha (commentarial).
Past actions themselves do not have any identity (although we may easily think they are products of one), and yet they are capable of ripening as future results.
Sorry, but this is not correct. Causes and results arise simultaneously. It is only our deluded perception that perceives the results as ripening at some future time.
No, I never use Wikipedia articles as my source since I perspnally feel that they are completely unreliable. Anyone can add and edit information; and as such, one never knows who the information is coming from or how acurrate such information really is. Concering the Jataka, some of my sources are Lance Cousins, Prof. Richard Hayes, Dr. Radha Banerjee, and C.B. Varma.
Perhaps you are correct, and I think that this idea on its own would be a great idea for another thread. Nevertheless, as far as my knowledge of the suttas goes, I am not aware that they ever make this distinction. For example, it states that, "And what is the result of kamma? The result of kamma is of three sorts, I tell you: that which arises right here & now, that which arises later [in this lifetime], and that which arises following that. This is called the result of kamma" (AN 6.63).
There is also another example in the suttas where it states that, ""Now what, monks, is old kamma? The eye is to be seen as old kamma, fabricated & willed, capable of being felt. The ear... The nose... The tongue... The body... The intellect is to be seen as old kamma, fabricated & willed, capable of being felt. This is called old kamma. And what is new kamma? Whatever kamma one does now with the body, with speech, or with the intellect: This is called new kamma" (SN 35.145).
Well, that doesn't really differ from what I said. The result appears to ripen at a later time, but really they arise interdependently. That's something my teacher has drilled into us time and time again. The only reason we're not aware of that is because of our deluded dualistic belief in time and space. As another teacher said, if we could immediately experience the results of our actions as we're doing them, we'd never do most of what we do! Like if we step on a bug, if we could experience simultaneously the feeling of our chests being crushed and our ribs snapping, we wouldn't do it in the first place!
I do not see where what you said "doesn`t really differ" from what Jason posted in #617, since there cleary is a distinction made between past, present and future. Are you suggesting that the Buddha said that space and time are merely a priori fictions to our experience, creating an illusion of cause and effect (before and after) and that there is a way to experience without space, time and causality?
I do believe Bobby's idea that to say of the existing aggregate "this is not my Self" in the affirmative is not an expression of sakkaya ditthi is correct.
I think regarding the aggregates not as the self is undoubtedly correct. However, in the Buddhist dictionary of Nyanatiloka(http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/s_t/sakkaaya_ditthi.htm)I found this long ago, and I must say (11-15) still confuses me:
* (1-5) the belief to be identical with corporeality, feeling, perception, mental formations or consciousness;
* (6-10) to be contained in them;
* (11-15) to be independent of them;
* (16-20) to be the owner of them (M.44; S.XXII.1).
I do not see where what you said "doesn`t really differ" from what Jason posted in #617, since there cleary is a distinction made between past, present and future. Are you suggesting that the Buddha said that space and time are merely a priori fictions to our experience, creating an illusion of cause and effect (before and after) and that there is a way to experience without space, time and causality?
Regards
Of course they're illusions, fofoo, and yes, there is a way to experience without space, time and causality. That's what it's all about.
Palzang
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federicaSeeker of the clear blue sky...Its better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubtModerator
edited February 2007
What comforts me, personally, is that I'm slowly beginning to understand what people are saying... I get palzang's comment on actions and results arising simultaneously, even though Elohim also clearly explains the sequential view as expounded by the Buddha....
(and here's me thinking we were discussing a food colouring berry....)
But it's all good discussion, and I applaud you all for your coherent and "even-tempered" contributions.
Of course they're illusions, fofoo, and yes, there is a way to experience without space, time and causality. That's what it's all about.
Palzang
Palzang,
You are going to fast for me! For now, I "side" with Nyanatiloka concerning paticcasamuppāda, who insisted that it is fixed on 3 different births/lifes, and who rejected Dahlke and his simultaneity of all 12 parts constructing one single karmic moment. Perhaps this is the right time to start a thread on paticcasamuppāda, if not already there exists one.
I've got no idea what "patticasamuppada" is. All I know is what my teacher tells me, and that's quite sufficient for me. I really don't get into the academic analysis of sutras and so forth. Completely uninteresting to me. For me, Buddhism is much more right-brain than left. Guess I'm just a mystic at heart!
As a Ch'an practitioner, and therefore essentially a Mahayanist, I find the Pali Cannon a source of never ending inspiration! And things are not always what they seem. There is an assumption in the Mahayana that all phenomena are 'empty' of any substantial 'thing'.
"Form is void, void is form" - as the Buddha spoke in the Heart Sutra.
Nagarjuna and many other great thinkers developed the 'Sunyata' philosophy to ever greater degrees. However, it became clear to me, upon even a brief association with the Pali literature - that quite a different interpretation was being presented. Sunyata in the Pali Cannon, referred only to the Mind inself being 'free' of any objective character, including being 'free' of anything that could be called a 'self'. Hence the 'anatta' doctrine, or 'no-soul' theory. The external, physical world is not presented as 'empty' in the Pali Cannon.
When the Buddha teaches, He is usually speaking to members of the Sangha, who are exempt from social duties, usually applicable to Hindu people. The Hindu state (and it must be remebered that the Buddha was a Hindu), allowed for religious groups to be self-governed and self-policed, providing that the group did not work toward the over-throwing of the state or disrupt the status quo. This shows that the Buddha did not, at the time of His physical presence, teach the 'emptiness' philosophy beyond that of the confines of the Mind that is to be 'liberated'.
Lay Buddhists were/are expected to integrate their Buddhist practice into their everyday lives, in a peaceful manner. This is still very much the rule. The anatta doctrine refers to the Mind - where the Buddha said he could not find anything that he could call a 'soul'. This is 'soul' from the Hindu perspective. Inshort, there is no Hindu soul concept, as it existed at the time of the Buddha's physical life, in the philosophy that He advocated, based upon His deep and profound enlightenment.
Having said this, it is also obvious that the idea that 'all' is empty, is implicit in the Buddha's philosophy. A Mind that is empty of all discriminating factors - will perceive all phenomena that it experiences, as equally 'empty' of any underlying substantiality. This is the Mahayana development of the pali philosophy. It is a logical progression. The anatta doctrine is really a developmental clue as how to proceed in one's development. The transcendence of the ego - leads to perception of emptiness. The ego is the essence of a sense of 'self', but it should not be confused with a theocratic 'soul', that usually stands outside of the Mind and body, whilst mysteriously being associated with it. Both the Mahayana and the Pali tradition agree on this - the ego must be transcended, but not mistaken for a 'soul', as a 'soul' does not exist - according to Buddha, and those who have thoroughly explored their Minds and broke the cycle of dualistic suffering.
Having said this, it is also obvious that the idea that 'all' is empty, is implicit in the Buddha's philosophy. A Mind that is empty of all discriminating factors - will perceive all phenomena that it experiences, as equally 'empty' of any underlying substantiality. This is the Mahayana development of the pali philosophy. It is a logical progression. The anatta doctrine is really a developmental clue as how to proceed in one's development. The transcendence of the ego - leads to perception of emptiness. The ego is the essence of a sense of 'self', but it should not be confused with a theocratic 'soul', that usually stands outside of the Mind and body, whilst mysteriously being associated with it. Both the Mahayana and the Pali tradition agree on this - the ego must be transcended, but not mistaken for a 'soul', as a 'soul' does not exist - according to Buddha, and those who have thoroughly explored their Minds and broke the cycle of dualistic suffering.
Thank you.
I am not sure if it is offensive when I ask the following question. I think i perceive an artifical need of mostly Western Buddhists to seperate themselves from what they consider "Hinduism". It goes so far that they claim that "the whole universe manifests in oneself", yet they denounce one instantly as "hindu" or "Vedantin" when one wants to discuss tat tvam asi. Maybe this hefty need to distiungish Buddhists from Hindus springs from the same source as the"theocratic" body/soul dualism of many western people, I don`t know.
But now the question,do you consider the following , which i found in Elliot Deutsch`s book about Advaita Vedanta as "Hindu", "not Buddhist"?
"Atman (or paramatman) for Advaita Vedanta, is that pure, undifferentiated self-shining conciusness, timless, spaceless, and unthinkable, that is not different from Brahman and that underlies and supports the individual human Person"
But now the question,do you consider the following , which i found in Elliot Deutsch`s book about Advaita Vedanta as "Hindu", "not Buddhist"?
"Atman (or paramatman) for Advaita Vedanta, is that pure, undifferentiated self-shining conciusness, timless, spaceless, and unthinkable, that is not different from Brahman and that underlies and supports the individual human Person"
Dear fofoo
Thank you very much for your kind words and informative post. I suppose I better start my answer by saying that the Buddha was a Hindu. It is generally agreed, that it was the Hindu spiritual authorities that distanced themselves from Buddha and His message, and not necessarily the Buddha who 'rejected' Hinduism outright. Infact, even in the Pali Cannon, the Buddha speaks quite openly about the existance of Hindu Gods (see ), and mentions in the Dhammapada, the Hindu God Indra as a Protector of those who follow the Dhamma.
Interestingly enough, many assume that the Buddha was openly opposed to 'caste', however, this is not as it would seem. It is true that the Sangha (i.e. community of sramanas), did not adhere to either social duty, or indeed social caste. In other words, the community of 'ordained' Bhikkhus did not refer to one another by their birth caste, but rather by the length of time one had spent as a Bhikkhu - as time served, seems to have been equated with an assumption that one knew more about the Dhamma, than beginners.
But this situation is not unique to Buddhism. At that time in north India, it was common for reliigous groups to be granted a small piece of land (sangharama) by the ruling monarch, so that they could live and practice their path unhindered by worldly concerns. This meant of course, a natural freedom from the duties of caste. The Buddha was approached by King (Bimbisara?), for assurances that the Buddhist Sangha would not cause disruption within society, through its lay followers. The Buddha agreed, and made it clear that the lay-followers had to obey the law of the land they lived in, whilst practicing their Buddhism. Exemption from caste therefore, applied only to monastics, and not the greater society as a whole, and certainly not to lay followers.
The Buddha probably saw himself as a reforming Hindu. The problem was compounded by the apparent conflict of philosophy between the Buddha's self-sufficient way, and the Brahman's method of controlling society through ritual - ritual that only they could perform. As various rulers became Buddhist, then so did their kingdoms, and I suspect that the social caste system became undermined as a consequence. This was probably caused by the practice of instructions for monks, by lay people. The sutras are there for all of us to read of course, and the wisdom contained therein is very helpful. However, the underlying assumption for a monk or nun, is one of social equality, whereas for a lay-person, the assumption is quite different. A lay-person must honour all his/her duties to the state, whilst 'integrating the practice into their everyday lives.
Today, Hinduism has made a tentative step toward re-absorbing Buddhism back into the Hindu pantheon. The Budha is viewed as an avatar of Lord Vishnu, and when I was staying in Sri Lanka, one of the forest viharas openly celebrated Vishu, along side the Buddha.
If we view the philosophy of 'Buddhism' as a strand of Hindu thought, then, like ALL strands of Hindu thought, it would be distinctive and clearly 'different' from the other strands of Hindu thought. The Advaita Vedanta philosophy you quote, is of that particular strand of Hindu thought, whilst Buddhism might be contrued as of another, independent strand of Hindu thought. However, to the practicing Buddhist, (as, I suspect to the ordinary practicing Hindu), where one's philosophy actually appears in a pantheon of other philosopies is probably not an issue of concern.
The spread of Buddhism must also be taken into account. India had an empire that spread all over southeast Asia. Places like Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and Java all had Hindu colonies and socially replicated the caste system. China, Vietnam, Korea and Japan never experienced Hinduism or Hindu colonialism - Buddhism arrived in these countries free of the Hindu social programming that gave rise to it. This might explain, at least in part, why buddhism appears to be 'separate' from Hinduism. For many of the countries that adopted Buddhism, it was quite 'free' from any Hindu influence. Rather like how Christianity is viewed by most Christians as 'non-Jewish'.
The Pali Cannon teaches that the Mind is empty. If this is so, then presumably it is free of 'soul'. I would be very interested to hear your views on this matter.
Welcome to the discussion. While I find your reading of the Nikayan philosophy interesting and suprising, I must say you post some things I don't find myself in agreement with. I hope you don't mind my briefly discussing them.
I think your distinction between the Pali philosophy and the Mahayana philosophy of emptiness is somewhat oversimplified and not technically correct when you speak of the Pali side. Let's first get out of the way that the word "empty" and its forms (Suñña in Pali) is not only used in one sense in the Pali literature but rather it is a neutral word whose message pivots on what it is referred to and in what context. In my experience there are at least four principle usages.
The first usage is pedestrian, meaning empty as in just empty, (as in "an uninhabited Palace of Brahma" (D i.17), an uninhabited forest, an empty hut, etc). In most of these contexts, no special religious meaning is intended, though on occasion in similes its meaning also embraces the further meanings we will discuss.
The second usage is used primarily when someone comes to the Buddha to debate or challenge his teaching, and the Buddha reveals Socratically that the person's view is confused or mistaken. In these cases the Buddha describes that person as "empty and useless" meaning they do not grasp the Dhamma, they are unwise, uninstructed, on the wrong path. Once again we are not yet to the essential teachings of emptiness.
A third sense, and indeed the most common sense of "empty" in the Pali Nikayas is probably what you describe as the Mahayana elaboration together with certain elements of what you describe as the Pali basis. That being the emptiness of all phenomena, with particular emphasis on emptiness of personal factors (the five khandhas, which include physical forms, objective factors). This is described in the Phena sutta as discussed far up thread, as well as in numerous other suttas. This meaning, I would argue, is primarily for the purpose of laying out the soteriological uselessness of that which is said to be empty, of teaching the correct attitude (ie that of non-clinging) towards that which is said to be empty. "Empty," therefore, in this sense is the word that encapsulates the three marks of impermanence, suffering, and anatta. That which is described in this way is "a phenomena for abandoning" "to be scattered," etc. So it is on this point that I disagree with you. Rather than the Pali teachings not emphasizing or even explicitly stating that "all" phenomena are empty of Self, in fact, this is among the most common explicit and insistent themes of the Pali literature.
Finally, the fourth proceeds naturally from the previous not in the sense of philosophical elaboration of the principle but rather as the practice urged by it. This sense is revealed most vividly in the Maha-Sunnata sutta of the Mahjjima Nikaya (122). It describes the mind of one who is abides in contemplation, the mind that does not cling to anything and is therefore empty of, as you put it, characteristics, is pure, shining, fixed, steady, permanent, and a whole list of other ways of describing it that take it beyond the defiled realm of the three marks which has been abandoned.
Now we get into the controversial territory that has propelled so much verbiage on this thread. This, the ultimate usage of emptiness, I would say, is that which is empty of other (rather than empty of self), is the noble Self which we define not in reference to the five aggregates as some kind of characteristic (the characteristic of self?) but which is defined negatively as that which they cannot be owing to the three marks (anatta means not-self). It is only known by the peace of Nibbana, which is "empty" (of non-self characteristics).
So briefly: Non-Self is empty of Self and should be viewed with non-clinging, and non-clinging is that very self which is empty of other (empty of that which is non-self). From a Mahayana/Vajrayana perspective, this particular philosophy of emptiness is taught in the form of Shentong teaching (of the formerly "lost" Jonang school of Tibet) and in the so-called Tathagata-garbha series of sutras.
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. There is a Jonang Foundation website: http://jonangfoundation.org/ devoted to the preservation of the heritage of this unique Tibetan school.
Thank you so much for your comments. I do not agree or disagree with what you, but accept it all openly and willingly. I appreciate your kind efforts in this matter. Who would have thought that emptiness would be so complicated!:)
I have to teach now, but when I get some spare time, I will give your interesting post the full attetion it deserves.
This thread - and all its 'verbiage' (LOL) - has been a source of much reflection for me. Your last posting is most useful. Above all I should like to thank you for the link to the Jonang Foundation: a beautiful and informative site with some wonderful pictures.
Welcome to the discussion. While I find your reading of the Nikayan philosophy interesting and suprising, I must say you post some things I don't find myself in agreement with. I hope you don't mind my briefly discussing them.
Thank you for your welcome. I have not mentioned the Nikayas specifically, but would include the Vinaya and the Abhiddhamma literature in a general sense (piecing together relevant strands of philosophical thought, as they become apparent). Whether you 'disagree' or 'agree' with what eminates from my keyboard/stroke Mind, is entirely your own affair, but I am very grateful that you even bother to read it - so thank you.
I think your distinction between the Pali philosophy and the Mahayana philosophy of emptiness is somewhat oversimplified and not technically correct when you speak of the Pali side. Let's first get out of the way that the word "empty" and its forms (Suñña in Pali) is not only used in one sense in the Pali literature but rather it is a neutral word whose message pivots on what it is referred to and in what context. In my experience there are at least four principle usages.
The crux of the matter, seems to be based upon and error, or at the very least, a misunderstanding. I have not, as yet, drawn any 'distinction' between the 'Mahayna' and the 'Pali Cannon'. The 'emptiness (i.e. 'sunnata/sunyata') I consider exactly the same in concept, as it eminates from exactly the same teacher. The cursory comments I have made, are designed to draw the reader's attention to merely one aspect of Mahayana philosophy, and where it might be construed as 'developing' or 'extrapolating' upon or even away from the Pali Cannon. This does not, in itself, constitute a drawing of a 'distinction' between the Pali Cannon and the Mahayana as you assert. Infact, purely as a matter of interest, the academic Florin Sutton, in his rather excellent book entitled 'Existence and Enlightenment in the Lankavatara-sutra', is of the opinion that the enlightenment referred to in this Mahayana sutra, is purely the 'emptiness of the Mind - in accordance with the Plai Cannon, and does not extend its meaning to include the 'emptiness' of all phenomena 'outside' of the Mind. Between this Mahayana sutra (and possibly even the Mahayana Yogacara School), and the Pali Cannon, no discernable 'distinction' is possible or perceivable. The point being that the Mahayana and the Pali Cannon share a common root and sometimes a common expression. And like branches on the same tree, ultra-conservative Theravada Schools, and ultra-liberal Mahayana Schools, give the 'appearance' of being 'different' and indeed 'distinctive'. The differences by and large, appear only in the Mind of the perceiver, etc.
The first usage is pedestrian, meaning empty as in just empty, (as in "an uninhabited Palace of Brahma" (D i.17), an uninhabited forest, an empty hut, etc). In most of these contexts, no special religious meaning is intended, though on occasion in similes its meaning also embraces the further meanings we will discuss.
The second usage is used primarily when someone comes to the Buddha to debate or challenge his teaching, and the Buddha reveals Socratically that the person's view is confused or mistaken. In these cases the Buddha describes that person as "empty and useless" meaning they do not grasp the Dhamma, they are unwise, uninstructed, on the wrong path. Once again we are not yet to the essential teachings of emptiness.
A third sense, and indeed the most common sense of "empty" in the Pali Nikayas is probably what you describe as the Mahayana elaboration together with certain elements of what you describe as the Pali basis. That being the emptiness of all phenomena, with particular emphasis on emptiness of personal factors (the five khandhas, which include physical forms, objective factors). This is described in the Phena sutta as discussed far up thread, as well as in numerous other suttas. This meaning, I would argue, is primarily for the purpose of laying out the soteriological uselessness of that which is said to be empty, of teaching the correct attitude (ie that of non-clinging) towards that which is said to be empty. "Empty," therefore, in this sense is the word that encapsulates the three marks of impermanence, suffering, and anatta. That which is described in this way is "a phenomena for abandoning" "to be scattered," etc. So it is on this point that I disagree with you. Rather than the Pali teachings not emphasizing or even explicitly stating that "all" phenomena are empty of Self, in fact, this is among the most common explicit and insistent themes of the Pali literature.
Finally, the fourth proceeds naturally from the previous not in the sense of philosophical elaboration of the principle but rather as the practice urged by it. This sense is revealed most vividly in the Maha-Sunnata sutta of the Mahjjima Nikaya (122). It describes the mind of one who is abides in contemplation, the mind that does not cling to anything and is therefore empty of, as you put it, characteristics, is pure, shining, fixed, steady, permanent, and a whole list of other ways of describing it that take it beyond the defiled realm of the three marks which has been abandoned.
To add clarity to our discussion, by the term 'sunna', I will assume you are referring to the Pali 'sunnata' (and the Sanskrit 'Sunyata'), and proceed from this point. I would like to start this section of my reply with a quote;
'It seems to me that the early Mahayana emphasis on emptiness as meaning nirvana and the middle way of conditioned genesis is quite different from what we find in early Buddhism. Early Buddhism focuses on observing the nature of life as "impermanent" (anicca) and "suffering" (dukkha), in order to realise that all phenomena are "not self" (anatta), and thus attain nirvana (nibanna).'
(The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism: By Choong Mun-Keat, pages 2/3)
The four classes of emptiness that you have elucidated, I am in full agreement with - with the caveat that the term 'emptiness' maybe used in others, not yet mentioned.
Now we get into the controversial territory that has propelled so much verbiage on this thread. This, the ultimate usage of emptiness, I would say, is that which is empty of other (rather than empty of self), is the noble Self which we define not in reference to the five aggregates as some kind of characteristic (the characteristic of self?) but which is defined negatively as that which they cannot be owing to the three marks (anatta means not-self). It is only known by the peace of Nibbana, which is "empty" (of non-self characteristics).
So briefly: Non-Self is empty of Self and should be viewed with non-clinging, and non-clinging is that very self which is empty of other (empty of that which is non-self). From a Mahayana/Vajrayana perspective, this particular philosophy of emptiness is taught in the form of Shentong teaching (of the formerly "lost" Jonang school of Tibet) and in the so-called Tathagata-garbha series of sutras.
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. There is a Jonang Foundation website: http://jonangfoundation.org/ devoted to the preservation of the heritage of this unique Tibetan school.
You have employed some rather interesting foot work in this section of your post. And introduced not only the Mahayana, but also the Vajrayana at its conclusion. I am not adverse to this, and wil see what I can do in response. I will need to assess the last section of your post - part by part - to assist clarity:
This, the ultimate usage of emptiness, I would say, is that which is empty of other (rather than empty of self),.
I would argue that the ultimate usage of 'emptiness', is to be 'empty' of any intellectually constructed notion of 'emptiness'. The 'emptiness' that the concept sunatta refers to is an 'experiencial' emptiness - and not merely a clever idea, super-imposed upon phenomena, designed to make that phenomena more understandable, or indeed acceptable. The Mind is empty - even of the idea of emptiness.
Your statement 'empty of other (rather than empty of self)', presupposes the existance of a 'Self', defined by 'what it is not', rather than by 'what it might be'.
So briefly: Non-Self is empty of Self and should be viewed with non-clinging, and non-clinging is that very self which is empty of other (empty of that which is non-self). From a Mahayana/Vajrayana perspective, this particular philosophy of emptiness is taught in the form of Shentong teaching (of the formerly "lost" Jonang school of Tibet) and in the so-called Tathagata-garbha series of sutras. .
Your argument has swayed from the strict Pali orthodoxy, to liberal Vajrayanism. You have defined 'emptiness' in a number of ways, but the crux of your argument evolves around 'sunatta' being the 'emptiness' of certain phenomena - and what is left, you consider 'Self'. This is not the teaching within the Pali Cannon, but it is a teaching that is often seen in some Mahayana and virtualy all Vajrayana Schools. The implication being that the 'Greater Self', is the absence of a 'Lesser Self', etc. And what the Lord Buddha denied in the Pali Cannon was a 'Lesser Self', but what he was really doing was using 'Skillful Means' to strip the seeker's Mind of impure thought processes, so once 'stripped', all that would remain, would be the 'true self'. This is an interesting extrapolation, and many have considered it a pilosophical 'divergence' away from the original Buddhist message, toward a more mainstream Hindu bias, where 'atman' sneaks into Buddhist philosophy from the back door.
The 'Self' concept, the Lord Buddha considered (in the Pali Cannon), to be an erroneous, intellectual construct. A pre-enlightened intellect, can not possibly understand or comprehend what lies beyond it, or indeed 'through' it. Any constructs of 'Self', remain only a figment of the intellect/imagination, until the Mind is thoroughly penetrated with insight.
I actually think that the Buddha's 'silence' with regards to the questions from Vacchagotta, hints at this reality. If there is a 'Self', then it must be 'free' of any notion of intellectually created 'Self-ness', that is compounded by ego-ness, to create a sense of 'separate' and pemanent' 'Selfhood'. In short, whatever lies beyond the sense of 'Self', can not be truly described as 'Self'. And it is this philosophical point that underpins the teaching of 'anatta'. The Buddha is not 'denying' Self, nor equally is He giving permission to philosophically 'speculate' in a wild and disjointed manner. And it is 'between' these two extremes that we must sail our ships of discovering. The Self does not, and can not exist as 'Self', from the Buddhist philosophical perspective. Whatever 'it' is, is far more profound.
The Buddha's teaching on Anatta (no-soul/no-self) is certainly one of the most difficult of his teachings to grasp...partly because there is nothing to grab.;)
When the Buddha tells us that self is an illusion it seems to me that for most of us this seems absurd.
"What do you mean, I'm right here!"
Indeed, but what is this "I'm" that insists it is "right here" as it free floats through the continuum of space and time through this most august of Kalpas? You can name it, but names are just names...and to do so ia to form attachment to both name and form, so this too is incorrect.
First, there is no independent self, because all is interdependent- thus all is both empty (shunyata) and impermamnent (anicca). It is true that there is an entity named Dan Hettmannsperger, or "Validus" -but this "being" is made up of five aggregates which are at all times changing.
Interestingly, Quantum Physics has provided scientific proof that this is more true then we could have ever guessed. The old "atomic" theory of matter which stated that atoms are eternal and unchanging has now been totally disproven. We now understand that what we call an atom is not really understood to be a "thing" at all- but rather, an event. Even Black Holes, once thought to be eternal prisons of energy that were totally inert are now understood to leak energy as per the findings of Stephen Hawkings.
The Universe unfolds and reveals the truth as shown to us by all Buddhas and all Bodhisattvas in all dimensions and all world systems.:)
The Buddha's teaching on Anatta (not-self) is certainly one of the most difficult of his teachings to grasp partly because many misunderstand it as being 'no-self' and 'no-thing'.
When the Buddha tells us that self is an illusion, for most of us, we take an interest in this teaching (even if we have not realised it).
Although 'self' is an illusion, it does and can arise & it can influence the mind immensely. The illusion of 'self' is inherently linked to the occuring of suffering.
The Buddha discussed how the experiences of existence & non-existence arise. He taught the holding to either view of existence or non-existence is not the middle-way because the view of existence does not account for the cessation of things and the view of non-existence does not account for the arising of things.
By & large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by (takes as its object) a polarity, that of existence & non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'non-existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one.
'Everything exists': That is one extreme. 'Everything doesn't exist': That is a second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle: From ignorance as a requisite condition come fabricators,....etc, etc, etc...
First, there is no independent self, because all is interdependent- thus all is both empty (shunyata) and impermamnent (anicca). It is true that there is an entity named Dan Hettmannsperger, or "Validus" -but this "being" is made up of five aggregates which are at all times changing.
Are you saying there is an 'interdependent self'?
Are you saying the 'self' is made up of the five aggregates?
Validus, I just came across this interesting book, Process and Reality, by Whitehead. I haven't started reading it, yet, but it seems like something which may be up your alley.
Thanks...I'll check it out when I have time but honestly I'm reading too many different books right now to consider adding to my reading list. I just picked up The Perennial Philosophy, by Aldous Huxley and the writings of Meister Eckhart (Christian mystic from the 14th century).
Thank you very much for your kind words and informative post. I suppose I better start my answer by saying that the Buddha was a Hindu.
The Buddha was not a hindu at all. Hinduism did not exist at all in the Buddha's time.
The Buddha went his own way, which was quite apart from the way of beliefs and speculative views of those religions that eventually turned into hinduism.
The Buddha was not a hindu at all. Hinduism did not exist at all in the Buddha's time.
The Buddha went his own way, which was quite apart from the way of beliefs and speculative views of those religions that eventually turned into hinduism.
Well...Siddartha Gautama would not have recognized the word "Hindu" 2,600 years ago...but it is not inaccurate to call him a Hindu since that word denotes an ethnicity as much as a religion (There are Jews who don't believe in God...they are still "Jewish" nonetheless, agreed?). What we currently call "Hinduism" did exist in the time of the Buddha. The oldest religious text in the world is the Rig Veda, a Hindu scripture that pre-dates the Buddha by more then a 1,000 years.
Well...Siddartha Gautama would not have recognized the word "Hindu" 2,600 years ago...but it is not inaccurate to call him a Hindu since that word denotes an ethnicity as much as a religion (There are Jews who don't believe in God...they are still "Jewish" nonetheless, agreed?).
Your argument is equivocal. The Buddha never referred to himself or anyone else as "Hindu". Do you think we should now refer to all who consider themselves as Tibetans as "Chinese", since that country does not exist any more, and is now part of China and its culture?
What we currently call "Hinduism" did exist in the time of the Buddha. The oldest religious text in the world is the Rig Veda, a Hindu scripture that pre-dates the Buddha by more then a 1,000 years.
A scripture (later to be adopted by the Hindu religion) to which the Buddha did not subscribe, part of a group of constantly shifting religions and philosophies (later to become known as "Hinduism") to which the Buddha did not subscribe. Again, as I said, the Buddha walked His own path.
Comments
Love ya'll,
Bobby
The word sakkaya, which is often translated as personality, self-identity, or existing group, is said to correspond to the Sanskrit word sat-kaya (existing group). In the suttas, it is used as another name for the five clinging-aggregates. It is most widely known for its use in the compound sakkaya-ditthi (self-identification view). In relation to this self-identification view, it refers to a belief of self tied in with one or all of the five clinging-aggregates that is only abandoned with stream-entry.
Jason
You might also want to read the introduction to The Illustrated Jataka: Other Stories of the Buddha by C.B. Varma for some more detailed information. I think that these two references cover everything concerning your questions regarding the Jataka stories as well as verses. I hope that this is what you were looking for.
Jason
Love ya'll,
Bobby
I am aware that certain translators tend to translate sakkaya based on the assumption that it correspnds to the Sanskrit word sva-kaya (own body, own group). However, according to the commentaries, it corresponds to the Sanskrit word sat-kaya (exisiting group), which makes sense to me since khandha can be translated as existing group, groups of clinging, et cetera.
At any rate, I already said that, "In the suttas, sakkaya is used as another name for the five clinging-aggregates. It is most widely known for its use in the compound sakkaya-ditthi (self-identification view). In relation to this self-identification view, it refers to a belief of self tied in with one or all of the five clinging-aggregates that is only abandoned with stream-entry."
Jason
I have trouble following you here. Afaik, Jataka refers
1.) To a set of books of the Pali Canon
2.) To a variety of non-canoncial literature of the same genre
When I look to my online Jakarta Edition of the canon, there are 22 books, many of them contain not only verses for educational purposes, but also much story material. Are you saying that within the books, the verses are canonical or authorative, the story lines around them not?
Regards
In breaking down sakkaya, 'sat' can be rendered as existential while kâyo is 'aggregate'. Hence, sakkaya refers to the aggregates which are not the self. This is abundantly clear in the Culavedalla Sutta (44) of the Majjhima-Nikaya.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
So, sakkayaditthi is view of self derived through the murky vantage of the existing aggregate aka the five aggregates of existing personality, or even more literally "view of existing personality". This is a very limited vantage point on a number of levels, one being that if my view of self is derived entirely from this existing aggregate, it annihilates any understanding of previous forms of existence and of the fate (because my concern then, is whether or not this being I think I am now will fare on or be annihilated) of this form---leading to such doctrines as sassatavada (the perpetuity of some one or more elements of the existing aggregates as self) and ucchedavada (the view of the annihilation of some one or more elements of the existing aggregates as self). Each view, as most tend to, has a grain of truth but is fundamentally wrong on the basis of the error of sakkayaditthi, the view that the self is the existing personality structure. The grain of truth of the sassatavada is the eternity of the self, but its error is a failure to extract the self from the aggregates, and so taking one or some of the aggregates to be eternal. The grain of truth of the ucchedavada is the impermanence of the aggregates, but its error is the same: failure to extract the self from the the aggregates, and so taking the self to be impermanent. So we see each of the two extremes of sakkayaditthi grasp half the truth and, as is canonically asserted, owe their basis to the identification of self with the existing personality structure, as if they mirror each other. The whole truth is derived from erasing the basic error from a superimposition of the two extremes.
I do believe Bobby's idea that to say of the existing aggregate "this is not my Self" in the affirmative is not an expression of sakkaya ditthi is correct.
I see no problem at all all. I guess that we'll just have to agree to disagree about this one. I have no reason to believe that the ancient commentaries are wrong about this. As for the rest, the point that sakkaya is another term that is used for the clinging-aggregates, I think that we have already covered this multiple times. That is the only thing that is not in question here. Perhaps we could move on?
Jason
I apologize for not being clear enough. As far as I know (which means that I could be wrong), the Jataka verses are canonical, but the stories that go with the verses are not part of the canon itself but are considered to be post-canonical commentarial literature. It is the same as with the Dhammapada and its commentary. I am not saying that one is authoritative and one is not authoritative, but I am saying that one is canonical and one is post-canonical. That, however, is as much as I know.
Jason
Jason,
How do you construe the meaning of this?
I think that it is fairly obvious, but I shall try to humor you once again. The Jataka verses are canonical, which means that they are officially a part of the Pali Canon. The verses are accepted as being buddhavacana (word of the Buddha), whereas the prose portions are regarded as being atthakatha (commentarial).
If you want to have a doctrinal discussion or debate, it is good to know what is the word of the Buddha and what is not in such a discussion or debate. This does not mean that what is canonical is automatically more authoritative than what is commentarial, but what is canonical should certainly carry more weight.
Jason
Was this your source?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jataka
Here, btw, is a useful read of the Jataka problematic.
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ENG/win.htm
Love ya'all,
Bobby
Sorry, but this is not correct. Causes and results arise simultaneously. It is only our deluded perception that perceives the results as ripening at some future time.
Palzang
No, I never use Wikipedia articles as my source since I perspnally feel that they are completely unreliable. Anyone can add and edit information; and as such, one never knows who the information is coming from or how acurrate such information really is. Concering the Jataka, some of my sources are Lance Cousins, Prof. Richard Hayes, Dr. Radha Banerjee, and C.B. Varma.
Jason
Perhaps you are correct, and I think that this idea on its own would be a great idea for another thread. Nevertheless, as far as my knowledge of the suttas goes, I am not aware that they ever make this distinction. For example, it states that, "And what is the result of kamma? The result of kamma is of three sorts, I tell you: that which arises right here & now, that which arises later [in this lifetime], and that which arises following that. This is called the result of kamma" (AN 6.63).
There is also another example in the suttas where it states that, ""Now what, monks, is old kamma? The eye is to be seen as old kamma, fabricated & willed, capable of being felt. The ear... The nose... The tongue... The body... The intellect is to be seen as old kamma, fabricated & willed, capable of being felt. This is called old kamma. And what is new kamma? Whatever kamma one does now with the body, with speech, or with the intellect: This is called new kamma" (SN 35.145).
Regards,
Jason
Palzang
I do not see where what you said "doesn`t really differ" from what Jason posted in #617, since there cleary is a distinction made between past, present and future. Are you suggesting that the Buddha said that space and time are merely a priori fictions to our experience, creating an illusion of cause and effect (before and after) and that there is a way to experience without space, time and causality?
Regards
I think regarding the aggregates not as the self is undoubtedly correct. However, in the Buddhist dictionary of Nyanatiloka(http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/s_t/sakkaaya_ditthi.htm)I found this long ago, and I must say (11-15) still confuses me:
* (1-5) the belief to be identical with corporeality, feeling, perception, mental formations or consciousness;
* (6-10) to be contained in them;
* (11-15) to be independent of them;
* (16-20) to be the owner of them (M.44; S.XXII.1).
I think 1-15 are covered with DN1, BRAHMA-JâLA SUTTA (http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/1Digha-Nikaya/Digha1/01-brahmajala-e.html#q-001). Do you all think the above breakdown of sakkaya-dhitti is accurate or sufficient?
Regards
Of course they're illusions, fofoo, and yes, there is a way to experience without space, time and causality. That's what it's all about.
Palzang
(and here's me thinking we were discussing a food colouring berry....)
But it's all good discussion, and I applaud you all for your coherent and "even-tempered" contributions.
Thank you.
Palzang,
You are going to fast for me! For now, I "side" with Nyanatiloka concerning paticcasamuppāda, who insisted that it is fixed on 3 different births/lifes, and who rejected Dahlke and his simultaneity of all 12 parts constructing one single karmic moment. Perhaps this is the right time to start a thread on paticcasamuppāda, if not already there exists one.
Regards
Palzang
You know, the thing that makes Samsara go round. It`s translated in English I think as dependent origination /arising.
Regards
"Form is void, void is form" - as the Buddha spoke in the Heart Sutra.
Nagarjuna and many other great thinkers developed the 'Sunyata' philosophy to ever greater degrees. However, it became clear to me, upon even a brief association with the Pali literature - that quite a different interpretation was being presented. Sunyata in the Pali Cannon, referred only to the Mind inself being 'free' of any objective character, including being 'free' of anything that could be called a 'self'. Hence the 'anatta' doctrine, or 'no-soul' theory. The external, physical world is not presented as 'empty' in the Pali Cannon.
When the Buddha teaches, He is usually speaking to members of the Sangha, who are exempt from social duties, usually applicable to Hindu people. The Hindu state (and it must be remebered that the Buddha was a Hindu), allowed for religious groups to be self-governed and self-policed, providing that the group did not work toward the over-throwing of the state or disrupt the status quo. This shows that the Buddha did not, at the time of His physical presence, teach the 'emptiness' philosophy beyond that of the confines of the Mind that is to be 'liberated'.
Lay Buddhists were/are expected to integrate their Buddhist practice into their everyday lives, in a peaceful manner. This is still very much the rule. The anatta doctrine refers to the Mind - where the Buddha said he could not find anything that he could call a 'soul'. This is 'soul' from the Hindu perspective. Inshort, there is no Hindu soul concept, as it existed at the time of the Buddha's physical life, in the philosophy that He advocated, based upon His deep and profound enlightenment.
Having said this, it is also obvious that the idea that 'all' is empty, is implicit in the Buddha's philosophy. A Mind that is empty of all discriminating factors - will perceive all phenomena that it experiences, as equally 'empty' of any underlying substantiality. This is the Mahayana development of the pali philosophy. It is a logical progression. The anatta doctrine is really a developmental clue as how to proceed in one's development. The transcendence of the ego - leads to perception of emptiness. The ego is the essence of a sense of 'self', but it should not be confused with a theocratic 'soul', that usually stands outside of the Mind and body, whilst mysteriously being associated with it. Both the Mahayana and the Pali tradition agree on this - the ego must be transcended, but not mistaken for a 'soul', as a 'soul' does not exist - according to Buddha, and those who have thoroughly explored their Minds and broke the cycle of dualistic suffering.
Thank you.
Palzang
I am not sure if it is offensive when I ask the following question. I think i perceive an artifical need of mostly Western Buddhists to seperate themselves from what they consider "Hinduism". It goes so far that they claim that "the whole universe manifests in oneself", yet they denounce one instantly as "hindu" or "Vedantin" when one wants to discuss tat tvam asi. Maybe this hefty need to distiungish Buddhists from Hindus springs from the same source as the"theocratic" body/soul dualism of many western people, I don`t know.
But now the question,do you consider the following , which i found in Elliot Deutsch`s book about Advaita Vedanta as "Hindu", "not Buddhist"?
"Atman (or paramatman) for Advaita Vedanta, is that pure, undifferentiated self-shining conciusness, timless, spaceless, and unthinkable, that is not different from Brahman and that underlies and supports the individual human Person"
Dear fofoo
Thank you very much for your kind words and informative post. I suppose I better start my answer by saying that the Buddha was a Hindu. It is generally agreed, that it was the Hindu spiritual authorities that distanced themselves from Buddha and His message, and not necessarily the Buddha who 'rejected' Hinduism outright. Infact, even in the Pali Cannon, the Buddha speaks quite openly about the existance of Hindu Gods (see ), and mentions in the Dhammapada, the Hindu God Indra as a Protector of those who follow the Dhamma.
Interestingly enough, many assume that the Buddha was openly opposed to 'caste', however, this is not as it would seem. It is true that the Sangha (i.e. community of sramanas), did not adhere to either social duty, or indeed social caste. In other words, the community of 'ordained' Bhikkhus did not refer to one another by their birth caste, but rather by the length of time one had spent as a Bhikkhu - as time served, seems to have been equated with an assumption that one knew more about the Dhamma, than beginners.
But this situation is not unique to Buddhism. At that time in north India, it was common for reliigous groups to be granted a small piece of land (sangharama) by the ruling monarch, so that they could live and practice their path unhindered by worldly concerns. This meant of course, a natural freedom from the duties of caste. The Buddha was approached by King (Bimbisara?), for assurances that the Buddhist Sangha would not cause disruption within society, through its lay followers. The Buddha agreed, and made it clear that the lay-followers had to obey the law of the land they lived in, whilst practicing their Buddhism. Exemption from caste therefore, applied only to monastics, and not the greater society as a whole, and certainly not to lay followers.
The Buddha probably saw himself as a reforming Hindu. The problem was compounded by the apparent conflict of philosophy between the Buddha's self-sufficient way, and the Brahman's method of controlling society through ritual - ritual that only they could perform. As various rulers became Buddhist, then so did their kingdoms, and I suspect that the social caste system became undermined as a consequence. This was probably caused by the practice of instructions for monks, by lay people. The sutras are there for all of us to read of course, and the wisdom contained therein is very helpful. However, the underlying assumption for a monk or nun, is one of social equality, whereas for a lay-person, the assumption is quite different. A lay-person must honour all his/her duties to the state, whilst 'integrating the practice into their everyday lives.
Today, Hinduism has made a tentative step toward re-absorbing Buddhism back into the Hindu pantheon. The Budha is viewed as an avatar of Lord Vishnu, and when I was staying in Sri Lanka, one of the forest viharas openly celebrated Vishu, along side the Buddha.
If we view the philosophy of 'Buddhism' as a strand of Hindu thought, then, like ALL strands of Hindu thought, it would be distinctive and clearly 'different' from the other strands of Hindu thought. The Advaita Vedanta philosophy you quote, is of that particular strand of Hindu thought, whilst Buddhism might be contrued as of another, independent strand of Hindu thought. However, to the practicing Buddhist, (as, I suspect to the ordinary practicing Hindu), where one's philosophy actually appears in a pantheon of other philosopies is probably not an issue of concern.
The spread of Buddhism must also be taken into account. India had an empire that spread all over southeast Asia. Places like Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and Java all had Hindu colonies and socially replicated the caste system. China, Vietnam, Korea and Japan never experienced Hinduism or Hindu colonialism - Buddhism arrived in these countries free of the Hindu social programming that gave rise to it. This might explain, at least in part, why buddhism appears to be 'separate' from Hinduism. For many of the countries that adopted Buddhism, it was quite 'free' from any Hindu influence. Rather like how Christianity is viewed by most Christians as 'non-Jewish'.
The Pali Cannon teaches that the Mind is empty. If this is so, then presumably it is free of 'soul'. I would be very interested to hear your views on this matter.
Thank you
Welcome to the discussion. While I find your reading of the Nikayan philosophy interesting and suprising, I must say you post some things I don't find myself in agreement with. I hope you don't mind my briefly discussing them.
I think your distinction between the Pali philosophy and the Mahayana philosophy of emptiness is somewhat oversimplified and not technically correct when you speak of the Pali side. Let's first get out of the way that the word "empty" and its forms (Suñña in Pali) is not only used in one sense in the Pali literature but rather it is a neutral word whose message pivots on what it is referred to and in what context. In my experience there are at least four principle usages.
The first usage is pedestrian, meaning empty as in just empty, (as in "an uninhabited Palace of Brahma" (D i.17), an uninhabited forest, an empty hut, etc). In most of these contexts, no special religious meaning is intended, though on occasion in similes its meaning also embraces the further meanings we will discuss.
The second usage is used primarily when someone comes to the Buddha to debate or challenge his teaching, and the Buddha reveals Socratically that the person's view is confused or mistaken. In these cases the Buddha describes that person as "empty and useless" meaning they do not grasp the Dhamma, they are unwise, uninstructed, on the wrong path. Once again we are not yet to the essential teachings of emptiness.
A third sense, and indeed the most common sense of "empty" in the Pali Nikayas is probably what you describe as the Mahayana elaboration together with certain elements of what you describe as the Pali basis. That being the emptiness of all phenomena, with particular emphasis on emptiness of personal factors (the five khandhas, which include physical forms, objective factors). This is described in the Phena sutta as discussed far up thread, as well as in numerous other suttas. This meaning, I would argue, is primarily for the purpose of laying out the soteriological uselessness of that which is said to be empty, of teaching the correct attitude (ie that of non-clinging) towards that which is said to be empty. "Empty," therefore, in this sense is the word that encapsulates the three marks of impermanence, suffering, and anatta. That which is described in this way is "a phenomena for abandoning" "to be scattered," etc. So it is on this point that I disagree with you. Rather than the Pali teachings not emphasizing or even explicitly stating that "all" phenomena are empty of Self, in fact, this is among the most common explicit and insistent themes of the Pali literature.
Finally, the fourth proceeds naturally from the previous not in the sense of philosophical elaboration of the principle but rather as the practice urged by it. This sense is revealed most vividly in the Maha-Sunnata sutta of the Mahjjima Nikaya (122). It describes the mind of one who is abides in contemplation, the mind that does not cling to anything and is therefore empty of, as you put it, characteristics, is pure, shining, fixed, steady, permanent, and a whole list of other ways of describing it that take it beyond the defiled realm of the three marks which has been abandoned.
Now we get into the controversial territory that has propelled so much verbiage on this thread. This, the ultimate usage of emptiness, I would say, is that which is empty of other (rather than empty of self), is the noble Self which we define not in reference to the five aggregates as some kind of characteristic (the characteristic of self?) but which is defined negatively as that which they cannot be owing to the three marks (anatta means not-self). It is only known by the peace of Nibbana, which is "empty" (of non-self characteristics).
So briefly: Non-Self is empty of Self and should be viewed with non-clinging, and non-clinging is that very self which is empty of other (empty of that which is non-self). From a Mahayana/Vajrayana perspective, this particular philosophy of emptiness is taught in the form of Shentong teaching (of the formerly "lost" Jonang school of Tibet) and in the so-called Tathagata-garbha series of sutras.
in friendliness,
V.
p.s. There is a Jonang Foundation website: http://jonangfoundation.org/ devoted to the preservation of the heritage of this unique Tibetan school.
I have to teach now, but when I get some spare time, I will give your interesting post the full attetion it deserves.
Thank you.
This thread - and all its 'verbiage' (LOL) - has been a source of much reflection for me. Your last posting is most useful. Above all I should like to thank you for the link to the Jonang Foundation: a beautiful and informative site with some wonderful pictures.
Thank you for your welcome. I have not mentioned the Nikayas specifically, but would include the Vinaya and the Abhiddhamma literature in a general sense (piecing together relevant strands of philosophical thought, as they become apparent). Whether you 'disagree' or 'agree' with what eminates from my keyboard/stroke Mind, is entirely your own affair, but I am very grateful that you even bother to read it - so thank you.
The crux of the matter, seems to be based upon and error, or at the very least, a misunderstanding. I have not, as yet, drawn any 'distinction' between the 'Mahayna' and the 'Pali Cannon'. The 'emptiness (i.e. 'sunnata/sunyata') I consider exactly the same in concept, as it eminates from exactly the same teacher. The cursory comments I have made, are designed to draw the reader's attention to merely one aspect of Mahayana philosophy, and where it might be construed as 'developing' or 'extrapolating' upon or even away from the Pali Cannon. This does not, in itself, constitute a drawing of a 'distinction' between the Pali Cannon and the Mahayana as you assert. Infact, purely as a matter of interest, the academic Florin Sutton, in his rather excellent book entitled 'Existence and Enlightenment in the Lankavatara-sutra', is of the opinion that the enlightenment referred to in this Mahayana sutra, is purely the 'emptiness of the Mind - in accordance with the Plai Cannon, and does not extend its meaning to include the 'emptiness' of all phenomena 'outside' of the Mind. Between this Mahayana sutra (and possibly even the Mahayana Yogacara School), and the Pali Cannon, no discernable 'distinction' is possible or perceivable. The point being that the Mahayana and the Pali Cannon share a common root and sometimes a common expression. And like branches on the same tree, ultra-conservative Theravada Schools, and ultra-liberal Mahayana Schools, give the 'appearance' of being 'different' and indeed 'distinctive'. The differences by and large, appear only in the Mind of the perceiver, etc.
To add clarity to our discussion, by the term 'sunna', I will assume you are referring to the Pali 'sunnata' (and the Sanskrit 'Sunyata'), and proceed from this point. I would like to start this section of my reply with a quote;
'It seems to me that the early Mahayana emphasis on emptiness as meaning nirvana and the middle way of conditioned genesis is quite different from what we find in early Buddhism. Early Buddhism focuses on observing the nature of life as "impermanent" (anicca) and "suffering" (dukkha), in order to realise that all phenomena are "not self" (anatta), and thus attain nirvana (nibanna).'
(The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism: By Choong Mun-Keat, pages 2/3)
The four classes of emptiness that you have elucidated, I am in full agreement with - with the caveat that the term 'emptiness' maybe used in others, not yet mentioned.
You have employed some rather interesting foot work in this section of your post. And introduced not only the Mahayana, but also the Vajrayana at its conclusion. I am not adverse to this, and wil see what I can do in response. I will need to assess the last section of your post - part by part - to assist clarity:
I would argue that the ultimate usage of 'emptiness', is to be 'empty' of any intellectually constructed notion of 'emptiness'. The 'emptiness' that the concept sunatta refers to is an 'experiencial' emptiness - and not merely a clever idea, super-imposed upon phenomena, designed to make that phenomena more understandable, or indeed acceptable. The Mind is empty - even of the idea of emptiness.
Your statement 'empty of other (rather than empty of self)', presupposes the existance of a 'Self', defined by 'what it is not', rather than by 'what it might be'.
Your argument has swayed from the strict Pali orthodoxy, to liberal Vajrayanism. You have defined 'emptiness' in a number of ways, but the crux of your argument evolves around 'sunatta' being the 'emptiness' of certain phenomena - and what is left, you consider 'Self'. This is not the teaching within the Pali Cannon, but it is a teaching that is often seen in some Mahayana and virtualy all Vajrayana Schools. The implication being that the 'Greater Self', is the absence of a 'Lesser Self', etc. And what the Lord Buddha denied in the Pali Cannon was a 'Lesser Self', but what he was really doing was using 'Skillful Means' to strip the seeker's Mind of impure thought processes, so once 'stripped', all that would remain, would be the 'true self'. This is an interesting extrapolation, and many have considered it a pilosophical 'divergence' away from the original Buddhist message, toward a more mainstream Hindu bias, where 'atman' sneaks into Buddhist philosophy from the back door.
The 'Self' concept, the Lord Buddha considered (in the Pali Cannon), to be an erroneous, intellectual construct. A pre-enlightened intellect, can not possibly understand or comprehend what lies beyond it, or indeed 'through' it. Any constructs of 'Self', remain only a figment of the intellect/imagination, until the Mind is thoroughly penetrated with insight.
I actually think that the Buddha's 'silence' with regards to the questions from Vacchagotta, hints at this reality. If there is a 'Self', then it must be 'free' of any notion of intellectually created 'Self-ness', that is compounded by ego-ness, to create a sense of 'separate' and pemanent' 'Selfhood'. In short, whatever lies beyond the sense of 'Self', can not be truly described as 'Self'. And it is this philosophical point that underpins the teaching of 'anatta'. The Buddha is not 'denying' Self, nor equally is He giving permission to philosophically 'speculate' in a wild and disjointed manner. And it is 'between' these two extremes that we must sail our ships of discovering. The Self does not, and can not exist as 'Self', from the Buddhist philosophical perspective. Whatever 'it' is, is far more profound.
Thank you
PS:
What exactly do disagree with? Thank you.
Love ya'll,
Bobby
When the Buddha tells us that self is an illusion it seems to me that for most of us this seems absurd.
"What do you mean, I'm right here!"
Indeed, but what is this "I'm" that insists it is "right here" as it free floats through the continuum of space and time through this most august of Kalpas? You can name it, but names are just names...and to do so ia to form attachment to both name and form, so this too is incorrect.
First, there is no independent self, because all is interdependent- thus all is both empty (shunyata) and impermamnent (anicca). It is true that there is an entity named Dan Hettmannsperger, or "Validus" -but this "being" is made up of five aggregates which are at all times changing.
Interestingly, Quantum Physics has provided scientific proof that this is more true then we could have ever guessed. The old "atomic" theory of matter which stated that atoms are eternal and unchanging has now been totally disproven. We now understand that what we call an atom is not really understood to be a "thing" at all- but rather, an event. Even Black Holes, once thought to be eternal prisons of energy that were totally inert are now understood to leak energy as per the findings of Stephen Hawkings.
The Universe unfolds and reveals the truth as shown to us by all Buddhas and all Bodhisattvas in all dimensions and all world systems.:)
When the Buddha tells us that self is an illusion, for most of us, we take an interest in this teaching (even if we have not realised it).
Although 'self' is an illusion, it does and can arise & it can influence the mind immensely. The illusion of 'self' is inherently linked to the occuring of suffering.
The Buddha discussed how the experiences of existence & non-existence arise. He taught the holding to either view of existence or non-existence is not the middle-way because the view of existence does not account for the cessation of things and the view of non-existence does not account for the arising of things. Name what?
Naming? Sounds like Taoism. Sounds like Advaita Hinduism.
Where did the Buddha teach about 'name-form'? For Buddha, nama-rupa is 'body-mind'.
Are you saying there is an 'interdependent self'?
Are you saying the 'self' is made up of the five aggregates?
-Gassho
The Buddha was not a hindu at all. Hinduism did not exist at all in the Buddha's time.
The Buddha went his own way, which was quite apart from the way of beliefs and speculative views of those religions that eventually turned into hinduism.
Well...Siddartha Gautama would not have recognized the word "Hindu" 2,600 years ago...but it is not inaccurate to call him a Hindu since that word denotes an ethnicity as much as a religion (There are Jews who don't believe in God...they are still "Jewish" nonetheless, agreed?). What we currently call "Hinduism" did exist in the time of the Buddha. The oldest religious text in the world is the Rig Veda, a Hindu scripture that pre-dates the Buddha by more then a 1,000 years.
Your argument is equivocal. The Buddha never referred to himself or anyone else as "Hindu". Do you think we should now refer to all who consider themselves as Tibetans as "Chinese", since that country does not exist any more, and is now part of China and its culture?
A scripture (later to be adopted by the Hindu religion) to which the Buddha did not subscribe, part of a group of constantly shifting religions and philosophies (later to become known as "Hinduism") to which the Buddha did not subscribe. Again, as I said, the Buddha walked His own path.
Did I say, "the Buddha didn't walk his own path"?
Did I say, "the Buddha called himself a Hindu"?
Did I say, "the Buddha followed the Rig Veda"?
-No.
-No.
-No.
I'm glad to see that degree in Sophistry you earned is keeping you busy.
You said: "it is not inaccurate to call him [the Buddha] a Hindu", in support of HengYu's statement "The Buddha was a Hindu".
Again, please refrain from any further personal attacks, as they are not conducive to open discussion and violate the TOS.
Especially considering you did it three times?
Did I say, "You said, 'the Buddha called himself a Hindu'"?
Did I say, "You said, 'he Buddha followed the Rig Veda'"?
-Yes, you did.
-No.
-No.
Please do not put words in MY mouth.
How about keeping it shut?